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 Introduction
The Place of Narratology in the Historical Study of 
Eighteenth-Century Literature
Liisa Steinby and Aino Mäkikalli
Definierbar ist nur das, was keine Geschichte hat. (Nietzsche)1
Narratological concepts, such as focalization, perspective, implied author, 
the distinction between story and discourse, and even homo- and het-
erodiegetic narration, today belong to the toolkit of scholars of literature, 
including those who do not consider themselves narratologists. Since 
literary analysis almost always also encompasses formal aspects of works, 
narratological concepts concerning the structure and forms of a narrative 
are taken by many as a ‘natural’ choice. Narratologists did not originally 
see their work as ‘a handmaiden to interpretation’; their theoretically-based 
taxonomic description of narrative was separated from interpretation, 
which always also has to do with the content of the narrative (Herman, 
2008, p. 30). However, while there are those, even today, who want to keep 
narratology ‘uncontaminated’ by other approaches (see, e.g., Kindt, 2009), 
most narratologists now welcome attempts to combine narratological con-
ceptualization with a whole range of different approaches in contemporary 
literary scholarship (see, e.g., Nünning, 2009). We can therefore speak of a 
rapprochement between the narratological analysis of narrative forms and 
various approaches which stress cultural and historical contextualization 
in interpretations of literature.
This rapprochement, however, is not unproblematic, and there still exists 
a clear split between the narratological study of literature and the study of 
literary history, i.e. the historically and contextually interpretative study 
of literature. Scholars of literary history continue in their research to make 
use primarily of other conceptualizations than the narratological. Given 
the present heightened awareness of the historicity of all cultural phenom-
ena, literary scholars more and more widely regard all literary research 
as historical, in the sense of taking into account the specif ic character of 
the literature of a certain period and its particular social, cultural, and 
1 ‘Only something which has no history is capable of being def ined’.
8 LiiSa StEiNby aNd aiNo Mäkik aLLi 
historical circumstances, which in turn naturally leads to conceptualiza-
tions of a historical character. In contrast, narratological concepts were 
originally conceived of as ahistorical, universally valid classif ications of 
the phenomena of narrative discourse (cf., e.g., Fludernik, 2009, pp. 9, 110), 
and they have remained so very much down to today; only recently has the 
possibility been raised among narratologists of taking the historical dimen-
sion into account in narratological research (cf. especially Fludernik, 1996; 
2003). How these different conceptualizations – historical and content-
specif ic on the one hand, formal and ahistorical on the other – interact in 
the historical study of literature is a widely unexplored area. In practical 
historical research, the different nature and source of conceptualizations 
is mostly not reflected upon, and though present-day ‘postclassical’ nar-
ratology proclaims itself open to other approaches, encompassing content 
and context, this still has the character of a programme rather than a fait 
accompli.
In the title of the present volume, ‘narrative concepts’ refers, f irst of all, to 
the (basically ahistorical) concepts of narratology, and what is at issue is their 
use in, and compatibility with, the historical study of eighteenth-century 
literature; but the notion also leaves place for conceptualizations of a more 
historical character, and inquires into their relationship with narratological 
ones. The authors, while demonstrating how some central concepts function 
in practice, are concerned in particular with the meta-level question of 
concept use and formation. The study of eighteenth-century literature is, 
in the opinion of the editors, particularly well-suited to this kind of self-
reflection, in that – as for example Monika Fludernik has observed – the 
original narratological categories, as established in the work of Gérard 
Genette, Franz K. Stanzel, and their followers, though universally oriented, 
were derived above all from the eighteenth- to early twentieth-century 
novel (e.g., Alber and Fludernik, 2010, p. 8). This means that the problems we 
encounter in the study of eighteenth-century narrative literature clearly do 
not follow from the need to expand the range of a theory beyond its original 
primary scope, but that we need to deal with the even more fundamental 
issue of the compatibility of narratological conceptualizations with the 
historical study of literature.
In this Introduction, we f irst follow the development of narratology 
from its early, structuralist phase to the modern, ‘postclassical’ phase, 
which promises an opening up not only to historical literary research but 
also to many adjacent f ields – including some, such as cognitive science, 
that are traditionally considered remote from literary scholarship. This 
is followed by some observations on practices of concept formation in 
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the historical study of literature and in narratology – a f ield of study 
which, despite the greatly enhanced theoretical self-awareness of literary 
scholarship in general, has remained underdeveloped, or even more or 
less ignored. In the concluding section of the Introduction, the problem 
of compatibility is f irst considered in the light of one excellent recent 
example of historical research, followed by a brief survey of the articles 
in the present volume.
Developments in Narratology: From Structuralist Approaches to 
‘Diachronic’, ‘Cultural’ and ‘Contextual’ Ones
Structuralist narratology, today called ‘classical’, was inspired by the same 
zeal to raise the ‘scientific’ status of literary scholarship that fuelled the work 
of the Russian Formalists. ‘Classical’, structuralist narratology was built in 
analogy with structural linguistics, for which the object of research was the 
structure of language which enables speech. As Jonathan Culler explains 
in the foreword to Tzvetan Todorov’s Poetics of Prose (orig. La poétique de 
la prose, 1971), the aim of structuralist poetics is not the interpretation of 
individual works but discovering ‘the structures and conventions of literary 
discourse which enable them [the works] to have the meanings they do’; in 
this, poetics is following the example of structural linguistics, which aims 
at making explicit the rules and conventions of a language (Culler, 1977, p. 
8). In describing his scientif ic method, Todorov, a pioneer of structuralist 
poetics, stresses that it is the general characteristics of literary discourse 
that structuralist poetics deals with; however, he goes even further, claiming 
that it is the possible, not the actual literary forms that are the subject of 
poetics: ‘Poetics will have to study not the already existing literary forms 
but, starting from them, a sum of possible forms: what literature can be 
rather than what it is’ (ibid., p. 33; emphasis in the original). Defining the 
possible rather than the empirically observable forms of literature implies 
a method that is not purely empirical but deductive. Todorov explains this 
as follows: ‘[S]cientif ic method proceeds rather by deduction. We actually 
deal with a relatively limited number of cases, from them we deduce a 
general hypothesis, and we verify this hypothesis by other cases, correct-
ing (or rejecting) it as need be. […] it is not the quantity of observations, 
but the logical coherence of a theory that f inally matters’ (Todorov, 1987, 
p. 4). The method includes the deduction of categories from theoretical 
premises, rather than creating categories on the basis of a historical analysis 
of literature. This is exemplified by Todorov’s distinction between historical 
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literary genres and theoretical ones: ‘historical genres are the result of an 
observation of literary phenomena; theoretical genres are deduced from a 
theory of literature’ (ibid., p. 21). He clearly prefers the latter.
The question of the nature and role of ‘deduction’ in the method of struc-
turalist poetics is an area which has scarcely been examined, and indeed 
concept formation in structuralist poetics and narratology as a whole is a 
neglected subject of study. No attention has been paid to the important fact 
that theory-building in structuralist narratology (and poetics) lacked the 
solid method of hypothesis verif ication that was available in structuralist 
phonology – the pilot and paragon of a structuralist science (cf. Dosse, 1997, 
pp. 54, 174) – i.e. the commutation test.2 Consequently, no clear criteria 
were established for considering something a ‘theory’, rather than merely 
a bundle of (more or less original) general claims or ideas. This might have 
led to a chaotic plenitude of competing ‘theories’; what actually happened, 
however, was that one particular theory became the core of the structuralist 
– and, as we will see, even later – narratology for decades to come: Gérard 
Genette’s Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method (orig. ‘Discours du récit’ 
in Figures III, 1972). This is not because its theoretical foundation, allegedly 
lying in the ‘grammar of verbs’ (cf. Genette, 1980, p. 30), was any more solid 
than that of other, competing theories (such as that of Roland Barthes), 
but because Genette’s def initions of the concepts were exceptionally clear 
and because he succeeded in systematizing certain main concepts in the 
prevalent traditions of research on different forms of narration (cf. Culler, 
1980, p. 7; Steinby, 2016). Although several of Genette’s concepts, particularly 
focalization, voice, person, the status of the narrator, and the story-discourse 
distinction (cf. Alber and Fludernik, 2010, p. 13), have been the subject of 
extensive critical discussion, it is his conceptualization – with some addi-
tions, such as Wayne Booth’s ‘implied author’ – that forms the hard core 
not only of ‘classical’ narratology but also of more recent applications of 
narratology in other approaches to literary research.3
2 In phonology, the existence of a phoneme in a language is proved by the commutation test, 
in which a native speaker of the language is asked to decide whether the difference between 
two sounds is functionally meaningful or not, i.e., whether the difference in sound produces a 
difference in meaning (cf. Trubetzkoy, 1971, pp. 31-33). The commutation test is the means for 
empirically testing the validity of theoretical hypotheses.
3 There are, of course, claims that the classical concepts can and should be replaced by new 
ones; Monika Fludernik, for example, suggests that in her ‘natural’ narratology, ‘the cherished 
distinctions of classic narratology can be dispensed with or reconceptualized with great facility’ 
(Fludernik, 1996, p. 347). Such reconceptualization, however, does not take place here.
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The lucidity of Genette’s def initions, and his presentation of a taxo-
nomic system of categories of narrative discourse, commonly viewed as 
the merits of his narratology, also def ine its limits. The def initions are of 
the type ‘“prolepsis” is a leap forward in time in narration’ (cf. Genette, 
1980, p. 40), in which the concept is exhaustively def ined by specifying the 
def ining criteria: nothing needs to be, or can be, added to it. The concepts 
are universally applicable: independently of content, context, or century, 
‘prolepsis’ always refers to a narrative leap forward in time, and nothing 
but that. Genette’s taxonomy provides the scholar with a great number 
of such clear, exhaustively def ined, universal categories dealing with the 
formal traits of narrative discourse. The kind of empirical research that 
such a taxonomy allows consists of identifying in a particular text some 
of the traits as presented in Genette’s categories; obviously, the categories 
are not negotiable. As the categories are derived from a more fundamental 
theoretical basis – in Genette’s case, the grammar of verbs – it of course 
is impossible for them to be affected by empirical research. However, 
some later narratologists, such as Monika Fludernik, have suggested that 
the empirical study of literature can be used to contest certain existing 
narratological categories, or even to renew or add something to them (cf. 
Fludernik, 1996; 2003) – which means conceding that not everything can 
be derived from a theoretical basis.
The strength of Genette’s narratology is also its weakness: it can be used 
to identify accurately some traits of the formal structure of narrative, but 
for nothing but that. Questions of content, context, and reading experience, 
in other words essential aspects of literature, are excluded from narrato-
logical study. It is true that these aspects cannot be captured in any such 
concise, exhaustive def initions as those Genette offers us for the formal 
aspects of narrative. The reluctance of narratologists – old and new – to use 
concepts which cannot be expressed in the form of concise and exhaustive 
def initions is exemplif ied by James Phelan’s discontent with the ‘mimetic 
component’ of literary characters, which entails some ‘messy problems’: ‘this 
talk about characters as plausible or possible persons presupposes that we 
know what a person is. But the nature of the human subject is of course a 
highly contested issue among contemporary thinkers’ (Phelan, 1989, p. 11). 
Concepts that concern content-related, historical, and contextual aspects 
of literature, and that cannot be simply def ined, are deplored because of 
their lack of ‘scientif icity’ and are therefore preferably avoided. This being 
the case, scientif icity in narratological research is achieved at the cost of 
excluding many or most of the questions relevant to the study of literature 
(cf. Bal, 1990).
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The development of narratology following its structuralist phase (cf. 
e.g. Herman, 2008) can be described from (at least) three different angles. 
First of all, there is the ‘internal’ development of narratology; according 
to several leading contemporary narratologists, such as David Herman 
and Monika Fludernik, where classical narratology was modelled upon 
structural linguistics, the present-day understanding of narrative tends to 
seek its theoretical foundation in cognitive linguistics and cognitive sci-
ence more generally (cf. Herman, 2008; Fludernik, 2008). The development 
of narratology can be outlined as following that of linguistics: the era of 
structuralism was followed by Noam Chomsky’s ‘generative grammar’, 
inviting narratologists to study and identify correspondences between the 
deep and surface structure of literary texts. This was succeeded by text 
linguistics, i.e. the study of units of utterance transcending the sentence 
– which of course has a natural aff inity to the research of literary texts. 
In the next phase, linguistic pragmatics examined the different practices 
and functions of language use; it is to this phase of linguistics to which 
Fludernik, in addition to cognitive linguistics, anchors her own ‘natural’ 
narratology (cf. Fludernik, 1996, e.g., p. xi). Finally, in cognitive linguistics, 
language use is considered as a human cognitive process determined by 
general modes of human cognition, such as particular schemata – frames 
and scripts – for organizing and interpreting information (cf. e.g. Alber and 
Fludernik, 2010, p. 11). In what is called cognitive narratology, there are at 
least two different approaches to the study of literature: while Fludernik, 
despite basing her model on colloquial (‘natural’) narrative, is primarily 
interested in reconceptualizing traditional, or classical structuralist, no-
tions of literary study on the basis of her pragmatist-cognitivist approach, 
such scholars as Herman, Lisa Zunshine, and Alan Palmer are obviously 
primarily interested in general cognitive problems, and in using literature 
as a resource in this research.4 Cognitive narratology, which takes narrative 
in general as its object of study, is then regarded as one of the disciplines 
of cognitive sciences (cf. Palmer, 2010, p. 6) – one that, among other things, 
can teach us how we ‘read’ the human mind (Zunshine, 2006). However 
divergent these two directions in cognitive narratology are, and however 
far they may be from structuralist narratology, they share the view that 
4 According to Herman, ‘the project of integrating narrative theory and the cognitive sciences 
can be seen as an effort to understand how people weave tapestries of story by relying on 
abilities they possess as simultaneously language-using, thinking, and social beings’ (Herman, 
2003, p. 11). He describes his own work as an exploration of ‘the nature of narrative as a basic 
cognitive endowment’ (ibid., p. 19).
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the aim of research is to uncover the universal, constitutive principles 
which enable particular acts of mind, utterances, or (literary) texts, rather 
than investigating those particular utterances, texts or works. By so doing, 
cognitive narratologies revivify the prospect of reaching a new level of 
scientif icity in the study of literature.5
This story of the development of narratology, as following in the footsteps 
of linguistics, nevertheless gives a somewhat too smooth picture of the 
actual course of events; it disregards the fact that at some point in the 
1980s, narratology, as the strict science of narrative it claimed to be, was 
proclaimed as good as dead (cf., e.g., Herman, 1999, p. 2), and several of its 
important proponents, such as Slomith Rimmon-Kenan and Mieke Bal, 
had turned to something else. The recovery, however, followed sooner and 
from a different direction than expected: from the theory of historiography, 
where Hayden White had already claimed in 1973 that historians present the 
results of their research in a narrative form that does not derive from the 
subject of study but from certain primordial, mythic narrative structures (cf. 
White, 1973). Questions as to the (alleged) presence, functions, and specif ic 
forms of narrativity in historiography have not ceased to concern historians 
since then; but with what became known as ‘narrative turn’, narrative was 
soon recognized as a ubiquitous form of human sense-making practices, 
and the debate concerning narrative and its functions began to flourish 
in a great variety of disciplines and f ields of study, including sociology, 
folkloristics, and the study of biography and autobiography. This sudden 
interest in narrative, as a form of making sense of human experience, 
certainly diverged from the structuralist narratologist’s interest in the 
formal traits of narrative discourse, separate from the narrated contents, but 
despite this the new interest in narrative has revivified narratological study, 
which has expanded to a previously unimaginable degree. In contemporary 
research on narrative, aims and interests converge: cognitive narratologists, 
relying on the scientif ic basis of brain research, cognitive psychology and 
even artif icial intelligence, are concerned with the same phenomenon of 
narrative as a mode of human cognition which, in more concrete form, 
preoccupies various disciplines in the humanities and social sciences.6
5 Cf. Fludernik (2008, p. 51): ‘The cognitivist paradigm shift could thus pave the way for a 
much closer companionship of narratology with the empirical sciences and, perhaps, come a 
long way towards fulf illing narratology’s original aspirations towards a scientif ic image’.
6 In the Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory, for example, ‘narrative’ is def ined, draw-
ing on David Herman, as ‘a fundamental way of organizing human experience and a tool for 
constructing models of reality’ (Ryan, 2005, p. 345). 
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Yet another angle from which the development of narratology can be 
viewed is the perspective of the historical study of literature. The opening 
up of narratology to questions of human cognition and signif icance also 
includes new attempts to create a ‘diachronic’, ‘historical’, ‘cultural’, or 
‘contextual’ narratology. These narratologies are advocated primarily by 
German scholars – not surprisingly, since in Germany the historical orienta-
tion in literary and humanist research is traditionally very strong. Of the 
narratologists speaking for these new tendencies, the most prominent are 
Monika Fludernik and Ansgar Nünning. We can take a closer look at some 
of their writings, to f ind out what these new narratologies are about. In so 
doing, we look particularly closely at the question of concept formation.
In a much cited article from 2003, Fludernik deplores ‘the depth of 
neglect of diachronic concerns that is prevalent in narratology’, but she is 
convinced that ‘a major breakthrough’ of ‘diachronic narratology’ is immi-
nent (Fludernik, 2003, pp. 332, 334). In her Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology 
from 1996, she presents a theory of narrative based on cognitive linguistics 
and linguistic pragmatism,7 def ining narrative, or rather narrativity, as 
‘experientiality’ (Fludernik, 1996, p. 26), which she understands in terms 
of representation of personal, emotional, ‘inner’ experience.8 Towards the 
end of her study, however, she stresses that her ‘Natural Narratology is […] 
neither a purely theoretical nor a purely synchronic enterprise. Although 
I have just sketched a synchronic analysis of narrativization, historical or 
diachronic factors need to be incorporated into the theory as well’ (Ibid., p. 
313). ‘Synchronic’ and ‘diachronic’ are, of course, concepts borrowed from 
structuralist linguistics. Fludernik’s use of the notions in narratology is 
similar to David Herman’s, according to whom a synchronic study ‘seek[s] 
to capture the state of […] the narrative system at a specif ic phase of its 
emergence’, while diachronic study traces the ‘historical development 
of the system in question’ (Herman, 2011, p. 23). In these def initions, the 
concept of ‘system’ holds the core position: the historical changes that are 
observed are changes in some aspects of the system. The perspective in 
7 Fludernik, 1996, p. x: ‘Towards a “Natural” Narratology proposes to redef ine narrativity in 
terms of cognitive (“natural”) parameters, moving beyond formal narratology into the realm 
of pragmatics, reception theory and constructivism’.
8 According to Fludernik, a historical narrative typically lacks this kind of experienciality and 
‘therefore only qualif ies as zero-degree of narrativity’. Nevertheless, she will continue ‘to refer 
to such texts of zero-degree narrativity as “narratives” because common parlance prescribes 
this usage. There also is some precedent for similar terminological hassles’, and she believes 
that ‘the embarrassments of terminological awkwardness are more than outweighed by the 
advantages of my re-evaluation of narrative properties’ (ibid., p. 328f.).
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both synchronic and diachronic study is system-immanent: no contextual 
factors that might explain the changes in the state of the system are taken 
into consideration. In our view, this trait of system-immanence is what 
distinguishes a synchronic study from a historical study proper, which 
concludes explaining circumstantial factors. Moreover, upon closer inspec-
tion it turns out that diachronic study does not reveal new traits in a system, 
but rather corroborates that certain traits defined in the theory are present 
or absent in narrative literature at a certain historical moment. For example, 
Fludernik suggests that we should ask when erlebte Rede (‘free indirect 
discourse’) emerged in narrative literature (cf. Fludernik, 2006, p. 127). This 
kind of historical inquiry into the emergence, or more generally into the 
presence or absence, of certain given traits does not shake the theoretical 
foundation of the system: the concepts are not themselves derived from 
history, but are conceived as universal and theoretically founded. Fludernik 
remarks that while Genette’s typology is ‘self-avowedly synchronic’, these 
categories could easily be applied ‘to the history of the novel, mapping out 
a diagram to show which combinations of narratological parameters were 
current in which successive historical periods’ (ibid., p. 331) – and this is 
very much how she understands the diachronic dimension of her ‘Natural’ 
Narratology. She proposes for both that ‘one could produce diagrams that 
would represent in visual fashion how a number of narrative parameters 
cluster in individual works and how these clusters remain constant or shift 
their emphases and combinations on a diachronic plane’ (ibid.).
Variation in the distribution of the paradigmatic possibilities inherent in 
the theory is how Fludernik (in this phase, at least) understands historical, 
or diachronic, research; and she shares this understanding with Herman.9 
Fludernik suggests a diagrammatic representation of the distribution, and 
Herman comes very close to this in recommending quantitative methods to 
test ‘the patterns of constancy and change’ in diachronic research (Herman, 
2011, p. 25). In this kind of diachronic research, change is thus nothing but 
the redistribution of certain universal options, i.e., of the paradigmatic 
possibilities present in the ahistorical, universal theory, and changes are 
not contextualized in the historical world in which they take place. It is 
therefore well-founded to say, as Astrid Erll and Simone Roggendorf do, 
that Fludernik (at least in this phase) takes historical (or rather ‘diachronic’) 
9 Herman writes of research into f ictional mind representation that ‘A diachronic perspective 
focuses on the evolution, or changing distribution, of the strategies for mind representation’ 
(Herman, 2011, pp. 23-24; emphasis added).
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change into account – albeit only in this distributional sense – but does 
not contextualize it.10
In her textbook, An Introduction to Narratology (orig., Einführung in die 
Erzähltheorie, 2006) from 2009, Fludernik writes that ‘narratology’s most 
prominent feature is its implicit universal validity’ (Fludernik, 2009, p. 9). 
The claim is rephrased in weakened form when she says that ‘narrative 
theory has, for the most part, concerned itself with the universal struc-
tures found in narrative. Typologies have been devised which include and 
classify every conceivable kind of narrative’ (ibid., p. 110; emphasis added). 
Particularly in German narratology, however, there is also the diachronic 
approach to the study of narrative, which ‘trace[s] developments in narrative 
forms and functions through the centuries’ (ibid., p. 110). The role assigned 
to such research has widened somewhat compared to Towards a ‘Natural’ 
Narratology:
Historical analyses are relevant because they provide additional informa-
tion about how specif ic narrative techniques originated and when they 
came to predominate or fell out of favour [i.e. the distributional model]. 
But this is not all. Such analyses can sometimes lead to a signif icant 
revision or modif ication of the theoretical, especially the typological, 
bases of narrative theory (ibid., p. 111).
Thus, it is suggested that diachronic research may affect theoretical con-
cepts themselves. It is not that theoretical concepts are formed primarily 
on the basis of historical materials, but that historical f indings can modify 
theoretically based concepts – or at least typological categories, which we 
should probably understand as clusters of narrative traits (cf. Fludernik, 
1996, p. 331). Purely historical concepts still appear problematic from a 
narratological point of view: ‘One could argue, for instance, that certain 
accepted notions in narratology are only valid for certain periods. If this 
is so, can one still justif iably regard these categories as universals, or are 
they only special features which may come into play in particular historical 
periods?’ (Fludernik, 2009, p. 115) Apparently, historical concepts which lack 
universal validity are not considered as possible parts of a narratological 
theory.
In their Introduction to Postclassical Narratology: Approaches and Analy-
ses (2010), Monika Fludernik and Jan Alber distinguish between two phases 
10 ‘Fludernik historisiert, ohne zu kontextualisieren’ [‘Fludernik historicizes but does not 
contextualize’]; Erll und Roggendorf, 2002, p. 96.
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of postclassical narratology, the f irst of which is characterized as a phase of 
‘multiplicities’, ‘interdisciplinarities’, and ‘transmedialities’ (Alber and Flud-
ernik, 2010, p. 5). They accept Ansgar Nünning’s view that narratology has 
proceeded ‘from descriptive to interpretative and evaluative paradigms’ and 
‘from universalism to particularism (which is equivalent to contextualism)’, 
and quote him saying that postclassical narratology seems ‘to move toward 
a grand contextual, historical, pragmatic and reader-oriented effort’; the 
issue is ‘to recontextualize the classical paradigm and to enrich narrative 
theory with ideas developed after its structuralist phase’ (ibid., p. 6). There 
now exist feminist, postcolonial, and other content-specif ic narratologies; 
‘narratologists have tried to argue that the categories of narratology need 
to be modif ied or extended in order to accommodate the concerns of race, 
power, gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation’. However, just like ‘classical’ 
narratologists, Alber and Fludernik do not believe that there is any ‘natural’ 
connection between narratological traits and ideological concepts like these: 
‘Narrative devices by themselves do not carry any ideological freight; often 
they are neutral modes of focusing attention that only acquire normative or 
critical meanings in their various contexts of use’ (ibid., p. 8). Nevertheless, 
Fludernik’s cognitivist basis allows her to open up narratological concepts 
to content-dependence and contextual determination. While ‘structuralist 
narratology did not pay much attention to the referential or world-creating 
dimension of narratives’, cognitive narratologists (like herself) ‘show that 
the recipient uses his or her world knowledge to project f ictional worlds, and 
this knowledge is stored in cognitive schemata called frames and scripts’ 
(ibid., p. 11). Frames and scripts are a formative apparatus for dealing with 
information, but there is variation in which particular frames or scripts are 
used in a particular historical and/or cultural situation and for a certain 
genre or literary tradition. That is to say, some of the main concepts of the 
cognitive model of narration – frame and script – include the possibility 
of historical, cultural, and contextual change.11 Fludernik and Alber can 
therefore claim that ‘all narratology nowadays is context-sensitive’ (ibid., 
p. 22). (Though still primarily ‘diachronic’ in its approach, we may observe 
traces of contextualization in Fludernik’s paper in the present volume).
What Alber and Fludernik are suggesting is that postclassical narratol-
ogy, after a somewhat turbulent initial phase, has now arrived at a second 
11 ‘Cognitive narratology can thus be argued to affect the status of categories of narratological 
analysis; it shifts the emphasis from an essentialist, universal, and static understanding of 
narratological concepts to seeing them as fluid, context-determined, prototypical, and recipient-
constituted’. Ibid., p. 12.
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phase, in which consolidation is taking place, and they obviously believe 
that this is happening under the roof of cognitive theory (ibid., pp. 15, 22). 
Yet they admit that a process of further diversif ication is still ongoing, a 
process in which ever new postclassical narratologies are proclaimed to 
have been established by combining different approaches. Even the articles 
in the volume edited by them ‘all combine and creatively blend different 
approaches’, to achieve ‘a synthesis that looks different in every individual 
essay but is a synthesis nevertheless’ (ibid., p. 23) – a statement that rather 
signals the prolif ic imagination of the new narratologists than corroborates 
the idea that a consolidated state has been achieved in contemporary nar-
ratological theory.
Among the ‘postclassical’ narratologists, Ansgar Nünning has most 
emphatically proclaimed the coming of a new, contextual, historical, and/
or cultural narratology. In an article from 2002 written together with Vera 
Nünning, he claims that narratology is now open to approaches and f ields 
that were previously excluded from it, such as ‘the dimensions of history 
and the historical variability of narrative forms, aesthetics, ethics, ideology, 
interpretation and eventually the socio-cultural dimension’.12 The authors 
admit that narrative theory is not yet complete: some questions are still 
unanswered, and some have not yet even been asked (ibid., p. 29) – which 
suggests that narrative theory in its traditional, structuralist form is nev-
ertheless considered to have succeeded in def ining most of the relevant 
features in a narrative text.13 In another article from 2003, Ansgar Nünning 
maintains that ‘formalist analysis of narrative […] is no longer the main 
focus, narrative theorists have begun to turn their attention to “cultural 
analysis”’, referring to Mieke Bal, who had asked narratologists to place 
their analytic tools at the service of ‘other concerns considered more vital 
for cultural studies’ (cf. Bal, 1990, p. 729; Nünning, 2003, p. 240), i.e., to 
combine the formal analysis of narratives with some aspects of content or 
ideology. Nünning quotes Herman in his appraisal that the transformation 
from a classical, structuralist narratology to the contemporary, postclassical 
one ‘can be described as a shift from text-centered and formal models to 
models that are jointly formal and functional – models attentive both to 
the text and to the context of stories’ (ibid., p. 243);14 ‘functional’ here of 
12 ‘die Dimensionen der Geschichte und der historischen Variabilität von Erzählformen, 
die Ästhetik, der Ethik, der Ideologie, der Interpretation und schließlich die soziokulturelle 
Dimension’; Nünning and Nünning, 2002, p. 20.
13 There may be some discrepancy here, since the authors also contend that narrative forms 
are not constant but mediate views and collective ideas of their time of origin (ibid., p. 29).
14 The quotation is from Herman, 1999, p. 16.
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course refers to taking into account the various functions of formal traits 
in a narrative text. Nünning’s overall estimation of the present state of 
narratology, however, is more diffuse, and in fact questions the very idea 
of a completely new narratology: he remarks that ‘there are currently more 
self-styled narratologies under the sun than ever before’ (ibid., p. 247), but 
that ultimately, ‘most of the approaches in question are either mere applica-
tions of narratological concepts, i.e. narratological criticism, […] or so far 
removed from narratological research goals and methodological premises 
as to be virtually incompatible with narratology’ (ibid., p. 260).
In his next article on the same topic, in which Nünning hopes to be able to 
proffer ‘some conceptual and methodological premises for a context-sensi-
tive and cultural approach to narratives that is still rooted in narratology’, he 
seems to think along the same line: that the novelty of the new narratology 
consists of putting the analytical tools provided by (classical) narratology 
‘to the service of a cultural analysis of narrative f ictions’ (Nünning, 2004, p. 
356). He emphasises that ‘it does make a difference whether we can establish 
a consensus about textual features or not, and it is the descriptive toolkit 
of narratology that provides us with the terminological categories needed 
as the basis for rational argument’; he sees the task of cultural narratology 
in exploring ‘the ways in which the formal properties of novels reflect, and 
influence, the unspoken mental assumptions and cultural issues of a given 
period’ (ibid., p. 358; emphasis in the original). In an article from 2009, 
Nünning contends that there are a lot of new, contextualist, historical, and 
cultural narratologies, in which, however, the narratologists ‘always seem 
to be moving towards new destinations, but apparently they hardly ever get 
there’ (Nünning, 2009, p. 49). This means that new narratologies exist rather 
in the form of programmes than of f inished achievements, and in his view 
‘narratology and context-sensitive interpretations of narratives still seem 
oceans apart’ (ibid., p. 56). In yet another article from 2013, Nünning repeats 
the claim that contextual narratology has so far produced only works en-
titled ‘towards…’ (Nünning, 2013, p. 26). He also contends that the existing 
cultural narratology (kulturwissenschaftliche Narratologie) comprises the 
application of the analytical categories of narratology to historically and 
culturally variable forms and functions of narration, and the augmentation 
of the analytical toolbox by concepts which make narratology compatible 
with the questions and interests of cultural studies (ibid., p. 27). He speaks of 
closing the gap between formalist and content analysis as a semanticization 
of narrative forms (ibid., p. 29; cf. also Nünning, 2009, p. 64). In his view, 
what is needed f irst of all is a system of narratological categories for the 
context-oriented study of narrative and for a narrativistically oriented 
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cultural studies (Nünning, 2013, p. 46). In this view – that the creation of a 
new narratology has to start by establishing the most general categories, 
which are defined in a highly abstract, theoretical discourse15 – Nünning is 
following the opposite route compared to historians of literature, who start 
with the investigation of the concrete and proceed from there to abstract 
concepts.
On the basis of Fludernik’s and Nünning’s reviews of postclassical nar-
ratologies, it remains an open question how far, and in what ways, literary 
historical research can be combined with narratological conceptualiza-
tions, either in narratology’s classical form or in some new, postclassical 
one. However, the genuine interest of both Fludernik’s ‘diachronic’ approach 
and Nünning’s ‘cultural narratology’ (kulturwissenschaftliche Narratologie) 
for the historical dimension of literature is unquestionable. This cannot be 
said of postclassical narratology as a whole, in particular of the work done 
in the United States. Insofar as the aim of American cognitive narratologists 
continues to be the elucidation of literary phenomena, rather than, on the 
contrary, using literature as materials in the study of human cognitive 
mechanisms,16 ‘theory’ is very much favoured and ‘mere’ interpretation 
of literary works is criticized. We put ‘theory’ in inverted commas, since 
‘theory’ is here often used quite loosely to refer to any general ideas concern-
ing a topic, rather than a systematic presentation of the most basic, abstract 
concepts organizing and explaining a f ield.17 The new custom of presenting 
various ‘theoretical’ ideas and testing them with examples from literature 
has been praised, among others, by James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz, 
who have coined the term ‘theorypractice’ to refer to it (cf. Phelan and 
Rabinowitz, 2008, pp. 2, 5). They claim that ‘the continuous production 
15 An example: ʻZu den wichtigsten “lebensweltlichen Funktionen, die dem Erzählen zug-
eschrieben werden”, zählen die “Episodenbildung”, die Kohärenzstiftung, die “Geschehensin-
tegration” und die Sinnbildung, die vor allem darin besteht, “Handlungen, Ereignissen und 
Geschehnissen Bedeutung zu verleihen”’ (Ibid., p. 41). [‘Among the most important “lived-world 
functions assigned to narrating” are counted “episode-building”, creation of coherence, “integra-
tion of events” and creation of meaning, which consists primarily of “assigning meaning to acts, 
events and incidents”’.] Expressions in inverted commas are quotations from theoreticians given 
in the footnotes.
16 According to Herman, the aim in cognitivist research is ‘to explore the nature of narrative 
as a basic cognitive endowment’ (Herman, 2003, p. 19); or (quoting Mark Turner), ‘the study of 
language and of literature as expressions of our conceptual apparatus’ (Herman, 2010, p. 137).
17 One example of the loose, non-traditional use of ‘theory’ is Lisa Zunshine’s concept of 
an innate ‘Theory of Mind’ (Zunshine 2006), an instance from which the ‘readers of f ictional 
narratives recruit […] to link what characters say and do to inferences about underlying mental 
states’ (Herman, 2012, p. 126). Here ‘theory’ is used to refer to a (supposed) innate disposition in 
the human mind, which contradicts of course the traditional understanding of theory.
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of such [interpretative, non-theoretical] essays is less and less prof itable’ 
and that ‘untheorized interpretation can make only a minor contribution 
to contemporary narrative studies’ (Phelan and Rabinowitz, 1994, p. 7). 
However, seeing interpretative and historical research of literature as lack-
ing in any theory is incorrect; theoretical questions and concepts play an 
important role in interpretative and historical research too, even though 
these concepts may not be universal but content-specif ic and valid for a 
particular period only.
Theoretical Concepts in the Historical Study of literature
Reflections over the formation of concepts and their use in the historical 
study of literature are rare; this is certainly an under-researched area of 
literary studies. What can be done in this Introduction is of course not to 
f ill the gap, but merely to suggest some obvious aspects of the issue, the 
goal being to identify important differences between concept formation in 
narratology and literary history.
The theoretical concepts used in historical literary research are of various 
ages and origins. Some concepts are of very ancient origin, such as those 
of the literary genres of tragedy, comedy, and epic. This, of course, does 
not mean that these concepts have remained the same over centuries and 
millennia; we know that ‘tragedy’ in ancient Greece meant something other 
than in Elizabethan England or in eighteenth-century neoclassicism. This is 
something of which the modern scholar of literary history is well aware18 – in 
contrast to authors from many earlier periods. The concepts of classical 
poetics, the tradition of which reaches from Aristotle to mid-eighteenth-
century neoclassicism, were meant to be universally valid. We now know, 
of course, that they were not: even when the word designating a concept 
remained the same (e.g. ‘tragedy’), the content of the concept changed 
in the course of time. Concepts of genre, like other concepts of classical 
poetics, were not originally conceived of as tools for literary scholarship, 
but as rules to be followed by the authors of literary works. The nature of, 
for example, eighteenth-century tragedy is thus a question related both to 
the theoretical debate and to the tragedies produced and performed in that 
period. The two things are connected, but not identical.
18 For the literary historian, it is clear that genre concepts, though theoretical constructions, 
are historical formations developed in close connection with literature itself, and cannot be 
‘deduced’ from any ahistorical theory, as Todorov was suggesting; cf. e.g. McKeon, 2002, p. 1.
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Problems with theoretical concepts in literary history are to considerable 
extent similar to those involved in more general conceptual history (Be-
griffsgeschichte) which Reinhart Koselleck illustrates with examples from 
social history (cf. Koselleck, 2005). A literary historian, too, must beware of ‘a 
careless transfer to the past modern, context determined expressions’ (ibid., 
p. 81). The historian must also be critical of a ‘history of ideas’ which treats 
ideas ‘as constants, assuming different historical forms but of themselves 
fundamentally unchanging’ (ibid.); and he or she should keep in mind that 
‘the fact that a word has remained in constant use is not in itself suff icient 
indication of stability in its substantial meaning’ (ibid., p. 82). Some concepts 
change more, others less; in poetics, the most technical concepts, such as 
‘iambus’, tend to change less than broader, more comprehensive ones, such 
as the genre concepts or the concept of ‘literature’ itself. New concepts, 
referring to new literary phenomena, are of course formed as well, such as 
‘bourgeois tragedy’ in the eighteenth century.
In addition to concepts deriving from eighteenth-century debates, the 
literary historian also makes use of theoretical concepts of later origin. In 
the study of eighteenth-century English literature, these include for example 
Ian Watt’s concepts of the ‘rise of the novel’, referring to the emergence at 
the beginning of the century of a genre of the novel which differed radically 
from seventeenth-century romance, and of ‘formal realism’ which in Watt’s 
view describes what was crucially ‘new’ in the novel (cf. Watt, 1981, pp. 
34-35). Watt’s ideas marked an important turn to the novel in the study of 
eighteenth-century English literature. In the course of the debate, which 
has now been ongoing for more than half a century, his views have been 
contested, corroborated and augmented in a series of major contributions to 
the ‘rise of the novel’. This is an example of how important a new historical 
conceptualization can be for a f ield of research.
How such concept formation takes place is diff icult, or perhaps impos-
sible, to explain. What is clear is that these concepts concern merely a re-
stricted historical phenomenon – such as the new novel from the beginning 
of the eighteenth-century England – and that they are not derived from any 
underlying theory or borrowed from any other discipline. They are based 
on the empirical study of literature, even though the concept formation is 
not effected by any simple process of observation.19 Slightly less diff icult 
19 In an account of the genesis of The Rise of the Novel from 2000, Watt reveals that he only 
came to recognize the rootedness of the new English novel in empiricism by the detour of an 
‘exposure to German thought’ of Theodor Adorno, Georg Lukács, Max Weber, and others (cf. 
Watt, 2000, pp. 151, 153). 
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to explain is the character of such conceptualization. A concept referring 
to a complex cultural phenomenon – such as the ‘rise of the novel’ – is 
more than a mere word, whose meaning can be def ined. The concept is 
clarified in Watt’s book-length study on the topic, in which the phenomenon 
is elucidated from different aspects but not exhaustively defined. In this 
sense, Nietzsche is right in contending that something that has a history – or 
something that is a historical phenomenon – cannot be given a short, sharp 
definition, as definition was understood in structuralist poetics (or classical 
physics; see Steinby, 2016). For Genette, as noted above, a definition contains 
everything – and nothing but – what belongs to the content of the concept: 
the definition is in this sense exhaustive. A ‘prolepsis’ is a narrative leap 
forward in time; it is this and nothing but this, universally and immutably. 
In contrast, a def inition of a phenomenon like ‘the rise of the novel’ is 
something like a description, in which the most essential aspects of the 
phenomenon are brought together. Anyone who attempts such a definition/
description is aware of the fact that it will not be exhaustive, nor will it be 
permanently or universally valid. On the contrary: as research in the f ield 
proceeds, new and (hopefully) better descriptions/definitions will follow. 
And since our understanding of this particular phenomenon is essentially 
dependent on how we perceive adjacent phenomena, or related phenomena 
from another age, there is no limit to the progress of our understanding of the 
phenomenon, and consequently to the need for reformulation of the concept.
Obviously, not all core concepts of literary history were coined originally 
for the study of a particular historical period or a particular phenomenon; 
concepts and categories from other f ields are applied as tools for the histori-
cal study of literature as well. The evolution of our understanding of, for 
example, the concepts of modernity, individuality, society, and rationality 
that has taken place over the past few decades in the humanities and social 
sciences affects the conceptualizations of literary historians as well. What 
is specif ic in this appropriation of concepts from other f ields in the service 
of literary history is our awareness that the phenomena we encounter for 
example in the eighteenth century do not exactly f it the concept as defined 
in a philosophical or social-scientif ic theory. The concept does not remain 
the same when applied in the study of a particular literary historical period. 
The task of the literary historian is not a matter of identifying something 
known as ‘individuality’ or ‘rationality’ in a particular object of study, but 
of asking what that phenomenon looks like in this particular period, in the 
works of these particular authors.
We can pick – somewhat arbitrarily – a few examples of literary histori-
ans’ conceptualizations from some seminal works on eighteenth-century 
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English literature. J. Paul Hunter’s Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of 
Eighteenth-Century English Fiction (1994) indicates in its very title that 
the scope in which the ‘rise of the novel’ is here examined has expanded 
decisively from that of Watt’s. Hunter reminds us of the danger of ‘universal-
ism’, ‘essentialism’, and ‘ahistoricism’, which remain powerful trends in 
literary studies (Hunter, 1994, p. 5). He insists on not projecting our views 
concerning the contemporary novel, and its secularized worldview, onto 
the eighteenth century. The process of secularization needs to be examined 
in detail; likewise, the character of the ‘realism’ of the eighteenth-century 
novel must be separately determined (ibid., pp. 180, 200). Other concepts 
that need reconsideration include the didacticism of the early novel (ibid., 
p. 55), and the development of privacy and its relationship to the public 
realm (e.g., ibid., pp. 157, 303). We can see that theoretical concepts are 
used to focus research on particular issues or f ields, which are not merely 
subsumed within a given category but which need to be examined in order 
to gain a full picture of the specif ic character of the general phenomenon 
in this particular historical case. The work of the literary historian is thus 
to a great extent guided by certain crucial theoretical concepts, while the 
empirical research on the topic leads to revisions in the conceptualization 
of the subject.
In line with Hunter’s study, John Richetti’s The English Novel in History 
1700-1780 (1999) contextualizes the ‘rise of the novel’ both in different literary 
discourses and in social and cultural history. Richetti suggests that the main 
theme of the new novel is ‘the contested nature of subjectivity’ (ibid., p. 3); 
he elaborates upon this by applying Alasdair MacIntyre’s interpretation 
of ‘character’ as a mask, ‘a mode of social existence’, maintaining that the 
novel dramatizes ‘the gap that exists between an individual and his or her 
social role, a gap that is nonexistent in the character’ (ibid.; emphasis in 
the original). Thus, Richetti traces the changes in the forms of subjectivity 
that are entailed in the new ways of dealing with what is traditionally 
called ‘character’ in literary studies. Stuart Sherman, in Telling Time: Clocks, 
Diaries, and English Diurnal Form 1660-1785 (1996), discusses the impact 
of changes in the consciousness of time on the English literature of the 
period. The characterizing concepts he uses include a ‘growing appetite for 
“contemporaneity”’ (Sherman, 1996, p. 172) and a ‘task-oriented’ versus ‘time-
governed’ model of organizing experience, saying that Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe ‘ref igures task time as tasks timed’ (ibid., p. 229). Again, a new form 
of thought precipitates new forms of shaping the narrative.
Michael McKeon’s The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 (1987) traces 
the same development as Hunter and Richetti, but his theoretical frame 
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is somewhat different and more philosophical, since he is interested par-
ticularly in the development of the epistemological and the socio-ethical 
dimension in the emerging novel. He considers the strength of the novel as 
a modern genre to be derived from its unrivalled power both to formulate 
and to explain a set of problems that are central to early modern experience. 
These may be understood as
problems of categorical instability, which the novel, originating to resolve, 
also inevitably reflects. The f irst sort of instability with which the novel 
is concerned has to do with generic categories; the second, with social 
ones. The instability of generic categories registers an epistemological 
crisis, a major cultural transition in attitudes toward how to tell the truth 
in narrative. […] The instability of social categories registers a cultural 
crisis in attitudes toward the way in which the external social order is 
related to the internal, moral state of its members (McKeon, 2002, p. 20).
Thus, at the beginning of his empirical study of the emerging novel McKeon 
defines the leading questions and theses in philosophical and simultane-
ously cultural and historical terms. He also gives a reflective account of his 
method, which he calls dialectical and which he defines as follows: ‘A basic 
premise of dialectical method is that all categorizations are operational and 
conditional rather than once and for all and absolute – that they are parts of 
a larger process from which they may be abstracted only provisionally’ (ibid., 
p. xviii). That is to say, each category is tested and redefined in the course 
of the empirical study of the subject, and each definition of a concept, or 
description of a phenomenon, affects our understanding of other, adjacent 
concepts as well. Accordingly, McKeon professes the ‘virtue of concretion, 
that of descriptive precision’ (ibid.). This is very much, we dare say, how the 
historian of literature proceeds, even if he (or she) only too rarely explains 
his or her dealing with concepts and their relation to empirical research.
Encounters, Negotiations
The idea that the compatibility of narratological concepts with literary 
historical research, and their usefulness in it, consists in narratology’s 
providing the tools for dealing with the formal traits in narrative discourse, 
to which historical research adds content and context, turns out to be 
simplistic and defective. The suggestion that narratology can be opened 
up to historical research by ‘semanticizing’ the universal narrative forms 
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defined in narratology presents these forms as an ahistorical repertoire 
which can be f illed in with different contents, while literary historians are 
disposed to think that form is not separable from the specif ic content – 
defined, for example, in terms of genre – which the form expresses. If forms, 
as suggested above, cannot be def ined abstractly, apart from the content, 
in historical literary research, this points to a fundamental difference in 
concept formation compared to narratology. What we have here is also a 
matter of different views of conceptual accuracy: while for narratologists it 
means exhaustive definition (of a trait in narrative discourse), which is valid 
for all possible circumstances, for literary historians it means a pertinent 
description of what is essential in a concrete historical phenomenon. These 
differences in the understanding of the functioning of theoretical concepts 
are bound to cause diff iculties in attempts to dovetail or fuse narratology 
with historical literary research.
We can illustrate the problem with the excellent example of a study in 
which a literary historian accepts the challenge of narratological theory: 
Armin Schulz’s Erzähltheorie in mediävistischer Perspektive (Narrative 
Theory in a Medievalist Perspective, 2013). Since narratology, despite its 
ahistorical, universal orientation, was originally constructed with the 
modern novel in mind (‘modern’ in the broad sense of beginning in the 
eighteenth century), the question of its compatibility with the study of 
medieval literature arises naturally. Schulz’ main argument is that nar-
ratology does not help much in the analysis of medieval narratives, since 
it remains on the surface of narration, rather than examining ‘how the 
story – the histoire – is composed conclusively of action and the motives [or 
reasons] of action [Handlungsgründen]’.20 He enumerates important aspects 
of medieval narratives that contradict the basic suppositions of narratology: 
author and narrator cannot be distinguished; the characters narrate things 
they ought not to know about; the narratives appear to contain both too 
much and too little; the characters are not individualized, but have an 
identity essentially determined by social bonds, genre-dependent behav-
ioural patterns and their history (but not by any characteristics owned by 
this individual alone; ibid., pp. 1-2, 128). The vantage point in examining 
medieval narratives, according to Schulz, has to be that of the different 
genres – courtly novel, heroic epic, the ‘Märe’ (a novelistic story in verse), 
and the courtly legend – since patterns of story, narration, and characters 
are tied to genre (ibid., pp. 4-5). Important elements in the analysis are 
20 ʻwie das Geschehen – die histoire – bündig aus Handlungen und Handlungsgründen zusam-
mengesetzt wird’ (Schulz, 2012, p. 1; emphasis in the original).
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narrative schemata, the semantics of space, and the technique of creating 
coherence (ibid, p. 6). Schulz demonstrates how the narrative schemata and 
characters of narratives in different genres derive from ‘courtly anthropol-
ogy’ and from the medieval worldview, in which a Providence rules over 
Fortuna and human wilfulness. However, he also introduces a large number 
of narratological and related theories into his discussion, ranging from 
Genette to Propp and Bakhtin, but he always returns to the specif icity of 
medieval narration, as deriving from medieval thought patterns and nar-
rative schemata, and the ‘collective imagery’, which is historically specif ic 
(ibid., p. 21). He shows how the logic of creating cohesion in a medieval 
story is different from a modern one (e.g., ibid., pp. 322, 331); he sums this 
up by saying that the structure of a medieval narrative derives from ‘a 
conflict between different patterns of creating meaning, of different action 
schemata, themes, patterns of interaction and anthropologies’.21 As a whole, 
Schulz’s study demonstrates convincingly that the content and form of a 
narrative cannot be separated: a form is always the form of a particular 
content. This content, and consequently its form, is historically variable 
and contextually determined.
Eighteenth-century narrative literature, particularly the novel, is con-
sidered the beginning of the modern tradition of narration; the period is 
nevertheless suff iciently remote to elicit the question of historical speci-
f icity of the narratives of the time. In the present volume, concepts and 
conceptions both of narratology and of the historical study of literature 
are reflected upon in the light of eighteenth-century narrative literature. 
Some of the authors give more stress to narratological, others to historical 
conceptualizations; some suggest the applicability of certain narratological 
concepts with further specif ications, or propose augmentations to these 
concepts based on particular historical observations, while others consider 
that narratological concepts do nor serve to capture the phenomenon in 
question, and explain why.
The volume opens with Michael McKeon’s article on the challenge 
which the study of eighteenth-century literature presents to narrative 
theory. The author argues that the universalist emphasis of narratologists 
‘misrepresents generic historicity as transhistorical’, since in their general 
theories of narrative they chiefly refer to the modern novel. McKeon goes 
on to reflect upon some crucial concepts in narrative theory. Starting with 
the concept of realism, he maintains that it is not only Genette and Bal 
21 ʻvom Widerstreit unterschiedlicher Sinnbildungsmuster, Handlungsschemata, Themen, 
Interaktionsmuster und Anthropologien’; ibid., p. 348.
28 LiiSa StEiNby aNd aiNo Mäkik aLLi 
who equate mimesis, or the illusory imitation of an external reality, with 
literary realism; like them, Watt in his concept of formal realism partly 
misrepresents the phenomenon by disregarding the reflexive moment in 
realism. Richardson is not merely pretending to be giving a ‘historically’ 
accurate account of Pamela’s experiences; the form through which this 
experience is mediated – Pamela’s style of letter writing – is thematized 
as well. Thus, ‘diegetic self-consciousness’ is part of novelistic realism 
from the very beginning. McKeon goes on to argue that the narratologists’ 
understanding of ‘mimesis’ is likewise defective, and for much the same 
reason as realism: mimesis is understood solely in terms of illusionism. In 
his discussion of free indirect discourse (FID), McKeon detects important 
differences between Genette’s and Bal’s views on the matter. He suggests 
that the nature of the phenomenon is misrepresented both in Bal’s narrative 
layers model and in Genette’s idea of the character’s speech being partly 
‘emancipated’ from the narrator’s speech, and argues that FID is a reflexive 
mode of writing which thematizes the realistic form of character representa-
tion. He emphasizes that the emergence of FID is to be contextualized in 
the eighteenth-century preoccupation with ‘the nature and the limits of 
person, impersonation, personality, and personal identity’. Finally, McKeon 
raises some doubts regarding the claim that postclassical narratology is no 
longer tacitly bound to the modern novel; at least in some (postmodern, 
poststructuralist) forms, it seems to be attached even more restrictively to 
twentieth-century and contemporary narrative.
John Richetti’s article continues the discussion of the topic of realism 
in the eighteenth-century novel, adopting another angle: he examines the 
intricate relationship between rhetorical plot-making and the representa-
tion of ‘socio-economic actualities’ in Fielding’s Tom Jones. He begins by 
arguing that plot is for Fielding a generically determined rhetorical artif ice, 
rather than an arrangement of events as they flow from the characters and 
their experiences, as suggested by contemporary narrative theory. Fielding 
is presenting his readers with a ‘comic epic in prose’, which crucially affects 
the way the narrator deals with incidents and, above all, with the outcome 
of events. What is at issue for Richetti, however, is the tension between 
the comic-epic plot and the representation of problematical aspects of 
actual mid-eighteenth-century English life and social institutions – indeed 
giving ‘a fairly complete survey of English institutions’ – which resists a full 
absorption into comic artif ice. Richetti suggests that the socio-historical 
aspect is present particularly in some of the minor characters; he dem-
onstrates this by analysing some of the soldiers in whose company Tom 
spends some time in Book VII. More specif ically, the ruthless Northerton, 
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who in a quarrel almost stabs Tom to death, is interpreted as a character 
from a socio-economic and institutional landscape, who nevertheless also 
functions as a cog in the machinery of plot leading to the discovery of Tom’s 
parentage and his return to Paradise Hall, and who disappears from the 
novel after fulf illing his ‘task’ in the plot. Richetti compares Northerton’s 
role to that of the three Blif ils (young Blif il, his father, and his uncle), who 
represent the ‘evil’, scheming counterforce to Tom. They are completely 
absorbed in their function in the plot construction – with their intrigues 
and their intent to manipulate an ‘audience’ (Mr. Allworthy), they are a 
kind of parallel to the plot-making of the Fieldingesque narrator – while 
Northerton acts just as the reckless himself. What remains of him is a 
residue of ‘unassimilated characterological substance’ in the novel, which 
hints at other, additional possibilities of plot construction, more like those 
dealt with in contemporary narratology.
The presence of ample descriptive detail is considered to be a character-
istic of literary realism, and Watt’s claim that the ‘rise of the novel’ involves 
a shift to formal realism, i.e. to considering as real what is particular in 
time and space, fuelled the conception that eighteenth-century novels 
abound with descriptive details – which has proved to be a misconception. 
Monika Fludernik tackles the question of the description of house interiors 
in eighteenth-century literature, using the tools provided by Franz Stanzel 
in his concepts of perspectival and aperspectival description. Fludernik 
starts historically, with a brief overview of pre-eighteenth-century types of 
description – ekphrasis, portrait description, allegorical description – and 
includes in her discussion a contextual or ‘culturalist’ aspect: the increase 
in interior descriptions in eighteenth-century literature was due in part to 
changes in interior design in non-aristocratic households. As she points 
out, Stanzel’s concept of perspectival description refers to representing 
interiors in a manner which def ines the spatial locations of the rooms and 
the objects in them, i.e. ‘draws a map’, rather than (aperspectivally) merely 
giving an account – an inventory, a list – of the contents of the rooms. 
Fludernik delineates the development in eighteenth-century literature 
from aperspectival to perspectival description of interiors. While in early 
descriptions of houses the organizing principle was critical assessment 
of the house and the objects in it, rather than spatial contiguity, in the 
‘tour guide model’ the description follows more or less closely the visitor’s 
route in the house. The earliest perspectival descriptions are thus found 
in Gothic novels, while for example Defoe in Moll Flanders represents 
spaces and the location of objects only to the extent that it is relevant to 
the action.
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Aino Mäkikalli takes a look at two early eighteenth-century English 
novels: Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko and Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. She 
interprets the temporal order in these narratives in the context of late sev-
enteenth- and early eighteenth-century conceptions of time. The analysis 
examines the structure and temporal continuum of events and represen-
tations of characters in relation to time, in the context of contemporary 
time-keeping, chronological studies and the idea of history. Mäkikalli shows 
how the intrusion of history – ‘real life’ – into Behn’s narrative disrupts its 
‘adventure time’, which is characteristic of the baroque romance. Defoe’s 
dating of events is more precise than Behn’s, but both authors use temporal 
references to enhance the verisimilitude of the narrative and to create an 
effect of reality.
The topic in Liisa Steinby’s article is temporality, and the related ques-
tions of the central experiencing subject and the perception of other char-
acters, in Defoe’s Moll Flanders and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. 
The vantage point are the two revolutions in conceptions of time that took 
place in eighteenth-century literature. The f irst revolution, occurring at 
the beginning of the century, is that which Ian Watt refers to as the ‘formal 
realism’ of the new novel: what is now conceived as ‘reality’ are particular 
things in a particular place and at a particular time, rather than universal, 
timeless essences of things. The second revolution, taking place towards 
the end of the century, is the breakthrough of historicism – conceiving of 
all human things as historically changing – which has a counterpart in the 
novel of the development of an individual (the Bildungsroman). Steinby 
shows that the temporal structure of Moll Flanders is primarily determined 
by the protagonist’s manner of seeing everything from the perspective of 
her struggle for survival. In Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, the main form of 
temporality is the individual’s experience of time, in which he constantly 
recurs to past experiences, reinterpreting them and himself in their light, 
has new experiences which cannot immediately be given any def initive 
meaning, and imagines the future, which essentially codetermines the 
interpretation of past and present. What the protagonist himself is, how 
his life-story should be narrated, and what the other characters are both 
in themselves and for him, are then questions processed temporally, rather 
than something that can be instantaneously and definitively resolved.
In Dorothee Birke’s contribution, the main theoretical concept is Stanzel’s 
authorial narration, which she considers in the light of two examples of 
English novels from the 1750s. Stanzel’s authorial narration is often equated 
to narration from a position of ‘godlike omniscience’, comprising not only 
the characters’ hidden motives and thoughts but also the moral value of the 
iNtroduC tioN 31
acts, and is therefore often seen as outdated and incompatible with modern 
scepticism towards authority. Birke, however, argues that already in the 
eighteenth-century novel, authorial narration meant less the assumption of 
an authoritative stance than reflecting on narrative authority. Such means 
of reflection included commentaries on events and characters and on the 
narration itself, projected reader f igures, and ‘gnomic’ commentaries, offer-
ing general maxims concerning morality or human nature. Haywood’s The 
History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless opens with a passage on the general state 
of contemporary morals and manners, allowing the reader either to judge 
the heroine according to these conventional norms or, on the contrary, to 
examine these norms critically on the basis of the character and her story. 
As readers, we are invited to reflect upon our expectations and our role 
as reader. In the anonymously published Charlotte Summers, excessive 
authorial intrusions and Fieldingesque irony are displayed to make the 
reader conscious of him- or herself, as someone who is manipulated and 
convinced by the narrator, but who may also raise questions concerning 
the narrator’s authority.
Karin Kukkonen looks at the problem of tellability in the context of Ger-
man eighteenth-century criticism and novel-writing. The relevant critical 
discussion here was conducted by the German authority on poetics Johann 
Christoph Gottsched and the Swiss theoreticians Johann Jakob Bodmer and 
Johan Jakob Breitinger, and it concerned the question of how to make a liter-
ary work interesting by using a topic which contains something ‘marvellous’ 
without contradicting its verisimilitude. Kukkonen suggests that there is not 
only a lower limit of tellability – what makes the story worthwhile relating 
and reading – but also an upper one: too disturbing an event may not bear 
narration, while too many extraordinary elements may render it impossible 
to structure the whole into a convincing narrative. Using an example from 
eighteenth-century novel-writing, Maria Anna Sagar’s Karolinens Tagebuch, 
Kukkonen elucidates the difference between event-based and character-
based narrativity, the latter historically succeeding the former. Karolinens 
Tagebuch contains, in addition to letters by the I-narrator concerning her 
own, rather eventless life, the story of her friend, whose life-story closely 
resembles the lives of the heroines in admired contemporary novels by 
Christian Fürchtegott Gellert and Sophie von La Roche. The tellability of 
these (rather eventful) character novels is contrasted with Karoline’s plan 
to write a novel following the pattern of the adventurous baroque novel, 
which in this context represents an exceeding of the limit of (event-based) 
tellability: too many extraordinary events cannot be shaped into a convinc-
ing whole. Kukkonen goes on to argue that the relatively eventless life of the 
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protagonist achieves tellability by the reciprocal mirroring of the different 
narrative strains in her letters. Thus, the metaf ictional dimension proves 
to be a relevant aspect of tellability.
Claudia Nitschke starts with an analysis of the functions of embed-
ded narratives in Wieland’s Don Sylvio, and goes on to outline a trajectory 
reaching from Wieland through Lessing to the emergence of the aesthetic 
autonomy of art in Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten. Don 
Sylvio is described as a highly complex construction of different diegetic 
levels, ostensible presence of publisher, translator and author, spurious 
footnotes, authorial intrusions and the comments of the characters within 
the main story on the embedded ones. Not only is literary self-consciousness 
displayed – playfully and often satirically – in the structure of the novel, but 
the understanding of the nature and function of literature is also its main 
topic: the plot consists of the young protagonist’s learning to distinguish 
between f iction and reality. Nitschke shows how this takes place in the 
interplay between embedded stories and the protagonist’s experiences in 
‘real’ life (i.e., in the main story of the novel). The theoretical categories 
used in the analysis include immediacy and immersion, the Husserlian 
conception of ‘intersubjective objectivity’, and the difference between the 
pragmatic and the ontological approach toward f iction. In the end, Don 
Sylvio is able to differentiate between real life and literature, as a sphere of 
its own – a sphere which here is still not experienced primarily aesthetically. 
While Lessing emphasizes emotion and empathy as essential factors in 
understanding literature, Goethe’s novella cycle ends with a fairytale which 
emphasizes the aesthetic autonomy of literature.
Christine Waldschmidt asks a question that has not been asked in nar-
ratological theory: how is the relationship between the thought content of a 
narrative and its narrative form to be understood? This is a question which 
was very much present in the eighteenth-century literary scene, because of 
the stress in Enlightenment thinking on the didactic aspect of literature. 
Waldschmidt discusses the issue as one of rhetoricity: narrative form was 
viewed as the rhetorical means for persuading the reader to accept the 
thought content of an exemplary story. In Germany, the topic was discussed 
particularly in the framework of the theory of the fable. As examples of this 
tradition, Waldschmidt analyses a fable by Lessing and a short story by 
Schiller, a renarration of an embedded story in Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste. 
In Lessing’s fable about the dying wolf, the reader is made to accept the fact 
that hypocrisy is common in the world, but that this need not unsettle the 
existence of an ideal moral order. In Schiller’s story Merkwürdiges Beispiel 
einer weiblichen Rache, no moral conclusion can be drawn on the basis of 
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the story, in which events take place just as in the revenge plan of the female 
protagonist – except for the decisive, unexpected turn in the end, which 
shatters her wish for revenge. This unexpected outcome demonstrates the 
presence of a dynamic of psychic energies in human beings which we are 
not aware of. Waldschmidt’s conclusion is that Schiller is here continuing 
the exemplary mode of storytelling, but that the general thought that guides 
it is something that is in need of investigation rather than any known truth.
Penny Pritchard’s topic is the characterization of the deceased in English 
eighteenth-century funeral sermons. She starts by reminding us of the fact 
that the ‘rise of the novel’ took place amidst the flourishing of a plethora of 
various f ictional and (mostly) non-f ictional text-types, which is one reason 
to examine the characterization in funeral sermons with narratological 
tools developed for the study of f iction. Published funeral sermons were 
a didactic genre, the purpose of which was to exhort listeners or readers 
to follow in their lives the exemplary spiritual conduct of the now dead. 
The ‘obligatory’ praise of the Christian virtues of the deceased in the 
biographical parts of the funeral sermons led to accusations of hypocrisy. 
The praise of the Christian conduct of the deceased often followed a typol-
ogy of professional virtues: the person was characterized as a charitable 
merchant or a philanthropic physician. Finally, Pritchard discusses two 
atypical cases of characterization in a funeral sermon: one in which an 
idiosyncratic manner of the deceased is mentioned – the interest in this is 
motivated by the extraordinary stature of the deceased (Sir Robert Boyle) – 
and another in which the funeral sermon is used to absolve the reputation 
of the deceased against unjust accusations. The general and moral nature 
of the characterizations does not leave space for ‘experienciality’, which 
according to Monika Fludernik is a criterion of narrativity.
In the last two articles in the volume, Genette’s concept of paratext (or 
peritext) is applied to eighteenth-century writing. Pat Rogers discusses the 
biographies published by the English bookseller and publisher Edmund 
Curll, who also wrote parts of them. These biographies, whose subjects 
included authors, churchmen, scholars, politicians, soldiers, and historic 
f igures from previous centuries, typically consisted of a great variety of 
different components, of which the biography itself was only one, minor 
part. Rogers describes the characteristic features of a Curllean biography, 
classif ies the different types of paratext in terms of the categories of the 
time, and def ines their different functions, yielding a list different from 
Genette’s. A few exemplary cases clarify Curll’s compilation method, 
which aimed primarily at maximizing commercial prof it. Curll’s case is 
an extreme example of the use of paratexts – if we can call them that, in 
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books in which they no longer form a ‘threshold’ into the work proper but 
very much the matter itself.
Finally, Teemu Ikonen’s subject is peritextuality in French eighteenth-
century narratives. Rather than aiming at a classif ication of various 
peritexts – Ikonen f inds Genette’s project problematical – he examines 
peritextuality as a matter of ‘dispositional’ effects across the boundary of 
text and ‘off-texts’, effects which can be studied in terms of textual order, 
of the position of the author and of the reader, respectively. Two different 
versions of a work, by Diderot and de Laclos, in which the same narrative 
is embedded in different peritexts, are examined as examples. Ikonen 
shows how changes and rearrangements in peritextual settings transform 
the position of the author as an authority, and invite the reader to adopt 
different stances to the narrative text. The differences between versions 
of texts should not simply be left to textual criticism, Ikonen concludes: 
authorial revisions common in the eighteenth century can be considered as 
acts of repetition and transformation, creating narratologically challenging 
connections between the main narrative, its framings, and the cultural 
context.
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 The Eighteenth-Century Challenge to 
Narrative Theory1
Michael McKeon
I’ll begin with a narrative. Years ago in graduate school, as I became aware 
of the novel as something to study as well as to read, my eye was caught by 
two recent books whose claim was that the novel was getting a lot more 
attention than it deserved. Although very different in other respects, both 
Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism and Scholes and Kellogg’s The Nature of Narrative 
made the point that in those days, the dominance of novel studies was such 
that to speak of the novel, it seemed, was to speak of narrative as such. Their 
influential books argued that it was time to put the novel genre in its place 
by resituating it within the narrative mode, thereby throwing into relief all 
the other genres that had preceded it.
I already had read Aristotle’s Poetics in college, and I recognized this as 
an Aristotelian move. Aristotle’s method, I’d learned, proceeds from the 
most general categories – those of human knowing, acting, and making 
– to divide and subdivide categories into their component parts until the 
analytic process reaches the limits of its usefulness. Aristotle describes 
poetics as an imitative kind of making, which can be subdivided (among 
other ways) according to three different ‘manners’ of imitation. The poet 
may speak in the same voice throughout; or ‘dramatically’, in the assumed 
voices of several characters; or in alternation between ‘narrative’ and an 
assumed character, ‘as Homer does’ (Aristotle, 1448a). These three manners 
of imitation distinguish between what came down to us as poetry, drama, 
and narrative, the three modes of poetic or literary imitation. Aristotle 
treats these three manners of imitation as covering the f ield of logical 
possibility, and for this reason Frye calls them the basic roots or ‘radicals of 
presentation’ (Frye 1957, pp. 246-47). But after this initial analysis, the Poetics 
turns from the logical to the historical, and summarizes the major stages in 
the development of poetry from its origins to his present day, a summary 
that accounts for the several genres that fall under each mode, and that, 
unlike the modes to which they belong, are contingent categories whose 
1 My thanks to John Belton for helping me with the ancient Greek of Plato and Aristotle, and 
to Riccardo Capoferro and Natalie Roxburgh for acute reflections on an earlier draft of this essay.
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existence and nature are determined by historical vicissitude (Aristotle, 
1448b-1449b).
Frye, Scholes, and Kellogg wrote around the same time as the apotheosis 
of structuralist theory, which promoted the primacy of the literary modes 
– but with a fundamental difference from Aristotle’s usage. Ferdinand 
de Saussure had distinguished between langue and parole, synchrony 
and diachrony, the structural and the chronological axes of language. His 
followers in mid-century France and elsewhere treated this distinction 
as a dichotomous separation, and thought the understanding of literary 
modes is best attained when they are unconditionally separated from 
their historical instances – or more precisely, from the historicity of those 
instances.2 Structuralism looked to the operation of language for rules by 
which to challenge the authority of what it saw as un-self-critical historical 
practice – not just local and temporary literary usages but the category 
‘genre’ itself. The effect was not only (in general) to divorce theoretical 
from historical study, but also (in particular) to redirect attention away 
from kinds of narrative that, like the novel genre, have a specif ic historical 
character, and toward narrative as such, from whose general language use, 
it was thought, might be derived a broad understanding unclouded by the 
specif ic biases of more narrowly historical practice.
In the years following its heyday, narratology based on a linguistic model 
has received considerable criticism of which the readers of this essay are 
no doubt aware, and it has been superseded by what might be called an 
inclusively eclectic narrative theory. My aim in this essay is to undertake 
at some length a theoretically coherent critique of structuralist narratology, 
and in a more synoptic fashion to ask if and how its successor has responded 
to the problems I describe.
Narrative theory or narratology – I’ll use the terms interchangeably 
– rose on a wave of structuralist enthusiasm, dedicated not, like Aris-
totelian method, to the relationship between the general or synchronic 
category and its particular or diachronic instantiations, but to analyzing 
the general mode in isolation from its constituent genres. But how could 
the universal nature of the mode be analyzed apart from the evidence 
provided by its generic instances? The answer to this question is of course 
that it could not. Drawing on scientif ic method, narratology necessarily 
employs the evidence of particular generic usage to identify the abstract 
mode; but it brackets, as immaterial to that result, the concrete formal 
2 Saussure (1959, pp. 79-81) himself disputed the correlation of ‘diachrony-synchrony’ at the 
linguistic micro-level with ‘history-structure’ at the macro-level.
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circumstances from which the abstract modal form is generated. The par-
ticular variant features of generic forms provide the necessary means to 
the end of making intelligible the general and constant form of the mode; 
but the means have served their purpose once their variable elements 
have been winnowed away from what is constant to and constitutive 
of the mode as such. By this I don’t mean to deny that narratological 
studies cite particular narratives in their analyses. I mean that the dates 
of composition and the generic character of these narratives are treated 
as irrelevant to the issues at hand, which are not generic but modal, not 
local but universal.
This particularlizing generic data plays no part in the f inal assessment 
of the mode of narrative, but it does of course appear in narratological 
accounts of the evidence on which conclusions are based. Do the temporal 
and spatial range of these narratives justify generalizations about the nature 
of narrative as such? Taking Genette’s Narrative Discourse (1972) and Bal’s 
Narratology (1985) as a sample of structuralist narratology,3 I f ind that most 
of the narrative texts and usages cited by these exemplary theorists are quite 
recent. That is, the abstract theory of the narrative mode is largely drawn 
from the concrete practice of the novel genre. Narrative theory, which aims 
to universalize its principles beyond the local practice of any historical 
genre, appears to derive those principles from the generic practice of one, 
chronologically localizable, genre in particular. One might conclude from 
this that the universalizing premise of narratology misrepresents generic 
historicity as transhistorical. Or to put it differently, one might conclude 
that what we call narrative theory is for the most part really the genre theory 
of the novel. The theoretical separation between modes (like narrative) and 
genres (like the novel) is indispensable. But the coherence and integrity 
of modes depend on their abstract accountability for the concrete genres 
that compose their domain. To generalize about the nature of narrative 
therefore requires an attentiveness both to the historical—the temporal 
and spatial--particularity of genres and to the difference between the par-
ticularity of the part and the generality of the whole. Eighteenth-century 
experiments and innovations in narrative form were remarkably rich and 
deeply consequential for the future of narrative. This is the eighteenth-
century challenge to narrative theory--which also amounts to a reminder 
of the historicity of literary form.
3 Quotations from Bal, 2009 may be assumed to appear also in Bal, 1985 unless explicitly 
noted.
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Mimesis and Realism in Narrative Theory
Both conclusions would seem to follow from Genette’s and Bal’s analysis 
of narrative ‘mimesis’ and ‘realism’, which both critics use synonymously 
(e.g., see Genette, 1980, p. 165; Bal, 2009, p. 36). Genette in particular derives 
his understanding of mimesis and realism from Plato and Aristotle, and I 
therefore will begin by comparing Plato’s celebrated passages on narrative 
in Book III of The Republic with Genette’s reading of them.
Plato records the discourse of Socrates, who famously works with wholes 
and parts. In dialogue with Adimantus about the speech of the poets, 
Socrates uses the word diegesis or narration in a general sense, as a whole 
that contains three particular parts or kinds of narration: haple diegesis, 
or pure narration; diegesis dia mimesis, or narration through imitation; 
and narration that uses both of these kinds (392 D).4 But Adimantus seeks 
clarif ication, and Socrates replies: ‘I won’t try to speak in wholes and uni-
versals but will separate off a particular part and by the example of that 
try to show you my meaning’ (392 E). Using the Iliad as his text, Socrates 
recalls an early passage in which Homer speaks in his own voice, then 
quotes – speaks in the voice of – one of his characters. Socrates identif ies 
the f irst kind of narration as haple diegesis and the second kind as diegesis 
dia mimesis – a term that for clarity he shortly will change to diegesis dia 
mimeseos hole, narration wholly through imitation – adding that it’s ‘in 
this manner’ – by combining the two kinds (into what English grammar 
calls direct speech) – that Homer ‘has carried on nearly all the rest of his 
narration’ in his epic poetry (394 B-C). And he reminds Adimantus that 
‘it is narration […] both when he presents the several speeches and the 
matter between the speeches’ (393 B). Finally, and in order to make the 
distinction as clear as possible, Socrates now ‘translates’ a longer excerpt of 
mixed narration from the Iliad into haple diegesis-pure narration. At this 
point Adimantus declares, ‘I understand’. So Socrates returns to the topic 
of the whole of narration with which he’d begun, aligning the three parts of 
narration with three genres of poetry: the dithyramb, or ‘the recital of the 
poet himself’; tragedy and comedy, ‘which work wholly through imitation’; 
4 In English we might use the word ‘narrative’ to distinguish the general sense from the 
three particular kinds of ‘narration’ it encloses. Plato’s translator usually uses ‘narration’, but 
occasionally ‘narrative’. Genette usually uses ‘récit’ for narrative, but sometimes the adjectival 
‘narratif’ (or even ‘narrative’), as in ‘discours narratif’. His translator usually uses ‘narrative’ both 
as noun and adjective, although occasionally ‘narrating’ adjectivally. None of these texts use 
distinct words to distinguish between the general and the particular sense of narrative – nor 
will I in this essay. 
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and epic poetry, ‘which employs both’ (394 B-C). (Aristotle’s typology, with 
which I began, although it reminds us of his master’s, on examination is 
signif icantly different.)
‘As we know, Plato contrasts two narrative modes’: Genette (1980, p. 162) 
begins his commentary, reasonably enough, by focusing on the two kinds 
of narration that Socrates extracts from the passage of the third, mixed 
kind – epic – in which the f irst two coexist. What is odd is that even though 
it is here the source of those two kinds, Genette (1980, p. 172) neglects to 
mention Plato’s third kind of narration, not only here but throughout his 
entire explication of Plato on narrative (except once and to no analytic 
purpose). The result is that although for expressly heuristic purposes 
Plato has temporarily separated one part, narration through imitation, 
from another, pure narration, Genette refers to the former part simply as 
‘mimesis’ and allows it to assume the aspect of a singular and exclusive 
whole, a kind of narration that appears only by itself. He reinforces that 
effect, moreover, by abstaining from Plato’s general and inclusive usage of 
diegesis-narration, thereby enabling that inclusive category to acquire an 
exclusive character while retaining its broader connotation of inclusive-
ness, hence universality. By this means mimesis becomes in Genette’s 
commentary not simply a kind of narration that is permanently detached 
from its counterpart pure narration: it ceases to be a kind of narration 
altogether.
Let me now be more concrete about the combined sleight of hand and 
sheer confusion with which this dichotomization of diegesis and mimesis 
is achieved. Socrates, we recall, rewrites an excerpt of Homer’s mixed 
narration into pure narration; Genette (1980, p. 163) erroneously reduces 
this to a rewriting of ‘mimesis’ into ‘diegesis’, then enigmatically equates 
mimesis with ‘direct speech in the manner of drama’. ‘Direct speech’ 
customarily refers to quotation mediated by a framing voice, applicable to 
the mixed narration of epic but not to dramatic dialogue, which of course 
lacks narratorial mediation. The former reference would redeem Genette’s 
identif ication of Socrates’s source text as ‘mimesis’, but he appears more 
intent on reducing mimesis to its stripped-down and minimal, unmediated 
and non-diegetic extreme of dramatic dialogue. That diegesis is ‘mediated 
by the narrator’, ‘told’ rather than ‘directly shown’, means for Genette that 
its object, communicated to the reader by the agency of language, is itself 
language rather than something that purports to exist outside it. ‘[T]he very 
idea of showing, […] because of its naively visual character […] is completely 
illusory: in contrast to dramatic representation, no narrative can “show” or 
“imitate” the story it tells’ (Genette, 1980, pp. 163-4).
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The epistemological implications of the absolute opposition between 
telling and showing are equally absolute. To experience the narration of 
something is to apprehend it through the distancing mediation of a nar-
rator. To experience the imitation of something is to apprehend it in the 
absence of mediation. Venturing into the theory of reader response, Genette 
characterizes imitation in the most reduced of terms, as a ‘direct representa-
tion’ ‘borrowed from the theater’, and its project as ‘making one forget that 
it is the narrator telling’, creating a ‘feeling […] of literal f idelity’. This is 
best achieved when the object of imitation is speech, which can ‘impose 
itself with the documentary autonomy of a quotation’ (Genette, 1980, pp. 
163, 166, 171). Indeed, Genette (1980, p. 169) associates the mimesis of sheer 
quotation with ‘that absolute imitation’ that consists in duplication. In other 
words, unlike Socrates’, Genette’s ‘imitation’ is a project in attaining formal 
transparency. And by implication, the simple fact of narration, however 
managed and modulated, would seem on the contrary to represent in the 
writer and ensure in the reader a knowing sophistication regarding the 
construction of meaning by language.
How do these slippery arguments serve Genette’s strategic avoidance 
of Socrates’ third kind of narration, the mixed mode that dominates 
Homer’s epic poetry? Homer’s mixed narration combines ‘pure narration’ 
and ‘narration wholly through imitation’ to achieve (as I’ve just pointed 
out) direct speech, in which narration mediates imitation. Genette avoids 
this simple recognition by the confusing presentation I have just tried to 
characterize – most of all by an illogical but unrelenting dichotomization 
of narration and imitation, depicting the two techniques as not just op-
positional but linguistically incompatible, incapable of coexistence within 
the same linguistic structure – for example, the mixed narration of epic. 
Moreover Genette asserts the incompatibility of narration and imitation by 
construing the commonplace metaphor ‘showing’ in literal, ‘naively visual’ 
terms. First, he insists that only the imitation of words by words qualif ies 
according to this gratuitously literal standard. Second, he collapses the 
full range of techniques for imitating language into the singular instance 
of dramatic dialogue, which is by def inition unmediated by narration. Yet 
even taken on its own terms this rationale must fail. Genette is acutely 
sensitive to the way our experience of narratorial mediation can interpose 
itself between what we’re ‘told’ and what exists outside the telling. But 
surely the elaborate apparatus of theatrical presentation by which drama 
‘shows’ us its spectacle is an experience of mediation at least as powerful 
as if drama were mediated by narrative language – unless words alone are 
deemed capable of mediation.
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Much has been written over the years about the distinction between 
telling and showing, but it would be very diff icult to f ind anyone who ever 
subscribed to the view – attributed by Genette to ‘the Anglo-American 
normative vulgate’ in the wake of Percy Lubbock – that narrative can do 
without a narrator and thereby achieve transparency (1980, p. 163). Genette’s 
strategic literalism embraces the putative naïve literalism that he has at-
tributed to Lubbock and his followers. This allows him to use the false 
dichotomy telling vs. showing to reinforce the false dichotomy narration 
vs. imitation that he has been propounding. However, a more likely under-
standing of what is meant by showing as a narrative norm is that it refers 
to the “artistic” subtlety of narration that subtly veils the obvious agency 
of the narrator and the sheer force of narrative telling. If this is a plausible 
view of Lubbock’s meaning (which implies nothing about its value), there 
is an ironic similarity between the idea of showing that Genette reviles 
and the idea of focalization whose analytic precision he is commended for.
Transformed in Genette’s account by an excluded middle that in Plato 
had served an inclusive purpose by mediating between the other kinds, 
the Socratic triad becomes dichotomous and exclusive. Those instances of 
mixed narration that are no longer accounted for are silently folded into 
the other two kinds of narration, where their mixed character becomes 
invisible and they enable the dichotomization of diegesis and mimesis, the 
pure narration of the narrator and the pure imitation of dramatic dialogue 
(Genette, 1980, pp. 162-63). The presentation of an exclusive and partial 
system as inclusive and universal is perhaps an apt description of at least 
Genette’s practice of structuralist method.
Genette now consolidates his reduction of the Socratic triad to an 
oppositional dyad by advancing, from a ‘strictly analytic point of view’, 
the following axiom: ‘narration, oral or written, is a fact of language, and 
language signifies without imitating’. And for this reason, narrative mimesis 
is ‘the illusion of mimesis’. We might suppose that it all depends on what we 
mean by imitation. But Genette (1980, p. 164) anticipates recourse to other 
strictly analytic points of view by writing, in the very next sentence: ‘Unless, 
of course, the object signif ied (narrated) be itself language’. The absolute 
opposition of narration and imitation suddenly seems to dissolve. When it’s 
language itself that language narrates, narration must be mixed, both nar-
ration and imitation (that is, quotation). This is exactly what Socrates means 
by mixed narration, whose generic exemplar, combining pure narration 
and narration wholly by imitation, is epic. Is Genette proposing to restore 
the third, mixed part to the triadic whole of narration? Not so fast. His 
rationale, obscure as it is, seems rather to be this: The dichotomy between 
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narration and imitation must dissolve not through the addition of a third 
term but through the subtraction of the second term, imitation. However, 
narration, now reduced to a single category, by the logic of structuralism 
becomes itself susceptible to dichotomization, reproducing the absolute 
opposition of telling and showing, as it were, one level down.
What is the logic of this devolution? Structuralism is based on a prin-
ciple of stability according to which categories are def ined, and certif ied 
as def initive, by their absolute opposition to other categories. A case in 
point: Genette tells us here that his phrase ‘the poet can deliver a speech 
as someone else’ is ‘the Platonic def inition of mimesis’. But as we know, 
this is at best an exclusive because partial meaning of mimesis as far as 
Plato is concerned, because it excludes the meaning of mimesis as one 
part of diegesis. And in any case, Plato’s ambition is not an austere inquiry 
into the nature of mimesis as such (which might support Genette’s notion 
that the only mimetic use of language is that whose object is language) 
but the applicability of that term to one particular usage currently under 
discussion – namely, quotation. Nor does Plato deal in ‘definitions’: Socrates 
is not a structuralist but a dialectician of wholes and parts. Nonetheless 
Genette concludes that having excised imitation from narration, the single 
category of narration must be divided: ‘we must distinguish here between 
narrative of events and “narrative of words”’ (Genette, 1980, p. 164). To 
achieve the structuralist stability of dichotomy, however, is also to risk its 
destabilization. Poised on dialectical process, it is the fate of structuralism 
to mistake this supersession of static structure as a fall from it. Genette’s 
scare quotes enclosing ‘narrative of words’ suggest that although the mean-
ing of the phrase is that it is one kind or part of narrative, that meaning is 
also equivocal. (The same equivocation is achieved, in the passage I quote 
above, by the parenthetical juxtaposition of ‘narrated’ with ‘signif ied’).
In order to explain why what he calls the narrative of events precludes, 
and on the same grounds, both realism and mimesis, Genette (1980, p. 
165) now draws on Roland Barthes’s essay on ‘the reality effect’5 in ‘the 
realistic novel’ of Gustave Flaubert. According to Genette, Homer’s epic 
creates a ‘mimetic effect’ ‘fairly typical of’ Flaubert’s reality effect by includ-
ing ‘redundant information’, like ‘useless and contingent detail[s]’, in the 
narration of events. The effect is a ‘referential illusion’, what Genette calls 
elsewhere a ‘feeling of literal f idelity’, an illusion that language is referring 
to something beyond itself. Because Genette has excluded from Plato’s 
capacious ‘narration’ all narration that isn’t ‘pure’, words that are otherwise 
5 Genette’s translator renders Barthes’s ‘l’effet de réel’ infelicitously as ‘realistic effect’.
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functional in narration become ‘useless’, serving ‘no purpose other than to 
let us understand that the narrative mentions it only because it is there […] 
and demands to be “shown”’. Whatever words are used in the narration of 
events but don’t participate in telling the story have this mimetic-realist 
effect. The opposition is absolute. Such words may even have a clear and 
well-known narrative status or function neither to tell nor to refer – Genette 
cites the Homeric epithet ‘the loud-sounding sea’ (Iliad, I, p. 34), whose 
redundancy, we might suppose, is a feature of its mnemonic purpose – but 
if words don’t tell, the only alternative is that they must (illusively) refer 
(Genette, 1980, p. 165). Yet although Genette claims to be dealing with 
‘strictly textual’ factors in making these def initive distinctions, he offers 
no criterion for defining which words have the exclusive function of ‘telling’ 
(ibid., p. 166). (Later on, in his commentary on the Socratic translation of 
mixed narration into pure narration, Genette acknowledges the relativity 
of this distinction by good-naturedly observing that Socrates might have 
‘push[ed] further’ in that process rather than including in his target text of 
pure narration, as he has, ‘elements of a sort of intermediary degree’ (ibid., 
p. 170). And as we will see, when Genette extricates himself from narrative 
theory in order to account for some of the major varieties of narrative prac-
tice, he allows himself the looseness of phrases like ‘a little more mimetic’ 
(ibid., p. 171). Once a general structure of exclusive rules has been built into 
the universality claimed by the narrative mode, the inclusiveness that is 
the logical concomitant of universality can be imported into its interstices 
through varieties of generic historicity – so long as they’re recognized to 
be illusory or tautological.
How is the mimetic-realist illusion of reference carried off? Genette (1980, 
p. 157) uses several terms: ‘realistic motivation’ or ‘rationalization’ ‘justif ies’ 
what otherwise would seem unaccountable. ‘The role of the analyst is not to 
be satisf ied with the rationalizations, nor to be ignorant of them, but rather, 
having “laid bare” the technique, to see how the motivation that has been 
invoked functions in the work as aesthetic medium’ (ibid., p. 158). Genette’s 
allusion to Shklovsky suggests that motivation enhances the reality effect 
by somehow lashing the useless detail to narrative storytelling. Bal’s (2009, 
p. 36, 37) account of narrative motivation is more precise and full than 
Genette’s, training an attention on ‘description’ – ‘a textual fragment in 
which features are attributed to objects’ – that is comparable to his focus 
on the detail. For Bal, motivation is a technique of ‘naturalization – that 
is, making those interruptions known as descriptions seem self-evident 
or necessary, so that the inflections of the presentation, the attribution 
of qualities, and the ideological machinations remain invisible’. That is, 
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lashing descriptions to narration renders their extra-narrative function 
invisible or transparent and makes plausible ‘the referential existence of 
their described objects’ (Bal, 2009, pp. 41, 40; ‘remain invisible’ not in 1985).
The corollary is that if the lashing technique is ineffective and becomes 
visible, the mimetic-realist illusion fails. But Genette observes that this is 
a matter of degree, depending as it does on ‘a highly variable relationship 
between the sender and the receiver’. Truth may be one, but illusion has 
many forms and ‘varies according to individuals, groups, and periods’. 
Seventeenth-century readers, Genette speculates, likely ‘found more mi-
mesis than we do’ in seventeenth-century narrative. But the bottom line is 
that the ‘narrative of events […] is always narrative, that is, a transcription 
of the (supposed) non-verbal into the verbal’ (Genette, 1980, pp. 165, 166).
As a restatement of Genette’s strictly analytic but perplexing axiom, this 
one seems unexceptionable. Indeed, ingenuous. Does the rigorous apparatus 
of structuralist narratology come down to the insistence that language is 
ontologically of a different order than non-language – that art is not life? If the 
argument is that all varieties of mimesis-realism whose project is the imitation 
of the non-verbal are for this reason ‘illusory’, the point has the truth of truism: 
language does not transcribe objects into non-linguistic objects; mimesis-
realism does not entail an identical reproduction of the object imitated.
Genette now turns from narrative of events to narrative of words – or 
rather, ‘narrative of words’. Having deemed illusory the verbal imitation of 
the non-verbal, he now wonders if his other invented category, the verbal 
imitation of the verbal, ‘is condemned a priori’ to being mere duplication, 
not illusory but tautological. Of a passage in Proust Genette writes: ‘The 
narrator does not narrate the hero’s sentence; one can scarcely say he 
imitates it: he recopies it, and in this sense one cannot speak here of narra-
tive’ (1980, p. 169, Genette’s italics). Has the excluded middle absorbed the 
two poles as well? Even apart from the obscurity with which it has been 
presented, Genette’s dichotomy has come to seem no more than theoretical, 
diametrically ref ined to a vanishing point. Yet although the mimetic force 
of the narrative of events is notionally illusory, Genette (1980, pp. 165-66) 
observes (as we have seen) that it has had a historically rich and varied 
eff icacy. Similarly, although the imitative narrative of words is dubious 
as both narration and imitation, Genette (1980, pp. 171-73, all italics are 
Genette’s) nonetheless constructs for it a three-part typology, applicable 
to both uttered and inner speech:
1 ‘Narratized, or narrated, speech’, the sort of target text that Socrates 
achieves in his translation of Homer’s mixed narration into pure 
narration.
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2 ‘Transposed’ or indirect speech (also known as reported speech), ‘a little 
more mimetic than narrated speech’. However ‘the narrator’s presence 
is still too perceptible in the very syntax of the sentence for the speech to 
impose itself with the documentary autonomy of a quotation’. Includes 
the variant known by the name of ‘free indirect style’.
3 Homer’s mixed narration. Commonly known as direct speech but called 
by Genette ‘reported speech, dramatic in type’, ‘rejected by Plato’ be-
cause it is the ‘most mimetic’ of the three. This is the only occasion when 
Genette actually acknowledges that Homer’s narration is a mixture of 
his two polar kinds, which makes unaccountable his account of it, here 
and earlier (see above, p. 39), as dramatic.
Genette (1980, p. 175) follows this typology with a revelatory gloss on what 
he means by ‘theory’: ‘Needless to say, unless one is deliberately trying to 
prove a point [parti pris] (like the rejection, in Plato’s rewriting of Homer, 
of all reported speech), the different forms we have just distinguished in 
theory will not be so clearly separated in the practice of texts’. Certainly the 
work of theory, an abstracted overview of concrete practice, is to construct 
schematic categories that must blur the most particular differences between 
practices in the name of insight derived from generalization about their 
similarities. But when theory is motivated by an a priori impulse to prove 
a point, especially when the practice in question shows the point to be 
wrong, insight is the f irst casualty. I’ll return to the case of free indirect 
discourse because for several reasons it must hold a special interest in this 
inquiry. But the imbalance between rich theoretical generalization and 
the impoverished store of practical examples in structuralist narratology 
requires that having sampled the narrative theory of mimesis and realism, 
we turn f irst to the meaning of mimesis and realism as they’re actually 
deployed in, respectively, classical and eighteenth-century practice.
Mimesis in Classical Practice
It all depends on what we mean by imitation. As Genette (1980, pp. 172-73) 
elaborates his reading of Plato on narration, he becomes so committed to 
the exclusive structure he imposes on it that the entire discussion takes on 
the illusory quality of a def initive judgment, not a neutral description but 
a normative prescription: thus Plato has ‘rejected’ the purely mimetic and 
made an ‘appeal for the purely narrative’. Genette (1980, p. 173) f inds support 
for this misreading in the supposed antithesis of Plato and Aristotle as, 
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respectively, partial proponents of narration and imitation: ‘Aristotle lost no 
time upholding, with the authority and success we know of, the superiority 
of the purely mimetic. We should not fail to appreciate the influence that 
this prerogative, massively granted to dramatic style, exerted for centuries 
on the evolution of narrative genres’.
There are two problems here. First, Socrates’s distinction between three 
kinds of narration in these passages is instrumental toward a greater end, 
which concerns the principle that the Guardians of the republic should be 
expert in a single function, the craft of ‘civic liberty’:6
It would not be f itting for these to do nor yet to imitate anything else. But 
if they imitate they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate 
to them [, …] but things unbecoming the free man they should neither 
do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from 
the imitation they imbibe the reality. […] [T]here is a form of diction and 
narrative in which the really good and true man would narrate anything 
that he had to say.
But such a man,
When he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a 
good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it […] 
Then the narrative that he will employ will be of the kind that we just 
now illustrated by the verses of Homer, and his diction will be one that 
partakes of both, of imitation and simple [i.e., pure] narration, but there 
will be a small portion of imitation in a long discourse (395 C-396 E).
In other words, Socrates’s distinction between narration and imitation in 
these passages is a means to an end, rather than, as in structuralist method, 
a self-standing and invariable opposition, an end in itself. By the same token, 
Genette isolates one part of an argument, treating it as a whole or an end in 
itself rather than recognizing the greater whole it subserves.
As he so often does, Socrates uses the analysis of one sort of human 
activity – in this case language use – to think analogically about greater 
philosophical principles – here, the nature of justice in the polis. (The Re-
public itself inquires into the nature of the ideal state in order to investigate 
by analogy the nature of the soul). The end served by that distinction is to 
6 On the idea of the work, function, virtue, or particular excellence of a thing, see Plato, 352 
E-352 D.
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establish the principle that for the most part, the speech and action of the 
Guardian will be an outgrowth of his own particular excellence, although he 
also will have imitative recourse to that of other good men. Plato locates this 
norm in epic poetry and its mixture of narration and imitation – or in his 
own terms, pure narration and narration wholly through imitation. What 
Genette (1980, p. 172) calls ‘Plato’s appeal for the purely narrative’ in this 
passage is therefore really an appeal for the mixed speech characteristic, 
as Genette puts it, ‘f irst of the epic and then of the novel …’. Bal, as well, 
f inds in Plato a rejection of imitative form. He rewrites Homer, she thinks, 
because he f inds the Iliad’s passages of description (Genette’s ‘narrative of 
events’) ‘problematic’ – in her view Homer does too – rather than to explain 
to Adimantus why the Guardian needs to master both narration and to a 
much lesser extent imitation (Genette, 1980, p. 36).
This may suggest the second problem. Genette not only imposes a 
dichotomizing f ixity on Socrates’s dialectical method. He also mistakenly 
assumes that Plato and Aristotle mean the same thing by imitation. So 
far from ‘rejecting’ it, Plato understands imitation to be ontologically 
foundational, the dialectical scale and measure of all entities, hence by 
its very nature not singular and abstract but differential and incremental 
across the entire range of existence. In the comparison of any given thing 
to any other, imitation measures the proportion between being and appear-
ance, truth and probability, and the comparison can move up or down the 
dialectical chain revealing any entity – object, discourse, institution, art – to 
be by turns more or less proximate to the ideal forms of truth and being. 
For Aristotle, however, imitation pertains to one domain of philosophy 
in particular – the sciences of making, as distinct from those of nature 
and knowledge. That poetry is imitative says nothing about its qualitative 
status with respect to other, non-imitative arts or other domains of science. 
But because all aspects of poetic making are imitative, the dramatic, the 
narrative, and the mixed manner of poetry are all imitative. And because 
diverse means of making – language, instrumental music, dance – are 
comprehended in the category ‘poetry’, the fact that language can be said 
to signify doesn’t affect its status as an imitative art (see R. McKeon, 1952).
Returning to Genette, we can now see that Aristotle’s Poetics doesn’t 
uphold ‘the superiority of the purely mimetic’ to the ‘purely narrative’ 
(Genette, 1980, p. 173): it methodologically categorizes all poetry as mimetic 
(Aristotle, 1447a-b). Genette may base this erroneous claim on the fact that 
Aristotle judges tragedy to be superior to epic. But if all poetry is imitative, 
it should be obvious that this judgment has nothing to do with the imitative 
nature of tragedy in particular. It is based instead on other factors, most 
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important the respectively greater and lesser unity that tragic and epic 
plots are likely to possess (Aristotle, 1462a-b). Still, perhaps it is because the 
Poetics treats of drama that Genette is encouraged to conflate the entire 
range of poetic imitation, seemingly on Aristotle’s authority, with what he 
takes to be the extreme instance of dramatic dialogue.
So on the one hand, Aristotle’s understanding of the nature and scope 
of imitation is very different from Plato’s. Alien to both of them, on the 
other hand, is Genette’s model of the excluded middle, which reduces 
imitation to a single, absolute version that purports to reproduce reality 
with exactitude. We’ve already seen how contrary this model is to Plato. 
For his part Aristotle’s celebrated distinction between poetry and history 
makes clear its irrelevance to his thinking (1451a-b). Nor does Aristotle 
suggest that poetic imitation should aspire to raising in the reader a feeling 
of literal f idelity, whether to events or to words (Genette, 1980, p. 171). 
Rather, our pleasure in imitation is for him predicated on our awareness 
that it is art, and therefore can be compared to life: for it is ‘natural for 
all to delight in works of imitation’. ‘[T]hough the objects themselves may 
be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of 
them in art’ (‘tas eikonas tas malista ekribomenas’, literally ‘the artistic 
images the most perfectly and exactly made’). But ‘if one has not seen 
the thing before, one’s pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation 
(mimema) of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some 
natural cause’ (Aristotle, 1448b). Here Aristotle uses the language of ‘see-
ing’ and ‘viewing’, perhaps because he soon will be focusing on dramatic 
imitations in particular. But because he regards all poetry as imitative, 
he argues that the pleasures of self-conscious illusion are also available 
through the mediating experience of reading a play, as they are in reading 
an epic (Aristotle, 1462a). For Aristotle, imitation is the crucial means of 
mediating between art and life, creating an illusion of their sameness 
whose pleasure depends on the recognition that it is illusory, not present/
presence but representation.
I began this essay with the anecdotal observation that the texts treated 
by structuralist narrative theory are by and large modern, and suggested 
on that basis alone that narratology’s claims to be generalizing about the 
universality of narrative are illusory. In the previous section I’ve adduced 
evidence that what narratology takes to be, alternatively, the generic theory 
of epic mimesis or the modal theory of narrative mimesis is based on faulty 
assumptions and defective interpretations. The conjunction of these two 
sets of evidence might appear to predict that modern realist theory can 
be shown to diverge from the ancient theory of mimesis, thereby ‘proving 
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the point’, already adumbrated by its selection of primarily modern texts, 
that narrative theory’s claims to universality are groundless. However 
the best foundation on which to conclude the disparity between ancient 
mimesis and modern realism will be laid not by positing it at the outset, 
but by presenting historical evidence for the coalescence of a distinctively 
modern theory and practice of imitation by the end of the eighteenth 
century.
Realism in Eighteenth-Century Practice
In the structural analysis theorized by Genette and Bal, the function of 
realism is to sustain the illusion of reference beyond language by using 
descriptive details that lack a narrative function but are made to appear 
to subserve it. Genette and Bal also agree that realism is the novelistic 
equivalent of ancient epic mimesis – or perhaps more likely, that it is the 
novelistic expression of what is universally present in all instances of the 
narrative mode, mimesis. But in either case, close attention to the ancient 
texts on which the narratological reading of mimesis is based has revealed 
the need for a very different understanding of classical imitation. What are 
the results when we bring a comparably close attention to modern literary 
realism?
The historicity of realism is evident even in the nineteenth-century origin 
of the term itself (in contrast with mimesis, a transliteration of ancient 
Greek). And even in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century pre-history 
of the term, the practice to which ‘realism’ refers is not simply an illusory 
imitation of an external reality that conceals its motivating artif ice. In 
Cervantes, and continuously from Fielding onward, what we now call real-
ism is the technique of combining the representation of the real with a more 
or less explicit reflection on its status as a representation. In the words of 
György Lukács, novelistic realism involves a ‘double reflection’: a reflection 
of the world, and a ref lection of the process by which that ref lection is 
accomplished (Lukács, 1973, p. 202). Another way of putting this is that the 
novel is reflexive. It thematizes its formal procedure on the level of content: 
what the novel is about is, in part, what it does. The technique of realism as 
such takes no position on the further question of whether the real has an 
actual existence beyond language. The essence of the technique is the bal-
ance between an unprecedentedly detailed account of the real world – Ian 
Watt’s ‘formal realism’ suffices to describe this aspect of the technique – and 
an account of how that account has been created. This is the understanding 
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propounded by the three most important theorists of the novel,7 and in 
departing from this view Watt’s admirable and highly influential study of 
the rise of the novel, although it aims to historicize that genre, promotes a 
straightforward and non-reflexive view of realism as a formal technique. Not 
that Watt ignores or denies the ‘distancing effect’ of Fielding’s intrusions, 
their interference with the ‘sense of narrative illusion’. Rather, he thinks 
Fielding’s techniques run counter to and undermine novelistic realism, 
and that they could not and did not ‘become a permanent element in the 
tradition of the novel’.8 So in this respect, The Rise of the Novel played a major 
role in detouring Anglo-American novel criticism to an extent from which 
it has not yet recovered. In structuralist terminology, Watt’s formal realism 
dovetails with the structuralist view that realism is a technique of imitative 
representation that is innocent of self-conscious diegetic representation.
Of course, ref lexivity isn’t unique either to the novel or to narrative. 
Broadly speaking, all literary discourse as such is more or less reflexive or 
self-conscious in its formality, and novelistic reflexivity is only one of the 
ways in which literary reflexivity is achieved. What formally distinguishes 
novelistic from other sorts of literary reflexivity is the fact that the novel 
undertakes a representation of the real whose empirical ambition and 
insistence are unprecedented. These qualities are bound up with the seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century revolution in empirical epistemology that 
coincided with the origins of the novel genre, and that evoked both sides 
of its double reflection: both the ambition to represent the world, and the 
will to display the means by which that representation is achieved.
I’ve made the unsurprising suggestion that narratology is indebted to 
scientific method. More surprising, perhaps, is the suggestion that novelistic 
epistemology is indebted to scientif ic method (although the divergence 
of the new narrative genre from the new philosophy is also crucial). To 
attribute the rise of realism in eighteenth-century Britain to the scientif ic 
revolution of the seventeenth century would reduce an overdetermined 
development to a single cause. Nonetheless the influence of the new science 
on the emergence of the novel was enormous (see McKeon, 2009). And this 
suggests that in terms of epistemology and method, the similarities between 
novelistic and structuralist ambitions are considerable – up to a point.
Francis Bacon’s notion of experiment proceeds on the basis of two prin-
ciples. The natural world can be known only through the senses. But the 
7 György Lukács, José Ortega y Gasset, and Mikhail M. Bakhtin, all excerpted in McKeon, 
2000a. For a comparison of Watt with Lukács, Ortega y Gasset, and Bakhtin see McKeon, 2000b.
8 Watt 1964, pp. 285, 286, 288.
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sensible knowledge of nature is unreliable if sense data isn’t analyzed so as 
to separate nature itself from the influence of what can seem to be part of 
it, the circumstances by which it has come to be known. Scientif ic method 
aims to achieve this separation by transforming the single and singular 
experience of knowing into an experiment that multiplies the occasions 
and varies the circumstances – the time, place, and agency – of knowing. 
The more such data accumulates, the more a pattern of constancy can be 
discerned in its interstices, one that repeats and confirms the invariable 
identity of the thing itself as distinct from the variables that pertain to the 
disparate circumstances of each single act of knowing. Once those variables 
have been winnowed away, the identity of the thing itself stands disclosed 
(McKeon, 2009, p. 208). Formulating a technique for accomplishing a nar-
rative version of this process required trial and error; I’ll devote a page or 
two to summarizing how it emerged.
In their earliest novels Defoe and Richardson attempt to apply empirical 
epistemology in the comparatively naïve form of what I’ve elsewhere called 
‘the claim to historicity’: namely, the representation of their texts as au-
thored by actual people, their protagonists (McKeon, 1987, p. 45 and passim). 
The immediacy effect that is achieved by the claim to historicity precludes 
any mediating distance between Pamela’s presence and her representation, 
between content and form, what happens and how it happens – in narrato-
logical terms, between mimesis and diegesis9, story and discourse, fabula 
and sjŭzet. In other words, this early attempt to create the illusion of external 
reference is analogous to the f irst of Bacon’s experimental provisos, that 
the world can be known through the senses. Richardson takes advantage 
of epistolary form as a f irst-person narrative technique that maximizes the 
immediacy effect of actual authorship in two distinct but related ways: by 
creating a sense of both subjective expression and documentary objecthood. 
And in his parody of Pamela (1740), Fielding capitalizes on that absence of 
mediation, exploding Richardson’s claim to historicity by providing his 
own damning mediation. Shamela (1741), he claims, is the actual set of 
documents that Pamela was designed to substitute for and misrepresent, 
and that express a very different sort of subjectivity.
9 In this commentary I will sometimes, as here, present the relation between ‘mimesis’ and 
‘diegesis’ as dichotomous in order to make explicit the contrast between this narratological 
reduction of realism-as-mimesis, and the accurate understanding of realism as the dialectical 
relation between mimesis and diagesis. In particular I urge the reader not to confuse this faulty 
sense of mimesis (again, in its narratological reduction) with the meaning of that term that I’ve 
found in classical usage, which like realism incorporates in itself the self-conscious dialectic of 
life and art.
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Fielding’s parody might be said to have tolled the death knell for the claim 
to historicity. But Pamela also involves, less ostentatiously, a very different 
formal technique that lays the ground for the sort of reflexivity that will 
become realism. Richardson’s claim to historicity draws our attention to and 
objectif ies Pamela by a standard that is external to the text and therefore 
susceptible to the sort of disconfirmation that Fielding imagines. But in 
his prefatory material to Pamela, Richardson makes another sort of claim, 
about the pleasing authenticity of Pamela’s literary style, a claim that is 
internal to the text and that is confirmed if our own reading confirms it. 
One of Richardson’s prefatory puffers, advising him not to revise, objectif ies 
the relatively insubstantial and unelaborated nature of her literary style by 
comparing it to that of her clothing: ‘[L]et us have Pamela as Pamela wrote it; 
in her own Words, without Amputation, or Addition. Produce her to us in her 
neat Country Apparel, such as she appear’d in, on her intended Departure to 
her Parents; for such best becomes her Innocence and beautiful Simplicity’ 
(S. Richardson, 2001, p. 9). The comparison encourages us to anticipate a 
certain quality in Pamela’s writing style that stands out from mere writing 
as objectively as does her dress from the sort that Mr. B. would have her 
wear. In this way Pamela’s formal style becomes thematized on the level of 
content, and throughout the novel we’re sensitized to the way descriptions 
of dress reflexively evoke qualities of writing, an evocation that’s central 
to Richardson’s technique.
Also crucial are the responses of other readers to Pamela’s letters, readers 
who are also characters internal to the text we read. The most important of 
these is her master and would-be seducer Mr. B. Before his change of heart, 
Mr. B.’s desire to possess Pamela sexually is accompanied by his conviction 
that her letters are a tissue of misrepresentations that he also must possess 
and monitor. And because Pamela is therefore obliged to conceal her letters 
about her body and under her clothing, they’re thematized in a way that 
lends itself to her sexualization. So when at one point Pamela’s keeper Mrs. 
Jewkes seizes a packet of her letters, Pamela consoles herself that much of her 
writing ‘I still have safe, as I hope, sew’d in my Under-coat, about my Hips’. 
But Mr. B. forces Pamela to undress herself by threatening to do it for her:
‘Now’, said he, ‘it is my Opinion they are about you; and I never undrest 
a Girl in my Life; but I will now begin to strip my pretty Pamela, and 
hope I shall not go far before I f ind them.’ […] he began to unpin my 
Handkerchief. […] So I took off my Under-coat, and with great Trouble 
of Mind, unsew’d [my writing] from it. And there is a vast Quantity of it 
(S. Richardson, 2001, pp. 227, 235-36).
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Earlier Mr. B. had acknowledged that
I long to see the Particulars of your Plot, and your Disappointment, where 
your Papers leave off. For you have so beautiful a manner, that it is partly 
that, and partly my Love for you, that has made me desirous of reading all 
you write; […] there is such a pretty Air of Romance, as you relate them, 
in your Plots, and my Plots, that I shall be better directed in what manner 
to wind up the Catastrophe of the pretty Novel.
By this point Mr. B’s sexual desire has modulated into a species of love for 
Pamela that’s inseparable from his desire to read her, and to have the kind 
of pleasure entailed in that experience. Most important in the present 
context, Mr. B’s generic terminology suggests his detachment from the 
question of Pamela’s veracity. He no longer cares to challenge (as he had 
earlier) the documentary-empirical ‘mimetic’ truth of what Pamela writes 
but is focused instead on the subjective and diegetic ‘manner’ of her writing, 
her style. Now he confirms this in response to Pamela’s f inal plea. Putting 
these papers into his pocket, Mr. B. says: ‘You have more than these. Yes, Sir 
[says Pamela]; but all that they contain you know, as well as I. – But I don’t 
know, said he, the Light you put Things in’ (S. Richardson, 2001, pp. 231-32, 
239). And like Mr. B., we external readers learn to read self-consciously for 
Pamela’s manner, the light she puts things in, experiencing Richardson’s 
novel as a double ref lection whose story is to some degree about itself. 
Recalling Genette’s naively literalistic rejection of narrative ‘showing’, 
Richardson internalizes a f iguratively unmediated sense of being ‘shown’ 
within the process of reflexive mediation. Fielding doesn’t acknowledge 
the diegetic self-consciousness that is secreted at the heart of Richardson’s 
mimetic claim to historicity, but in Joseph Andrews (1742) he formulates 
the f irst coherent theory of novelistic realism (Fielding, 1999, bk. 3, ch. 1). 
Watt is right to emphasize the formality of novelistic realism. But he’s only 
half right, because he passes over the doubleness of its reflection, the fact 
of its reflexivity.
So the primary purpose of Richardson and Fielding’s realism isn’t simply 
mimetic (in the narratological sense of the term). Its purpose is to represent 
the real while accounting for how that representation has been accom-
plished. By the same token, novelistic self-consciousness, rightly seen as 
frustrating the naïve idea that empirical reality is subject to an immediate 
reflection, is also rightly seen as a skeptical instrument of empirical analysis, 
the narrative version of Bacon’s second stage of experiment. Novelistic 
narrative self-consciously reflects on the fact and method of its reflection 
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on the world. It doesn’t require Shklovsky or Genette to ‘bare the device’ 
by which the formal pleasures of reading are obtained.
But unlike the skeptical experimentalism of scientif ic method (and this 
is the crucial difference I refer to above), novelistic method doesn’t winnow 
out the variables it turns up. These variables, the dense circumstantiality 
generated by novelistic experimentation, also partially constitute the truth 
about the nature of human experience that is the object of experiment. They 
remain in the novelistic text both as a formal residue, the record of the au-
thor’s literary experiment, and as the thick and expansive mimetic-diegetic 
content that provides for the reader a second-order level of ‘experience’ in 
which to rehearse and learn the experimental method practiced by the 
author. To read a novel is (among other things) to encounter the diegetic 
thematization of an experiment in narrative form (McKeon, 2010, pp. 407-8). 
The experimentalism of structural narratology ignores this early history of 
novelistic method because it takes the novel to be governed by the universal 
principles that are assumed to govern narrative as such. On the one hand, 
the narrative constant of the novel is narration; on the other hand, all 
novelistic elements that narrative theory takes to play no role in storytelling 
it categorizes as variables under the broad category of illusory details or 
description. Although structural narratologists differ in the degree to which 
they bracket the analysis of novelistic description (Genette and Bal are a 
case in point), the normative dichotomization of narration and description, 
of diegesis and mimesis, directs relatively little attention or understanding 
to what is consigned to the latter category.
So far I have been describing the experiments in novelistic form that 
were practiced within the early novels. To this I’ll add a brief account of the 
closely-related debates about the nature of artistic reception and response 
that transpired during the same period and that shaped the ideas of realism 
and the aesthetic that were being formulated over the course of the eighteenth 
century. These debates evince an understanding very different from that 
posited by Genette in underscoring the structuralist axiom that ‘language 
signifies without imitating’. We recall his argument that whereas narrative 
can achieve only ‘the illusion of mimesis’, ‘dramatic representation’ literally 
does ‘show’ in a visual medium what it purports to imitate, and is therefore on 
the contrary ‘purely mimetic’. But Genette’s division between narrative telling 
and dramatic showing has only the logic of theory and bears no relation to 
the practical experience of Enlightenment commentators, for whom the 
problem of artistic illusion arose first with regard to drama, precisely because 
drama displays the real with visual immediacy. ‘[I]n contrast to dramatic 
representation’, Genette (1980, p. 164) writes, ‘no narrative can “show” or 
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“imitate” the story it tells’. But neither can dramatic representation: the insight 
of the Enlightenment commentators both anticipates and supersedes him.
It was, in fact, not the subtle mediations of narrative language but the spec-
tacular mediations of drama and the psychology of dramatic spectatorship 
that generated the f irst formulations of realism and the aesthetic, because 
theatrical presentation so patently intervenes between the viewer and the 
viewed. The issue was forced by the late Restoration ‘neoclassical’ doctrine 
of the two unities of time and place, which naively insisted that for dramatic 
imitation to be credited by its viewers requires a play to duplicate the reality it 
imitates as closely as possible in terms of the amount of time it takes and the 
quantity of space it traverses. Dryden represents the debate in Of Dramatic 
Poesy. An Essay. In the words of one speaker: ‘For what is more ridiculous than 
to represent an army with a drum and five men behind it, all which the hero 
of the other side is to drive in before him[?]’ How can plays please, and in 
some sense be ‘credited’ by, spectators who could not plausibly be thought to 
have taken their theatrical illusions for reality? (McKeon, 2009, pp. 232-33).
The answer to these questions, refined and sophisticated by a succession 
of authors from Dryden through Addison, Edmund Burke, Samuel Johnson, 
and William Wordsworth, was that it is neither the visual verisimilitude 
nor even the artistic medium that imitation depends on, but the creative 
imagination of its spectators. On the subject of staged warfare, another of 
Dryden’s interlocutors replies: ‘For my part, I can with as great ease persuade 
myself that the blows which are struck are given in good earnest, as I can 
that they who strike them are kings or princes, or those persons which they 
represent’. It is because playgoers don’t take theatrical imitations for reality 
that they are pleased by and credit them. Like Aristotle, Addison wrote that 
the pleasures of imitation are generated by the self-conscious comparison 
we make between what we see and how it is represented, ‘a new Principle of 
Pleasure, which is nothing else but the Action of the Mind, which compares 
the Ideas that arise from Words, with the Ideas that arise from the Objects 
themselves’. And as this passage suggests, Addison went even further than 
Aristotle by arguing that our aesthetic experience is not simply available but 
is positively enhanced by reading rather than watching a play, which only 
increases the imitative mediation required to obtain the greatest pleasure. ‘It 
will be asked’, wrote Johnson, ‘how the drama moves, if it is not credited. […] 
It is credited, whenever it moves, as a just picture of a real original’. The results 
of these inquiries into dramatic response were later applied to narrative and 
poetry, and at the end of the century, Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously de-
scribed our response to art as being achieved through the ‘willing suspension 
of disbelief’. That Coleridge wrote this in reference to novel reading makes 
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clear that these writers thought drama and narrative were analogous modes 
of imitation (McKeon, 2009, pp. 234, 237 [Addison’s italics], 239, 245, 250).
At one point in his commentary Genette (1980, p. 168) aff irms ‘the 
millennial opposition between diegesis and mimesis’. But the notion that 
either ancient mimesis or modern realism aims to achieve the illusion 
of a transparent, unmediated imitation is itself a modern illusion, and it 
would be difficult to find anyone affirming Genette’s ‘millennial opposition’ 
before twentieth-century structuralist theory itself.
My brief review of realist theory at its modern origins brings it into close 
proximity with the ancient theory of mimesis. Does the resulting evidence of 
a greater diachronic continuity confirm narratology’s principle of narrative 
universality? It seems to me that by now the defects of dichotomous thinking 
and its model of the excluded middle suggest the need for a more balanced 
relation between continuity and discontinuity. One such relation is available 
in the system of modes and genres that we owe to Aristotle, a system that 
integrates the relative continuity between two genres, epic and novel, that 
belong to the same narrative mode, with the relative discontinuity of two 
narrative genres that thrived under very different historical circumstances.
When Does History Matter?
Earlier in this essay I aff irmed the common wisdom that structuralist nar-
ratology entails a strict separation between narrative analysis and historical 
variation. The passages of narrative theory discussed here would seem to 
confirm that wisdom even though the nature of the narrative continuity they 
assert is mistaken. In the third edition of Narratology, however, Bal (2009, pp. 
71, 62) draws our attention to her treatment of description and the embedded 
‘mirror-text’ as evidence that ‘another preconception can be eliminated: that 
structural analysis is ahistorical’. We recall that in Bal’s analysis, description 
in the mimetic-realist text, inherently problematic, is rendered invisible by 
‘naturalizing’ it to the narrative. Historical change enters with modernism. 
To demonstrate this difference between realism and modernism, Bal (2009, 
pp. 36, 38) devotes several pages to the analysis of a long passage from Djuna 
Barnes’s Nightwood, in which description ‘ruptures linearity’ and ‘stops 
narrative in its tracks’; her contrasting realist passages are straightforward 
snippets from James and Dickens and allusions to Hardy and Balzac. My 
quantifying language perhaps too baldly underscores one problem with Bal’s 
analysis. More daunting is the rapt overstatement of her exegesis, as though 
to compensate for the availability of comparable passages in realist novels 
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(not least those of James and Dickens) (Bal, 2009, pp. 37-43). In a comparably 
historical vein, Bal (2009, p. 71) claims that ‘postmodernism has a special 
preference for the use of mirror-text’. Yet the ratio between postmodern 
and earlier texts Bal actually cites by way of example doesn’t come close to 
bearing out this generalization, and the far more frequent incidence of mirror 
texts before the mid-twentieth century measured against total number of 
publications must belie this easy claim (Bal, 2009, p. 71; cf. pp. 62-71).
Yet when a narrative technique is by consensus agreed to have attained 
broad acceptance at a recognized historical watershed, Bal sustains the 
ahistorical character of structural analysis by explicating it within a strictly 
linguistic classif ication. Free indirect discourse (FID) is a case in point. Bal 
treats FID within the logic of grammatical categorization without alluding 
to the chronologic of its dominant historical usage. Thus FID is one of the 
‘intermediate forms’ in the progression of ‘levels of narration’ from more 
to less direct techniques by which the ‘language situation’ of the narrator 
introduces the language situation of the character (Bal, 2009, 51-56).
As already mentioned, Genette classif ies FID as a variant of indirect 
style, and like Bal he characterizes it in soberly grammatical vocabulary. At 
the same time, Genette permits himself a less neutrally technical account. 
In fact it is in reference to indirect style that he (mistakenly) coordinates 
an imitative grammar of narration with the epistemological aim of rais-
ing the feeling of ‘literal f idelity’ (see above, p. 44). Indirect speech, still 
too shadowed by ‘the narrator’s presence’, fails in that aim. However FID, 
‘allowing a greater extension of the speech’, thereby engineers the ‘begin-
ning of emancipation’ (Genette 1980, p. 172). Sensitized by this strikingly 
qualitative metaphor for the relation between character and narrator in 
Genette’s account of FID, I returned to Bal only to f ind lurking within her 
own language an equally metaphorical term, but one of radically different 
import: not emancipation but invasion (ibid., p. 51). In Bal’s analysis, FID 
entails ‘text interference’, in which the language situation of the narrator 
is ‘invaded’ by that of the character, The implication of this terminological 
difference is that Bal and Genette bring to the analysis of FID the distinct 
forms intimated by their chosen categories of grammatical taxonomy: for 
Bal, the typology of ‘levels of narration’; for Genette, the typology of ‘states 
of characters’ speech’ (Bal, 2009, p. 48; Genette 1980, p. 171). As these terms 
may suggest, Bal’s analytic norm is (to use Genette’s terms) ‘who speaks’, 
whereas Genette’s is ‘who sees’ (Genette, 1980, p. 186). If so, the idea of 
focalization has succeeded for the most part in normalizing this crucial 
distinction, but it has not been successful in normalizing its application in 
narratological analysis.
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What’s the signif icance of Bal’s unpersuasive revelation of antirealist 
techniques in modernist description that resists naturalization, and in the 
postmodern mirror text, as historically innovative? From the historically 
more rigorous perspective of genre history, these techniques are not anti-
realist. And from the perspective of actual usage, by the twentieth century 
they’re not innovative but conventional. Nevertheless Bal’s recourse to 
history does challenge the common wisdom about narratology and history. 
By way of amendment, it’s not that structuralist analysis eschews history 
but that it tends to get it wrong. More precisely, it abstracts moments or se-
quences from the diachronic continuum of history in order to erase some of 
them, and to give others the authority of the normative, even the universal, 
measure of narrative. A little history is a dangerous thing, especially when 
it’s selected with parti pris.
The comparison of how Bal and Genette analyze FID offers another 
insight. Both use structural typologies in their analyses, but both use figures 
– ‘invasion’ on the one hand and ‘emancipation’ on the other – to express 
the challenge FID makes to the coherence of those typologies. The reason 
for this is that structural typologies aim to be static taxonomies in the sense 
that they consist of ‘states’ and ‘levels’ that are fully separable from one 
another. However FID entails not a stasis but a process, a movement from 
one state or level to another and back again. I would like to suggest that there 
is an analogy between the challenge represented by FID at the micro-level 
of the sentence and the challenge represented by generic change at the 
macro-level of history. Both are processes that are inconsistent with static 
structures, but in certain cases both are seen to require accommodation.
Like Bal, Genette gestures toward eliminating the preconception that 
structural analysis is ahistorical, and the technique he refers to is more 
truly innovative than those of Bal. In what he calls ‘immediate speech’ 
and a further emancipation of the speech of the character, ‘the narrator is 
obliterated and the character substitutes for him’. Genette describes here 
the technique ‘whose inchoateness supposedly guarantees transparency 
and faithfulness to the deepest eddies of the “stream of consciousness”’, and 
this he regards as a ‘revolution in the history of the novel’ (Genette, 1980, 
pp. 173, 174, 180, his italics). That structuralist narratology might celebrate 
as a historical milestone the devolution of narrative to sheer imitation 
is surely unexpected. For non-structuralists, the importance of stream 
of consciousness is not to be doubted. But to see FID as no more than a 
halfway house on the road to stream of consciousness – or as, in contrast to 
it, undeserving of historical notice – would appear to bypass a consideration 
of the major difference between the two techniques.
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Both Genette and Bal are interested in the affective response to narrative 
structures, but perhaps uncertain on how to integrate reader reception, 
presumably processual and variable under different micro- and macro-
circumstances, with decontextualized and invariant form. Whether a 
matter of character states or levels of narration, Bal and Genette concur 
that to read FID is to experience the ‘merging’ of what normally are kept 
separate (Genette, 1980, p. 174; Bal, 2009, p. 51). In some cases, ‘a distinction 
into narrative levels can no longer be made’ (Bal, 2009, p. 56). In Genette’s 
(1980, p. 172) words, the experience of the reader can be one of ‘ambiguity’ 
and ‘confusion’. But although these descriptions seem accurate, they treat 
FID, and for that matter the syntagmatic axis of language itself, as though 
it were a snapshot rather than a cinematic unfolding in which something 
remarkable – a temporal ‘mediation’ – begins and runs its course. The 
point can be made by comparing what happens in FID to the temporality 
of stream of consciousness, which captures the character’s experience of 
interior dynamism but leaves the reader’s sense of it static and immobile 
because it is abruptly given rather than entered into or departed from by 
process.10 FID consists on the contrary of the process, self-conscious by 
virtue of being a process, of oscillating between the ‘voices’ of narrator and 
character, creating the effect of moving back and forth between ‘outside’ and 
‘inside’, a movement that seems palpably to carve out a space of subjective 
interiority precisely through its narrative objectif ication.11
What makes FID distinctively different not only from stream of con-
sciousness but also from direct and indirect discourse is that it enables us 
to ‘hear’ the difference between the voices of narrator and character along 
a grammatical and syntactic continuum that proceeds from the voice of 
the narrator to that of the character, and then back to that of the narrator. 
The sequence is continuous in that the tense of narration and the third-
person reference with which it begins are maintained throughout. But the 
sequence is also a differential in that it takes us from (and f inally back to) 
a narrative voice that’s more or less distinctive in its own right, but that is 
separated from the voice of the character by the fact that the character’s 
voice is represented in the recognizable expressive idiom with which direct 
10 Genette (1980, pp. 173-74) offers a tendentious reading of Joyce’s remark about stream of 
consciousness that makes a virtue of its abruptness as, rather than interiority, its ‘main point’. 
This is to sacrif ice an understanding of FID that is within the supreme capacity of structural 
analysis alone – that is, the distinction between two correlative structures – to convey. 
11 My scare quotes aim to shield myself from the charge of naïve literalism. By ‘voice’ I mean 
to evoke metaphorically how the words of narrators, and the thoughts of characters translated 
into words, would sound if spoken.
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and indirect discourse have already made us familiar. (In the terminology 
of focalization, one might say that this difference in idiom corresponds to 
a shift in the focalized.) Although it reads like speech, FID represents at 
the level of thought. The representation of the character’s speech would 
require a grammatical shift that would preclude continuity by interrupting 
it, rather than sustain continuity (as FID does) by modulating it along a 
differential. As a realist (and therefore self-conscious) technique, FID invites 
us to experience the character’s consciousness by f iguratively descending 
into that character’s interiority, achieving the effect of depth by linguistic 
means that simultaneously displays and owns the technical artif ice of that 
achievement. Stream of consciousness is the great example of realism in 
the faulty, structuralist sense of that term; FID exemplif ies realism as the 
outcome of a macro-development in the capacity of novelistic narrative to 
thematize its formal technique of representation at the micro-level of the 
sentence.
Earlier in this essay I described Richardson’s thematization of form 
through the representation of the character Mr. B. reading Pamela’s letters 
and journal, the text that his readers are also in the process of reading. 
Exploiting Cervantes’s techniques of self-conscious narration, Fielding 
achieves a similar but more striking effect by embedding impersonal 
abstractions of his narrator and his reader in the text of Joseph Andrews, 
at f irst belaboring the latter in the voice of the former for being little more 
than an ignorant and passive bystander at the site of narrative action, 
but gradually inviting the reader into a more active participation in the 
imaginative composition of the text.12 In passing, Fielding’s ref lexive 
textual intrusions might well be described as interferences or invasions, 
constituting narrator and reader as separate entities in order to bring them 
into explicit, sometimes jarring, relation. Several decades later, Burney 
and then Austen substantially ref ine Fielding’s intrusive technique in the 
direction of FID. They forgo Fielding’s obtrusive embodiment of his reader 
within his text as a distinct entity (although the unobtrusive invocation 
of the reader remains an occasional strategy), instead locating the reader 
function temporarily within one or another character (as Richardson does 
with Mr. B.). They transform Fielding’s punctual moment of intrusion into 
12 For example, in the last book of Joseph Andrews Fielding’s (1999, p. 196) narrator tacitly 
invites the reader to anticipate the climax of the plot by employing one of the most familiar 
conventions of family romance, then begins his narration of the following day by personifying 
morning as a ‘beautiful young Lady’ who ‘rose from her Bed […] with a Countenance blooming 
with fresh Youth and Sprightliness, like Miss _____’ – at which point a note directs us to the 
bottom of the page, where we read: ‘Whoever the Reader pleases’.
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an extended temporal process. And they conflate, then re-separate, nar-
rator and character in that process, whose dialectical subtlety sustains 
the ‘illusion’ (Genette, 1980, p. 164) of interior depth, but not the illusion 
that the process that sustains this illusion is or should be ‘invisible’ (Bal, 
p. 41). The relation between Fielding’s innovative technique of narration 
and the institutionalization of FID offers one way to appreciate Fielding’s 
remarkable contribution to the development of novelistic narrative.
How is Fielding’s narrative practice accounted for in narrative theory? 
Given FID’s challenge to narratology, we might expect some comparable 
treatment of the way Fielding’s narrator ostentatiously intrudes into his 
own narrative. However he plays no role in Bal’s text, and no more than 
a cameo role in Genette’s. Is this because FID challenges the separation 
of narrator from character that def ines their chosen typologies, whereas 
Fielding challenges, at a higher level, the separation of discourse from 
story? But are not the latter terms general categories or wholes that are 
made up, respectively, of particular parts like narrator and character? 
Genette dismisses the importance of narratorial intrusion on the basis of 
considering it within a typology of narratorial ‘person’ or ‘status’. In this 
framework, ‘[i]nsofar as the narrator can at any instant intervene as such 
in the narrative’, every act of narration is ‘presented in the f irst person’, and 
the ‘real question’ concerns not narratorial intervention in the narrative but 
‘whether or not the narrator can use the f irst person to designate one of his 
characters’ (Genette, 1980, p. 244, his italics). The resulting typology gives 
us ‘the four basic types of narrator’s status’, none of which correspond to 
Fielding’s (or Cervantes’s) practice because none narrate from outside the 
narrative yet become intervening presences within it without also being 
named as f irst-person characters (Genette, 1980, p. 248).
But Genette returns to the topic of narratorial intervention when he 
considers ‘The Functions of the Narrator’, and it is here that Fielding’s name 
briefly surfaces (Genette, 1980, p. 255). Although Genette does number these 
functions, he is at pains to disclaim any system here: ‘These f ive functions 
are certainly not to be put into watertight compartments’. The ‘narrator’s 
interventions’ comes up almost by the way. ‘[E]veryone knows that Balzac 
“intervenes” in his narrative more than Flaubert, that Fielding addresses the 
reader more often than Mme. De La Fayette does […] but we will not claim 
to derive some cumbersome typology from that’ (Genette, 1980, pp. 256, 
257). Of course Genette is at liberty to derive any sort of typology that would 
express his view of what is important enough to systematize for analysis; 
so his refusal to claim is less the scrupulous assessment of objective data 
it may sound like than the corollary of his judgment that the data he has 
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assembled lacks narratological importance. Or so it would seem. But it turns 
out that Genette’s diff idence relates not to narratorial intervention but to 
its eighteenth-century innovations. Shortly after this disclaimer Genette 
boldly characterizes the modernist interventions of Proust’s Marcel as an 
‘invasion […] of the narrative by its own discourse’. In fact this Proustian 
practice may bear responsibility ‘for the strongest shock given in this work, 
and by this work, to the traditional equilibrium of novelistic form’, and 
Genette speculates that the Recherche ‘concludes the history of the genre 
(of the genres) and, along with some others, inaugurates the limitless and 
indefinite space of modern literature …’ (Genette, 1980, p. 259).13 This is a 
familiar argument from eschatology. Its effect is to efface the prior history 
of narratorial intrusion, which gathers momentum toward the end of the 
eighteenth century along with (pace Genette) the actual inauguration of lit-
erature as an explicit category. The problem is not entirely that structuralist 
narratology, thrown back on history, is likely to overemphasize modernism 
and to overlook its antecedents. As he explains in the Preface, Genette’s aim 
in writing Narrative Discourse was divided between his critical ambition 
to write a study of Proust’s Recherche and his theoretical ambition to use 
Proust as the basis for a study of narratology. But it must be said that the 
division of purpose that Genette describes, too comfortably, as ‘the paradox 
of every poetics’, may be itself a symptom of narratological overconfidence 
(Genette, 1980, p. 23). Not that Fielding should be put in competition with 
Proust’s incomparable text. My doubts concern more the way the stringent 
self-denial of ahistorical analysis is rewarded by the supreme confidence of 
ungrounded historical f iat. Perhaps the experience of deriving the totality 
of narrative theory from that single text created in Genette the illusion 
that in the process he had comprehended the totality of narrative practice.
Still, Genette’s remarks on Proust invite a more historically grounded 
ref lection on modern attitudes toward genre. What is the relationship 
between the modern belief in the death of genre and the late modern no-
tion of a non-genre literature, and the way the novel has been theorized, 
for most of its history, as a genre singularly def icient in generic identity? 
The idea of a separable ‘literary’ category is foreign to traditional culture. 
What looks like the special def iciency of the novel may rather be one of its 
13 We might infer that Fielding’s intrusions fail to occasion the epochal shock delivered by 
Marcel’s because the structural absence of Fielding’s hypostatized reader from the internal 
terrain of the story somehow denies that reader the affective experience of intrusion. However, 
Genette, now describing what he calls the ‘ideological’ function of the narrator, has increased the 
range of his exemplary texts to include novels that diverge from the autobiographical structure 
exemplif ied by Marcel and Gil Blas (see Genette, 1980, pp. 256-58).
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special functions: the role of enacting for modern culture the meaning of 
freedom as a negative quantity, a ‘freedom from’ what exists over against 
it. The modern shift in the idea of genre – from an enabling hermeneutic to 
a constraining taxonomy – is coextensive with the emergence of the novel 
because it marks a similar separation out of what formerly was held in 
relation. The novel is the great modern genre because it explicitly articulates 
a problem in matching particular instance to general kind or type that is 
only tacit, hence non-problematic, in traditional genre theory. The novel 
crystallizes genreness, we might say, self-consciously incorporating, as part 
of its form, the problem of its own categorial status. What makes the novel 
a different sort of genre is not in its ‘nature’ but in its tendency to reflect on 
its nature – which of course alters its nature in the process.
By the turn of the nineteenth century, FID was well on its way to becom-
ing the new genre’s most distinctive method of narrating the speech and 
thoughts of characters in language that conveys their personal interiority. 
At this moment, the power of the new genre to evoke a range of positions 
along an epistemological continuum between documentary objectivity and 
emotional subjectivity was gathering at the latter end of that spectrum. To 
appreciate the importance of FID, the student of genre is likely to contextu-
alize its emergence not only diachronically, within the history of novelistic 
form, but also synchronically, in relation to other analogous developments. 
At the turn of the eighteenth century, for example, the growth of so-called 
societies for the reformation of manners came to a head in the celebrity of 
the minister Jeremy Collier, who attacked playwrights for what he described 
as their profaneness and immorality. In Collier’s mind the basis for this at-
tack was that ‘‘tis the Poet that speaks in the Persons of the Stage’, and when 
these dramatic characters are vicious, the playwright’s ‘private Sentiments 
fall under Censure’. Collier’s insistence that the characterization of a vicious 
person is necessarily a vicious characterization evoked many rejoinders, 
including the playwright William Congreve’s measured reply that nothing 
should be ‘imputed to the Persuasions or private Sentiments of the Author, 
if at any time one of these vicious Characters in any of his Plays shall behave 
himself foolishly, or immorally in Word or Deed’.14 This is the same moment 
that Swift, irritated at complaints that A Tale of a Tub is irreligious, felt 
obliged to point out ‘that some of those Passages in this Discourse, which 
appear most liable to Objection are what they call Parodies, where the Author 
14 See McKeon 2005, pp. 99-102, where the Collier controversy is discussed in the context of 
other evidence that the modern separation between the public and the private was established 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
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personates the Style and Manner of other Writers, whom he has a mind to 
expose’ (Swift, 2010, p. 7). Neither Swift nor Congreve supposes himself to be 
breaking new ground. They’re insisting on tacit protocols of interpretation 
that, now made explicit, contribute to the period’s preoccupation with the 
nature and the limits of person, impersonation, personality, and personal 
identity.
Like the separation of the author’s from the character’s personality, the 
separation of narrator from character became an explicit protocol of literary 
characterization and interpretation. With hindsight, both separations can 
be recognized as the necessary precondition for modern experiments in 
their conflation. What the structuralists sequester in modernism and its 
aftermath as a strictly linguistic phenomenon is a far earlier, more gradual, 
and more expansive turn toward the modern that consists in the dialectical 
interaction between an unprecedented division of knowledge on the one 
hand, and on the other the multiple challenges to that division that were 
generated by it. Whether conceived as the ‘interference’ of one level with 
another or as its ‘emancipation’, what’s sacrif iced through the analysis of 
FID as a strictly linguistic technique is an appreciation – seemingly a simple 
point – that language use partakes in larger intellectual and cultural move-
ments with which it is contemporary, and shares structural similarities.
The structuralist separation of ‘structure’ from ‘history’ precludes this 
sort of insight by conceiving structure as ahistorical. I began this essay 
by describing the difference between the universal mode of narrative 
and its particular generic instances as structuralism has construed that 
difference in terms of a division between an abstract system of linguistic 
signif ication and the applications of that system in concrete use. Now, 
insofar as structure is an abstract universal, it seems justif ied to treat it as 
in itself suprahistorical; what’s been at issue in the foregoing discussion is 
the absence, in structuralist method, of analytic intercourse between the 
universal and the particular, structure and history. But there’s another 
sense of structure – structure as synchrony – that is related to universality 
in being devoid of temporality, but that is not for that reason devoid of a 
historical character.
Broadly speaking, until the later eighteenth century to do history had 
been to engage in diachronic or chronological study. At that time writers 
of the Scottish Enlightenment posited and began to practice a method of 
studying the past that abstracted a period, even a synchronic ‘moment’, apart 
from its diachronic temporality based on its similarity to other, structurally 
comparable moments in other diachronic sequences. Once returned to its 
chronology, the question was whether the distinctively layered character of 
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this synchronic moment bore a relation to its diachronic sequence similar 
to what transpired in those other ones. From these experiments emerged 
a comparative historiography. Half a century later Marx formulated a con-
ception of history as the dialectical relation of diachrony and synchrony. 
Structuralism conceives the relation between synchrony and diachrony 
dichotomously. But the tradition that f lows from Marx and the Scottish 
Enlightenment sees the synchronic departure from temporality as a condi-
tion under which the momentary suspension or freezing of diachrony allows 
historical understanding to be thickened along a different axis. It departs 
from temporality not by rising above it but by burrowing into it.
By this modern understanding, the study of history requires subject-
ing the diachronic dimension of sequential stages of temporality to the 
analysis of each moment’s synchronic dimension into levels of structure. 
Analogously, realism is a modern technique of representation that entails 
a double reflection: on the one hand, the ongoing representation of the real 
in the dimension of mimetic content; on the other hand, the representation 
of the real through the penetration of mimetic content by the dimension of 
diegetic formal self-consciousness, transforming the one-dimensionality 
of ‘the real’ into the reflexivity of ‘realism’.
Postclassical / Postmodern / Unnatural Narrative Theory
My argument thus far has concerned the ambition of structuralist narratol-
ogy to theorize narrative form exclusively in terms of universal linguistic 
structure. On that basis narratology sought to isolate narrative form, both as 
diegetic form abstracted from mimetic content at the micro-level of a given 
narrative, and as modal structure abstracted from its generic variations 
at the macro-level of the history of narrative. Narratology’s ambition, I’ve 
maintained, is frustrated by its unrationalized reliance on one genre in 
particular, the novel, for its evidence of universal usage; by its reduction 
alike of generic, novelistic norms of realism and modal, narrative norms of 
mimesis; by its embedding of exclusive criteria within putatively inclusive 
criteria of narrative form; and by an ambivalent slippage between structural 
and affective standards in assessing narrative form.
In the last several decades, theorists of narrative impatient with the 
limitations of structuralist analysis have challenged this ‘classical’ narratol-
ogy with increasing confidence and from multiple directions, culminating 
in a consensus that narrative theory has entered its second phase, far 
more inclusive than the f irst although prof iting from the work done in 
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preparing the ground for the second. David Herman, who coined the term 
‘postclassical narratologies’ and may be the most thorough explicator of this 
watershed, sees nearly as much continuity as break in the transition, but at 
the same time describes a new enterprise in which it would seem that just 
about anything goes.15 Another term for this second phase is ‘Postmodern 
Narrative Theory’, whose proponents see the f irst phase as more fully out-
moded than does Herman, and from a more decidedly deconstructive and 
poststructuralist position (see Gibson, 1996; Currie, 1998). Finally, ‘unnatu-
ral narratology’ is the name given to work that understands structuralist 
narratology, itself a discloser of ‘naturalization’, to be a framework whose 
protocols ‘naturalize’ narrative, and therefore provide a negative guide to 
unnatural effects dictated by formal procedures or in any case achieved 
at the level of content (see Alber, Iversen, Nielsen, and Richardson, 2013).
So narratology has been radically reconstituted. No longer conceived as 
the systematic description of linguistic signification, narrative theory is cur-
rently defined by its rigorous inclusivity, forgoing the strict division of form 
from content, langue from parole, and structure from history and thereby 
accumulating a vast assemblage of new data, techniques, and narrative 
entities. And yet the relation between narrative and novel, mode and genre 
continues to be problematic. The great majority of texts analyzed and ad-
duced as exemplary narratives continue to be novels, hence representative 
of only the most modern genre of that mode. Both mimesis and novelistic 
realism continue to be construed as epistemologically one-dimensional 
projects dedicated, whether naively or instrumentally, to the illusion of 
transparently representing the real. Moreover the classical partiality to the 
most modern genre, which persists in postclassical narratology’s common 
recourse to novels as representative of narrative, is aggravated by unnatural 
narratology’s preference for the most contemporary and self-consciously 
experimental novels to exemplify antimimetic/antirealist narrative. Yet 
as I have argued, the founding reflexivity of the novel genre exemplif ies 
the formal and epistemological qualities of what continues to be called 
‘antirealism’, while the richest trove of nonrealism in the ontological sense 
of supernatural and impossible contents is to be found in pre-modern 
romance, allegory, and the like.16
15 See Herman, 1999; Herman, 2005; Herman, 2012; Fludernik, 2005; Alber and Fludernik, 2010; 
Herman and Vervaeck, 2005.
16 Alber, Iversen, Nielsen, and Richardson, 2013; Mäkelä 2013; B. Richardson 2012; Phelan and 
Rabinowitz, 2012; Schaeffer and Vulture, 2005; Ronen, 2005; Palmer, 2005a; Fludernik, 1996, pp. 
35-38, 130-31. In Fludernik’s argument mimesis is closely correlated with realism and realism with 
verisimilitude, thereby over-emphasizing illusion at the expense of self-conscious reflexivity. 
thE EightEENth- CENtury ChaLLENgE to NarrativE thEory 71
In 1985, Bal cautioned against the term ‘theory of the novel’ because 
its practitioners have ‘obscured the precise position of the novel with 
respect to other genres and types of text’ (1985, p. 116; 2009, p. 175). Bal’s 
warning becomes unintentionally ironic with the realization that (as I’ve 
been arguing) theory of narrative of the sort she practices has had just this 
effect. In 2005, the postclassical narratologist David Herman wrote that 
‘theories of narrative were entangled until quite recently with theories of 
the novel’ (Herman, 2005, 32n.1). Half a century ago this was, in the view 
of Frye, Scholes, and Kellogg, the result of novel imperialism (see above, p. 
37). For the next forty years, I’ve been arguing, it’s been a function rather 
of structuralist narratology. Herman appears to suggest that with postclas-
sical narrative theory this entanglement has ceased; yet this seems to me 
neither true nor, measured by the postclassical rejection of exclusive and 
analytic standards, desirable. Has structuralist narratology itself continued 
to exert a more powerful and lasting influence than the watershed thesis 
recognizes? Or was the structuralist paradigm only symptomatic of a larger 
phenomenon?
The differences between classical and postclassical narratology are 
most likely to be foregrounded when the topic under analysis is a concrete 
instance of language use like FID, where not narrative structure but its 
effect on the reader has become of unambivalent interest in postclassical 
writings. Recent commentary stresses how a focus on the reader (or hearer, 
in oral interchange) and the metaphorical nature of ‘voice’ generate rhetori-
cal, pragmatic, perceptual, cognitive, medial, and contextual variables that 
militate against the adequacy of structurally systematic and unified typolo-
gies of language use. What nonetheless isn’t likely to be thrown into relief is 
the generic and historical specif icity of FID, like narratorial intrusion and 
other expressions of realist reflexivity, as a novelistic technique (Walsh, 
2010; Palmer, 2005a).17 The shift from a less to a more inclusive narrative 
theory cannot be doubted. Yet what seems most subject to inclusion is 
not the diachronic diversity of narrative but the diversity of theoretical 
postures that proliferated with the decline of structuralism and the rise of 
poststructuralism, and that has continued despite the decline of Theory 
itself.
However, her work is highly unusual if not unique in its methodological insistence that narrative 
theory must be informed by the history of genres (see below).
17 However, this might be understood less as continuous with the structuralist exclusion of 
historical contingency than as the result of the postclassical extension of FID beyond the literary 
boundaries imposed by the structuralist framework.
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The exceptions to these (admittedly under-documented) generaliza-
tions, however, are of fundamental importance. I will limit myself to 
two scholars, who despite signif icant disagreement provide cogent and 
broadly complementary theorizations of FID as a historical phenomenon. 
Ann Banf ield has argued that FID is a product of the ‘moment’ when 
orality or reported speech, which is dominated by the communicative 
function, is met and inf iltrated by the expressive function of literacy or 
represented speech. In that engagement, the ‘self ’ expressed by writing 
and the ‘now’ entailed in its subjectivity, tacit under conditions of orality, 
are separated out from the temporal ‘present’ of the ‘speaker’s’ act of 
communication and become explicit. FID enacts the dialectic between 
the speaker’s narration and the self ’s expression. But because the moment 
of literacy is recurrent and variable, the moment of FID lies both in the 
linguistic potentiality of literacy and in its historical actualization – 
in Europe, when western culture becomes a literate culture. Monika 
Fludernik’s exhaustive study of FID combines a mastery of linguistics, 
an acute and imaginative engagement with classical and postclassical 
narratological scholarship, and a remarkably deep investigation of the 
historicity of FID, not only from the early novel onward but also in pre-
novelistic, non-literary, and oral discourse. Fludernik argues that to come 
to terms with FID we need to acknowledge its presence in texts as early as 
the medieval and in forms more disparate than has yet been recognized. 
And we need to replace the familiar and misleading typology of direct, 
indirect, and free indirect discourse by a scalar model that can begin to 
account for its complex set of combinational variables, both linguistic 
and extra-linguistic, and for the subtly incremental range of its effects 
(Fludernik, 1993).
But the striking achievements of Banf ield and Fludernik nonetheless 
leave the achievements of postclassical narratology itself uncertain. I am 
far from knowing the f ield well enough to submit that Fludernik’s achieve-
ment is not simply remarkable but unique; however both options leave 
the achievements of postclassical narratology itself uncertain. Narrative 
theory has been liberated from an analytic model far too rigid to do justice 
to its subject matter. And it may be in the nature of this liberation that 
the ambition implicit in the original project – to theorize narration in 
universal terms that therefore apply to all particular instances – will be 
transformed into a more eclectic aim of inclusivity, and the application 
of a priori principle exchanged for unregulated if not random profusion. 
Nonetheless, a looser coordination of the modal whole with its constituent 
generic parts still seems a viable aim. The problem is that apart from the 
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work of these two scholars and a few others,18 research in the f ield remains 
as partial as before the change, and in the same way. The a priori misconcep-
tion of realism continues to skew the reading of the novel, while the already 
established tendency to focus on modern narrative (hence the novel) has 
become a yet more restrictive concentration on twentieth-century and 
contemporary narrative, especially as it entails non-literary discourses 
and media or is marked by their influence. That premodern narrative has 
comparable cross-discursive qualities but attracts little critical attention 
suggests that this ultra-modern emphasis has less to do with matters of 
form than with modernity itself.
Like classical narrative theory before it, postclassical and unnatural 
narratology seem to be trapped in what I have elsewhere described as 
the paradox of the ‘Novel Tradition’ (see McKeon, 2000a, pp. 268, 490, 587, 
803-6). For such theorists, the wholesale valorization of novelty and free 
innovation that characterizes Western modernity at large (by which I mean 
the period that in England began around 1700) enforces a conviction that 
to be plausibly modern, modern history must be demonstrably or at least 
seemingly unprecedented, a conviction that interferes, even more than 
the historiography of progress, with the capacity to think historically. To 
have coherence, all historical things must display both the continuity of an 
integral entity and, within that continuity, the discontinuity that confirms 
its existence over time and space, its capacity to change without changing 
into something else. To have a historical existence, the novel therefore 
must possess a discernible continuity, a tradition. But the only tradition 
compatible with modernity must be characterized by the discontinuity of 
innovation. Consequently the history of the novel is intelligible only as a 
series of discontinuous stages – typically realism, modernism, postmodern-
ism, and perhaps postcolonialism – each of which radically innovates on its 
predecessor, a claim that can be credited only by ignoring the formal coher-
ence of realism’s dialectic of double reflection, which also grounds all later 
stages of the genre however distinct the terms of that dialectic may become. 
The longevity of FID is in this respect instructive. A remarkably subtle 
technique, FID brings the dialectic of form and content down to the micro-
level of the sentence, and its affective power, structurally undiminished over 
time, nonetheless requires of its modern readers an undiminished capacity 
of attentive reception and response. We needn’t rehearse the force and 
consequence of life in late modernity – Benjamin’s storyteller virtualized 
and digitized – to conceive how the reflexivity of FID might be flattened 
18 E.g. see Alber and Fludernik, 2010, p. 13.
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by familiarity to a merely one-dimensional reflection. This misrecognition 
then sets the stage for the putatively unprecedented self-consciousness of 
contemporary narrative. Adapting Giorgio Santayana, those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it as though it were new. David 
Herman has rightly observed that postclassical narratology ‘should not be 
conflated with poststructuralist theories of narrative’ (Herman, 1999, p. 2). 
But the overlap is considerable, especially with regard to what has become 
the taken-for-granted reduction of novelistic realism (e.g., see McKeon, 
2000a, parts p. 10, p. 13). In this respect the legacy of structuralism has lived 
on in poststructuralism and postclassical narrative theory. Maybe we’ve 
learned to let the pref ix ‘post-’ do too much of our thinking for us.
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 Formalism and Historicity Reconciled 
in Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones
John Richetti
Every student of Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones quotes Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 
remark in his Table Talk: ‘What a master of composition Fielding was! Upon 
my word, I think the Oedipus Tyrannus, the Alchemist, and Tom Jones, the 
three most perfect plots ever planned’ (Coleridge, 1856, p. 521). The novel’s 
justly-celebrated plot with its twists and turns and surprises seems to 
involve for readers a series of uncertainties about the ultimate fates of 
its characters. And yet Fielding’s plot is distinct from what we now think 
of as ‘plot’. For one thing, the narrative unfolds in a supremely leisurely 
and digressive fashion, lacking the ‘structuration’ that contemporary nar-
ratologists see as the essence of plot. To quote a representative def inition 
by Karin Kukkonen, plot ‘designates the ways in which the events and 
characters’ actions in a story are arranged and how this arrangement in turn 
facilitates discussion of their motivations and consequences’. Kukkonen 
adds that ‘these causal and temporal patterns can be foregrounded by the 
narrative discourse itself or inferred by the reader’. Plot, the expanded 
definition continues, can be ‘progressive structuration’, as readers perceive 
‘connections between story events, motivations and consequences’, and 
it can also be part of ‘authorial design’ whereby the author structures the 
narrative ‘to achieve particular effects’ (Kukkonen, 2014). That is to say, 
plot in narratological analysis is a cognitive tool whereby the matter of the 
narrative − the nature of the characters (psychological, socio-historical, and 
so on) − the events and sequences that flow from those characters and their 
experiences, creates through the narrator’s arrangement and the reader’s 
interpretation a meaningful whole.
But narratological analysis of the elusive aspect of narrative we label plot 
runs up against Fielding’s undermining of plot in Tom Jones in our current 
sense of the term. Even though readers know that the narrator is completely 
in control (how could he be otherwise!), withholding for a time crucial facts 
and details about the sequence of events that constitute the story but oc-
cluding the links and characters’ motives that in fact connect those events, 
Fielding poses as merely the teller of a tale or the relator of a simple story 
(a ‘History’), facetiously minimizing his role as inventor of the narrative, 
creating a supervising suspense or suspicion about the ultimate fates of 
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his main characters, especially Tom. To be sure, the sobriquet that the title 
gives Tom, ‘a Foundling’, is a broad hint to the alert reader of the novel’s 
ultimate revelation, since foundlings in myth and romance are always more 
than they seem to be (Oedipus, Moses, for example), although Tom even in 
his exalted f inal restoration to grace is still a bastard, a fact that cannot be 
erased even by the romantic ending of the novel. That is to say, there is a 
generic inevitability in Fielding’s implicit evocation (strongly promoted by 
the word in his title, ‘a Foundling’) that reassures the alert reader (we cannot 
of course be sure just how alert or fully aware of the literary-historical 
ironies in his subtitle his initial readers were) about Tom’s ultimate fate and 
the resolution of the novel’s events. Contemporary narratological generali-
ties are insuff icient or indeed irrelevant in the face of Fielding’s playful 
comedy in which plot in any stable sense is undermined. For Fielding, we 
may say, plot is a rhetorical device tied to the generic inevitabilities of the 
comic romance tradition in which he is operating. Plot in Tom Jones is a 
visible rhetorical artif ice rather than an unfolding or exploration of the 
uncertain destinies or developing identities of his characters.
Moreover, Fielding’s coy sub-title for his book, a ‘comic epic in prose’, 
seeks to dilute plot in its technical narratological sense but also crucially, 
I want to argue, to modify the playful generic features of comic romance 
by its frequent elaboration of socio-economic actualities. In its way, Tom 
Jones is a panoramic view of mid-eighteenth-century England, and that 
representational fullness is sometimes in tension with the artif icialities and 
rhetorical playfulness of comic romance. That is to say, there are problemati-
cal aspects of actual mid-eighteenth-century English life that rear their ugly 
head when the novel may be said to go just a bit too far into situations or 
facts (or in the case I have in mind in presenting characters) that resist full 
or seamless absorption into comic artif ice. Certain representations in Field-
ing’s novel may be said to leave traces of a somewhat intractable or in point 
of practice an actuality beyond the artif ice of comic romance. Fielding both 
offers glimpses of this historicity and withdraws from its articulation or full 
exploration as he pursues his comic and moral symmetries. His narrative 
method provides socio-historical knowledge such as other sorts of novels, 
including his own Amelia (1751) and of course Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa 
(1747-1748), are uniquely equipped and designed to offer. But in his f irst two 
‘novels’, Joseph Andrews (1742) and here in Tom Jones he at times occludes 
or appropriates such socio-historical facts by literary transformations that 
are part of his comic romance.
Critical approaches to Fielding’s Tom Jones, exemplif ied by classic and 
still inf luential essays by R.S. Crane and Ralph Rader, stress either the 
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artif ice and control of the narrator (Crane, 1957) or the rich and varied 
socio-historical representations the novel features even as it creates a comic 
artefact (Rader, 2011). Crane’s analysis of the plot of Fielding’s novel stresses 
its organizing comic form whereby our anxiety over Tom’s fate ‘is the comic 
analogue of fear’, comic because there are plenty of narrative signals that all 
will be well in this basically benign world that Fielding evokes and controls. 
But despite his rigorous attention to the formal devices of Fielding’s novel, 
even Crane refers at times to a gap, which we don’t feel in other comic works 
such as Oliver Goldsmith’s She Stoops to Conquer, between this form and 
an implied world of, shall we say, socio-historical reality just beyond the 
novel’s representations: ‘We are not disposed to feel’, Crane admits, ‘when 
we are done laughing at Tom, that all is right with the world or that we can 
count on Fortune always intervening, in the same gratifying way, on behalf 
of the good’ (Crane, 1952, p. 84). I would revise Crane’s comment drastically 
to say that in fact the fortunate fate the plot of Tom Jones arranges for its 
hero dramatizes that Fortune in the actual world will never intervene on the 
side of the angels, that the good will almost invariably meet an undeserved 
bad end. For his part, Rader in his essay, ‘Tom Jones: The Form in History’ 
takes Tom’s distinctive and spontaneous goodness that for Crane provides 
readers with comic security about the hero’s ultimate fate and locates it 
ideologically and historically in Fielding’s reading of the Latitudinarian 
preachers of the day. And he also asks among other pertinent questions 
why a novel centred on a single protagonist should ‘have in it such a wealth 
of characters from all levels of society?’ and ‘why in purely artistic terms 
should it include glimpses of and encounters with the Jacobite rebellion of 
1745?’ (Rader, 2011, p. 246).
I want in what follows to try to answer or at least to explore these two 
questions Rader asks of Crane’s approach to Tom Jones (and in the process 
to speculate about why Crane admits that there is a limit to our confidence 
in the novel’s comic resolutions), since I think that Fielding’s unresolved 
socio-historical representations appear most clearly through a few minor 
or peripheral characters who function to a greater or lesser extent as part of 
the narrative structure, those tangled circumstances that will resolve Tom’s 
dilemma and in the end reward him as he deserves. To the extent that Tom 
Jones is panoramic or epic in scope, by the way, it resembles equally ambi-
tious nineteenth-century novels, which as Alex Woloch observes shrewdly 
in their proliferation of characters are often ‘structurally destabilized’ by 
too many people ‘who are incompletely pulled into the narrative’ and hang 
between allegorical generality and a particularity of reference that in its 
fullness should by rights belong only to the major characters (Woloch, 2003, 
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p. 19). But in Tom Jones at least some of these minor characters also acquire 
in the course of events a kind of virtual independence and disruptive socio-
historical resonance that the main characters do not possess. Paradoxically 
they have a particularized reference, a socio-historical specif icity that 
exceeds that of major characters with quasi-allegorical names like Allwor-
thy and Squire Western or Thwackum and Square, or of minor characters 
like the many comic servants and innkeepers, for example. Some minor 
characters can be said to mark the limits of Fielding’s comic artif ice or at 
least of his full narrative interest in articulating their histories.
To be sure, just about all the time, Fielding in Tom Jones smoothly manages 
these potentially problematical aspects of socio-historical representation 
perfectly well by establishing a jokey complicity with his readers, a form of 
reassuring comic universalizing in which we wait for the working out of the 
amusing inevitabilities of frail or corrupt human nature and the interlocking 
of events in the movement of the plot as they manifest themselves toward a 
long-delayed resolution, which is of course insured by the generic form of 
the comic romance. For an instance of a series of events and characters that 
will allow me to illustrate how such representation is managed smoothly 
in Fielding’s characteristic fashion even as it exposes the problematics 
of socio-historical representation, I want to consider the introduction of 
a company of soldiers in Chapters 11 and 12 of Book VII, as Tom tries to 
f ind the road to Bristol in order to seek his fortune after being banished 
from Paradise Hall. These soldiers are on their way northward to take on 
the Jacobite rebels led by Bonnie Prince Charlie. A look at this scene will 
respond to Ralph Rader’s question of why that specif ic historical moment 
is inserted into Fielding’s novel. As Martin Battestin notes in the Wesleyan 
edition of the novel, Fielding places the action very precisely in November 
1745 when the Duke of Cumberland had been appointed commander of 
the forces at a crisis point: the rebel army had penetrated into England as 
far as Derby, before beginning their retreat back to Scotland and eventual 
decisive defeat at Culloden in April 1746 (Battestin, 1975, p. xxxviii). Late at 
night when Tom is asleep in an armchair in the tavern where the suspicious 
host will not allow him a proper bed, the soldiers burst in and demand 
drink from the landlord. Tom awakens, joins in the revelry, and in fact pays 
the reckoning at the end when a dispute arises over who owes how much, 
some of the soldiers having decamped to avoid paying their share. So this 
historically resonant – and in 1749 very recent – moment of national crisis 
begins in comic boisterousness and predictable lower-class self-seeking and 
petty cheating, which tells us a great deal about the dominance of comic 
form in the novel:
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The Company having now pretty well satisf ied their Thirst, nothing 
remained but to pay the Reckoning, a Circumstance often productive of 
much Mischief and Discontent among the inferior Rank of Gentry; who 
are apt to f ind great Diff iculty in assessing the Sum, with exact Regard 
to distributive Justice, which directs, that every Man shall pay according 
to the Quantity which he drinks (TJ, p. 327).19
The son of a soldier, Fielding portrays here and elsewhere in Tom Jones the 
eighteenth-century English army as the imperfect, not to say laughably 
corrupt and ineff icient, institution it may to some extent have been, 
staging at some length for comic effect the ignorance and loutishness, here 
and elsewhere, of the common soldiery, who are no different and possibly 
worse in their thoughtless brutality and self-seeking than the other plebe-
ians he represents in the novel. (I should insert here that whether this 
depiction of a key institution is driven by literary or ideological motives is 
a good question without a clear answer. Why, to ask Rader’s question again, 
is the 1745 Jacobite rebellion, a very recent and deadly serious political 
crisis, inserted and then withdrawn from the novel? Why is the focus 
in this scene as Tom volunteers to f ight against the rebels on the comic 
and corrupt aspects of military life? What does such a depiction of the 
military tell us about Tom’s heroic and somewhat embarrassingly self-
conscious patriotism as he joins the forces?) The sergeant of the company, 
for example, is a minor miles gloriosus, telling Tom ‘many entertaining 
Stories of his Campaigns, tho’ in Reality he had never made any; for he 
was but lately come into the Service’ and as the narrator tells us ascended 
to his rank ‘by his Merit in recruiting, in which he was most excellently 
well skilled’ (TJ, pp. 328-29). Fielding’s readers then and perhaps now are 
certain to know that military recruiting in the eighteenth century was 
often enough a matter of trickery and false promises, so our sergeant is 
very much a rogue, comic enough in the narrative (he later tries to sell 
Tom a sword for the astonishing sum of twenty guineas but relents quickly 
when challenged and says that he meant twenty shillings!), but in actual 
practice as a recruiter he would be a symptom of corrupt, devious, and 
often brutal military custom for f illing the ranks. Indeed, much later 
in the novel Lady Bellaston proposes to Lord Fellamar that Tom can be 
legally pressed into the navy, and she’s right. Martin Battestin’s note in 
the Wesleyan edition of the novel explains that in 1744 a new law went 
19 All further quotations from Tom Jones in the text are from Penguin edition of the novel 
edited by Thomas Keymer and Alice Wakely.
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into effect that any able bodied male who had no visible trade or means 
of support could be conscripted.20
But at the end of this chapter of Book VII, as Tom meets the off icers of 
the company, he is greeted gallantly by the senior of the group, a sixty-
year-old lieutenant (an unlikely age for a soldier, especially then), who sees 
‘a remarkable Air of Dignity in [Tom’s] Look, which is rarely seen among 
the Vulgar, and is indeed not inseparably annexed to the Features of their 
Superiors’ (TJ, p. 329) and invites him to dine with the rest of the off icers. 
This courtly lieutenant provides an exemplary military case history that 
can only be meant to illustrate the moral corruption and misuse of power in 
the army, which is surely Fielding’s point in offering his story in some detail: 
promoted to lieutenant from ensign personally, we are told, by the Duke of 
Marlborough for his bravery after the battle of Malplaquet, the lieutenant 
has remained at this rank for forty years because his wife (unbeknownst 
to him) has refused to prostitute herself to the colonel who is his superior 
off icer. As the narrator reports, this lieutenant had served
near forty Years; during which Time he had seen vast Numbers preferred 
over his Head, and had now the Mortif ication to be commanded by Boys, 
whose Fathers were at Nurse when he had f irst entered into the Service 
[…] This unfortunate Off icer (for so I think he may be called) had many 
good Qualities, besides his Merit in his Profession; for he was a religious, 
honest, good natured Man; and had behaved so well in his Command, 
that he was highly esteemed and beloved, not only by the Soldiers of his 
own Company; but by the whole Regiment (TJ, pp. 330-31).
In this and the chapters that follow, the lieutenant proves himself in the 
context of an institution like the army that denies him advancement a noble 
and upright exception to its moral laxity, reproaching his junior off icers 
for their ignorance and profanity and serving as a kind of temporary father 
f igure for Tom after he is nearly killed in a cowardly assault by one Ensign 
Northerton in a quarrel a few chapters later, as Northerton, presumably 
drunk, after Tom has proposed a toast to Sophie Western, swears that ‘Tom 
French of our Regiment had both’ Sophia Western and her aunt at Bath (TJ, 
20 ‘Though the impressment of recruits for the Navy had been practiced in England since the 
thirteenth century, in 1744 a new law went into effect (17 George II, cap. 15) explicitly empower-
ing local authorities to conscript as soldiers or marines all “such able-bodied Men as do not 
follow any lawful Calling of Employment, or have some other lawful and eff icient Support and 
Maintenance”’ (Fielding, pp. 863-64).
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p. 334). When Tom calls him an impudent rascal, Northerton fells Tom with 
a bottle to the head.
The off icers’ dinner where we meet those ensigns under the command 
of the noble lieutenant is a riotous scene such as Fielding, who after all 
began literary life as a dramatist, loves to set up throughout the novel. It 
features his characteristically comic babble of voices and accents, a rich 
variety of idiolects for the members of the company, in which self-serving 
and boastful ignorance, profanity, and loutish behaviour collide not only 
with the lieutenant’s nobility and generosity but with Tom’s reverential 
evocation of Sophia and his heroic sentiments at the prospect of defending 
his country and his religion against the Jacobite menace. As he exclaims at 
one point over dinner:
‘I don’t know, Gentlemen,’ says Jones, ‘what may be your Opinion; but I 
think no Man can engage in a nobler Cause than that of his Religion; and 
I have observed in the little I have read of History, that no Soldiers have 
fought so bravely, as those who have been inspired with a religious Zeal: 
For my own Part, tho’ I love my King and Country, I hope, as well as any 
Man in it, yet the Protestant Interest is no small Motive to my becoming 
a Volunteer in the Cause’ (TJ, p. 332).
Such high flown, even priggish sentiments sound fairly odd in this profane 
and riotous company, where a bit earlier Northerton has aggressively dis-
played his ignorance after Tom describes the ‘Merriment’ that had passed 
among the soldiers with whom he arrived and avers that, nonetheless, 
‘“they will behave more like Grecians than Trojans when they come to the 
Enemy.” “Grecians and Trojans!” says Ensign Northerton, “who the Devil 
are they? I have heard of all the Troops in Europe, but never of any such 
as these”’ (TJ, p. 331). Despite having been at school and even after being 
reminded by the lieutenant of Pope’s translation of Homer, Northerton 
is not at all embarrassed by his ignorance, and his exuberant def iance of 
cultural and linguistic decorum pits his racy and irreverent manner of 
speaking against Tom’s and the lieutenant’s decorous pieties and sober 
conversation:
‘D___n Homo with all my Heart,’ says Northerton, ‘I have the Marks of 
him in my A___ yet. There’s Thomas of our Regiment, always carries a 
Homo in his Pocket: D___n me if ever I come at it, if I don’t burn it. And 
there’s Corderius, [Mathurin Cordier, author of a Latin textbook] another 
d___n’d Son of a Whore that hath got me many a Flogging’ (TJ, p. 331).
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Northerton continues in the same vein, swearing as he recalls his father’s 
desire that he should be a clergyman (hence his being sent to school), and 
the lieutenant cautions him to watch his language and to avoid abusing 
the clergy: ‘Scandalous Names and Reflections cast on any Body of Men, 
must be always unjustif iable; but especially so, when thrown on so sacred 
a Function’ (TJ, p. 332). The lieutenant is like Tom: except for a pardon-
able failing (despite his piety, he believes in a soldier’s right to defend his 
honour by duelling) he is a paragon, both morally and linguistically, and his 
proprieties we might add make him a kind of straight man for the slangy 
and irreverent Northerton.
In the shadow of what his original audience would have known was the 
nearly successful 1745 Jacobite rebellion, Fielding’s evocation of the English 
armed forces with a cast of characters like this is a distracting mixture of 
possibilities, of traditional comedy and satiric exposure, comic indignation 
or simply amusement at predictable knavery and hypocrisy, we might 
want to call it, coexisting with what can only be read as satisfaction in the 
historical outcome in which this institution worked well enough in defeat-
ing the rebels. Except for the odd panegyric like Addison’s ‘The Campaign’ 
about the victorious Marlborough, or Defoe’s embarrassing tributes to the 
military triumphs of his hero, King William, it is hard to f ind among major 
eighteenth-century English writers any glorif ication of military life and its 
leaders, and Fielding is no exception. Implicit in the standing army debates 
in England going back to the late seventeenth century is an anti-militarism 
that Fielding seems to share. But any systematic critique of arbitrary and 
unjust standards for military advancement implied by the lieutenant’s 
career is diluted by the private sexual melodrama that we are told has 
held him back, although Fielding’s original audience would have been well 
aware that commissions were legally purchased, with power and social 
privilege rather than military capacity or skill at the core of the English 
off icer class, at least at the lower levels. The injustice perpetrated by the 
lieutenant’s libidinous superior is chalked up to the moral inevitabilities 
of unchecked power in corrupt individuals rather than to the nature of 
an institutional culture that permits such abuses or at least does nothing 
to prevent them.
From scenes like this, one can generalize outward and say that Tom 
Jones offers, in its broad representational sweep, a fairly complete survey of 
English institutions, which are if one stops to think about it, the sources of 
its plot complications – the church and the clergy, the judiciary, the game 
laws, the rural gentry who exploit and administer that law, the army, an 
often corrupt and immoral aristocracy in the persons of Lady Bellaston 
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and Lord Fellamar, the upper f inancial bourgeoisie like Nightingale’s fa-
ther, social welfare and the regulation of the poor (consider Black George, 
Allworthy’s gamekeeper and his impoverished family), and many other 
aspects of mid-eighteenth-century English society, including the lack of 
vocational opportunities for young, educated but impecunious men like 
Tom – all these institutions and social classes governing mid-eighteenth-
century life are represented both seriously and comically as deeply flawed, 
but they do provide material for a series of good jokes, serving as occasions 
for severe critique, laughter accompanied by sentimental regret and even 
outrage at injustice, implicit indignation at downright exploitation and 
abuse of power. And yet ridicule and contempt are held within a control-
ling and reassuring comic understanding, the scandalous socio-historical 
particulars balanced by a universalizing and uniformitarian psychology 
and history. Fielding’s subject as he tells us in his opening chapter is after 
all primarily human nature rather than the condition of England in the 
mid-1740s.
In his tracking in these chapters from the feckless common soldiers, 
to the roguish other ranks, up to the often treacherous and ignorant 
lower off ice corps, Fielding displays his talent for comprehensiveness 
and inclusiveness; the canvas is Hogarthian, the effect is comic plenitude 
through varieties of demotic speech, regional accents and cross-class 
mixtures, especially in the fascinating character of Northerton, a ruthless 
and reckless parvenu who will shortly play what will turn out to be a key 
and indeed totally unexpected role in the working out of the intricate 
twists and turns of Fielding’s plot. If we think about Ensign Northerton 
as a character when we f irst meet him in the off icers’ dinner scene and in 
his subsequent actions in the narrative – his treacherous, thoughtlessly 
or perhaps just spontaneously brutal behavior in the chapters that follow 
his introduction – Northerton resonates beyond his socio-economic and 
linguistic place; he is both an interesting occasion for social satire, an 
illustration in his precise class history of the ignorance, the self-seeking 
corruption and casual brutality of the lower off icer corps. But in the end 
he turns out to be much more important as a key cog in the mechanism of 
the plot. For one thing, his assault on Tom keeps him from taking part in 
the expedition to Scotland against the Jacobites. Bribing the landlady of 
the inn where he is being held prisoner by the lieutenant for that nearly 
fatal assault, Northerton escapes and as the narrator informs us in Book 
IX, Chapter 7 he hastens to a rendezvous with his mistress, none other 
than Jenny Waters, formerly known as Jenny Jones, common-law wife 
of his fellow soldier, one Captain Waters and of course the woman who 
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confessed to Allworthy that Tom was her illegitimate son. Concubinage 
and casual sexual connections and temporary relationships among the 
soldiery are about as realistically sordid a detail as one can imagine, 
but Northerton brings murderous violence and theft to the mix, as well 
let it be noted an apparent sexual dynamism that prompts Mrs. Waters 
to abandon her captain for him. But at the bottom of Mazard-Hill, he 
attempts to murder his mistress and relieve her of a valuable ring and 
ninety pounds with which he plans to make his escape from England 
from one of the Welsh ports, thereby betraying the lady who had agreed 
to desert her military ‘husband’ Captain Waters and f lee the country 
with him.
Fielding’s evocation of his sudden impulse for murderous treachery is 
worth quoting for the narrator’s refusal to speculate about Northerton’s 
pre-meditation and its implication, given his previous outburst of rage 
against Tom, that his violence is more or less automatic and spontaneous. 
That is to say, Fielding avoids granting Northerton a coherent character or 
personality that explains his violent treachery; his effort seems to be to 
make him simply part of the hidden mechanism of the plot, although at 
this point a reader cannot possibly know that.
Whether the execrable Scheme which he now attempted to execute, 
was the Effect of previous Deliberation, or whether it now f irst came 
into his Head, I cannot determine. But being arrived in this lonely Place, 
where it was very improbable he should meet with any Interruption; he 
suddenly slipped his Garter from his Leg, and laying violent Hands on 
the poor Woman, endeavoured to perpetrate the dreadful and detestable 
Fact, which we have before commemorated, and which the providential 
Appearance of Jones did so fortunately prevent (TJ, pp. 457-58).
Tom happens to be sitting nearby with the Man of the Hill, and he intervenes 
to save Mrs.Waters in the nick of time. The coincidences and relationships 
in this violent intersection of three people are multiple, even for the reader 
and certainly for Tom, since he has never met or known about the woman 
who admitted to Allworthy that she was the foundling’s mother. So this 
key moment in the plot is not understood by readers and characters for 
what it is. Instead, it is at f irst a dramatization of Northerton’s villainy and 
Tom’s selfless heroism. Every reader of the novel will remember the rest, as 
Tom takes the terrif ied and nearly bare-breasted lady to the inn at Upton 
to complete her rescue. Fielding goes on to dwell upon the circumstances 
that led Northerton to this violence:
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[W]e have opened to thee a Scene of Folly, as well as Villainy, which we 
could scarce have believed a human Creature capable of ; had we not 
remembered that this Fellow was at that Time f irmly persuaded that he 
had already committed a Murder [that is of Tom at the off icers’ dinner], 
and had forfeited his Life to the Law. As he concluded that his only Safety 
lay in Flight, he thought the possessing himself of this poor Woman’s 
Money and Ring, would make him Amends for the additional Burthen 
he was to lay on his Conscience (TJ, p. 458).
One wonders whether Fielding wants us to believe that Northerton has a 
conscience! He goes on to say that since Northerton ‘had neither the Birth 
nor Education of a Gentleman’ he was not f it to be an off icer in the army, 
and that if ‘his Baseness can justly reflect on any besides himself, it must 
be only on those who gave him his Commission’ (TJ, p. 458). Given what 
we have learned about some English off icers such as the colonel who has 
opposed the saintly lieutenant’s promotion because his wife would not 
prostitute herself to him, this is a fairly empty protest on Fielding’s part. 
The fact is that having invented Northerton in all his elemental viciousness 
as a crucial and hidden link in his plot, Fielding f inds it diff icult to account 
for his character. He cannot fully accommodate a character like this to his 
comic vision, but as we shall see we need him for a key twist in the plot.
Had it not been for this incident and Tom’s subsequent liaison with this 
woman, the quondam Jenny Jones, later Waters, he comes to fear is his 
mother, his real identity might never have emerged in the tangled series 
of events that is the novel’s plot. So Northerton’s compulsions, his sexual 
history and his spontaneous violence, are the secret essence of Fielding’s 
famous clockwork plot, a crucial cog in its workings, and yet given what 
Northerton has told us of himself he is something more than that, not only 
pathologically violent but a signif icant case history, a ‘character’ whose 
story has various potentially realistic and socio-historical dimensions that 
do not f it into the comic symmetries Fielding cultivates in his adherence 
to the comic romance genre.
This elusive and ruthless Northerton, resisting the upward mobility his 
parents had in mind when they sent him to school and designed him for a 
clergyman, grabbing pleasure, enjoying def iance, sowing destruction and 
disorder as he goes, is not quite an incidental picaro, since his origins and 
social trajectory are carefully noted; he has a history and Fielding sees that 
readers are informed of it: the child of parents who hoped through their son 
to ascend socially. This is what he says earlier in the dinner scene when the 
lieutenant asks him if he has been at school:
90 JohN riChEt ti 
‘Ay d___n me have I,’ answered he, ‘the Devil take my Father for sending 
me thither. The old Put wanted to make a Parson of me, but d___n me, 
thinks I to myself, I’ll nick you there, old Cull: The Devil a Smack of your 
Nonsense, shall you ever get into me. There’s Jimmey Oliver of our Regi-
ment, he narrowly escaped being a Pimp too; and that would have been 
a thousand Pities: For d___n me if he is not one of the prettiest Fellows in 
the whole World; but he went farther than I with the old Cull: For Jimmey 
can neither write nor read’ (TJ, pp. 331-32).
In his subversively malevolent energies, his self-destructive rejectionism, 
his reckless denial of moral and social decorum, his contempt for the social 
ambitions his father had for him, Northerton might well be a comically 
sinister f igure out of a nineteenth-century realistic novel by Stendhal or 
Balzac or Thackeray or Dickens. But for Fielding in Tom Jones he is primarily 
a functional f igure in the clockwork complicated mechanism of his plot 
and only secondarily part of the socio-economic/institutional landscape, 
the historical knowledge that Fielding to some extent delivers, but to an 
important extent fashions for his own literary and comic purposes: f irst, 
Northerton helps move along the Hogarthian comedy and the satire of the 
eighteenth-century army, but his much more important – if implicit – func-
tion comes in his serving as the subversive double of Tom Jones, the bastard 
born to be hanged as everyone said, the drunken and irresponsible ward of 
the lord of the manor who is expelled from Paradise Hall for his behaviour. 
But in point of fact Northerton’s dependable villainy, his amoral resiliency 
and elusiveness, as well as his energetic profanity are the realistic opposites 
of Tom’s instinctive and improbable virtue and fine speeches, although later 
in the novel he and Tom will be more or less equal in the eyes of the law, both 
suspected of felonious assault. To some extent at f irst glance, Northerton’s 
demonic personality and brutal history are eff iciently absorbed by the 
demands of the novel’s moral and comic symmetry in which characters 
tend to be balanced in pairs. But as we contemplate his actions there is a 
surplus energy and expressiveness in Northerton as Fielding represents 
him that erodes or eludes that symmetry.
As an instance of military incompetence as well as thoroughgoing villainy, 
Northerton is indeed part of what I am calling Fielding’s critical examination 
of eighteenth-century institutions. His villainy is not derived overtly from 
his occupation, although the implication is that fecklessness like his thrives 
in a specific eighteenth-century English military context. In his predictable 
and amoral viciousness, Northerton is of a piece with the other villains 
in the narrative, although he is crude and overt where Tom’s half-brother 
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(as he turns out to be in the end), Blif il is subtle and cunning, but like the 
latter’s lies and distortions Northerton’s actions create what turn out to be 
temporary obstacles and in paradoxically happy fact essential contributions 
to Tom’s progress toward his ultimate happy ending. Northerton’s character 
is precisely problematical in that one can derive it from his socio-economic 
circumstances that locate him within the limited possibilities for movement 
upwards for young men without connections or wealth in eighteenth-century 
English society, as his subversion of morality and discipline might well be 
seen as the negative reaction to his privileged education, just as Tom’s es-
sential decency might be related to Allworthy’s disastrous choice of tutors for 
him and Master Blif il, with Tom reacting against their absurd and inflexible 
teachings and Blifil manipulating both of his tutors for his own advantage. Of 
course, I am highlighting and isolating what Fielding only touches on in pass-
ing, uninterested as he seems to be in deriving character from circumstances, 
or at least as later novelists would in seeking to understand the relationship 
between character and socio-economic circumstances; but if we read as it 
were against the comic grain of the narrative, Northerton as a character is 
instructively distinct from what will emerge as Tom’s privileged and magical 
status as the true heir to the Allworthy estate, the folk tale foundling (to 
be sure still a bastard, conceived out of wedlock), the hero of a modern 
romance, however modified from the traditional simplicities of that genre. 
Northerton’s story is, from this perspective, the realistic or malevolently 
picaresque alternative to the comic romance embodied in the charming and 
sweet person of Tom Jones. Northerton’s amoral and destructive energies are 
in an important sense a dramatization of what Tom would most likely have 
become without the literary transformations wrought by Fielding’s comic 
narrative in which Tom, as Rader pointed out, is a benevolent, generous 
embodiment of Latitudinarian goodness.
To be sure, as a minor character who is almost purely functional in Field-
ing’s complicated plot, Northerton is as Alex Woloch says of the implied 
person behind any minor novelistic character, not so much reflected in 
the text as ‘partially inflected’, radically contingent within the story as a 
whole (Woloch, 2003, p. 13). There is a fascinating if unresolvable excess in 
Northerton; he is in Woloch’s terms inflected but we can’t be said to have 
any clear sense of what his deviations (that is to say, his inflections, his 
singular markings) from moral and social norms actually signify. What, 
in other words, drives this character to commit various forms of mayhem? 
Fielding doesn’t bother to explore it; he ignores it or claims that it is opaque 
and mysterious, and Northerton is simply part of the comic and brutal 
English soldiery, although as later events prove he is not simply that.
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It is quite otherwise for Fielding as he presents Tom’s other, more obvi-
ous evil twin, Blif il, who is a major character in the novel and thereby far 
less elusive than Northerton in the sense that the reader is instructed to 
understand him and Tom in their relationship as half-brothers, with Blif il 
as Tom’s moral and emotional opposite. Blif il’s place in the comic and moral 
symmetries of Fielding’s novel, then, is absolutely clear, dictated by the bal-
ancing of characters into opposing pairs. Whereas Northerton as he himself 
presents his history is in one sense completely forthright in his impulsive 
violent urges and amoral movements, Tom Jones is transparent in his public 
persona, ingenuous and open, generous and spontaneous for better and 
sometimes for worse. Blif il, however, in his capacity as Tom’s opposite, is 
decidedly not what he seems to be to other characters in the novel; he is 
manipulative, devious, and self-serving, opaque to others, indeed possessed 
of the secret upon which the plot turns, Bridget Allworthy’s admission on 
her deathbed that Tom is her son by the late Mr. Summer. And yet both 
young men have, as we learn at the end, the same mother, and they have 
identical childhoods, the same loving uncle and aunt and the same tutors, 
although Tom is slightly older. The balancing symmetries of the romance 
plot, here and elsewhere overrule such naturalistic possibilities.
Since a minor character like Northerton turns out to be essential for 
the working out of the plot of Tom Jones, I want, then, to consider as well 
how the plot of Fielding’s comic romance is served in other senses by a few 
major characters who are in one respect similar in villainy to him, although 
totally different in their self-presentation and self-consciousness – all three 
Blif ils, the uncle, Dr. Blif il, the father, Captain Blif il, and Blif il (who is 
never given a f irst name) the son of the marriage between Captain Blif il 
(another soldier, as it turns out) and Bridget Allworthy. Dr. Blif il is part of 
the Allworthy household we meet in the opening chapters, the recipient of 
Allworthy’s patronage as someone who is unable to support himself in the 
medical profession his father forced him to study. This Blif il, Fielding tells 
us, had ‘a great Appearance of Religion’, and he adds, his tongue f irmly in 
his cheek, ‘Whether his religion was real, or consisted only in Appearance, 
I shall not presume to say, as I am not possessed of any Touchstone, which 
can distinguish the true from the false’ (TJ, p. 60). In Fielding’s transparent 
irony, his disingenuous pseudo-ignorance, this means that Dr. Blif il is a 
hypocrite, a Tartuffe of the f irst order. Noting quickly that the sexually 
eager Bridget Allworthy (Fielding’s embarrassing joke about plain spinsters 
ready to marry any warm body is what drives this part of the plot, and it 
is distasteful to modern readers) would provide him with an avenue to 
possession of the Allworthy estate, he f inds that, as Fielding renders his 
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thoughts, there is one obstacle to this opportunity: ‘an unfortunate Accident 
which had happened to him about ten Years before; namely, his Marriage 
with another Woman, who was not only still alive, but what was worse, 
known to be so by Mr. Allworthy’ (TJ, p. 61). Fielding’s narrator pretends to 
validate Dr. Blif il’s frame of reference, although the effect is to dramatize 
it comically as the character’s moral nullity. So Dr. Blif il remembers, in 
Fielding’s ingenuous tracing of knavery, ‘that he had a Brother who was 
under no such unhappy Incapacity’ (TJ, p. 61). Thus Captain Blif il enters 
the novel, invited by his brother to court Bridget as a means of acquiring 
the Allworthy estate. Here in part is his history and his portrait, what for 
Northerton by signif icant contrast Fielding never provides:
This Gentleman was about 35 Years of Age. He was of a middle Size, and 
what is called well built. He had a Scar on his Forehead, which did not 
so much injure his Beauty, as it denoted his Valour (for he was a half-pay 
Off icer.) He had good Teeth, and something affable, when he pleased, 
in his Smile; though naturally his Countenance, as well as his Air and 
Voice, had much of Roughness in it, yet he could at any Time deposite 
this, and appear all Gentleness and good Humour. … in his Youth had 
abounded in Sprightliness, which, though he had lately put on a more 
serious Character, he could, when he pleased, resume. […]
He had purchased the Post of Lieutenant of Dragoons, and afterwards 
came to be a Captain; but having quarrelled with his Colonel, was by 
his Interest obliged to sell; from which Time he had entirely rusticated 
himself, had betaken himself to studying the Scriptures, and was not a 
little suspected of an Inclination to Methodism (TJ, pp. 61-62).
The ironies in these evocations of the Blif il brothers are as thick as they are 
obvious. In their self-seeking hypocrisy and careful scheming for advantage, 
they represent the dominant opposition to the virtuous and the deserving in 
Fielding’s comic universe, where the prevailing mode of conceptualization 
of characters is comic opposition. The Blif ils are poised for comic effect in 
the Somersetshire countryside against, Tom, Sophia, and Allworthy. We 
wonder, perhaps, why Allworthy and others are fooled by these knaves and 
by similar bad actors such as the two tutors of the boys, Thwackum and 
Square. But Fielding warns us that life is not like his comic novel:
the Reader is greatly mistaken, if he conceives that Thwackum appeared 
to Mr. Allworthy in the same Light as he doth to him in this History; 
and he is as much deceived, if he imagines, that the most intimate 
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Acquaintance which he himself could have had with that Divine, would 
have informed him of those Things which we, from our Inspiration, are 
enabled to open and discover (TJ, p. 123).
But the hypocrisies of his father and uncle are nothing compared to the 
self-seeking and scheming for advantage of the youngest Blifil, who succeeds 
where they do not. For one f iendishly clever and indeed crucial instance 
of his scheming, consider the moment in Book VI, Chapter X when Blif il 
maliciously reports that Tom was drunk on the day that Allworthy fell ill 
and was thought to be in danger of dying: ‘in the very Day of your utmost 
Danger, when myself and all the Family were in Tears, he f illed the House 
with Riot and Debauchery. He drank and sung and roared’ (TJ, p. 275), and 
that day Blif il and Thwackum surprised Tom in amorous embrace in the 
woods with Molly Seagrim. But of course readers already know that Tom 
was drunk when he celebrated Allworthy’s recovery. The narrator tells us 
very precisely that Thwackum had wanted to tell Allworthy that very day 
of Tom’s drunken behaviour, and he explains Blif il’s strategy:
In Reality, Blif il had taken some Pains to prevail with the Parson, and 
to prevent the Discovery at that Time; for which he had many Reasons. 
He knew that the Minds of Men are apt to be softened and relaxed from 
their usual Severity by Sickness. Besides, he imagined that if the Story 
was told when the Fact was so recent, and the Physician about the House, 
who might have unraveled the real Truth, he should never be able to give 
it the malicious Turn which he intended. Again, he resolved to hoard up 
this Business, till the Indiscretion of Jones should afford some additional 
Complaints; for he thought the joint Weight of many Facts falling upon 
him together, would be the most likely to crush him; and he watched 
therefore some such Opportunity as that with which Fortune had now 
kindly presented him (TJ, p. 276).
The cold calculation in this is chilling and of course tremendously effective 
for the key event in the novel’s plot, since it leads to Tom’s banishment from 
Paradise Hall and the beginning of his adventures and travails. Blif il we 
may say is like a playwright or a novelist; he is aware of an audience, in this 
case Allworthy, and alert to the timing and thus the effect of his words, 
which he uses here and elsewhere to manipulate others rather than like 
Tom and other characters who speak to express an opinion or an emotion. 
To some extent, Blif il is like Fielding’s narrator in this regard; he withholds 
information and times its partial revelation precisely in order to produce 
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actions and consequences. But Blif il is not writing a comic romance; he is 
rather manipulating others for his own advantage and not like Fielding for 
his readers’ amusement and instruction. Blif il is in this light a demonic 
parody of the Fieldingesque narrator.
A comparison of Blif il and Northerton is thus instructive. Northerton’s 
actions and words are spontaneous and unplanned and to some extent 
self-destructive, purely revealing of a rapacious self and nearly demented 
and out-of-control personality. His spontaneity makes him much more 
like Tom than like Blif il. The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling depends 
upon a host of secrets, of the narrator’s withholding or suppression of 
information, the most important of which if one thinks about the title is 
exactly Tom’s mysterious paternity, a secret that Blif il possesses and also 
suppresses. Northerton has no secrets, but unlike Tom he has an identity 
and a personal history that place him in a profession that he has recklessly 
chosen over the career his father planned for him. He has a demented and 
reckless agency, whereas Tom is as he goes manipulated by events that 
Fielding’s plot arranges, his agency compromised by the circumstances 
of the plot, Northerton’s cowardly attack on him at the inn among the 
most important. Northerton, however, is not a f igure out of romance, like 
Tom the foundling, but a representation of social possibility and active, 
purposeful, self-destructive moral failure. Blif il’s schemes propel Tom into 
his adventures in the world, and Northerton’s actions are part and parcel of 
those adventures, in fact the key impetus to the resolution of the plot and 
the exposure of Blif il’s careful conspiracy. But Northerton does not know 
that he is a crucial cog in the plot (how could he?). Blif il, on the other hand, 
deliberately and carefully attempts and almost succeeds in controlling for 
his own evil ends the plot of the novel.
Overall, Tom Jones is nearly representational in the full latter-day nov-
elistic sense: offering readers comprehensive, moral-satiric knowledge of 
a whole range of characters within social institutions in their historical 
unfolding, and articulating them across a wide spectrum of comic idiolects 
from different professions and the entire gamut of English mid-eighteenth-
century social groups and positions. Fielding subordinates many of the 
socio-historic actualities of his day to his fashioning of a moral and aesthetic 
artefact we know as Tom Jones that exploits but foreshortens or abridges or 
simplif ies these actualities to shape the ideal movement of his comic epic 
plot. Ensign Northerton’s history and character play a crucial part in the plot 
but also mark an unresolved contingency in that shaping, marking Field-
ing’s mostly unrealized (or pointedly neglected) potential for conveying to 
his readers insights into how character and personality are immersed in 
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socio-historical circumstances. Northerton is an instance of how a more 
or less accurate or realistically disturbing rendition of a character in a 
particular historical moment is accommodated to the comic necessities of 
the all-encompassing final structure of the plot in its f inal resolution, even if 
there remains a residue of unassimilated characterological substance within 
that rendition. Blif il and his father and uncle, by contrast, are completely 
assimilated character types, along with a whole host of other characters 
such as the Allworthys, Thwackum and Square, Partridge, Jenny Jones, the 
Seagrim family, Squire Western and his sister, Di Western, Lady Bellaston, 
Lord Fellamar, as well as Tom and Sophia. In their different ways, these 
characters f it into the workings required by the genre of comic romance 
and also serve that social comprehensiveness Fielding’s novel adds to that 
pattern. When we f inish the novel we know their interlocking fates, which 
form a comic mosaic, a happy and satisfying whole.
Northerton is, as it were, borrowed from outside the realm of social 
and moral types who populate the novel; he is simply himself and in that 
reckless self-assertion he helps move the plot along. But whatever becomes 
of the deserter and moral desperado? What indeed in the novel’s moral 
economy and comic resolution could become of such a personage? We’ll 
never know, since he is simply dismissed from the novelistic scene thanks 
to Tom’s typical carelessness: he ties his hands but not his legs. So this 
murderous Northerton simply walks away from Mazard-Hill, out of the 
novel into some indeterminate future while Tom is mesmerized by Mrs. 
Waters’exposed breasts, and their subsequent tryst in the inn at Upton is 
a crucial prelude, if at f irst with temporarily disastrous consequences, to 
his eventual redemption, possession of his Sophia, and return to Paradise 
Hall. Tom’s sexual spontaneity is part of the essential movement of the plot; 
through his brief affair with Mrs. Waters he begins the chain of events that 
lead to his deliverance.
By virtue of his irrepressible, gratuitous villainy, Northerton is crucial to 
the workings of Fielding’s plot. But he is, it would seem, simply an instru-
ment or device to move things crucially along, and Fielding as we have seen 
declares himself unable to explain the motives in his mayhem. In some 
actual world or in another kind of novel distinct from Fielding’s comic 
romance novelistic plot in our current sense would demand that he be ac-
counted for in some way, that his actions and his ultimate fate be explained 
or explored. In Tom Jones, however, he remains a key but unwitting actor, 
as well as a unique loose end in an otherwise completely tidy summing 
up for all the characters at the end of the novel. In short, Northerton is 
never absorbed by the resolving f inal structure of Fielding’s plot, and his 
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disappearance from the reader’s ken marks him as intractable, incapable of 
transformation by comic form or assimilation into the concluding symmetry 
and reformed community the plot creates. Northerton belongs to another 
kind of novelistic plot such as contemporary narratology understands it in 
which characters are situated in and derived from the specif ic events and 
circumstances that constitute the plot. Northerton stands apart from those 
events and circumstances.
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 Perspective and Focalization in 
Eighteenth-Century Descriptions1
Monika Fludernik
As Cynthia Wall has so magisterially illustrated in The Prose of Things (2006), 
descriptions of rooms hold a marginal position in eighteenth-century texts. 
This is due partially to conventions of writing and partially to the absence 
of f ixed furniture arrangements before the end of the eighteenth century. 
On the one hand, literary descriptions before the eighteenth century were 
often stylistic exercises in rhetorical enumeration. Mieke Bal, in her superb 
essay on description, cites (a translation of) a locus amoenus passage from 
Longus’s novel Daphnis and Chloë:
And that garden indeed was a most beautiful and goodly thing and such 
as might become a prince. For it lay extended in length a whole furlong. 
It was situated on a high ground, and had to its breadth four acres. To a 
spacious f ield one would easily have likened it. Trees it had of all kinds, 
the apple, the pear, the myrtle, the pomegranate, the f ig, and the olive; 
and to these on the one side there grew a rare and taller sort of vines, 
that bended over and reclined their ripening bunches of grapes among 
the apples and pomegranates, as if they would vie and contend for beauty 
and worth of fruits with them. So many kinds there were of satives, or 
of such as are planted, grafted, or set. To these were not wanting the 
cypress, the laurel, the platan, and the pine. And towards them, instead 
of the vine, the ivy leaned, and with the errantry of her boughs and her 
scattered blackberries did imitate the vines and shadowed beauty of the 
ripening grapes.
Within were kept, as in a garrison, trees of lower growth that bore 
fruit. Without stood the barren trees, enfolding all, much like a fort or 
some strong wall that had been built by the hand of art; and these were 
encompassed with a spruce, thin hedge. By alleys and glades there was 
everywhere a just distermination [sic! M.F.] of things from things, an 
orderly discretion of tree from tree; but on the tops the boughs met to 
interweave their limbs and leaves with one another’s, and a man would 
1 Research for this article was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the 
context of the Graduate School ‘Factual and Fictional Narration’ (GRK 1767).
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have thought that all this had not been, as indeed it was, the wild of na-
ture, but rather the work of curious art. Nor were there wanting to these, 
borders and banks of various flowers, some the earth’s own volunteers, 
some the structure of the artist’s hand. The roses, hyacinths, and lilies 
were set and planted by the hand; the violet, the daffodil, and anagall 
[sic!] the earth gave up of her own good will. In the summer there was 
shade, in the spring the beauty and fragrancy of f lowers, in the autumn 
the pleasantness of the fruits; and at every season amusement and delight 
(Longus, 1955, pp. 189-91; cited Bal, 1982, pp. 112-13).
As Bal notes, this garden cannot be drawn. Its rhetorical structure is based 
on the list which is meant to signal a plenitude of items. The description 
f irst divides the trees in the garden into those that do or do not bear edible 
fruit; then spatially into external and internal; and f inally outlines the 
patterns of trees and f lowerbeds. Although the logic of textual succession 
is partly motivated by spatial distribution, the description is not mimetic 
and not focalized. The list is the linguistic means of realizing a poetics 
of instantiation. For a garden to serve as the optimal manifestation of an 
ideal, it has to display a variety of trees, among them fruit trees, and has 
to supply both the security of enclosure and the pleasures of aesthetic 
variety. The description, one could almost say, microtextually echoes the 
prodesse et delectare of classical poetics – it instructs the reader about the 
available varieties of trees and delights him or her with their aesthetic 
arrangement.
There are three traditional types of description in use in literature 
before the eighteenth century. The f irst category comprises ekphrastic 
passages in which objects are depicted at length (the shield of Achilles 
in the Iliad [see The Iliad, Book 18, lines 478-608, pp. 322-33] being the 
standard exemplum). Type two consists of the portrait description in 
the Petrarchan tradition which occurs in love poetry (Sir Philip Sidney’s 
and Edmund Spenser’s sonnets), but also in romance (e.g. the ekphrastic 
description of Philoclea’s portrait in the Old Arcadia [1580] or the introduc-
tory depiction of Pamphilia in Mary Wroth’s The Countess of Montgomery’s 
Urania [1621]).2 The third type of pre-eighteenth-century description is 
allegorical. Unlike the locus amoenus passage above, allegorical vignettes 
are sometimes perspectival in a foregrounded manner – their information 
allows readers to trace spatial arrangements with great exactitude. See, 
for instance, Diego de san Pedro’s The Prison of Love (Cárcel de Amor, 1492) 
2 For the passage in the Old Arcadia see Sidney, 1987, pp. 10-11.
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in John Bourchier’s English translation (1549?). In this text, the narrator, 
a knight from Spain, encounters a prisoner being led to a castle, and the 
guard tells him: ‘I ame principall off icer in the house of the god of loue 
[…] And with the beautie of this Image I cause ye affections wherwith3 I 
broyle and enflame the lyues as thou maist se by this prisoner whom I lede 
in to the prisone of loue: who all onely by dethe hopeth his delyuerance’ 
(Bourchier, 1492, 8).4 The knight, on the plea of the prisoner, gains access 
to the castle and discovers him sitting in a chair of f ire. The castle and the 
knight’s imprisonment are depicted extensively in allegorical manner. The 
Castle of Love is built on a rock, the foundation being the stone of Faith. 
It is upheld by four pillars, namely Understanding, Reason, Memory, and 
Will. There are two porters, who ask him to leave his ‘armour’ behind, who 
are called Hope, Rest, and Contentacion. The f irst porter is later identif ied 
as Desire, the second porter as Torment. The ‘auctor’ or narrator ascends 
the stairs, which are later identif ied as Anguish. He then encounters the 
prisoner of love, one Lereano, who is fettered to a chair that is burning. He 
has a shield, with which to defend himself, which is called Wit. Though 
sitting in the chair of f lames (Just Affection), he never gets scorched. 
There are two women who minister to him, called Pain and Passion, and 
they serve him the Bread of Steadfastness. There is also a Moor (Despair) 
and three servants, who are Evil, Pain, and Dolour, who give him a dish 
of Despair, with the meat of “Doutfulness” and the Cup of Tribulation. 
Finally, the walls of the castle carry three images, namely of Heaviness, 
Anguish, and Travail, and the brightness surrounding the prisoner and 
emanating from an eagle’s beak corresponds to the prisoner’s Inward 
Thoughts.
The narrator is here led into the castle and guided through the interior 
in the manner of a disquisition on the horrors of erotic servitude; the 
qualities of love-lornness are discursively transformed into an architectural 
design and operate by means of memorial techniques (compare Miller). 
While portraits usually employ a top-down-structure (hair–eyes–cheeks–
lips–necks–bosom), which is not after all so different from the themes-
subthemes-structure proposed by Philippe Hamon (Hamon, 1981; Hamon, 
1982) and discussed in Bal’s reference to the locus amoenus passage, in 
this example we encounter spatial focalization which follows the narrator 
on his path into the central apartment and therefore closely resembles a 
3 All manuscript abbreviations are spelled out in my quotations.
4 The facsimile edition has no pagination. I have numbered the pages starting with the title 
page.
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‘route perspective’ in linguistic parlance (Linde and Labov, 1975; Taylor and 
Tversky, 1992 & 1996; Tversky et al., 1999).5
The near-absence of mimetic descriptions before the eighteenth century 
can moreover be explained by reference to interior design before 1660. 
Early modern interiors, as numerous studies have demonstrated, were fairly 
empty and did not have a f ixed arrangement of furniture (Rybczynski, 
1987; Tristram, 1989; Young, 2004; McKeon, 2005; Brown, 2008). Tables and 
chairs were positioned around the walls and carried into the chamber 
when needed for meals. In fact, beds were a rare luxury, with benches and 
tables also used for sleeping. Futon-like mats could be put on benches or the 
floor. Only in the second half of the eighteenth century did non-aristocratic 
households start to furnish their interiors on a more regular basis. From 
the mere possession of a piece of furniture, whose very existence was 
foregrounded, attention shifted to the quality of objects displayed (and 
that display was the issue is, for instance, noted by Brown, 2008) and later 
on to their tasteful (or tasteless) arrangement as evidenced in the descriptive 
passages of Victorian novels. One can, therefore, argue that the history of 
interior design is responsible for the very existence and content of literary 
descriptions in narratives (Wall, 2006). This evolution can also be observed 
in drama, where the Restoration period, despite its introduction of grand 
scenery by means of shutters and wings, was still focused on a fairly empty 
stage. By the time of Richard Brinsley Sheridan’s The Rivals (1775) or The 
School for Scandal (1777), however, more extensive furnishings appear in 
the stage directions, though they still remain scant by Victorian standards 
of the pièce bien faite (‘well-made play’).6
This culturalist reading of the presence of description in eighteenth-
century literature, in my opinion, complements rather than disproves 
Ian Watt’s theses about the novel’s increased attention to realistic detail 
as documented by the fact that Daniel Defoe’s novels are cluttered with 
objects. As I will show below, when it comes to interiors, Defoe does not 
necessarily provide extensive descriptions of interior spaces and their 
contents. It is, however, true that his protagonists own and handle a great 
variety of objects and that the desire for possession and attainment of such 
5 On description in general see the recent volume by Wolf and Bernhart, especially Nünning’s 
article, as well as the earlier introductory essay by Haupt. Excellent contributions on literary 
description are also, for the nineteenth century, Kullmann, 2004, and, for the early modern 
period, Jahn, 1993.
6 One may think of the sofa under which Lydia Languish and her maid Lucy hide the books 
from the lending library from the eyes of Mrs. Malaprop in Act I, Scene ii of The Rivals, or of the 
screen behind which Lady Teazle hides in the f ifth act of The School for Scandal. 
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objects is constitutive of their social and personal self-fashioning. People are 
what they seem to be on account of their dress and comportment; identity 
congeals into what one owns and what one wears and how one is able to live. 
It is less the quality, beauty or conveniency of an item that makes it remark-
able in Defoe; ownership trumps appreciation. Though Watt’s emphasis on 
realistic detail in my opinion fails to reflect the scarcity of actual passages 
of description in Defoe’s texts, his insights are important to focus on the 
emergence of objects as named entities in early eighteenth-century f iction. 
The empty spaces of early modern houses, streets, towns, and other spaces 
start to f ill up with consumer goods. The f irst stage in confronting this 
deluge of objects is to name them, to list them; only later – once one has 
become accustomed to the items cluttering one’s life – does one start to 
focus on them in detail, to distinguish between them, to appreciate their 
artistry, their neatness, or their beauty.
What I would like to do in this article is to analyse the descriptions of 
interiors from the viewpoint of perspective and focalization and to do so 
by taking Franz Karl Stanzel’s seminal (a)perspectivism thesis as a starting 
point for a diachronic analysis of description in English literature. I will 
then discuss examples of descriptions from the eighteenth century in a 
variety of texts.
Perspectivism and Aperspectivism: Stanzel’s Model Reconsidered
In the Section 5.2 of his Theory of Narrative (1984), Stanzel proposed a thesis 
regarding the development of description. He submitted the hypothesis 
that before the late nineteenth century, in fact before the advent of the 
f igural novel, i.e. the novel of internal focalization, descriptive passages 
tended to be aperspectival, whereas, with the onset of interior focalization, 
perspectivism asserted itself. The only critic to have engaged with this thesis 
so far is Manfred Jahn, who noted that his students consistently agreed that 
Stanzel’s example of perspectivism (a passage from James Joyce’s Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man) was a clear instance of a perspectival description, 
but overwhelmingly balked at the alleged aperspectival nature of the Trol-
lope passage which Stanzel quotes as illustrating a lack of perspective (Jahn, 
1999, pp. 95-96). What does Stanzel, then, mean by the term (a)perspectival?
Stanzel’s def inition of this term, it should be underlined, does not at all 
coincide with internal focalization per se. Stanzel is of course well aware 
that the f igural novel emerges only at the turn of the twentieth century, 
hence it does not make sense to expect internal focalization to occur in 
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the Victorian or eighteenth-century authorial novel. Instead, Stanzel’s 
hypothesis concerns the imaginative evocation of novelistic space and the 
reader’s ability to visualize the setting in precise and empirically validatable 
terms. Stanzel’s empirical test consists in the reader trying to draw a map 
of the space depicted in the descriptive passage. As it so happens, his two 
examples are both of interiors (although he could have chosen gardens or 
landscapes); his thesis is not restricted to the inside of houses.
Let us look at the passage cited by Stanzel as an example of aperspectival 
description. It comes from Anthony Trollope’s Barchester Towers (1857) and 
delineates the shocking experience of Dr. Grantly and Mr. Harding when 
they f irst visit the new bishop, Dr. Proudie, in his off ice:
His lordship was at home, and the two visitors were shown through the 
accustomed hall into the well-known room where the good old bishop 
used to sit. The furniture had been bought at a valuation, and every chair 
and table, every bookshelf against the wall, and every square in the carpet 
was as well known to each of them as their own bedrooms. Nevertheless 
they at once felt that they were strangers there. The furniture was for the 
most part the same, yet the place had been metamorphosed. A new sofa 
had been introduced, a horrid chintz affair, most unprelatical and almost 
irreligious; such a sofa as never yet stood in the study of any decent High 
Church clergyman of the Church of England. The old curtains had also 
given way. They had, to be sure, become dingy, and that which had been 
originally a rich and goodly ruby had degenerated into a reddish brown. 
Mr. Harding, however, thought the old reddish-brown much preferable 
to the gaudy buff-coloured trumpery moreen which Mrs. Proudie had 
deemed good enough for her husband’s own room in the provincial city 
of Barchester.
Our friends found Dr. Proudie sitting on the old bishop’s chair, looking very 
nice in his new apron; they found, too, Mr. Slope standing on the hearth-
rug, persuasive and eager, just as the archdeacon used to stand; but on 
the sofa they also found Mrs. Proudie, an innovation for which a precedent 
might in vain be sought in all the annals of the Barchester bishopric! 
(Barchester Towers, pp. 33-34; cited Stanzel, 1984, p. 120; my emphasis).
As Stanzel correctly notes, one would be hard put to draw a map of the 
room, since its content is given, but not the relationship of the individual 
items in their relation to one another. One can imagine the bishop’s desk to 
be on the left, the f ireplace with the hearth-rug in the middle, the windows 
on the right, and the notorious sofa as placed in the middle downstage so 
PErSPEC tivE aNd FoCaLizatioN iN EightEENth- CENtury dESCriPtioNS 105
to speak; but the f ireplace could just as well be to the right, the sofa to the 
left and the desk in the upstage middle, with two sets of windows to the 
left and right of it. The narrative does not authorize us to read the sequence 
of impressions as occurring in a left to right clockwise direction. On the 
contrary, the passage is structured rhetorically by moving from the familiar 
to the unfamiliar and scandalous. To this extent, then, Stanzel is perfectly 
within his rights to characterize the passage as aperspectival.
Why, then, Jahn’s students’ ‘doubt and incomprehension’ (Jahn, 1999, 
p. 96)? An explanation might be sought in the implied perspective of the 
paragraph. What we are confronted with are the impressions registered by 
the two entering clergymen. They step into a very familiar room and note as 
a pièce de résistance f irst the sofa and then the curtains and f inally, horror 
of horrors, Mrs. Proudie enthroned upon her ‘chintz affair’. The passage 
therefore could be argued to reflect the newcomers’ gaze as it sweeps across 
the familiar surroundings and gets arrested at what they perceive to be 
striking incongruities. The whole vignette is of course an ironic comment 
on the traditionalism of the rural clergy, who expect everything to remain 
exactly the same, down to the furnishings of the bishop’s chambers. It 
also registers (perhaps less ironically so) Victorian male affront at female 
intrusion into the male preserve of clerical business, the domestic sphere 
transgressing into the public domain. Mrs. Proudie has not merely dared 
to change the curtains (it is, incidentally, rather strange that the colour 
buff, not a f laming red or tasteless pink or pea green, should receive such 
derisory notice); she has moreover obtruded her sofa and herself onto the 
bishop’s off icial space, thus annihilating the boundary between the private 
and the public realms.
The narrative is not devoid of perspective, but it veils the precise spatial 
arrangement of the items noted by the two visitors and overlays the clergy-
men’s impressions and moral outrage by a narratorial medium that f ilters 
their consciousness through a highly elaborate rhetorical discourse: ‘every 
chair and table, every bookshelf against the wall, and every square in the 
carpet was as well known to each of them as their own bedrooms’. This 
sentence is not likely to be free indirect discourse, though the vocabulary 
of scandalization mimics the indignation experienced by the two guests. 
Were one to turn to Uspensky, one could therefore argue that this vignette 
expresses Grantly’s and Harding’s perspective ideologically and psycho-
logically, but not linguistically or spatially. Hence the impression of Jahn’s 
students that this cannot be totally ‘aperspectival’.
When one turns back to Stanzel’s major thesis, however, focusing on 
the inability to draw a map of the setting, the passage’s aperspectivism 
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immediately emerges as an important quality of the extract and opens 
our eyes to a major historical fact of novelistic narrative, namely the 
dearth of spatial perspectivism in literary descriptions before the end 
of the nineteenth century. Not only, that is, are there few descriptive 
sections in narratives before the nineteenth century; descriptions (Keen 
2014), when they do occur, are very rarely perspectival. In what follows I 
would like to discuss some rare examples of perspectivism before Trol-
lope, but also to raise a few theoretical questions. Among these, three 
stand out. Since there are a few perspectival examples before 1800, do 
these correlate with internal focalization? Put differently, can spatial 
focalization occur only in conjunction with psychological perspective 
and a backgrounding of the authorial narrator? Secondly, is description 
in novels/passages of internal focalization always perspectival in Stanzel’s 
sense? And thirdly, what happens in postmodernist texts that no longer 
employ internal focalization? Questions two and three are clearly beyond 
the temporal purview of this volume and will therefore be left for a later 
opportunity.
Early Description and Perspective
As Wall illustrates in her seminal The Prose of Things, descriptions in early 
modern texts focus primarily on spaces (in the depictions of London by 
Stow, for instance) and then on inventories of items gathered in one space, 
thus producing a model of description in lists (Wall, 2006, Chapter 3). Initial 
anticipations of the depiction of persons by means of description can be 
found in the work of Aphra Behn; it is what people wear that character-
izes them – outside the topoi of the beauty catalogue and the portrait, a 
character’s facial expressions does not yet f igure in the way we are familiar 
with from the nineteenth century. Thus, Prince Tarquin, in the passage cited 
by Wall (2006, p. 126), is presented as having ‘his Cloak cast over his Face, 
and a black Periwigg’; he is moreover ‘all alone, with his Pistol ready cock’d’ 
(Fair Jilt, p. 165). This description is fully functional, since it explains the 
strategies of his assassination attempt. When Prince Tarquin is about to be 
executed, we get an extended description of his comportment and clothing, 
emulating the visual spectacle: ‘The details of the prince’s clothes, the arena 
of execution, the motion of his hands, the stroke of the executioner, the 
cultural differences between executions in Flanders and those in England, 
the behavior of eager, weeping, sympathetic, bloodthirsty spectators, com-
bine for an exact, drawn-out scene’ (Wall 2006, p. 127; see Fair Jilt, p. 174). 
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Yet this scene remains theatrical, its descriptions part of the spectatorial 
frame of watching from afar.
When we move into interiors, there are some close-ups of people’s faces 
in Richardson’s Clarissa, for instance, when Lovelace indulges in a lengthy 
prosopographia, as Wall calls it (2006, p. 143), of the woman he is about to 
get into his power (Letter 99, Richardson, p. 399; cited as Letter III, p. 55 in 
Wall, 2006). In this passage he spends a full paragraph on her ‘wax-like flesh’ 
and ‘its delicacy and f irmness’, rejecting the Petrarchan snow imagery as 
analogue to her ‘f lesh and blood’ complexion. He continues by focusing on 
her ‘wavy ringlets’, ‘wantoning in and about a neck that is beautiful beyond 
description’, and then turns to her cap, a ‘Brussels-lace mob’, and her neg-
ligée, a ‘morning gown’ of ‘pale primrose-coloured paduasoy’ (Richardson, 
p. 400; quoted Wall, 2006, p. 143). The paragraph continues to describe 
the cuffs of this garment, her earrings, handkerchief and shoes; but the 
main effect of this description is not fashion-related information but erotic 
tease – the garments allow glimpses of and invite speculations about her 
body. Lovelace’s eyes are glued on Clarissa’s packaging, which hides that 
which she keeps from him and which he intensely desires.
As Wall demonstrates in Chapter 7, domestic tours are the f irst instances 
of extensive depictions of interiors. These include both the layout and the 
description of individual rooms. The Journals of Celia Fiennes (1662-1741) and 
Defoe’s A Tour Thro’ the Whole Island of Great Britain (1724-1726) serve as 
spearheads of a whole avalanche of house guides published in the eighteenth 
century (Wall, 2006, pp. 191-97). Let us look at some of these descriptions to 
see how they handle perspective.
Samuel Pepys, for instance, visited Audley-End on October 7th, 1667, and 
gave the following description of it:
Took coach to Audley-End, and did go all over the house and garden; and 
mighty merry we were. The house indeed do appear very f ine, but not so 
f ine as it hath heretofore to me; particularly the ceilings are not so good 
as I always took them to be, being nothing so well wrought as my Lord 
Chancellor’s are; and though the f igure of the house without be very 
extraordinary good, yet the stayre-case is exceeding poor; and a great 
many pictures, and not one good one in the house but one of Harry the 
Eighth, done by Holben [sic]; and not one good suit of hangings in all the 
house, but all most ancient things, such as I would not give the hanging-up 
of in my house; and the other furniture, beds and other things, accord-
ingly. Only the gallery is good, and above all things the cellars, where we 
went down and drank of much good liquor. And indeed the cellars are 
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f ine: and here my wife and I did sing to my great content (Pepys, 1997, p. 
606; my emphasis).
This description is structured not according to spatial contiguity (you enter, 
then proceed through the lobby, up the staircase, etc.), but in reference 
to critical assessment. It starts out with the disappointing features of the 
house, the ceilings, staircase, pictures, and hangings, and then, having 
singled out one good picture, continues by praising the gallery and cellar. 
The description fails to clarify which ceilings Pepys is talking about (in 
the hall, in the gallery?); it also does not explicate where the pictures are 
hung (also including the gallery?). The outside of the house, inserted by 
counterpoint into the criticism, is conceded to make a f ine f igure, archi-
tecturally speaking (one assumes). When the gallery is praised, it remains 
open whether its superior quality resides in its proportions, its panelling, 
or in the views it offers onto the grounds; and the juxtaposition with the 
cellars is odd, since they are enjoyed for their wine and (presumably) not 
their construction; hence the impression of a logical non sequitur between 
the gallery and the cellars being ‘good’.
One can observe that Pepys focuses on foregrounded items in a list of 
features that he is interested in in houses (external approach, painting on 
the ceilings, grandeur of staircase, paintings, gallery and the view from 
it, wine) to the exclusion of other topics (china, carpets). His description 
is both judgmental and selective; it certainly does not aim to provide an 
exhaustive representation of the interior.
Defoe’s depiction of Wilton in the Tour is much more extensive. It also 
anticipates guidebook language by using a second-person (and even f irst-
person plural) pronoun for the virtual visitor (the reader) and by tracing a 
path through the house that resembles a proper tour. In the terms of Linde 
& Labov and Taylor & Tversky (1992; 1996) this is therefore a clear instance 
of a ‘tour perspective’, of a description in which the observer or focalizer 
moves through the depicted space and lists impressions as they open up.
There are no less than four […] rivers, which meet all together at or near 
the city of Salisbury; […] The two f irst [i.e. the Nadder and the Willy] join 
their waters at Wilton […]; and these are the waters which run through 
the canal and the gardens of Wilton House, the seat of that ornament of 
nobility and learning, the Earl of Pembroke. […] Wilton House is now a 
mere museum or a chamber of rarities […].
You ascend the great staircase at the upper end of the hall, which is very 
large; at the foot of the staircase you have a Bacchus as large as life, done 
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in f ine Peloponnesian marble, carrying a young Bacchus on his arm, the 
young one eating grapes, and letting you see by his countenance that 
he is pleased with the taste of them. Nothing can be done f iner, or more 
lively represent the thing intended – namely, the gust of the appetite, 
which if it be not a passion, it is an affection which is as much seen in 
the countenance, perhaps more than any other. One ought to stop every 
two steps of this staircase, as we go up, to contemplate the vast variety of 
pictures that cover the walls, and of some of the best masters in Europe; 
and yet this is but an introduction to what is beyond them.
When you are entered the apartments, such variety seizes you every way 
that you scarce know to which hand to turn yourself. First on one side 
you see several rooms filled with paintings as before, all so curious, and 
the variety such, that it is with reluctance that you can turn from them; 
while looking another way you are called off by a vast collection of busts 
and pieces of the greatest antiquity of the kind, both Greek and Romans; 
among these there is one of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius in 
basso-relievo. I never saw anything like what appears here, except in the 
chamber of rarities at Munich in Bavaria.
Passing these, you come into several large rooms, as if contrived for 
the reception of the beautiful guests that take them up; one of these is 
near seventy feet long, and the ceiling twenty-six feet high, with another 
adjoining of the same height and breadth, but not so long. Those together 
might be called the Great Gallery of Wilton, and might vie for paintings 
with the Gallery of Luxembourg, in the Faubourg of Paris.
These two rooms are f illed with the family pieces of the house of Herbert, 
most of them by Lilly or Vandyke […].
After we have seen this f ine range of beauties – for such, indeed, they 
are – far from being at an end of your surprise, you have three or four 
rooms still upon the same floor, filled with wonders as before. Nothing 
can be f iner than the pictures themselves, nothing more surprising than 
the number of them. At length you descend the back stairs, which are in 
themselves large, though not like the other (A Tour, pp. 198-99; italics in 
the original; my emphasis in bold italics).
The tour starts at the grand staircase and then describes the rooms on the first 
floor, which seems to serve merely representative purposes of museum-like 
display. It then passes several apartments and rooms, ending in two spaces 
of great height which Defoe christens the gallery. After the gallery, there are 
more rooms before one can ‘descend [by] the back stairs’. This clear spatial 
sequence is, however, vitiated by a considerable vagueness regarding the 
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precise spatial relationship between these stages of the guided tour. First, one 
would expect the grand staircase to be located in the centre of the house and 
for the various rooms to be arranged circularly (or quadrangularly) around 
it; with visitors, say, moving up the staircase and then turning left, passing a 
couple of rooms in a row and then arriving at the ‘gallery’, after which more 
rooms take one back to the main staircase. This, clearly, is not the path of the 
tour that Defoe is describing. Pictures from Wilton’s site online, for instance, 
demonstrate that (one of) the room(s) with busts is an oblong gallery, thus 
suggesting that the floor plan consists not of one sequence of rooms in which 
one needs to observe a one-way route but that there are parallel rooms at each 
stage so that one can branch off from the main rooms to subsidiary ones. 
Even in Defoe’s time, apparently, the private quarters of the proprietors were 
closed off to visitors, hence the exit through the back stairs. This suggests that 
visitors were allowed only into one wing with the state rooms, a hypothesis 
corroborated by the absence of bedrooms in the extract.7
Celia Fiennes’ travelogues, which she started to write in 1702 but then 
never published (f irst extracts were printed in 1812 and the full manuscripts 
only in 1888), have a similar guide-book feel to them. She visits places of 
interest and of note, accumulating lists of houses seen and places she has 
visited. Her diaries include several extensive descriptions of house interiors, 
many of which take us through the sights as if we were on a tour:
[T]he house [Longford House near Salisbury on the Avon] stands f inely to 
the River, a brick building, you enter into a walled Court low up 12 stepps 
at least [sic] into a noble hall, on the left hand was a parlour and on the 
right a large drawing roome a little parlour and large Staires up to severall 
very handsom Chambers furnish’d with good tapistry and damaske and 
some velvets which was new […]. [O]ut of the drawing roome by Glass 
doors you enter the Garden on a terrass and that by stepps so to severall 
Walks of Gravel and Grass and to the Gardens one below the other (The 
Journeys of Celia Fiennes, pp. 57-58).
Though her text is very clear on the architectural setup of the entry hall, she 
then focuses only on the furnishings on the f irst f loor without providing 
any information on the number of chambers or the precise location of 
tapestries and velvet curtains.
7 Wilton Estates kindly allowed me access to maps of the ground f loor and f irst f loor from 
1746. The design indeed shows a quadrangle structure, but the names given to the rooms do not 
easily correspond to Defoe’s description; notably, the map fails to show the two galleries.
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At the end of the eighteenth century, house descriptions get more specific 
and they are more perspectival in Stanzel’s sense, allowing the reader to 
draw a map of the described spaces:
[A]fter being led through a large hall, we were introduced to the ladies […].
The room where they sat was about forty-five feet long, of a proportionable 
breadth, with three windows on one side, which looked into a garden, and 
a large bow at the upper end. Over against the windows were three large 
book-cases, upon the top of the middle one stood an orrery, and a globe on 
each of the others. In the bow sat two ladies reading, with pen, ink, and 
paper on a table before them, at which was a young girl translating out of 
French. At the lower end of the room was a lady painting, with exquisite 
art indeed, a beautiful Madonna; near her another, drawing a landscape 
out of her own imagination; a third, carving a picture-frame in wood, in 
the f inest manner; a fourth, engraving; and a young girl reading aloud 
to them; the distance from the ladies in the bow-window being such, 
that they could receive no disturbance from her. At the next window 
were placed a group of girls […] (Millenium Hall, pp. 58-59; my emphasis).
In this abstract from Sarah Scott’s novel A Description of Millenium Hall 
(1762), the narrator and her companion visit the hall of the estate in which 
the female community is housed. Here it is possible to draw a map of 
the hall with the various windows, bookcases and groups of characters 
which the visitors see as they enter. However, since the passage does not 
employ deictics in the form of to the left or in front, this is an example of 
a perspectival description which is not necessarily focalized through a 
particular subjective viewpoint. In fact, the only deictic hint regarding 
a point of view comes in the terms upper and lower, where (one assumes) 
the persons entering from opposite the windows see the bow (bay) further 
to their right (or left) and the lower end closer to them on their left (or 
right). In the terms of Linde and Labov or Taylor and Tversky (1992; 1996), 
the description therefore employs non-grounded spatial specif ications, 
but in practice corresponds to a gaze tour, a view of the room from one 
particular point.
In the late 1790s, as narratologists know very well, the Gothic novel 
notably anticipates internal focalization in the representation of con-
sciousness, employing considerable stretches of psychonarration and free 
indirect discourse. It is also in the Gothic novel where the f irst perspectival 
descriptions in Stanzel’s mode can be found in passages that present inte-
riors from the experience of a character through internal focalization. A 
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good example of such a perspectival description occurs in The Mysteries 
of Udolpho:
Lady Blanche, it being not yet dark, took this opportunity of exploring 
new scenes, and, leaving the parlour, she passed from the hall into a wide 
gallery, whose walls were decorated by marble pilasters, which supported 
an arched roof, composed of a rich mosaic work. Through a distant window, 
that seemed to terminate the gallery, were seen the purple clouds of 
evening and a landscape, whose features, thinly veiled in twilight, no 
longer appeared distinctly, but, blended into one grand mass, stretched 
to the horizon, coloured only with a tint of solemn grey.
The gallery terminated in a saloon, to which the window she had seen 
through an open door, belonged; but the increasing dusk permitted her 
only an imperfect view of this apartment, which seemed to be magnif i-
cent and of modern architecture; though it had been either suffered to 
fall into decay, or had never been properly f inished. The windows, which 
were numerous and large, descended low, and afforded a very extensive, 
and what Blanche’s fancy represented to be, a very lovely prospect; and 
she stood for some time, surveying the grey obscurity and depicturing 
imaginary woods and mountains, vallies and rivers, on this scene of 
night; her solemn sensations rather assisted, than interrupted, by the 
distant bark of a watch-dog, and by the breeze, as it trembled upon 
the light foliage of the shrubs. Now and then, appeared for a moment, 
among the woods, a cottage light; and, at length, was heard, afar off, 
the evening bell of a convent, dying on the air. When she withdrew her 
thoughts from these subjects of fanciful delight, the gloom and silence 
of the saloon somewhat awed her; and, having sought the door of the 
gallery, and pursued, for a considerable time, a dark passage, she came to 
a hall, but one totally different from that she had formerly seen. By the 
twilight, admitted through an open portico, she could just distinguish 
this apartment to be of very light and airy architecture, and that it was 
paved with white marble, pillars of which supported the roof, that rose 
into arches built in the Moorish style. While Blanche stood on the steps of 
this portico, the moon rose over the sea, and gradually disclosed, in partial 
light, the beauties of the eminence, on which she stood, whence a lawn, 
now rude and overgrown with high grass, sloped to the woods, that, almost 
surrounding the chateau, extended in a grand sweep down the southern 
sides of the promontory to the very margin of the ocean. Beyond the woods, 
on the north-side, appeared a long tract of the plains of Languedoc; and, 
to the east, the landscape she had before dimly seen, with the towers of 
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a monastery, illumined by the moon, rising over dark groves (Mysteries 
of Udolpho II, x, pp. 471-72; my emphasis).
Not only do we get a clear outline of the succession of rooms through which 
Blanche passes; we moreover are rewarded with a landscape prospect that 
combines the uncanny of the mansion with the sublime in the landscape. 
The passage is perspectival in Stanzel’s sense since it provides us with very 
explicit directions on the contiguous objects and scenes observed by Lady 
Blanche. Yet, despite the extensive particularities outlined in the text, the 
overall impression regarding the castle’s interior is not of a clear structure 
but of a labyrinth.
We can therefore conclude that in the eighteenth century, though de-
scriptive passages are not that common in f ictional narratives, a marked 
increase in perspectivization can be noted where the layout of interiors is 
concerned. Is this also true of single rooms? The passage from Millenium 
Hall can be taken as a perspectival endpoint. Are there any examples of 
perspectivism to be found in earlier texts which depict rooms?
A novel that most readers agree to be full of precise descriptions is Moll 
Flanders (1722). Yet when one looks at the actual text, one is bound to be 
disappointed. For instance, in the following passage it is apparent that the 
plate which Moll wants to steal lies in the shop window. The scenario is 
focused on the plate and its accessibility. As one can observe, Moll enters 
and is about to snatch her prey when she is intercepted by a vigilant inhabit-
ant from the house opposite. The owner of the shop being absent, it can be 
speculated that the ware lies on an interior windowsill (otherwise, Moll 
might have snatched it from outside through the open window); but as to 
the precise arrangements inside the shop, these are left very vague indeed 
since ‘at one side of the shop’ fails to clarify the position of the door and 
window to the room as a whole:
It was on the Christmas-day following, in the Evening, that, to f inish 
a long Train of Wickedness, I went Abroad to see what might offer in 
my way; when going by a Working Silver-Smiths in Foster-Lane, I saw a 
tempting Bait indeed, and not to be resisted by one of my Occupation; for 
the Shop had no Body in it, as I could see, and a great deal of loose Plate 
lay in the Window, and at the Seat of the Man, who usually, as I suppose, 
Work’d at one side of the Shop.
I went boldly in, and was just going to lay my Hand upon a piece of Plate, 
and might have done it, and carried it clear off, for any care that the 
Men who belong’d to the shop had taken of it; but an off icious Fellow in 
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a House, not a Shop, on the other side of the Way, seeing me go in, and 
observing that there was no Body in the Shop, comes running over the 
Street, and into the shop, and without asking me what I was, or who, seizes 
upon me, an cries out for the People of the House (Moll Flanders, p. 343; 
italics original emphasis, bold italics my own emphasis).
Likewise, when Roxana in Defoe’s eponymous novel (1724) accedes to 
the wishes of the landlord, he returns her furniture to her, which is listed 
without a clear indication of where individual items would be placed.8
A much more perspectival passage is the one where Moll steals the 
bundle:
Wandering thus about, I knew not whither, I passed by an Apothecary’s 
Shop in Leadenhall-Street, when I saw lie on a Stool just before the Counter 
a little Bundle wrapped in a white Cloth; beyond it stood a Maid Serv-
ant with her Back to it, looking towards the top of the Shop, where the 
Apothecary’s Apprentice, as I suppose, was standing upon the Counter, 
with his Back also to the Door, and a Candle in his Hand, looking and 
reaching up to the upper Shelf for something he wanted, so that both 
were engaged mighty earnestly, and no Body else in the Shop.
[…] It was no sooner said but I step’d into the Shop, and with my Back to 
the Wench, as if I had stood up for a Cart that was going by, I put my Hand 
behind me and took the Bundle, and went off with it, the Maid or the 
Fellow not perceiving me, or any one else (Moll Flanders, 1989, pp. 254-55; 
italics original emphasis, bold italics my own emphasis).
Here we get a very good sense of the spatial relations between Moll 
and the two shop assistants, but there is of course barely a pause in the 
temporal sequence of the story of theft. The description here serves the 
function of (delayed) orientation. Moreover, though the relative positions 
8  ‘This was the f irst View I had of living comfortably indeed, and it was a very probable Way, 
I must confess; seeing we had very good Conveniences, six Rooms on a Floor, and three Stories 
high: While he was laying down the Scheme of my Management, came a Cart to the Door with 
a Load of Goods and an Upholsterer’s Man to put them up; they were chiefly the Furniture of 
two Rooms, which he had carried away for his two Years Rent, with two f ine Cabinets, and some 
Peir-Glasses, out of the Parlour, and several other valuable things. These were all restored to 
their Places, and he told me he gave them me freely, as a Satisfaction for the Cruelty he had us’d 
me with before; and the Furniture of one Room being f inish’d, and set up, he told me, he would 
furnish one Chamber for himself, and would come and be one of my Lodgers, if I would give 
him Leave’ (Roxana, p. 32; italics original emphasis, bold italics my own emphasis).
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of the involved parties are noted carefully, the rest of the shop receives 
no notice; hence we have no idea whether there were one or two shop 
windows, whether there were counters on each side of the door, and so on. 
The description here serves the function of explaining how the theft was 
possible but does not have an ulterior purpose of creating the atmosphere of 
the shop or of metonymically signalling the shop owner’s character through 
the description of his workplace; nor is the passage meant to reflect Moll’s 
emotions or dispositions in the way that descriptive paragraphs typically 
do in nineteenth-century novels.
Even where we encounter an extensive description of a room in an 
eighteenth-century novel, the presentation need not be very perspectival, 
though it is focalized:
He went up stairs into a Garret, where he saw a most moving Scene. There 
lay on a Bed (or rather on a parcel of Rags patched together, to which 
the Mistress of the House chose to give the Name of a Bed) a young Man, 
looking as pale as Death, with his Eyes sunk in his Head, and hardly able 
to breathe, covered with half a dirty Rug, which would scarce come round 
him. On one Side of him sat holding him by the Hand, a young Woman 
in an old Silk gown, which looked as if it had been a good one; but so 
tattered, that it would barely cover her with Decency. Her Countenance 
was become wan with Affliction, and Tears stood in her Eyes, which she 
seemed unwilling to let fall, lest she should add to the Sorrow of the Man 
she sat by, and which, however, she was not able to restrain. The Walls 
were bare, and broke in many places in such a manner, that they were 
scarce suff icient to keep out the Weather (David Simple, pp. 125-26; italics 
original emphasis, bold italics my own emphasis).
In this passage from Sarah Fielding’s The Adventures of David Simple (1744), 
the perspective is focalized through the eyes of David, the sentimental hero. 
Yet the enumeration of impressions does not follow a spatial logic, but draws 
the eyes and imagination of the readers to the main sufferer and his sister. 
The room itself is not only bare, but taken note of only when the affecting 
misery of the siblings has been expanded on; the vignette of overloaded 
sentimental sympathy operates in a centrifugal manner by concentrating 
f irst on the dying man, then on the sister sitting next to him amid the signs 
of poverty which underline the pathos of her anguish, and only at the last 
notes the dreary surroundings as another intensif ier of the scenario. (The 
text continues with the presence of the cantankerous landlady, whose 
earlier mention would have disturbed the pathos of the scene).
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Concluding Remarks
While it seems that the architectural outlay of interiors in eighteenth-
century texts begins to anticipate perspectival descriptions in Stanzel’s 
sense of the term, when one turns to rooms, that is, enclosed interiors, this 
trend is much weaker. Although descriptions of objects, including persons, 
become more and more minute by the end of the eighteenth century, the 
depictions of rooms lag behind. We continue to f ind lists of items which 
are arranged by different logics, but not in terms of spatial contiguity and 
relationality. Only at the very end of the eighteenth century does one f ind 
some instances of perspectivism in the depiction of rooms.
On the other hand, these examples from eighteenth-century texts suggest 
that focalization and perspectivism do not necessarily go together. Whereas 
in Stanzel’s model, the modernist novel clearly displays perspectival descrip-
tions motivated by internal focalization (the observer is a reflector figure), in 
the eighteenth-century texts that I have looked at, the conjunction does not 
always occur. One may have descriptive passages that are focused through 
the eyes of a character but do not allow one to draw a map, since the focus 
is on what strikes the protagonist rather than on presenting a very useful 
description of the room (Pepys, Fielding, Trollope). Conversely, one can have 
narratorial presentations of interiors that are extremely perspectival and al-
low one almost suff icient material for a map (Fiennes, Defoe); these usually 
correlate with a gaze or tour perspective. It also seems likely to me, though 
I have not yet done the relevant research, that many nineteenth-century 
descriptions, at least in English literature, will be focused through the eyes 
of various protagonists (motivated by their entry into rooms) on the pattern 
we observed in the Trollope passage. Yet, despite this (often merely implicit) 
visual focalization, these descriptions I suspect, like Stanzel’s example 
from Barchester Towers, will also emerge as being not perspectival (i.e. 
consciousness-centred) in Stanzel’s sense. It therefore seems very plausible 
to me that a more extensive analysis of descriptions in the Victorian novel 
will turn out to corroborate his assessment.
Perhaps one will have to acknowledge that our desire for reproducible 
interiors is anachronistic and possibly induced by the ubiquity of f ilm and 
transmedializations of novels into f ilm. Having been raised on a diet of 
visual representations that are by nature exact, when we turn to written 
texts we now expect them to provide equally complete information. As a 
result, we tend to suppress the important role of indeterminacy in the liter-
ary reading process. It is precisely because we do not get complete spatial 
information that we make f ictional settings resonate psychologically – the 
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inbuilt gaps are not f illed completely in the reading process but allow for 
empty but suggestive spaces in our minds and for imaginative creativity. 
The banality of photography and f ilm in their more humdrum manifesta-
tions lies precisely in their freezing of impressions in one unchangeable 
visual image. Art movies therefore tend to symbolize the surface of reality 
depicted; they also creatively juxtapose scenarios, introduce indetermi-
nacy and blur the boundaries between fantasy and the f ictional world. 
While factual description focuses on providing information, on directing 
interlocutors and readers to gain a particular destination or put together a 
piece of furniture, literary descriptions need to engage our imaginations. 
The more suggestive the description the better; excessive delineations of 
spatial arrangements on the lines of the nouveau roman paradoxically turn 
out to be deadly and flat, whereas a few strokes of the stylistic brush can 
produce vivid images of f ictional settings.
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 Temporality in Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko 
and Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe
Aino Mäkikalli
In the Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory (2005) Monika Flud-
ernik suggests that time in narrative can be viewed from three different 
perspectives: f irst, the general, philosophical aspect of temporality and its 
signif icance for the levels of story and discourse; second, the relationship 
between the story and discourse levels; and third, the grammatical and 
morphological devices used (tense markers) and their signif icance for 
the levels of discourse and story. She stresses the study of two temporal 
levels, that of the story and that of the discourse, leading to the analysis 
of chronological distortions of the surface level of the narrative text and 
the surface-structure analysis of tense in narrative (Fludernik, 2005, pp. 
608-09).
Fludernik’s categorization broadens the problem of temporality in narra-
tive from the classical narratology of Gérard Genette, who placed the focus 
on the analysis of temporal relationships in terms of the concepts of order, 
duration, and frequency; these helped to identify in particular the rhythms 
and temporal strategies of narration. Fludernik remarks that Genette’s 
concepts promote the analyses of chronology and sequentiality, which are 
scrutinized from the viewpoint of objective, measurable calendar and clock 
time. She suggests, however, that there are other ways to investigate time in 
narrative. Fludernik brings forward psychological and subjective concep-
tions of temporality, noting for example that reading time is not merely a 
matter of the number of hours spent reading the pages of a book; it also 
includes the reader’s expectations and interpretations during the reading 
process. She refers to this as the ‘cognitive order’ of the reading process, 
which is closer to the experience of time than counting minutes and hours 
of time. Fludernik thus emphasizes narrativity as based on experientiality, 
and on the narrator’s or character’s experiential reality in the narrative 
(Fludernik, 2005, p. 610). Thus, time in narrative is not merely a question of 
time at the linguistic level, but also of time as experience.
While the question of experience is important, in this article I focus 
mainly on temporality at the structural level of a narrative and on charac-
terization. In the debate over temporality at the level of story and discourse 
in narrative, considerable controversy has arisen since Genette’s classical 
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theory.1 One problem that these studies have identif ied is that there exist 
plenty of elusive narratives, containing for example such serious temporal 
contradictions that it is almost impossible to derive a consistent chronology 
from the text. Brian Richardson (2003) refers to Alain Robbe-Grillet’s La 
Jalousie as an example of such a novel. But another kind of a problem – 
and this is what I see as the main problem in narratological approaches 
to temporality in f iction – lies at the metalevel, in the concepts of time 
and temporality themselves. If we take a look at almost any encyclopedic 
account of temporality or time in narrative, we will f ind meticulous lists, 
categories and perhaps hierarchies of how time can be studied in narratives. 
We f ind the notion that ‘time is culturally constructed, and thus concepts 
of time vary as a result of historical evolution’, as in The Living Handbook 
of Narratology (Scheffel, Weixlerti, and Werner, 2014); yet the same source 
claims that in narratological analysis, ‘time is both a dimension of the nar-
rated world (as conceived in the broader sense) and an analytical category 
(‘tense’) which describes the relation between different narrative tiers’. Thus 
narratological theory recognizes historical and cultural aspects of time, 
but does not take them into account in practice. Time is treated as though 
it were self-evidently lucid and explicit, even though we are dealing with a 
concept which is itself highly elusive and challenging to def ine.
In his essay ‘Time in Literature’ J. Hillis Miller (2003, p. 87) surveys studies 
on the topic, and makes an important point: ‘[l]iterary works […] may reflect 
the philosophical, theological, or scientif ic concepts of time prevalent when 
they were written’. I would add that contemporary concepts of time not only 
may do so, but are embedded in all f iction, in their structure, language and 
themes. Hillis Miller’s claim implies that time itself can be understood in 
various ways; it is not a closed or ‘natural’ concept, but can be sensed differ-
ently depending on the historical period. This is an observation which seems 
to be ignored in most of the narratological discussion; whether a narrative 
is from the eighteenth or the twentieth century, as has been shown, time is 
viewed as a closed and unchangeable concept. Nonetheless, at the end of their 
entry for ‘Time’ in The Living Handbook of Narratology, Scheffel, Weixler, and 
Werner (2014) remark that a great deal remains to be explored in narrative 
temporality, as ‘narratological research still privileges a Newtonian concept 
of time which cannot always be adequately applied to pre- and postmodern 
novels’. This is a pivotal point, albeit it must be noted that modern novels too 
can represent much more, or something other, than only Newtonian time.
1 See e.g. Herman, 1998; Gallagher, 2000; Richardson, 2002; Levenson, 2009; Scheffel, Weixler, 
and Werner, 2014.
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My purpose in this article is to examine ways in which temporal ordering 
in prose f iction narratives of the late sixteenth and early eighteenth century 
can be analyzed and understood in the context of the conceptions of time 
then prevalent. Rather than how time is ordered in these narratives, the 
ultimate question is what time means in these narratives. What does it add 
to our understanding, to be aware of the historical fact that for example 
at the end of the seventeenth century Newtonian physical time was only 
being established, or that in everyday life clock-time was experienced 
mostly within hearing distance of church bells or nearby public tower 
clocks? How do we take into account the great historical distance, and 
possibly varying ideas of time and temporality, when these early novels 
were published? This essay is an attempt to tackle the problem in relation to 
the early modern English novel. In taking examples from two, considerably 
different, writers, Aphra Behn and Daniel Defoe, my purpose is to show 
that our understanding of time in narrative can fruitfully be extended 
by including in the analysis culturally, socially and historically differing 
views of time. Temporal ordering in these examples is connected to both 
pre-modern and modern ideas of time, as can be observed at the level of 
language and in formal structure.
Oroonoko: Pre-Modern Temporality and the Emergence of 
Realism
Although the focus in this volume is on eighteenth-century literature, it is 
also appropriate to take into account the ‘long’ eighteenth century and to 
look at such late seventeenth-century narratives as Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko 
(1688). Behn’s novel, as indicated by its full title Oroonoko: or the Royal Prince. 
A True History, claims to be a true story.2 It tells the story of an African 
prince who falls in love with a beautiful and noble maid, Imoinda. The 
couple meets with adversity: Imoinda is sold into slavery, as ultimately is 
Oroonoko as well. In the end, they are unexpectedly reunited in Surinam, 
both as slaves and Imoinda becomes pregnant by Oroonoko. Since they 
cannot gain their freedom, the love story ends with the couple’s mutual 
agreement to die rather than continue in slavery.
According to Joanna Lipking (1997, p. xi), Oroonoko stood for what was 
new in the late seventeenth century: a new form of prose f iction, the 
2 Fludernik too uses Oroonoko as one of her key texts in theorizing ‘natural’ narratology. See 
Fludernik 1996.
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growth of empires, the emergence of women writers, and an interest in 
non-European ‘others’. In the twentieth and twenty-f irst century, critics 
and scholars have disagreed as to the form of the narrative – its meaning 
and tendencies – and have been drawn to ideological readings because of 
the novel’s themes. Oroonoko has been scrutinized for its representation of 
slavery, colonialism, race, class, gender, political philosophy and economic 
history. Laura J. Rosenthal (2004, p. 156) notes that less attention has been 
devoted to the novel’s form and complex artistry. Oroonoko shares many 
of the aspects of the seventeenth-century tradition of the heroic romance, 
such as the somewhat stereotypical aristocratic characters and the love 
story.3 Rosenthal (2004, p. 161) therefore suggests that the narrative creates 
its innovative literary form by combining realism and romance.
Compared to seventeenth-century romances, especially those of French 
heroic and pastoral romances, as well as later novels, Oroonoko is relatively 
short, around 100 pages (65 pages in the Norton critical edition of 1997). The 
story consists of events starting from Coramantien, where Oroonoko, the 
soldier prince, f irst meets his beloved, Imoinda:
Oroonoko coming from the Wars, […] he thought in Honour he ought 
to make a Visit to Imoinda, the Daughter of his Foster-father, the dead 
General; […] and to present her with those Slaves that had been taken 
in this last Battle, as the Trophies of her Father’s Victories. When he 
came, […] he was inf initely surpriz’d at the Beauty of this fair Queen of 
Night, whose Face and Person was so exceeding all he had ever beheld 
[…]. So that having made his f irst Compliments, and presented her an 
hundred and f ifty Slaves in Fetters, he told her with his Eyes, that he was 
not insensible of her Charms; […] she understood that silent Language 
of new-born Love; and from that Moment, put on all her Additions to 
Beauty.
‘Twill be imagin’d Oroonoko stay’d not long before he made his second 
Visit; nor, considering his Quality, not much longer before he told her, 
he ador’d her (O, pp. 14-15).4
What can we make of this passage in terms of temporality and concep-
tions of time? We can begin by looking at language and tense, and how 
sentences – and more generally events – are temporally linked. The elements 
emphasized in the text show that the narration follows the past tense, 
3 Cf. Liisa Steinby’s essay in this volume.
4 Unless otherwise noted, in this essay bolding is added but italics are original. 
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the narrator being outside of the action in this part. We f ind temporal 
expressions such as ‘not long before’ and ‘not much long before’; later in the 
text we f ind ‘in a little time’ (O, p. 19), ‘one day’ (O, p. 19) or such adverbs 
and particles such as ‘soon’, ‘before’, ‘after’, and ‘while’, resembling a more 
timeless tale placed in a far-away land. What is constant in the narrative 
is its temporal ‘nonpunctuality’; more specif ically, the absence of clock or 
calendar time as a device to organize events, which would strengthen the 
realism of the narrative. The narrative seems to be arranged in ‘and then’ 
form, combining events in a temporal order without being overly precise.5
The events in the story follow chronological order, with one exception. 
The story begins with a f irst-person narrator, the ‘Eye-Witness to a great 
part’ (O, p. 8), telling the reader about the circumstances in which the hero’s 
story has evolved, and about those in the colony of Surinam in the West-
Indies, where the f inal events of the story take place. In this context the 
narrator says: ‘before I give you the Story of this Gallant Slave [Oroonoko], ‘tis 
f it I tell you the manner of bringing them [slaves] to these new Colonies’ (O, 
p. 8). The narrator then gives a detailed depiction of the milieu, the people 
of Surinam and their customs, before she turns to describing the place 
called Coramantien, Oroonoko’s homeland in Africa. Now the actual story 
begins, moving forward to Oroonoko’s and Imoinda’s f irst encounter. The 
union of the lovers is at risk, as the king too is in love with Imoinda. When 
it is discovered that Imoinda has lost her virginity, she is sold as a slave. 
Since death is thought to be better than slavery, the king tells Oroonoko 
that Imoinda was executed. Oroonoko enters another war, is betrayed and 
is himself sold into slavery, in the same place as Imoinda: Surinam. There 
they meet, to their mutual surprise.
The narrative moves forward in vague temporal terms, and events take 
place in succession, with days, weeks, or months passing between them; 
sometimes something happens before or after something else. The narrator’s 
key idea, however, is to tell the story as it might have happened in real life:
I do not pretend, in giving you the History of this Royal Slave, to entertain 
my Reader with the Adventures of a feign’d Hero, whose Life and Fortunes 
Fancy may manage at the Poet’s Pleasure; nor in relating the Truth, design 
to adorn it with any Accidents, but such as arriv’d in earnest to him: And 
it shall come simply into the World, recommended by its own proper 
Merits, and natural Intrigues; there being enough of Reality to support 
it, and to render it diverting, without the Addition of Invention (O, p. 8).
5 For ‘and then’ narration, see Rimmon-Kenan, 1986, pp. 16-17.
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This is the narrator in the very f irst paragraph of the narrative, assuring 
the reader that the story is true and is being retold as witnessed by or told 
to the narrator. Whether or not the story was true in real life, we cannot 
ultimately know, but as a narrative it reports events as if in the order they 
took place, without narrowing the time of events too accurately. The nar-
rative thus seems to follow much more the temporal ordering of a fairy 
tale, ‘once upon a time…’ than of a precise historical account. Unlike such 
novels as for instance Fielding’s Tom Jones, it is reported as a sequence of 
interesting biographical events rather than as the composition of a com-
plex plot. This convention can be attributed to the contemporary literary 
context, the romance and its narrative patterns, but it can also be linked 
to contemporary views of time.
The idea of vague temporal expressions was prevalent in the seventeenth-
century romance tradition, as well as, it can be argued, in everyday life: 
the sense of time was mainly ordained by the natural cycles of the year, 
the rhythm of holy days, and the everyday tolling of church bells. It is thus 
no surprise that in prose f iction the sense of time follows similar patterns, 
and is not confined to precise time-keeping. We can grasp a concrete sense 
of how time was experienced in London in the 1660s from Samuel Pepys’s 
diary. It was in 1665 that Pepys, a government off icial, was presented with 
his f irst silver watch, worth £14: his f irst personal timekeeper so accurate 
as to show time to the minute. The watch, however, seems to have been 
more of a diversion for Pepys than a useful device; he himself, like the 
general public, seems to have ordered his sense of time by the church bells 
of London or, occasionally, a sundial.6 At a general level, the view of time 
was connected to several contexts. In addition to the everyday experience 
of time-keeping, the conception of history was still primarily cyclical. After 
the medieval period, underpinned by Christian eschatology, a cyclical view 
originating from antiquity regained its strength during the Renaissance. 
The cyclical view entailed two assumptions: f irst, that nature is uniform 
and unchanging, secondly, that history consists of a sequence of repetitive 
cycles. As nature was thought to remain static, the existence of parallels 
between individuals and events from different epochs seemed evident 
(Guibbory, 1986, pp. 8-9). The idea of return is inherent in the Italian word 
rinascita and the French Renaissance (also used in English), indicating 
the rebirth of something old rather than the emergence of something new 
(Whitrow 1991, pp. 132-34). According to Achsah Guibbory (1986, p. 8), the 
6 The Diary of Samuel Pepys Vol. VI, 1981 (1665), p. 101, pp. 221-22. See also Mäkikalli, 2007, pp. 
162-63.
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cyclical conception of history clearly prevailed during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, and continued to exercise considerable influence into 
the eighteenth. This also means that in historical prose f iction the past 
is viewed as providing exemplary patterns for the narrating of historical 
events. It is in this light that we should consider the key aspects of temporal-
ity in Oroonoko. While Behn is radical in locating events in the context of 
the recent past, and in ascribing noble and heroic characteristics to non-
Europeans, we can nevertheless approach the story as an exemplary one.
We can clarify the cyclical idea of temporality in Oroonoko by taking a 
look at characterization in the narrative. If we look at the passage quoted, 
we f ind characterization shared with the romance form: the modern novel 
rarely if ever tells stories about princes or princesses, but that is the case in 
Behn’s story. Oroonoko is a prince; heroic and brave, he has ‘real Greatness 
of Soul’ and ‘ref in’d Notions of true Honour, that absolute Generosity, and 
that Softness that was capable of the highest Passions of Love and Gallantry’ 
(O, p. 12). Moreover, he is educated in the European sciences and languages 
(he had a French Royal Tutor), and his shape is the most perfect that can be 
imagined: ‘The most famous Statuary cou’d not form the Figure of a Man 
more admirably turn’d from Head to Foot. […] The whole Proportion and 
Air of his Face was so noble, and exactly form’d, that, bating [except for] 
his Colour, there cou’d be nothing in Nature more beautiful, agreeable and 
handsome’ (O, p. 13). Imoinda in turn is the most beautiful and virtuous 
creature there can be, ‘the fair Queen of Night’ as Behn puts it. Let us take 
a look at another passage from the narrative:
[A]s he [Oroonoko] knew no Vice, his Flame aim’d at nothing but Honour, 
if such a distinction may be made in Love; and specially in that Country, 
where Men take to themselves as many as they can maintain; and where 
the only Crime and Sin with Woman is, to turn her off, to abandon her to 
Want, Shame and Misery: Such ill Morals are only practis’d in Christian-
Countries, where they prefer the bare Name of Religion; and without 
Vertue [sic] or Morality, think that’s suff icient. But Oroonoko was none 
of those Professors; but as he had right Notions of Honour, so he made 
her such Propositions as were not only and barely such; but, contrary to 
the Custom of this Country, he made her Vows, she shou’d be the only 
woman he wou’d possess while he liv’d; that no Age or Wrinkles shou’d 
incline him to change, for her Soul wou’d be always fine, and always 
young; and he shou’d have an eternal Idea in his Mind of the Charms 
she now bore, and shou’d look into his Heart for that Idea, when he cou’d 
f ind it no longer in her Face.
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After thousand Assurances of his lasting Flame, and her eternal Empire 
over him, she condescended to receive him for Husband; or rather, receiv’d 
him, as the greatest Honour the Gods cou’d do her (O, pp. 15-16).
Thus the characters are aristocratic and superior to the common people, and 
have eternal features and qualities, which will not change in the course of 
time. As we see in the f irst quotation, ‘he told her with his Eyes, that he was 
not insensible of her Charms; […] she understood that silent Language of 
new-born Love; and from that Moment, put on all her Additions to Beauty’ 
and ‘not much longer before he told her, he ador’d her’. The couple fall in 
love in an instant – a conventional feature in the romance tradition. Human 
qualities are permanent, and remain unaffected despite the many events 
and ordeals encountered by the characters. It is well known that throughout 
her life Behn maintained her loyalty to the Stuart monarchy, and it has 
been suggested that Oroonoko embodies the heroic qualities that Behn 
admired in Charles I (Rosenthal, 2004, p. 155). The narrative suggests a close 
correspondence between birth and worth; as both the Stuart king and the 
royal slave were destroyed, Laura Brown (1997) has argued that the death 
of the royal slave may have functioned as an allegory for the end of Stuart 
power, or at least the end of an era.
This idea of characterization can be partly contextualized back to what 
Mikhail Bakhtin has described as adventure-time, referring both to structural 
temporality and to the characters’ relation to time. According to Bakhtin, 
in the romance tradition there is a timeless vacuum between the beginning 
and the ending. That is to say, the gap between the two different biographical 
stages is not productive but seems timeless, in the sense that after the moment 
of falling in love no further events seem to affect the eventual marriage. The 
initial feelings lead to wedlock, leaving no room for potential changes brought 
about by the characters’ intervening experiences or development. The time 
taken up by the depiction of mere adventures is thus empty, standing outside 
realistic life. The action is detached from biographical and biological time, 
because it is never subject to change (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 89-91). Behn’s narra-
tive first seems to present unchanging characters, rather than the developing 
or individualistic ones found in modern novels. The end of the narrative and 
the downfall of the characters, however, contradict the romance tradition, 
which presented happy endings and praised eternal love between the central 
characters. In Oroonoko, we are following biographical events with a tragic 
ending. This brings an element of realism to the narrative: we have people 
with unforeseen destinies that could have occurred in real life. This is also 
underpinned by the historical depiction of practices in Surinam.
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Although Behn uses neither specif ic years nor any other precise time 
references in her narrative, some details are nevertheless mentioned 
which indicate a particular historical event. One way of creating a sense 
of temporal realism is the use of a f irst-person narrator, who reappears later 
in the text as a character, and who seems to have much in common with 
the author herself. Aphra Behn in fact visited Surinam, and the depiction 
of the setting and events in Oroonoko contributes a sense that the action 
takes place in the English colony of Surinam before 1667, when it was taken 
over by the Dutch:
his [Oroonoko’s] Misfortune was, to fall in an obscure World, that afforded 
only a Female Pen to celebrate his Fame; though I doubt not but it had 
liv’d from others Endeavors if the Dutch, who, immediately after his 
Time took that Country, had not kill’d, banish’d, and dispers’d all those 
that were capable of giving the World this great Man’s Life, much better 
than I have done (O, p. 36).
Behn’s use of a realistic setting thus at the same time contributes a certain 
realism to the use of historical time. We are to believe that last stages 
of Oroonoko’s and Imoinda’s lives took place in the 1660s. Yet we might 
speculate that in this passage Behn is using history to condemn Dutch 
actions in Surinam, rather than creating realistic time and place for her 
narrative. Whether factually ‘true’ or not, the story of Oroonoko in a sense 
reflects a hybrid temporality, in a story the point of which is to present the 
destinies of unusual people and unexpected events to European readers. At 
the same time, its temporal vagueness is something originating not from a 
fairy-tale but from contemporary ideas of time and history.
Robinson Crusoe: Dated Events
In early English prose f iction we are witnessing the emergence of the 
representation of particular time: of chronological, concrete, ‘real’ and 
secular time, in contrast to the absence of temporality or the timelessness 
represented for example by the romance tradition. We can ask to what 
extent the narrated time of prose f iction is based on ‘real’ time, which both 
Georg Lukács (1971, pp. 120-22) and Mikhail Bakhtin (1986, pp. 11-39) identify 
as the main constitutive element of the modern novel. They argue that 
time in the modern novel is immanent, dynamic and continuous, standing 
outside the static world of ideas.
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Although Behn too uses the f irst name of the character in her title, thus 
placing the emphasis on the individual, Defoe’s novels present characters 
with more detail and personal history than Behn’s. Robinson Crusoe is born 
in York, a son of a middle-class family; he feels wanderlust, and ignores 
his father’s wish that he study law and earn an appropriate middle station 
in life. This already depicts a different ground upon which the character 
is based. Defoe’s story world is not one of idealized princes or princesses, 
aristocrats or royals, but of middle-class English people. As earlier stud-
ies have shown, Defoe’s characters are particularized to a certain extent, 
but they lack the psychological development and the individual view of 
the world which would turn them into modern, dynamic and developing 
individuals. The passage of time turns them into better persons in terms of 
morality and faith, but not of psychological growth.7 Nevertheless, they are 
represented as persons who could have lived in late seventeenth-century 
or early eighteenth-century England, and can thus be identif ied as if they 
were real historical persons, situated in a particular time and place.
The detailed study of temporal references in Defoe’s novels reveals that in 
following chronological and calendar time, Defoe is using specific temporal 
coordinates more than earlier writers of prose fiction. This is something that 
Ian Watt (1983, p. 23) regards as a central aspect of the early English novel. 
The convention can be demonstrated in Robinson Crusoe (1719), the f irst of 
Defoe’s novels. I have dealt with the temporal aspects of Defoe’s novels in 
detail elsewhere (see Mäkikalli 2007); here I merely give brief examples of 
Defoe’s use of temporality in Robinson Crusoe, to demonstrate the differ-
ences in temporal representation compared to Oroonoko, published only 
some thirty years earlier.
In Defoe’s œuvre as a whole, temporal duration and the specif icity of 
temporal references in relation to calendar time and chronology vary from 
novel to novel. When we arrange the temporal references in Robinson 
Crusoe so as to form a temporal continuum, already the opening sentence 
is signif icant: it exemplif ies the manner typical of Defoe’s novels of placing 
events and characters on a chronological continuum: ‘I was born in the Year 
1632, in the City of York’ (RC, p. 4). The novel thus begins by informing the 
reader of the central character’s year of birth. In the course of the story 
further dates are mentioned which seem to be central in Robinson’s life. 
September 1st, 1651 is the day when Robinson f irst boards a ship; eight years 
later, now a wealthy planter, he sets out again on the same day on a voyage 
to purchase slaves on the West coast of Africa, but ends up shipwrecked 
7 For Defoe’s characterization, see Watt, 1983; Novak, 1963, p. 129; Mäkikalli, 2007, pp. 106-13.
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on a desert island.8 Later he carves the date of his landing ashore on a 
wooden cross, which serves him as a calendar (‘I come on Shore here on the 
30th of Sept. 1659’, (RC, p. 48); he also mentions celebrating the anniversaries 
of his arrival on the island (RC, p. 76). Robinson is rescued from the island 
on 19 December 1686 and arrives in England on 11 June 1687 (RC, p. 200). 
He lives in England until the death of his wife; in 1694 he is ready to take 
off again, ready for further adventures, which are narrated in the sequel, 
The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (RC, p. 219; FRC, p. 11). Robinson 
returns to the island on 10 May 1695 (FRC, p. 32) and embarks on further 
adventures in Asia; he returns to London on 10 January 1705 at the age of 72, 
having spent ten years and nine months away from England (FRC, p. 319). 
We can thus follow Robinson’s course of life chronologically, pinpointed by 
certain dates from the year of his birth to that of his retirement.
Defoe thus uses specif ic dates in order to endow the narrative with a 
realistic illusion or vraisemblance. There may have been plenty of reasons for 
doing this; yet one might be linked to a rising general awareness of ways of 
representing the past, and of techniques for inscribing a secular chronology. 
The early modern period challenged many earlier views of time, and there 
was a steadily growing interest in temporal order and chronology. According 
to Anthony Grafton, no discipline was more central to the study of time 
during this period than the careful study of the past. Events had their place 
in a history, which began with the Creation and proceeded in an orderly 
way through the Flood and the Exile, the fall of Troy and the rise of the 
European nations, before f inally reaching modern times. From the Renais-
sance to the Enlightenment, technical chronology, i.e. the reconstruction of 
calendars and the dating of the main events of ancient and medieval history, 
was a central topic of debate among European thinkers (Grafton, 1993, 
pp. 4-7). The period following the Reformation spurred a special interest 
in the interpretation of the Bible not merely as allegorical revelation but 
also as a historical document, thus widening the theological debate over 
biblical chronology (Whitrow, 1991, p. 137). The concept of the ‘century’ in 
the reckoning of time established itself in the Protestant areas during the 
1550s, leading historians to arrange events and documentary materials in 
a more chronological order (Borst, 1993, p. 103). The inauguration of the 
Gregorian calendar in 1582, and the view of chronology presented by the 
French Calvinist Joseph Scaliger in his De emendatione temporum (1583), 
8 In the original edition of Robinson Crusoe, a blank space stood in place of the date of de-
parture on the disastrous voyage, but in the fourth edition, also published in 1719, the temporal 
reference was already added. See RC, p. 31, n. 6.
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may also have exerted an influence on Defoe’s fascination with chronology, 
and his tendency in his novels to provide a chronology based on exact dates 
and calendar years. Scaliger’s purpose was not to demarcate the beginning 
and end of time based on theological or natural explanations, but to define 
the precise location of events on the historical timeline. The purpose of his 
system of Julian days, which started at noon 1.1.4713 BCE, was to counteract 
changes (i.e. inaccuracies) in the lengths of years and months in calculat-
ing the interval between two events. It has been suggested that modern 
historical chronology (chronologia) begins with Scaliger’s time-scale, into 
which he incorporated central historical events.9
Defoe’s and Behn’s shared interest in writing prose f iction was to tell true 
stories. Oroonoko claims to be ‘a true history’ in its title; Robinson Crusoe 
similarly claims on the title page to be ‘written by himself’. In the preface to 
Robinson Crusoe, ‘The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; 
neither is there any Appearance of Fiction in it’ (RC, p. 3). Both narratives 
emphasize that they are to be read as reports of events taking place in 
real life, in history. As scholars have demonstrated, both narratives could 
have been based on real accounts: Oroonoko on Behn’s own experiences in 
Surinam, Robinson Crusoe on Alexander Selkirk’s calamitous voyage and 
shipwreck as a mariner. In Oroonoko the sense of realistic narration comes 
to the fore in depictions of place and milieu, but at the structural level and 
in characterization it follows the romance tradition. The temporality of the 
narrative thus remains vague, the action is not temporally particular or 
precise, and the characters have eternal rather than temporally dynamic 
qualities. In Robinson Crusoe, in contrast, we f ind an endeavor to locate 
the action on a chronological time scale. The temporality of the narrative 
is therefore more specif ic, and the characters are given a personal and 
thereby a historical context.
The study of temporality in narratives such as Oroonoko and Robinson 
Crusoe points in various directions, and needs more detailed contextual-
ization within contemporary views of time than has been possible here. 
Oroonoko, with its vague temporal references, represents timelessness; in 
Robinson Crusoe Defoe uses specif ic dates to inscribe a new, chronological 
time. I hope in this essay to have demonstrated that in analyzing these 
narratives and novels it is fruitful to take into account historical views of 
time. Ultimately, what is at stake here is a matter of methodology.
9 Whitrow 1991, p. 137; Borst 1993, pp. 104-06; Richards 1999, pp. 12-13.
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 Temporality, Subjectivity and the 
Representation of Characters in the 
Eighteenth-Century Novel
From Defoe’s Moll Flanders to Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehrjahre
Liisa Steinby
Introduction: Temporality and Subjectivity in Classical Narratology 
and in the Eighteenth-Century Novel
In the course of the eighteenth century, the experience of time – and, con-
nected to this, the experience of human existence – underwent profound 
changes. Here I trace these changes as expressed in the eighteenth-century 
novel mainly on the basis of two examples, representing two different 
phases of temporalization of experience: Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722) and 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (1795-1796).
If we agree with Ian Watt’s view of the ‘rise’ of the modern novel in 
England in the f irst half of the eighteenth century, what we have here is 
the f irst radical temporalization of experience in that century. According to 
Watt, this turn was based on a change in our understanding of reality: the 
Platonic-Aristotelian and medieval view of the immutable, ideal essences of 
things as the primary reality was replaced by the conception of the primary 
reality consisting of particular things that we perceive. In contrast to general 
essences, a particular thing always appears in a certain place and time 
(Watt, 1981, pp. 12-35). This ‘formal realism’ of the new novel corresponds, 
according to Watt, to Locke’s empiricist philosophy. The literature of the 
classical period – extending from Aristotle’s Poetics to eighteenth-century 
neoclassicism – dealt with the eternal truths of life in the form of illustrative 
exempla (ibid., p. 25), and the characters were bearers of the common human 
lot or specimens of general character types. In contrast, in the new novel 
the focus of interest lies in a particular individual (or individuals) and his or 
her experience (cf. ibid., pp. 15-16). The individuation of characters also leads 
to a loss of credibility for traditional patterns of action, i.e. conventional 
plots, which are replaced by the narration of an individual’s experiences 
(ibid., p. 15). The importance assigned to the temporal dimension of events 
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is also manifested in a more accurate account of time compared to earlier 
literature (ibid., pp. 26-28).
Watt claims that it is typical of the new novel to see the individual’s 
life as ‘a historical process’, signifying that the ‘narrative is occurring at a 
particular place and at a particular time’ (ibid., p. 26). However, the turn 
to historicism proper – seeing things historically – takes place in a later 
phase of Enlightenment thinking, namely in the last third of the century. 
Contrary to the classical view of history deriving from the antiquity, history 
is now no longer seen as a repetition of ahistorical patterns, but involves 
the constant creation of something new. Reinhart Koselleck describes 
this change in the perception of history as a change in understanding the 
relationship between the experience of the past and the expectation of 
the future: where in traditional society the world appeared immutable, 
and the future was therefore expected to be similar to the past, in the new, 
historicist thinking the experience of the past and the expectation of the 
future fall apart: what happened in the past need not return in similar form 
in the future (Koselleck, 1985, pp. 349-75). The French Revolution meant a 
confirmation of this late-Enlightenment idea of the possibility of change: by 
acting in the present, a future can be created which will be different from 
the past, and which hopefully will be something that better meets human 
needs and desires (cf. ibid., p. 54). And by creating history, humankind 
by the same time creates itself: history is now understood as the endless 
self-constitution of humanity, as described by Johann Gottfried Herder, one 
of the f irst proponents of historicist thinking (Herder, 1985, p. 716f.; 1991, p. 
153f). Moreover, the view of the historical constitution of humanity has a 
counterpart in the new understanding of individuality that emerges towards 
the end of the century. Individuals are no longer considered as instances 
of general humanity or specimens of ahistorical character types, but an 
individual now appears as a unique personality. Sociologically speaking, 
this emphasis on individuality arises in a society in which one’s possibilities 
are no longer automatically determined by one’s inherited rank or position 
in the society. As Günter Saße contends (Saße, 2010, p. 241), the plurality 
of functions which one had to occupy in modern society evoked the need 
to f ind in oneself, in one’s individual personality, the integrating instance 
which could counteract this pluralization. However, what a person is is not 
a stable thing: just as humankind will recognize its potentialities only in 
the process of history, the individual becomes him- or herself only through 
a process of development.
In what follows, we shall examine how the temporalization of experience 
affects the ‘story logic’, or the manner in which cohesion is built in the 
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narrative, and the representation of the experiencing and acting subject – 
the protagonist – and other characters. I apply the concepts ‘experiencing 
and acting subject’ and ‘character’ in a ‘naturalized’ way, as referring to 
something that we imagine to be f ictional counterparts of real persons.1 The 
experiencing and acting subject refers to the person from whose perspective 
the f ictive world (primarily) appears to the reader. The experiencing and 
acting subject of course has a ‘character’, too, but it may come to the fore 
in a different manner compared to other characters. While the vantage 
point in this study is in the history of the eighteenth-century novel and its 
intellectual background, we may ask how far narratology can provide us 
with a toolkit for the analysis.
The discussion of temporality in narratology has occurred basically 
within the framework set by Gérard Genette in his influential Narrative 
Discourse (1980; orig. ‘Discours du récit’, in Figures III, 1972; cf. e.g. Sternberg, 
1990; 1992). Following the idea of the Russian formalists that the basic op-
position in a narrative is that between the story told and the narration of 
it, the main questions of narrative time concern the order and duration of 
narration in relation to the order and duration of the events of the story. The 
order of narration can either adhere to the (chronological) order of events in 
the story or can deviate from it, and there is a varying relationship between 
the duration of the event and the duration (i.e., the number of pages) of 
its narration (Genette, 1980, Ch. 1 and 2). Thus ‘time’ here means physical, 
objectively measurable time, and the parameters of temporality that are 
taken into account have to do with location along the continuum of time 
and quantity. ‘Frequency’, which Genette takes up as a third dimension 
of narrative temporality, of course is a quantitative concept as well. For 
Genette, ‘frequency’ means comparing the number of events in the story and 
the number of their occurrences in the narration. It is possible to narrate a 
single event once or n times, and to narrate an event that occurs n times once 
or n times. The f irst of these possibilities Genette calls a singulative (ibid., 
1 Structuralist narratology introduces the concept of the ‘actant’ as a functional unit of 
the action, or plot, to replace the ‘character’. Cf. e.g., Bal, 2002, p. 115: ‘[A]n actor is a structural 
position, while a character is a complex semantic unit. But as readers, we “see” characters […] 
That no satisfying, coherent theory of character is available is probably precisely because of 
this human aspect’; Margolin, 1990, p. 844: ‘Character as actant is a purely functional category 
[…] actants may be invested with semantic features, turning them into acteurs’; Herman, 2002, 
p. 119: ‘[S]tructuralist narratologists began by underscoring the constructedness of characters, 
their irreducibly semiotic status, when viewed as nodes in a network of signs’, while James 
Phelan has studied ‘characters’ mimetic, synthetic (= semiotic), and thematic dimensions’. Cf. 
also Phelan (1989) and Jannidis (2004; 2009).
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pp. 114-15), the third one is called iterative narration (ibid., p. 116). Genette’s 
striving for strict objectivity and exactness means cleansing the concepts 
of anything that refers to the subjective experience of time.2
Along with temporality, another basic aspect of narrative discourse for 
Genette is ‘mood’, def ined as a phenomenon of focalization. The ‘focalizer’ 
is the one through whose perception events in the story world are seen 
(answering the question ‘who sees?’; ibid., p. 186). The focalizer is the clos-
est that Genette’s narratology comes to the experiencing subject; another 
subject is the narrator, who in Genette’s theory is reduced to a narrative 
function, a ‘voice’ (answering the question ‘who speaks’; ibid. p. 186). The 
tendency to consider both the characters and the narrator of the story 
as abstract functions rather than as representations of human beings is 
characteristic of classical narratology (cf. e.g., Bal, 2002;3 Margolin, 1990). 
Just like temporality, focalization too is discussed in terms of location and 
quantity. For example, what is traditionally called ‘telling’ and ‘showing’ 
are, according to Genette (1980, p. 164), distinguished in terms of greater 
or smaller distance from the object, and consequently in different quanti-
ties of information. It is evident that the concept of focalization does not 
include any interpretative activity on the part of the perceiving subject: a 
focalizer is a mere optical point of observation and a neutral transmitter 
of information (cf. Steinby, 2016). We may question how far these abstract, 
quasi-physical concepts of time and focalization can serve the analysis of 
the temporalization of experience in the eighteenth-century novel.
Defoe’s Moll Flanders: Time, Subjectivity and Character 
Representation in a Survival Story
Watt describes the novelty of the rising novel, as represented by Defoe, 
Richardson and – with some reservations – Fielding against the backdrop of 
the seventeenth-century romance. Despite the fact that recent scholarship 
has demonstrated the existence of a great variety of f ictional and non-
f ictional text types that flourished in England at the turn of the eighteenth 
century and formed the ground for the growth of the novel (cf. Davis, 1983; 
McKeon, 2002; Hunter, 1994; Richetti, 1999), a comparison between the 
2 I have discussed Genette’s concepts of time, space, and subjectivity in more detail in Steinby 
(in press).
3 Bal, 2002, p. 16: ‘When […] I discuss the narrative agent, or narrator, I mean the linguistic 
subject, a function and not a person […]’.
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romance of the previous century and the emerging novel serves well in 
carving out what is ‘new’ in the new novel. This is also valid for changes in 
ways of experiencing time.
The conventional pattern of action in a Baroque novel (romance) is the 
following: The protagonists are two young rulers, or a prince and a princess, 
from far-away countries and an indefinite past, who fall in love with each 
other; before they can marry, however, they are separated, and each of them 
has to undergo a great number of adversities and dangers. The virtue and 
f idelity of the lovers are tried in stereotypical adventures, including among 
others war, battle and shipwreck; being captured by pirates, sold on the slave 
market, or harassed by an obnoxious suitor; having a narrow escape from 
being burnt at the stake or sacrif iced to a foreign god. The lovers remain 
unshakeable, and in the end their virtue is rewarded and their enemies 
punished: the infamous enemy who threatens their kingdom and possibly 
their lives is destroyed, the kingdom(s) is (are) restored to them, and they 
enter into matrimony.4 There is no inner connection between the events 
and the characters that experience them: their intentions and actions have 
nothing to do with what they encounter. Instead of ‘horizontal’ or causal 
connections between the adventures, there is a ‘vertical’ connection be-
tween the events and the transcendent world order: it is divine Providence, 
using Fortuna as its tool, that probes the virtue of the lovers (cf., e.g., Röder, 
1968, pp. 27-36; Frick, 1988). Those temporal coordinates that are given are 
vague and punctual, such as ‘suddenly’, ‘the following day’. Temporality as 
the dimension in which things undergo development or inner change is in 
these novels completely lacking.5
In Daniel Defoe’s second novel, Moll Flanders, the protagonist’s life is 
narrated by herself towards the end of her life. The events take place in 
contemporary, or almost contemporary, England and the British colonies, 
and the narration mainly follows the chronological order of events; at the 
end of the story, Molly mentions that she has completed her biography in 
1683, when she is almost seventy, which means that her life is a couple of gen-
erations back from her f irst readers. Like a heroine in a Baroque novel, Moll 
experiences a great variety of adversities and adventures; but the world is the 
4 The enormous size of these novels is a considerable hindrance for today’s curious readers. 
For example, Mme de Scudery’s Artaméne ou Le Grand Cyrus (1649-1653) comprises ten volumes 
and several thousand pages. A useful compilation of excerpts from the German representatives 
of the genre is Cholevius (1965).
5 On the Baroque novel, see e.g., Emrich (1981), Frick (1988). Mikhail Bakhtin’s (2008) account 
of the Greek adventure novel offers a good description of the Baroque novel (or romance) as 
well, since many of the distinctive features are the same.
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recognizable, everyday English world. Several real names of places are given 
as the scene of events, including London, Hammersmith, Bath, Lancashire, 
York, Virginia and Maryland. However, contrary to what Watt says about 
the great amount of concrete details in the new novel – something that he 
refers to as a ‘commonplace view’6 – there are no detailed descriptions of 
places, interiors, objects, or the characters’ attire.7 We are moving about 
in familiar places among familiar objects, which are not described but 
merely recognized as what they are: the aesthetic or picturesque values – or 
sociological implications – of places, interiors or particular objects are 
paid no attention to at all. Of Brickhill, for example, where she is going to 
marry her f ifth husband, Moll writes: ‘After dinner we walked to see the 
town, to see the church, and to view the f ields and the country, as is usual 
for strangers to do’ (MF, p. 154). A guest-house is merely a guest-house, a 
room a room, in which those pieces of furniture are mentioned which play 
a role in the action, as in the room where Moll will spend the night with 
the would-be (f ifth) husband: ‘There was a bed in the room, and we were 
walking to and again, eager in the discourse; at last, he takes me by surprise 
in his arms, and threw me on the bed, but without the least offer of any 
indecency, courted me to consent […]’ (MF, p. 155). Obviously, space and 
different objects are present only as the prerequisites of action.
There is, however, one particular aspect of objects to which Moll does pay 
attention: their monetary value. When Moll mentions, and possibly specifies 
with an adjective or two, valuable things such as jewels, precious cloths, 
watches or any other property, up to and including houses and estates, this 
always happens with a calculating eye: she is estimating the pecuniary value 
of these possessions. This manner of perceiving things follows naturally 
from her position in the world: she is the progeny of a Newgate convict 
mother and an unknown father, and from her earliest childhood was at 
the mercy of strangers. This determines what kind of story her life history 
is: the survival story of a girl and woman, without family or connections, 
who has nothing to rely on but her own resourcefulness. Thus, despite the 
many surprising turns and adventures, Moll’s life story – unlike those we 
f ind in Baroque novels – has an inner cohesion: it is her striving for security 
that determines her attitude to events and to other people, and even her 
experience of time.
6 Watt, 1981, p. 18: ‘particularity of description had always been considered typical of the 
narrative manner of Robinson Crusoe and Pamela’.
7 That this is the case in eighteenth-century English novels in general is demonstrated by 
Wall (2006).
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In Moll’s story time is an important dimension, and the most relevant 
time-span is her lifetime. Moll keeps from the beginning the reader informed 
about her age: in connection with various life events, she mentions having 
been three, seventeen, twenty-f ive, forty-two, f ifty, sixty-one or sixty-eight. 
The age is much more than mere neutral recording of the course of time: 
it is something which Moll’s prospects of success def initely depend on. At 
the age of three, she is completely dependent on those who are taking care 
of her; when she is seventeen and a beauty, she is seduced, but is saved by 
the marriage proposal of the brother of the deceitful seducer. When this 
husband dies only f ive years later, Molly survives by remarrying, repeatedly, 
till she is about f ifty. She now realizes that she scarcely has a chance on the 
marriage market any longer, and for years she ‘earns’ her living as a thief. 
Thus, age is utterly important8 – not as a measure of anything like an inner 
maturing process, but because it is a highly relevant factor in Moll’s life 
project of securing for herself a safe, and if possible comfortable, existence.
In Moll’s account of events, the hour or the time of day when something 
happens is hardly ever mentioned; a watch, for Moll, is a precious object to 
be stolen, rather than an article of utility. Moll keeps however recording the 
duration of the different periods of her life: how many months or years had 
gone by, sometimes how many days, and particularly how long she lived 
with each of her f ive husbands. The specification of time is functionalized in 
relation to Moll’s main objective: to survive. There is a connection between 
the calculation of the value of her possessions and the counting of time: 
the question is always, for how long a time a certain sum of money will 
suff ice, invested in property or liquid assets. Her struggle for survival is 
also the perspective from which she sees other persons, including – and 
particularly – her husbands, whom she may love dearly, but who represent 
for her primarily providers of security.
For example, of her second husband Moll writes that ‘[m]y husband had 
this excellence, that he valued nothing of expense. As his history, you may 
be sure, has very little weight in it, ‘tis enough to tell you that in about two 
years and a quarter he broke, got into a sponging-house, being arrested in an 
action too heavy for him to give bail to […]’ (MF, p. 53). The husband leaves 
her, and what remains to Moll is to count her possessions and on this basis 
to assess her position: ‘I found, upon casting things up, my case was very 
much altered, and my fortune much lessened, for, including the hollands 
and a parcel of f ine muslins, which I carried off before, and some plate and 
8 See the discussion of ‘female time’ in Moll Flanders and Roxana in Mäkikalli, 2006, pp. 
201-17.
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other things, I found I could hardly muster up £500; and my condition was 
very odd […]’ (MF, p. 55). She does not tell about her emotional but about 
her economic distress.
Moll does not depict her husbands, in the neoclassical manner, as differ-
ent character types, nor does she employ black-and-white painting, like a 
Baroque novelist. For her there is no problem in recognizing what someone 
is like – once the possibility of deliberate deception is excluded, against 
which Moll knows enough to be on her guard; and this commonsense 
understanding of people, which takes no time to acquire, suff ices very well 
for her in any of her relationships. Of some of her husbands, she mentions 
one or two characteristic features – for instance that her f irst husband was 
a great joker – but she sees no point in going into their characters more 
deeply. How little the husbands are individualized is indicated by the fact 
that most of them are not even mentioned by name. Moll therefore has to 
use other means of distinguishing them when she happens to speak of two 
of her husbands in the same sentence: ‘It must be observed that when the 
old wretch, my brother ([the third] husband) was dead, I then freely gave 
my husband [the fourth but also the f inal one, reinstated in this position 
towards the end of Moll’s life] an account of all that affair […]’ (MF, p. 294).
Of her marriages, Moll tells us very little. For example, the f ive years of 
the f irst marriage are summed up in two sentences:
It concerns the story in hand very little to enter into the further particu-
lars of the [husband’s] family, or of myself, for the f ive years that I lived 
with this husband, only to observe that I had two children by him, and 
that at the end of the f ive years he died. He had been really a very good 
husband to me, and we lived very agreeably together; but as he had not 
received much from them [his family], and had in the little time he lived 
acquired no great matters, so my circumstances were not great, nor was 
I much mended by the match (p. 50).
Moll’s attention is focused on the periods between the marriages, when 
she has to f ind new forms of livelihood. At f irst, for several decades, this 
means providing herself with a new, preferably prosperous husband. Each 
search for a new husband is an undertaking that requires great energy and 
wisdom, as well as often some cunning. For example, she tells us about the 
man who would become her third husband:
I picked out my man without much diff iculty, by the judgment I made of 
his way of courting me. I had let him run on with his protestations that 
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he loved me above all the world; that if I would make him happy, that 
was enough; all which I knew was upon [the mistaken] supposition that 
I was very rich, though I never told him a word of it myself (MF, p. 67).
While the periods of dependence on a husband are recorded only briefly, 
Moll’s narration of the dangerous period when she had to support herself 
by stealing contains much more detail: she describes several particular 
occasions when she narrowly escapes being caught, which would mean 
being hanged or transported as a convict to the colonies. Eventually, Moll 
is captured and transported to the New World; but she manages to secure 
her likewise convicted and transported fourth husband (a highwayman) a 
place in the same ship, and by investing cleverly the assets she had earned 
by stealing they establish a new, prosperous living on an estate in Maryland. 
The values of the different possessions, the yearly prof it of the estate, and 
Moll’s inheritance from her mother – who was also the mother of her third 
husband – are carefully specif ied.
Thus there is a clear rhythm to Moll’s story of her life: it is the periods 
of insecurity, which are the times in which her life depends on her own 
initiative and inventiveness, that are described in detail, including the lively 
rendering of crucial scenes and dialogues, while the smooth periods, those 
of her relative security and her dependence on a husband, are recounted 
only very briefly. The narrative rhythm thus accentuates the phases when 
Moll appears as an independently acting subject. Defoe’s Moll, like his 
Robinson Crusoe, is an individual left on her or his own to get along in the 
world, and time is an essential dimension in her struggle for subsistence. 
The passing of time is a threat when the means of livelihood are running 
out, but time is an asset when it offers an opportunity to gain property. For 
Moll, the intervals between her marriages are periods in which these ‘active’ 
aspects of time are accentuated, while within her marriages, the passing of 
time is relatively insignif icant: Moll merely emerges from each marriage 
some years older. Thus in Moll’s life, essentially the same problem – how 
to survive – as well as a temporary solution to this problem surface again 
and again; and the repetition of the pattern brings a feature of seriality to 
Moll’s narrative of her life.9
9 Stuart Sherman has analysed the serial form in eighteenth-century diaries and the adoption 
of this form in the new novel (Sherman, 1996). Moll’s autobiography is not in diary form but is 
presented as having been written ‘afterwards’, when she has lived through all the adversities 
of life and is now a prosperous estate owner; here it is the content of her life, the repetition of 
the very same distress, that entails the repetitive pattern of her life history.
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At the end of the novel another time perspective comes to the fore: that 
of eternity. In the last sentence of the novel Moll writes that she and her 
husband have now returned to England, ‘where we resolve to spend the 
remainder of our years in sincere penitence for the wicked lives we have 
lived’ (MF, p. 295). Thus old Moll and her aged husband turn their faces 
from time to eternity (cf. Mäkikalli, 2006, pp. 95-113). The reader, however, 
cannot avoid the impression that Moll has not abandoned her previous life 
strategy in the f irst place: what she is now doing, in deciding to repent for 
the rest of her life, is securing comfort in her life hereafter.
In conclusion, we see that the essential story logic of Moll Flanders does 
not derive from the fact that Moll is the focalizer who registers events, 
offering information about events and characters (cf. Genette, 1980, pp. 
75f., 160-64); what is decisive is rather that the information she gives us is 
strongly biased and conditioned by her struggle for subsistence. This is to say 
that in order to grasp the inherent logic in her story – including its temporal 
structure – we have to take into account the kind of person she is and the 
nature of her primary problem in life. That events and other characters 
are seen from her perspective means that anything she encounters she 
sees as either an opportunity or a hindrance in her struggle for subsistence 
and a comfortable life. The rhythm of her narrative, which is formed by 
the alternation of condensed and expanded narration, derives from her 
experience of the alternation between tranquil, relatively secure, passive 
periods – primarily those of her marriages – and turbulent, risky, active ones 
in which both the threatening and promising aspects of time come most 
clearly to the fore. This indicates that narrative duration and rhythm are 
phenomena that, in order to make sense, must be explicated in connection 
with the content, which again is dependent on the particular historical 
conditions: in this case, the insecure position of women without a fortune 
in eighteenth-century England.
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre: Temporality, Character 
Representation. and the Experiencing and Acting Subject
In Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship), 
temporalization extends to the manner how characters are seen as well 
as to one’s way of understanding oneself. This is connected with the new 
understanding of human beings as unique and developing individuals. We 
have seen that in Moll Flanders, although the characters are not presented 
as representatives of general types, individuality does not play a great role 
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in their depiction. There is no problem of recognizing people as they are, 
and the characters are thinly if at all described and strongly functionalized 
as parts of Moll’s survival story. There is no issue of the identity of the 
protagonist, either. In contrast, in Goethe’s novel the individuals, including 
the protagonist, are not easily identif ied as what they are. In addition, 
while Defoe’s characters do not change except for aging, Goethe’s char-
acters undergo changes, which further complicates their recognition. It is 
precisely the individual’s change or formation (Bildung) that is thematized 
in the Lehrjahre. Traditionally, a Bildungsroman, of which the Lehrjahre is 
considered to be both the earliest example and the paragon, is understood 
as the story of the development of a young person towards a fully developed 
personality (cf. Dilthey, 1965, p. 273). As I have argued elsewhere, however, 
the Lehrjahre is less the story of Wilhelm’s Bildung than a narrative of his 
disparate experiences, out of which he strives to construct the story of his 
Bildung (cf. Saariluoma [Steinby], 2004, esp. 310-16). The queries in what 
follows concern character representation and the role of Wilhelm as the 
experiencing and acting subject, approached from the viewpoint of the new 
temporalization of experience.
Individualization and Temporalization in Character Representation
To close the gap in character representation between Defoe and Goethe, a 
few remarks on two other authors may be appropriate. While Defoe does not 
pay much attention to the representation of characters, for Henry Fielding, 
another exponent of the new novel, the pertinent, insightful representation 
of characters is of primary importance: it is the f ield within which an author 
can display his skills in the ‘new province of writing’ which Fielding claims 
to have established with his Joseph Andrews (1742) and Tom Jones (1749).10 
This new genre, which he calls ‘private history’,11 is about ‘morals and man-
ners’. He assures us emphatically that ‘I describe not men, but manners; not 
an Individual, but a Species’.12 To be able to do so, he has studied human 
nature by observing men (and women) in contemporary life.13 Thus, while 
10 ‘For as I am, in reality, the founder of a new province of writing, so I am at liberty to make 
what laws I please therein’. Tom Jones, Book II, Ch. 1.
11 Tom Jones, Book XIII, Ch. 1. However, despite proclaiming being free to invent whatever 
laws he wishes for the new province of writing, Fielding f its the new genre into the neoclassical 
frame, def ining it as ‘prosai-comi-epic writing’ (Tom Jones, Book V, Ch. 1) or (in the Preface of 
Joseph Andrews) ‘a comic Epic-Poem in Prose’.
12 Joseph Andrews, Book III, Ch. 1.
13 See Tom Jones, the introductory chapters of Books I, IX and IV.
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Fielding embraces the (neo)classical thinking of characters, seeing them in 
terms of human nature and different character types, these types are not 
borrowed as such from the literary tradition but are based on the author’s 
own observations. This brings a flavour of particularity, empiricism and 
‘contemporaneity’14 to his otherwise atemporal neoclassicism. The charac-
terization is also atemporal in the sense that Fielding, in the neoclassical 
manner, regards ‘conservation of character’ as an inescapable principle of 
character representation.15
In contrast, the German novel in the latter part of the century was 
particularly interested in how human beings change: either through inner 
maturation or by their experiences of the world, or both. Christoph Martin 
Wieland’s Geschichte des Agathon (Agathon’s Story,16 1766-1767) is considered 
to be the first novel of this type.17 The novel tells the story of the protagonist’s 
development, which comprises the difficult choice, on the basis of his experi-
ences of life, between Platonism and hedonism. The ample psychological 
analysis of the struggle in the protagonist’s mind brings dynamism to the 
whole; what is at stake are however two philosophical positions, which 
can be exhaustively defined in general terms. Contributing to the sense of 
atemporality is the author’s choice to set the psychodrama in the world of 
antiquity, as though to emphasize the ahistorical character of the problem. 
The characters represent, in the neoclassical manner, general human possi-
bilities. Thus the main adversary of Agathon’s Platonism, the sophist Hippias, 
is introduced to the reader using purely classif icatory notions:
Der Mann, der sich für zwei Talenten das Recht erworben hatte, den 
Agathon als seinen Leibeignen zu behandeln, war einer von den merk-
würdigen Leuten, die unter dem Namen der Sophisten in den griechischen 
Städten umherzogen […]. Hippias […] war einer von diesen glücklichen, 
dem die Kunst, sich die Torheiten anderer Leute zinsbar zu machen, ein 
Vermögen erworben hatte […] (Wieland, 1986, p. 46).18
14 For the eighteenth-century author’s growing appetite for ‘contemporaneity’, see Sherman, 
1996, p. 172 (Sherman is here referring to J. Paul Hunter).
15 Tom Jones, Book XVIII, Ch. 1
16 The German ‘Geschichte’ means both ‘story’ or ‘history’; the title is emphatically modelled 
in line with English novels, such as ‘The History of Tom Jones’. 
17 See, e.g., Köhn, 1968; Jacobs, 1972. 
18 ‘The man who had for two talents purchased the right to treat Agathon as his slave was one 
of those odd people who under the name of sophists traveled around in the Greek cities […]. 
Hippias […] one of those lucky men who had made a fortune by the skill of prof iting of others’ 
foolishness […]’.
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There is no need to describe the individual; the description is completed 
by def ining the general class to which Hippias belongs.
Towards the end of the century, the replacement of human essence and 
character types by individual identities revolutionized the description of 
characters in the novel. The identity of a unique individual is something 
that has to be def ined in each particular case separately.19 This unique 
individuality is formed in the course of one’s life, and is recognized through 
reflecting upon that life. The search for an identity in one’s life may be 
called the creation of a ‘narrative identity’ (cf. e.g., Taylor, 1989, p. 289; 
Schmidt, 1989, p. 92). In a seminal article, Verena Ehrich-Haefeli locates the 
emergence of the narrativization of character representation in Goethe’s 
Die Leiden des jungen Werther (The Sorrows of Young Werther, 1774). When 
Werther in a letter to his friend wants to give a description of his new 
acquaintance Lotte, he f irst looks for general attributes that would describe 
her aptly, but soon gives up the effort: all that, he says, is nothing but trash, 
miserable abstractions which cannot express her self (Werther, p. 19). Instead 
he narrates about his f irst meeting with her, which is the famous scene 
where Lotte divides up the bread among her younger sisters and broth-
ers. Ehrich-Haefeli concludes that although the individuality cannot be 
expressed in general terms, it can be the object of narration (Ehrich-Haefeli, 
1998, p. 818). This does not mean that Lotte’s life story is told; rather, she is 
shown in a number of situations of which she is a part. Ehrich-Haefeli points 
up that while in earlier (neoclassical) novels the characters are defined prior 
to the events and remain in their essence untouched by them, in Werther 
characters and events are intertwined in a new, unprecedented way (ibid., p. 
819). With this shift in characterization, the roles of narrator and reader have 
profoundly changed: instead of being described directly by the narrator’s 
authority, the character of a f ictive person is something that can only be 
conjectured from the particular situations and events of the story.
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre was preceded by the manuscript entitled 
Wilhelm Meisters theatralische Sendung (Wilhelms Meister’s theatrical 
calling), written in the 1770s about the same time as Werther and later 
reworked into the f irst f ive books of the Lehrjahre.20 The narration in both 
novels is extra- and heterodiegetic (Genette) or auctorial (Stanzel), although 
it closely follows Wilhelm’s experiences. In the Sendung, however, it is the 
19 As Odo Marquard remarks, the pre-modern concept of essence has in Modernity been 
replaced by the concept of identity (Marquard, 1979, p. 358).
20 The Sendung was not published in Goethe’s life-time, and the manuscript was thought to 
be lost for good, until one copy was found in the early 1900s and published in 1911.
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narrator who provides the reader with insight into the nature of events and 
characters, while in the Lehrjahre much more is left for Wilhelm and the 
reader to interpret and judge. This is connected with a difference in the 
protagonist’s character and his position in the novel. The Sendung is the 
story of the development of a theatrical genius, in which everything the 
protagonist encounters is related to his calling. In contrast, Wilhelm in the 
Lehrjahre is no genius, and his enthusiasm for the theatre proves to be a false 
path. The Lehrjahre thus lacks an organizing centre analogous to Wilhelm’s 
calling in the Sendung, and it is much more diff icult to f ind any pattern 
in the events. What Goethe is here suggesting is that one’s experiences in 
life do not naturally form any coherent entity, since what we encounter is 
not easily deciphered – not to mention seeing everything as a meaningful 
element in our own life story.
Let us take as an example the introduction of the actress Philine. In the 
Sendung it goes as follows:
Sie war das gutherzigste Geschöpf von der Welt, naschte gerne, putzte 
sich und konnte nicht leben, ohne spazieren zu fahren oder sich sonst 
eine Veränderung zu machen; ganz allerliebst war sie aber, wenn sie ein 
Glas Wein im Kopfe hatte. Wer ihr diese Freuden verschaffen konnte, 
war ihr angenehm, und wenn sie einmal, welches doch selten geschah, 
einiges Geld übrig hatte, so vertat sie es auch wohl mit einem irrenden 
Ritter, der ihr leidlich gef iel und dessen starke Seite der Beutel nicht war. 
In reichlichen Tagen schien ihr nichts gut genug, und bald darauf nahm 
sie wieder mit allem vorlieb. Sie pflegte sich einem freigebigen Geliebten 
zu Ehren mit Milch, Wein und wohlriechenden Wassern zu waschen, 
bald tat ihr der gemeine Brunnen gleiche Dienste. Gegen Arme war sie 
sehr freigebig und überhaupt von Herzen mitleidig, nur nicht gegen die 
Klagen eines Liebhabers, den sie einmal abgedankt hatte (Sendung, 
pp. 729-30).21
21 ‘She was the most good-hearted person of the world, who liked nibbling at delicacies and 
grooming herself, and could not live without going for a drive or in some other way entertaining 
herself; and most charming she was when she had imbibed a glass of wine. Whoever could 
offer her these pleasures was agreeable to her, and when she sometimes, which happened only 
seldom, had some money left, she spent it with an erring knight who pleased her reasonably, and 
whose purse was not his strong side. In prosperous days nothing seemed good enough for her, 
and soon afterwards she was again contented with everything. To honour a generous lover she 
used to wash herself with milk, wine and fragrant waters, but soon a common well served the 
same purpose. Towards the poor she was very generous, and in general she had a compassionate 
heart, except for the complaints of a lover whom she had once dismissed’. 
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The listing of Philine’s habits goes on for another half a page. The charac-
terization of Philine does not take place directly by categorizing her, let 
us say, as a ‘frivolous actress’, but the description of her habits amounts 
unambiguously to something like that. The narrator approaches his topic 
as though he were a close acquaintance of hers, who has observed her for 
a long time and now sums up his singular observations in a portrait of her 
habits. This means that becoming acquainted with Philine’s character is 
a temporal process, although what is given here are only the results of 
that process. (We note that it is necessary to ‘naturalize’ the narrator as 
someone who has a ‘past’ in which he has ‘observed’ a character). The lively 
portrait of the frivolous actress chimes in with Wilhelm’s view of Philine: 
she represents for him the light pleasure-seeking that the theatre means 
for part of the public. This is something with which Wilhelm f inds fault, 
and he therefore keeps at a distance from her.
In the Lehrjahre no description of Philine’s character is given by the 
narrator, not even in the iterative form of describing her habits; she is 
presented only in particular situations which she shares with Wilhelm. 
His f irst encounter with her is reported as follows:
Ein Mädchen, das Rosen und andere Blumen herumtrug, bot ihm [Wil-
helm] ihren Korb dar, und er kaufte sich einen schönen Strauß, den er 
mit Liebhaberei anders band und mit Zufriedenheit betrachtete, als das 
Fenster eines an der Seite des Platzes stehenden andern Gasthauses sich 
auftat und ein wohlgebildetes Frauenzimmer sich an demselben zeigte. 
Er konnte ungeachtet der Entfernung bemerken, daß eine angenehme 
Heiterkeit ihr Gesicht belebte. Ihre blonden Haare f ielen nachlässig auf-
gelöst um ihren Nacken; sie schien sich nach dem Fremden umzusehen. 
Einige Zeit darauf trat ein Knabe, der eine Frisierschürze umgegürtet 
und ein weißes Jäckchen anhatte, aus der Türe jenes Hauses, ging auf 
Wilhelmen zu, begrüßte ihn und sagte: ‘Das Frauenzimmer am Fenster 
läßt Sie fragen, ob Sie ihr nicht einen Teil der schönen Blumen abtreten 
wollen?’ – ‘Sie stehn ihr alle zu Diensten’, versetzte Wilhelm, indem er 
dem leichten Boten das Bouquet überreichte und zugleich der Schönen 
ein Kompliment machte, welches sie mit einem freundlichen Gegengruß 
erwiderte und sich vom Fenster zurückzog (Lehrjahre, pp. 90-91).22
22 ‘A girl, with roses and other f lowers for sale, coming by, held out her basket to him, and 
he purchased a beautiful nosegay; which, like one that had a taste for these things, he tied up 
in a different fashion, and was looking at it with a satisf ied air, when the window of another 
inn on the opposite side of the square f lew up, and a handsome young lady looked out from it. 
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The reader sees only the same particular events as Wilhelm, who sums up 
this encounter as a ‘pleasant adventure’ (artiges Abenteuer, ibid., p. 91). The 
reader may notice that Wilhelm is attracted to the cheerful-looking young 
woman. This is conf irmed when Wilhelm is soon afterwards invited to 
her place, where she insists on combing his hair and in so doing ‘could not 
avoid’ touching his knees with hers and bringing her bosom so close to his 
lips ‘that he was more than once tempted to give it a kiss’.23 Undoubtedly, 
Philine is the same frivolous actress as in the Sendung; however, there is 
more ambiguity in her character in the Lehrjahre than in the Sendung. 
The momentary impressions of her the reader receives vary considerably. 
Wilhelm’s relationship to her is ambiguous as well: he is at the same time 
repelled by her frivolity and attracted by her. When she keeps Wilhelm 
sitting on a bench in front of a guesthouse and caresses and kisses him in 
that public place, he feels embarrassed and annoyed; when he sees her by 
the side of the beautiful countess with whom he is in love, the contrast is 
very much to her disadvantage; but after Wilhelm is wounded when the 
theatrical troupe with which he travels is attacked by highwaymen, it is 
she who stays back to take care of him; and when one morning he f inds 
her with a book in her hand, sleeping innocently at the edge of his bed, he 
can scarcely resist the temptation to caress her. What Philine ‘is’, is a task 
for both Wilhelm and the reader to be solved in the course of time, but the 
question is never answered def initely – just as in real life we can never 
be quite sure that we know a person completely. All Wilhelm – like the 
reader – possesses are glimpses of her in different situations, out of which 
he can try to compose a portrait of her.
In the f irst f ive books of the Lehrjahre, the characters are not presented 
to either the protagonist or the reader through a continuous narrative of 
their lives, but through their acts in particular situations. Only through 
synthetic activity on the part of Wilhelm – and the reader – can coherence 
be created among these separate images. This recognition of what someone 
Notwithstanding the distance, he observed that her face was animated by a pleasant cheerful-
ness: her fair hair fell carelessly streaming about her neck; she seemed to be looking at the 
stranger. In a short time afterwards, a boy with a white jacket, and a barber’s apron on, came 
out from the door of her house, towards Wilhelm; saluted him, and said: “The lady at the window 
bids me ask if you will not favour her with a share of your beautiful f lowers.”—”They are all at 
her service,” answered Wilhelm, giving the nosegay to this nimble messenger, and making a 
bow to the fair one, which she returned with a friendly courtesy, and then withdrew from the 
window’ Goethe, 1917, Book II, Ch. 4. 
23 ‘[…] daß er mehr als einmal in Versuchung gesetzt war, einen Kuß darauf zu drücken’ (ibid., 
p. 94).
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is like is a temporal process which is open towards the future: we can never 
be certain that the future will not reveal some new aspect of the person. In 
addition, a change in our general understanding of the world may change 
the way we see someone. This all comes very close to the manner in which, 
in Goethe’s opinion, we create a portrait for ourselves of real people in real 
life.24 Approaching the identity of a person through concrete acts and situa-
tions, rather than in abstract concepts, is part of Goethe’s ‘gegenständliches 
Denken’, his tendency of thinking in terms of concrete objects rather than 
abstractions (cf. e.g., Bollacher, 2001).
To sum up: in these eighteenth-century novels, we see how atemporal 
typology of characters, such as Fielding’s or Wieland’s, is replaced – in 
Goethe – either by the iterative description of the person’s habits or by a 
‘singulative’ rendering of the person’s particular acts in particular situations. 
The Genettean categories of ‘iterative’ and ‘singulative’ are applicable here, 
but they are insuff icient to provide a full account of the temporalization 
of character representation. This is because Genette’s categories of narra-
tive time bear no relationship to the question of whether reality is seen as 
atemporally or temporally ordered. It is precisely this shift from atemporal 
to temporal thinking – the emergence of a historical view of the world and 
of human beings as unique individuals, identif ied by their particular acts 
and experiences – that brings about the fundamental change in character 
representation in the novel.
Temporary Identities: Attempts at Narrating Who One Is
The Bildungsroman, of which Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre is the paragon, 
may sound like the prototype of modern life narrative, since in the com-
munis opinio it is a narrative of identity formation. However, if ‘narrative’ 
means that a ‘sets of events’ has been ‘transformed into stories with 
beginnings, middles, and ends’ (White, 2005, p. 137), ‘impos[ing] order on 
chaotic events, structuring amorphous, lived experience’ (Ritivoi, 2005, p. 
231), or creating a ‘network of connections [which] gives events coherence, 
motivation, closure, and intelligibility and turns them into a plot’ (Ryan, 
2005, p. 347),25 this is not what the Lehrjahre offers. Coherence, insight into 
24 Goethe (1999, p. IX) writes in Farbenlehre: ‘Vergebens bemühen wir uns, den Charakter 
eines Menschen zu schildern; man stelle dagegen seine Handlungen, seine Thaten zusammen, 
und ein Bild des Charakters wird uns entgegentreten’ (‘It is a vain effort to try to describe the 
character of someone; you just have to assemble his acts and deeds, and a portrait of him is 
given to us’). 
25 Cf. also Richardson, 2005, p. 353: ‘in this conception, plot makes events into a narrative’.
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causal connections between events,26 and closure are lacking in the account 
of Wilhelm’s experiences in the Lehrjahre. Events are not emplotted so 
as to give a narrative of Wilhelm’s development. Rather, as I have argued 
elsewhere, it is the narrative of Wilhelm’s experiences over a certain period 
of time, and of his unsuccessful attempts to discern a plot in his life and 
define what he himself is (cf. Saariluoma [Steinby], 2004).
To make it clear to the reader that Wilhelm’s interpretations of himself, of 
others and of his situation are unreliable, the author of the Lehrjahre employs 
at the very beginning of the novel an exceptional narrative perspective. 
Before the reader catches sight of Wilhelm at all, the f irst chapter presents a 
discussion between his love, the actress Mariane and her old servant, which 
reveals that Mariane has another lover. This is a man whom Mariane does 
not care about, but whom she keeps, on her servant’s advice, for economic 
reasons, and who has now given notice of returning in a fortnight. Mariane 
says that despite this she will give herself to Wilhelm, whom she loves, 
hoping for some miraculous salvation from her distress: ‘Vierzehn Tage! 
Welche Ewigkeit! In Vierzehn Tagen, was kann da nicht vorfallen, was kann 
sich da nicht verändern!’27 (Lehrjahre, p. 11). In the next chapter Wilhelm 
enters, and it turns out that he plans to leave his bourgeois family and the 
merchant’s trade for a career in the theatre, where together with his beloved 
he will work for the education of the public. He tells Mariane about the 
puppet theatre and other theatrical performances of his childhood, which 
he created and carried out more or less successfully with his friends, as 
compelling evidence that the theatre has always been his calling. Finally, he 
compares these reminiscences of his childhood with his present situation:
Es ist eine schöne Empfindung, liebe Mariane, […] wenn wir uns alter Zeiten 
und alter unschädlicher Irrtümer erinnern, besonders wenn es in einem Au-
genblicke geschieht, da wir eine Höhe glücklich erreicht haben, von welcher 
wir uns umsehen und den zurückgelegten Weg überschauen können. Es 
ist so angenehm, selbstzufrieden sich mancher Hindernisse zu erinnern, 
die wir oft mit einem peinlichen Gefühle für unüberwindlich hielten, und 
dasjenige, was wir jetzt, entwickelt, sind, mit dem zu vergleichen, was wir 
damals, unentwickelt, waren (Lehrjahre, pp. 16-17; emphasis in the original).28
26 Cf. Ronen, 1990, p. 819: ‘It is commonly agreed that only events tied together by chronology 
and causality can form the basis for a narrative text’.
27 ‘A fortnight! What an eternity! What cannot all happen in a fortnight, what cannot change!’.
28 ‘It is a f ine emotion, Mariane, […] when we bethink ourselves of old times, and old harmless 
errors; especially if this is at a period when we have happily gained some elevation, from which 
we can look around us, and survey the path we have left behind. It is so pleasant to think, with 
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The passage is the f irst occasion when Wilhelm offers an overall interpreta-
tion of himself and his life, whose course he now believes himself to know 
with certainty: he tells us how his life story is to be emplotted, and describes 
this moment as the point in time when he has reached maturity. The reader, 
however, knows that Wilhelm is building his expectations of a future with 
Mariane on false presuppositions – and that his error in evaluating his 
situation is in fact much more grave than any of the mishaps in the theatrical 
performances of his childhood. Indeed, when Wilhelm a fortnight later 
detects Mariane’s deception, all his dreams concerning his future life in the 
theatre are crushed. Mariane leaves town, and Wilhelm will never see her 
again. The fact that Wilhelm is shown initially as an unreliable interpreter 
of his own life affects the reader’s attitude toward him throughout the novel: 
rather than accepting Wilhelm’s interpretations, the reader has to interpret 
the events in the novel along with Wilhelm, but independently of him.
Later, when Wilhelm is sent on his travels to collect outstanding payments 
from his father’s debtors, he comes across a number of actors and spends 
his time with them; among other things, he follows them into a count’s 
residence, where he participates in entertaining the aristocratic society by 
theatrical performances. When after these experiences Wilhelm is offered 
a post as a professional actor, he accepts the proposal, although what he 
has seen of the theatre so far does not corroborate his youthful dreams of 
the educational function of the theatre. His decision is provoked by a letter 
from his brother-in-law, who is planning a future for him as a merchant, 
which he f inds anything but attractive. He writes back that his goal from 
early on was the Bildung of himself as a many-sided personality, and that 
this goal can nowhere be realized better than in the theatre. Here Wilhelm 
proffers the second interpretation of himself and his life story – one which 
seemingly f its very well the idea of the Lehrjahre as a Bildungsroman. The 
reader, however, sees that Wilhelm is again mistaken: f irst of all, it is not true 
that Wilhelm has always pursued his own Bildung – originally he dreamt of 
a theatrical career with the goal of educating the theatre public; secondly, 
from Wilhelm’s experiences so far it is clear that the theatre, even when 
favoured by high society, cannot offer him the kind of opportunity for Bil-
dung that he now claims to be seeking. Indeed, after just a few performances 
his theatrical career ends with his f inal disappointment with the theatre.
composure and satisfaction, of many obstacles, which often with painful feelings we may have 
regarded as invincible; pleasant to compare what we now [,developed,] are [are], with what 
we then were struggling to become [rather: with what we at that time, undeveloped, were]’. 
Goethe, 1917, Book 1, Ch. 3.
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After leaving the theatre, Wilhelm can no longer find any direction in life: 
everywhere, he sees only his own errors. In the last two books of the novel, 
Wilhelm is further away than ever from being able to tell a coherent story 
of his life. He becomes acquainted with members of the so-called Society of 
the Tower, an association of men (and women) who, in the spirit of the late 
Enlightenment, are active in the f ields of education and in practical projects 
of general benefit. Wilhelm feels confused and distressed; when he realizes 
that he is desperately in love with the beautiful, saintly Natalie right after he 
has proposed marriage to another woman (Therese), this does not alleviate 
his agony. In this state of mind, he reads the account of his ‘apprentice years’, 
written by some of the educators in the Society of the Tower:
Er fand die umständliche Geschichte seines Lebens in großen, scharfen 
Zügen geschildert; weder einzelne Begebenheiten, noch beschränkte Emp-
findungen verwirrten seinen Blick, allgemeine liebevolle Betrachtungen 
gaben ihm Fingerzeige, ohne ihn zu beschämen, und er sah zum erstenmal 
sein Bild außer sich, zwar nicht, wie im Spiegel, ein zweites Selbst, sondern 
wie im Portrat ein anderes Selbst: man bekennt sich zwar nicht zu allen 
Zügen, aber man freut sich, daß ein denkender Geist uns so hat fassen, 
ein großes Talent uns so hat darstellen wollen […] (Lehrjahre, p. 505).29
This life story is not presented to the reader, who of course would be very 
interested to hear how a ‘great talent’ emplots Wilhelm’s life history. Most 
conspicuously, Wilhelm obviously does not benefit in the least of reading 
this story: whatever he thinks of it, he does not recognize in it any pattern 
that would bring him clarity. He is after the reading as confused as before 
and remains that till the very end of the novel. We can therefore say that 
the novel proceeds from the protagonist’s (false) certainty about his identity 
and the ‘plot’ of his life to a completely uncertainty of both; and it seems 
that even a ‘great talent’ succeeds only partially in this portraying task. The 
novel ends in a moment of bliss when Wilhelm learns that the woman whom 
he truly loves – the ‘beautiful amazon’ Natalie – offers him her hand. This 
does not mean however that Wilhelm’s confusion concerning his identity 
and his life is over.
29 ‘He found his life delineated with large sharp strokes; neither unconnected incidents, nor 
narrow sentiments perplexed his view; the most bland and general ref lections taught without 
shaming him. For the f irst time, his own f igure was presented to him; not indeed, as in a mirror, 
a second self; but as in a portrait, another self; we do not, it is true, recognise ourselves in every 
feature; but we are delighted that a thinking spirit has so understood us, that such gifts [great 
talent] have been employed in representing us […]’ Goethe, 1917, Book VIII, Ch. 1.
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Thus, although in the two last books the Society of the Tower shows 
great interest in the ‘apprentice years’ of individuals, and the life stories 
of many characters are displayed, Wilhelm’s life story, which could reveal 
his identity, remains untold (cf. Saariluoma [Steinby], 2004, pp. 210-27; 
Petersdorff, 2006; Schöll, 2008). This is valid both within the world of the 
novel and to the reader. Replying to Schiller, who had read the manuscript 
and wished that Goethe would make the relationship between the different 
elements and the central idea of ‘apprentice years’ clearer, Goethe speaks of 
his ‘realistic tic’, which prevents him from creating such order.30 He seems 
to be suggesting that the inherent disparateness of one’s experiences resists 
any clear patterning – a view in which we recognize Goethe’s modernity. 
The ‘objectivity’ (Gegenständlichkeit) of the representation which is charac-
teristic of Goethe means that the author offers to his readers events and the 
actions of the characters in particular situations, but leaves their ‘meaning’ 
and their role in the protagonist’s development almost as opaque as events 
and characters are in real life. There is no ‘vertically’ given signif icance of 
events, as in Baroque novels, nor are events ‘horizontally’ interconnected in 
any way that might make their overall signif icance clear (as, for example, in 
Moll’s story). It remains the task of both Wilhelm and the reader to search 
for coherence in Wilhelm’s apparently disparate experiences.
We can therefore say that the Lehrjahre does not present a life story that 
provides the protagonist with a narrative identity, and that the novel as a 
whole proceeds from the protagonist’s (false) certainty about his identity 
and about the ‘plot’ of his life to complete uncertainty about both. If in 
Werther narrative appeared as a means of capturing someone’s individual 
identity, a task of which no general categories were capable, in the Lehrjahre 
‘narrative identity’ appears as something diff icult or impossible to achieve 
– although the search for it is a temporal process into which the reader is 
invited, along with Wilhelm.
Temporality in the Lehrjahre is a many-faceted phenomenon; here we 
have focused on Wilhelm’s experience of time.31 Wilhelm produces inter-
pretations of his experiences, which, however, do not last; he interprets 
himself differently at different times, without coming to any conclusion; 
and – like other characters – he changes over the course of time. The overall 
dynamism of the novel suggests that what is at issue here is Wilhelm’s 
incessant activity itself, both participating in events and searching for their 
30 Goethe in a letter to Schiller from 9. July 1796, Schiller – Goethe, 1977, p. 242.
31 Other aspects of time in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre are discussed in Saariluoma [Steinby], 
2005.
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meaning, rather than the outcome of these activities. The novel shows the 
complex experience of temporality of the modern individual, for whom 
everything, including oneself, is constantly changing and the understanding 
of things is a never-ending task.
Conclusion
The analysis of Defoe’s Moll Flanders and Goethes Wilhelm Meisters Lehr-
jahre has shown that there occurred a temporalization of experience and 
narration in the eighteenth-century novel, and that novelistic temporali-
ties grew ever more complicated towards the end of the century. We have 
applied some of Genette’s categories in describing these temporalities, 
including order, duration and rhythm, along with iterative and singulative 
narration: however, these conceptualizations alone do not suff ice in de-
scribing temporal experience and temporal structures in these novels. What 
is problematic in Genette’s conceptualization is its objectivistic, scientistic 
view of time, perception and narration (Steinby, 2016). When the questions 
asked concern merely the relationship between the order and duration of 
events and those of the narration, together with the amount of information 
gathered by the recorder of events (the focalizer), what is overlooked is the 
ambiguity of the modern world which is characteristic of the modern novel. 
‘Gathering information’ is too simplistic a view of what takes place with 
the ‘focalizer’ as the central experiencing and acting subject of the novel, 
and the experience of time which structures the novels is not a matter of 
recording clock and calendar time.
What essentially determines the temporal experience and gives a coher-
ence to the protagonist’s life story in Moll Flanders is her basic situation 
in life: being exposed all alone to the adversities of life and compelled to 
cope entirely on her own. She does not register the events ‘objectively’, but 
things, events and other people signify for her possible means of survival. 
The passing of time is likewise relevant in relation to the question of subsist-
ence, to which even the question of her age is subordinate; and it is this 
question that determines the rhythm in her narrative of her life. In Wilhelm 
Meisters Lehrjahre, the experience of time is much more complex than in 
Moll Flanders. This derives from the fact that the experiencing subject in 
this novel is a modern, autonomous subject of interpretation and action, 
for whom ‘common sense’ (or the religious view of the world) is no longer 
a reliable guide to understanding matters. Relying upon himself, he has 
to create for himself an understanding of events, of the persons he meets, 
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and of himself. It is diff icult to recognize what others are like, and even 
more diff icult to know oneself and to see one’s life as a meaningful whole. 
Wilhelm makes efforts to understand himself on the basis of his acts and 
experiences, but he fails to create for himself a stable narrative identity. 
The Lehrjahre presents the modern human condition: the uncertainty that 
characterizes one’s existence and one’s understanding of oneself and others, 
and a temporality in which the present is constantly bringing forth new 
material of experience, while at the same time it is necessary to further 
reflect upon past experiences and to take responsibility for one’s future. 
This is a temporal condition that resists capture by objectivistic concepts 
based on location and quantity.
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 Authorial Narration Reconsidered
Eliza Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless, Anonymous’ Charlotte 
Summers, and the Problem of Authority in the Mid-
Eighteenth-Century Novel
Dorothee Birke
From a narratological point of view, one of the most controversial legacies 
the eighteenth-century novel has bestowed onto its inheritors is the tech-
nique of authorial narration. Described by Franz K. Stanzel as one of three 
typical narrative situations, authorial narration as defined in the Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Narrative Theory is ‘characterized by a highly audible and 
visible narrator’ who ‘sees the story from the ontological position of an 
outsider, that is, a position of absolute authority which allows her/him to 
know everything about events and characters, including their thoughts 
and unconscious motives’ (Jahn, 2005, p. 364). This association of authorial 
narration with an assumption of ‘absolute authority’ has, in conjunction 
with the modernist preference for ‘showing’ rather than ‘telling’, made the 
mode seem suspect to many twenty- and twenty-f irst-century novelists 
and their audiences. David Lodge, to name a prominent example, sees ‘an 
increasing reluctance among literary novelists to assume the stance of 
godlike omniscience that is implied by any third-person representation of 
consciousness’ (Lodge, 2002, p. 86). Authorial narration, it might seem, is 
reactionary, both aesthetically and ideologically speaking: incompatible 
with contemporary scepticism towards authority and grand narratives.
It could be seen as a surprise, then, that authorial narration has been mak-
ing a comeback since the last decades of the twentieth century. Paul Dawson 
has recently shown that in works by contemporary British and American 
authors like Salman Rushdie, Martin Amis, Zadie Smith, Jonathan Franzen 
and Don DeLillo, there is a ‘prominent reappearance of the ostensibly out-
moded omniscient narrator’ (Dawson, 2009, p. 143). He argues that while the 
‘“universal” moral authority of the classic omniscient narrator is indeed no 
longer available to contemporary writers’, it has ‘been replaced by a range of 
non-essentialized and more specif ic relativized modes of narrative author-
ity’ (Dawson, 2009, p. 149) which are realized in contemporary versions of the 
‘classical’ model. Dawson ties this renewed interest in authorial narration on 
the part of novelists to concerns about the perceived decline of the novel’s 
cultural signif icance in the age of digital media.
162 dorothEE birkE 
A pressing question that Dawson’s excellent analysis leaves unanswered 
is how universal the ‘moral authority of the classic omniscient narrator’ 
really is (or was). As I will argue in this paper, closer examinations of the use 
of authorial narration in the eighteenth-century novel suggest that authorial 
narration in the eighteenth century is no less complex and contradictory 
than its twenty-f irst-century counterpart. Then, too, it served to reflect 
on authority as a problem for the novelist rather than straightforwardly 
assuming an authoritative stance. Seen in the context of the history of 
the novel, this makes perfect sense: mid-eighteenth-century authors like 
Henry Fielding, Sarah Fielding or Charlotte Lennox were intensely involved 
in debates about the purposes and functions of the novel as an emerging 
cultural phenomenon. Authorial narration as a technique (or maybe better, 
a spectrum of techniques) provided a rhetorical means of importing such 
debates into the pages of the novel.
I have elsewhere discussed Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones – a work often re-
ferred to as providing stable narratorial authority – as an example of highly 
complex and ambivalent rhetorical self-fashioning in which the author of 
the novel playfully asserts and disputes his own claims to authority (see 
Birke, 2015). The large number of intrusive authorial commentaries in Tom 
Jones, I argued, serves to reflect on and complicate notions of novelistic 
authority rather than to cement such claims. With their highly ironic and 
sophisticated commentary, Fielding’s novels are of course in some ways a 
special case. In this paper, I will consider authorial narration in the 1750s, 
the decade after the publication of Tom Jones, in which novelists, on the one 
hand, sought to build on the critical success of Fielding and Richardson, 
and on the other hand were writing back against views of the genre as 
superf icial or salacious.
My two examples will be novels that represent juxtaposing tendencies: 
Eliza Haywood’s The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless (1751) employs com-
mentary throughout, but in a less obtrusive way than Fielding. The anony-
mously published The History of Charlotte Summers, the Fortunate Parish 
Girl (1750), in contrast, continues and intensif ies the playful commentary 
as a form in its own right. It exemplif ies the novelist’s self-conscious stance 
towards his or her own work as a cultural artefact that scholars like Thomas 
Keymer and Christina Lupton have described as characteristic of the time 
(see Keymer, 2002, p. 17; Lupton, 2011, p. 290).1 I will show that in both its 
1 The seminal point of reference for all such studies is Wayne Booth’s 1952 article on ‘The 
Self-Conscious Narrator in Comic Fiction Before Tristram Shandy’, in which he describes works 
featuring narrators (both homo- and heterodiegetic) who comment on the act of narration in 
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f lamboyant and more restrained varieties, authorial narration was a key 
technique for ref lecting on the problem of the novelist’s authority in a 
period in which the ‘rise of the novel’ (Watt, 1957) was gaining momentum.
Theoretical and Terminological Foundations
The different narratological conceptualizations of authorial narration have 
reflected a broad range of views on its defining characteristics. For Stanzel, 
a main concern was to distinguish the voice of the authorial narrator from 
that of the author – a move that freed theorists from narrowly intentionalist 
discussions. Since then, narratologists have concentrated on two major 
phenomena associated with the technique. The first of these is the authorial 
narrator’s ‘omniscience’, or what Gérard Genette has called ‘zero focaliza-
tion’, i.e. a distribution of information ‘where the narrator knows more than 
the character’ (Genette, 1980, p. 189). The second aspect is the degree of the 
authorial narrator’s ‘intrusiveness’, which is created by the commentaries 
that make the narrator ‘audible and visible’ (Jahn, 2005, p. 364). As Dawson 
rightly points out, these two aspects are not necessarily linked, and there 
are many instances of zero focalization without instances of intrusive 
comments. He thus proposes to limit the usage of the label ‘omniscient 
narration’ to ‘those works which actualize a panoramic narrator, which 
perform omniscience, rather than those narratives which report without 
comment, or in which commentary does not reveal a sense of the narrator’s 
personality’ (Dawson, 2009, p. 148).
While I agree that the two phenomena should be distinguished, I would 
argue that ‘omniscience’ is not the best label to use because it empha-
sizes the aspect of focalization instead of that of intrusiveness. Narratorial 
comments, as I will demonstrate in my analyses, should more usefully 
be seen as rhetorical bids for authority than as expressions of god-like 
all-knowingness.2 Stanzel’s term ‘authorial narration’ at f irst sight seems 
to be problematic as well, since it suggests precisely what Stanzel wanted to 
get away from: the idea that the narrator’s voice is that of the author. This, 
however, could be less inappropriate than classical narratology has made it 
order to show that Sterne’s employment of narratorial digression in Tristram Shandy was not 
an original invention, but had quite a few predecessors in the 1740s and 1750s. 
2 Dawson also argues that ‘[w]e need not take the notion of an all-knowing narrator literally’ 
(2009, p. 148), as those critics tend to do who seek to describe the authorial narrator as a telepath 
or a superhuman entity.
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out to be. As Susan Lanser has argued in her feminist study on the history 
of narrative mediation, the voice in narratorial commentary
(re)produces the structural and functional situation of authorship. In 
other words, where a distinction between the (implied) author and a 
public, heterodiegetic narrator is not textually marked, readers are 
invited to equate the narrator with the author and the narratee with 
themselves. This conventional equation gives authorial voice a privileged 
status among narrative forms (Lanser, 1992, p. 16).
The idea that authorial narration is a mode of self-fashioning on the part of 
the writer is particularly useful insofar as it gives a convincing answer to 
the question where the ‘authority’ of this type of narration stems from: it is 
connected with the act of storytelling, with acts of invention, selection and 
persuasion, rather than with supernatural powers such as all-knowingness. 
What narratological theory has not suff iciently acknowledged so far is that 
the ‘authority’ of authorial narration is neither monolithic nor uncontested: 
it involves different kinds of authority (defined by the OED as ‘the power to 
influence action, opinion, belief’), which do not necessarily reinforce each 
other. One type of authority (which I label ‘narrative authority’) comes as 
part and parcel of creating a work of f iction: it is the power to influence the 
reader’s beliefs with regard to what happens in the story, what characters 
do and think and so on. Being accepted as an author of f iction means being 
able to put forward such authority claims, which cannot be contested.3
However, commentaries extend beyond the facts of the f ictional world: 
they involve, for example, claims with regard to the psychological credibility 
of the characters that are portrayed, or with regard to the moral implications 
of the story. Such claims to psychological and ethical authority transcend 
3 There is one branch of narrative theory that has given careful consideration to authority 
as a problem: feminist narratologists, f irst and foremost Susan Lanser (1992), have argued that 
explicit authority claims were problematic for female writers, who were not granted the same 
authoritative status as their male counterparts. More recently, Vera Nünning has shown that 
women writers in the eighteenth century tended to use more unobtrusive strategies, whereas 
their nineteenth-century counterparts ‘like Charlotte Brontë and George Eliot could make 
extensive use of the privileges of overt narrators and thus lay claim to a position of authority’ 
(2012, p. 104). These studies offer important contributions for historicizing and contextualizing 
narrative strategies. The one point in which they fall short, in my view, is that they tend to cement 
a monolithic view of overt authorial commentary as straightforwardly assuming a position of 
authority rather than negotiating various, sometimes contradicting or contentious, authority 
claims. This is why they have problems with female authors like Eliza Haywood, who do use 
overt authorial commentary.
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the specif ic cases to which they are attached. They are linked to larger ideas 
about the purpose and potential of f ictional writing, for example the notion 
that novels can give particular insights into the human psyche, or that they 
can function as models for morally sound behaviour, etc. Whether authors 
of f iction are regarded as authorities with regard to moral or psychological 
questions is obviously a contested and also historically variable issue. The 
authority claims in authorial narration, then, can function as instantiations 
and extensions of contemporary debates about the functions of novel-
writing. This is particularly obvious in the case of those commentaries that 
offer general maxims (I will call them ‘gnomic’) and those that reflect on 
acts of narration or reception (‘metadiscursive’ commentaries).4
Claims to kinds of authority other than narrative authority have a 
somewhat contradictory aspect insofar as the more explicitly they are put 
forward, the more do they expose themselves to potential scrutiny and 
criticism. In contrast to the f ictional ‘facts’ themselves, the ref lections 
offered in commentary are subject to discussion – in a sense, many of these 
utterances can be read as partial answers to the question ‘why should I read 
this book?’. By spelling out a particular position, commentaries also open 
up the possibility of contradiction, and thus, ultimately, the question of 
whether the story should have been told differently (or even not at all). In 
this sense, I argue, narratorial comments problematize authorial control 
at the same time at which they invoke it.
The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless
Eliza Haywood’s The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless starts out with a 
general statement about contemporary morals and manners:
It was always my opinion, that fewer women were undone by love than 
vanity; and that those mistakes the sex are sometimes guilty of, proceed, 
for the most part, rather from inadvertency, than a vicious inclination. 
The ladies, I am sorry to observe, are apt to make too little allowances 
to each other on this score, and seem better pleased with an occasion 
to condemn than to excuse […]. There are some who behold, with 
4 My typology of commentaries follows the suggestion of Ansgar Nünning, who distinguishes 
between comments focussing on particular characters or events (he calls them ‘analytical’, I 
prefer ‘diegetic’ in order to emphasize their focus on the universe of the f ictional characters) 
as well as the types I have labelled ‘gnomic’ and ‘metadiscursive’ (Nünning, 1997).
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indignation and contempt, those errors in others, which, unhappily, they 
are every day falling into themselves; and as the want of due consideration 
occasions the guilt, so the want of due consideration also occasions the 
scandal: and there would be much less room either for the one or the 
other, were some part of that time which is wasted at the toilette […] 
employed in examining the heart, and what actions are most becoming 
to the character (BT, p. 3).5
After this general remark, the narrator moves directly into the exposition of 
the story: ‘Betsy Thoughtless was the only daughter of a gentleman of good 
family and fortune in L—e, where he constantly resided…’ (BT, p. 3). In these 
passages, Betsy is introduced as having ‘a great deal of good-nature’ (BT, p. 
4), but being naïve and susceptible to flattery and thus in danger of falling 
under the bad influence of another young woman, the tellingly named 
‘Miss Forward’, who ‘had a great deal of the coquette in her nature’ (BT, p. 5).
At f irst sight, the beginning of the novel seems to be a good example for 
the use of authorial commentary to straight-forwardly convey a moralizing 
message, in this case one about female vanity and the dangers to which it 
exposes even generally amiable women. This is precisely how some crit-
ics have seen the novel, for example Lanser, who charges Haywood with 
conventional misogyny (Lanser, 1992, p. 49).6 It might seem puzzling, then, 
that in her introduction of the edition in the ‘Mothers of the Novel’ series, 
Dale Spender represents the novel as a feminist classic: ‘Eliza Haywood 
holds up to scrutiny the values of her day and she does not hesitate to focus 
on the sexual double standard and its inherent injustice’ (Spender, 1986, 
p. xii). Such widely differing evaluations of the novel are, I want to argue, 
possible not despite the overt narratorial commentary, but rather because 
of the specif ic ways in which it is employed.
First, Haywood sets the tone for the novel in the choice of topic for this 
f irst gnomic commentary: the fallibility of conventional judgment, which 
attributes immodest behaviour to ‘vicious inclination’ rather than to a more 
complex and common mixture of vanity and lack of circumspection (a 
mixture that is also already alluded to by means of the protagonist’s telling 
name). The passage, then, sets up two conflicting ideas about of the main 
purpose of the subsequent introduction of the protagonist Betsy and her 
5 Citations are from the Pandora edition of the novel. 
6 Vera Nünnning offers a Lanserian reading of the passage I have cited, regarding it as an 
example of a ‘f irm and overt establishment of a position of moral authority’ (2012: 90), which 
takes a male subject position and criticizes behaviour that is represented as typically female.
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ill-advised behaviour: is the reader mainly invited to judge the character, 
to decide to what extent she is a positive or negative example for female 
behaviour – or is this an injunction on the reader to monitor precisely these 
evaluations, to reflect whether the reader has the same uncharitable views 
that were just criticized?
Second, this ambiguity is intensif ied by the fact that the f irst and the 
second paragraph of the novel are not connected by any explicit transition 
clarifying the application of the gnomic statement in the f irst passage to the 
descriptions of the second. In the terms suggested by Karin Kukkonen in her 
reading of Haywood, the narration flaunts the Gricean maxim of relation: 
it abruptly shifts from a very general observation to specif ic descriptions 
of individual experience and thus poses the question of relevance. If they 
do not want to regard the sequence as incoherent, readers will themselves 
have to look for ways of applying the moral from the gnomic statement to 
what follows.7 In contrast to the pattern established by Henry Fielding’s 
narrators, who frequently reflect on the effects the narrative could or should 
have on the projected reader (albeit in an ironic manner),8 Haywood here 
does not use metadiscursive commentary or explicit reader address. Readers 
are left to infer that the reference to the process of ‘examining the heart’ in 
the f irst paragraph of the novel can also be read as a writing programme 
for the novel itself, which, in laying open the motivations and emotions of 
its protagonist, is supposed to foster insights into human behaviour as well 
as self-scrutiny in the reader. Here, again, the protagonist’s telling name 
and its exposition in the title point the way: they signal to the reader to 
expect an exploration of Betsy’s character as a type – in this case, a familiar 
stereotype of femininity which is sympathetically expanded in the course 
of the novel. This expansion is facilitated by the range of different possible 
connotations of the word ‘thoughtless’ – ranging from the negative ‘lacking 
consideration for others’ to the positive ‘free from care or anxiety’ (see OED).
Third, one could say that the oscillation between an assertion of 
conventional norms and values and their critical examination is already 
self-reflexively announced in the f irst chapter title: ‘Gives the reader room 
to guess at what is to ensue, though ten to one but he f inds himself deceived’ 
7 Kukkonen describes the narrator in Betsy Thoughtless as ‘uncooperative’ with regard to the 
maxim of manner – she shows how the narration anticipates future events in the story, thus 
playing with reader expectations (Kukkonen, 2013, pp. 210-15).
8 See e.g. the beginning of Chapter 11 in Tom Jones: ‘It hath often been observed by wise Men 
or Women, I forget which, that all persons are doomed to be in Love once in their Lives. […] Miss 
Bridget is an Example of all these Observations’ (Tom Jones, pp. 64-65).
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(BT, p. 3).9 Kukkonen observes that such references to the handling of 
reader expectation serve to establish the narrator herself as a coquette, who 
like many of the female characters in her novel ‘manages her encounter 
with the reader, pref iguring inferences, disappointing or gratifying them’ 
(Kukkonen, 2013, p. 215). I would add that in contrast to the coquette, 
Haywood’s narrator invites readers to be aware of this interplay at the 
same time in which they are engaging in it. This awareness is, possibly, 
heightened by the juxtaposition of different modes: there is a contrast 
between the playful mode typical of the chapter titles and the somewhat 
more sober tone of the narration proper.10 Whereas Henry Fielding’s novels 
are characterized by a pervasive use of irony and direct reader address, 
Haywood uses these devices much more sparingly, so that their condensed 
employment in the chapter titles becomes more conspicuous. The question 
raised by the combination of the chapter title and the f irst two paragraphs, 
then, is not only ‘what is going to happen on the level of the story?’, but also 
‘what kind of book am I reading, and what kind of insights can I expect 
from it?’. Even taken by itself, the chapter title already touches upon both 
questions, as the reader’s guess about ‘what is to ensue’ could pertain either 
to the actions described in the novel or the reading experience on which 
the reader is embarking.
Authority claims are thus evoked and negotiated in complex ways at the 
beginning of Betsy Thoughtless. The many evaluative phrases in the f irst 
paragraph (‘guilty’, ‘vicious’, ‘I am sorry to observe’), f irst of all, announce 
moral authority. At the same time, the gnomic commentary lays claim to 
psychological authority, as it puts forward a general observation about the 
true motivations of typical female behaviour (‘those mistakes the sex are 
sometimes guilty of, proceed […] rather from inadvertency, than a vicious 
inclination’). This combination suggests an aff inity to conduct literature 
9 The narratological distinction between the level of the paratext and that of the main body of 
the text should not preclude the treatment of such paratextual elements as chapter titles in the 
case of authorial narration: one important element of the ‘(re)produc[tion] of the structural and 
functional situation of authorship’ (Lanser, 1992, p. 16) in these novels is the suggestion that the 
narrative voice is that of the person responsible for or at least involved in selection (sometimes 
also invention/creation) and editorial arrangement of the textual elements. 
10 For a discussion of the function of chapter titles in mid-eighteenth-century English f iction, 
in particular the novels by S. Fielding and Lennox, see Birke (2012). I argue there that chapter 
titles are frequently used to juxtapose different narrative styles and thus heighten the sense 
that the title is a playful commentary on the text – a similar technique is employed in Charlotte 
Lennox’ The Female Quixote and, even more strikingly, in Sarah Fielding’s The History of David 
Simple. 
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with its aim of regulating female behaviour.11 Such an implicit purpose is 
complicated, however, by the aspects analysed above: the focus on social 
norms of evaluation as themselves problematic, the implicit challenge to 
establish connections between gnomic statements and the description of 
concrete characters and events, and the playful attitude towards the reader 
encapsulated by the chapter title. The novel is positioned as a text that can 
not only incorporate the regulatory potential of conduct books, but present 
deeper truths about the human heart and character. At the same time, it 
is suggested that these two kinds of purpose and authority may be at odds 
with each other. Moreover, by highlighting the issue of reader expectation 
and by playing with the cooperative principle, the novel foregrounds the 
processual character of the practice of reading and ultimately raises the 
question of the degree and the limits of authorial control.
Although, as I have already observed, metadiscursive commentary – 
including reader address and references to narrative technique – is much 
less extensively employed in Betsy Thoughtless than in Tom Jones (apart 
from the use in chapter titles), there are quite a few notable instances, as 
for example in Chapter 2:
She [Betsy Thoughtless] had a great deal of wit, but was too volatile for 
reflection; and as a ship without suff icient ballast is tossed about at the 
pleasure of every wind that blows, so was she hurried through the ocean 
of life, just as each predominant passion directed.
But I will not anticipate that gratif ication which ought to be the reward of 
a long curiosity. The reader, if he has patience to go through the following 
pages, will see into the secret springs which set this fair machine in mo-
tion, and produced many actions which were ascribed, by the ill-judging 
and malicious world, to causes very different from the real ones.
All this, I say, will be revealed in time; but it would be as absurd in a 
writer to rush all at once into the catastrophe of the adventures he would 
relate, as it would be impracticable in a traveller to reach the end of a 
long journey, without sometimes stopping at the inns in his way to it. To 
proceed, therefore, gradually with my history (BT, p. 8).
After the diegetic commentary on the person of the protagonist, which 
evokes the conventional metaphor of the self as a vessel at sea, a metadis-
cursive commentary is added which calls into question the explanatory 
11 There are some direct allusions to the genre, for example the title of Chapter VI: ‘May be of 
some service to the ladies, especially the younger sort, if well attended to’ (BT, p. 31).
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and proleptic signif icance of the former. The reader is warned not to as-
sume that the catch-all assessment of the character as f ickle can provide 
the same insight into the ‘secret springs’ or underlying character traits 
and motivations that the narrative as a whole is supposed to convey. 
This recurring evocation of the special effect of f ictional writing is here 
combined with a play on the (also conventional) metaphor of the novel 
as a journey – as famously elaborated on by Fielding in Joseph Andrews, 
when he compares chapter titles to ‘Inscriptions over the Gates of Inns 
[…], informing the Reader what Entertainment he is to expect, which if he 
likes not, he may travel on to the next’ ( Joseph Andrews, p. 90). Haywood 
modif ies the metaphor by describing the author, not the reader, as a travel-
ler. By doing so, she suggests a synchronization between the process of 
reading and the production of the text – both the impatient reader and 
the hasty author need to slow down. The modif ication thus highlights 
the interdependence between expectations on the part of the reader and 
designs on the part of the author: they must constantly be negotiated. The 
metadiscursive commentary dramatizes such a negotiation as a spectrum 
of rhetorical acts in which the reader, as the writer’s counterpart, is not just 
an implied addressee, but projected in more specific attitudes: being patient 
or impatient, f inishing the book or not, more or less carefully judging the 
characters. This serves to privilege or suggest specif ic stances on the part of 
the reader – however, it also acknowledges the fact that just as the writer is 
free to lay out her own rules for her work, the reader is free to evaluate the 
results and to realize the act of reception in his or her own individual way.
The History of Charlotte Summers, the Fortunate Parish Girl
While Haywood’s Betsy Thoughtless represents a tendency to tune down 
the intrusiveness and irony of the Fieldingesque authorial narrator, the 
anonymously published Charlotte Summers, ‘one of the more successful 
f ictions of the 1750s’ (Lupton, 2011, p. 292), features the opposite approach to 
authorial narration, increasing the self-reflexive tendency of the technique 
to the point of excess.12 This is done, for one thing, by playfully emphasizing 
the family resemblances to Fielding’s work. In the introduction, the nar-
rative voice is explicitly marked as imitating Fielding’s style. The narrator 
12 The novel has been attributed to Sarah Fielding (who is still listed as the author, for exam-
ple, in the catalogue of the digital library of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek), but the critical 
consensus seems to be that this is a misattribution (see Foster, 2004, p. 62; Moore, 2013, p. 759).
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introduces himself as an illegitimate child, ‘the f irst begotten, of the poeti-
cal issue, of the much celebrated Biographer of Joseph Andrews, and Tom 
Jones’ (CS I, p. 3).13 The homage to Fielding is furthermore evident both 
in the highly intrusive authorial commentary and in the novel’s plot: the 
protagonist, the orphaned Charlotte Summers, is taken in by the benevolent, 
Allworthy-like Lady Bountiful. Like Tom Jones, Charlotte is forced to leave 
and to go on an adventurous journey that eventually brings her to London 
and unsavoury places like a brothel and a debtor’s jail. In the end, both her 
lost parents reappear, so that (again like Tom Jones) she turns out not to 
be an orphan after all, and she is allowed to marry the man she loved all 
along, Lady Bountiful’s son Thomas.
Like the authorial narrator in Fielding’s novels, the narrator of Charlotte 
Summers throughout the novel comments extensively not only on the char-
acters and events but particularly conspicuously on his narrative technique, 
which is frequently compared with Fielding’s. He resolves to imitate, for 
instance, the division into chapters and books, which are prefaced by 
digressive introductory chapters:
These were Mr. F—g’s nodding Places for his Readers; for he it seems 
could not take a Nap, but he was obliged to pump and sweat for laborious 
Dullness to please them […]; but it was his Misfortune to be a Wit, and 
consequently out of his natural Element when endeavouring to be really 
stupid; but for me whose Wit is borrowed and the Effect of Art, and to 
whom Dullness is natural, there is nothing in Nature more easy to me 
than to take a sound Nap with my Readers for twenty pages together 
(CS I, p. 33).
Such playful disparagements of his own abilities are typical of this narrator, 
who is preoccupied with the question of how the reader will experience 
and react to the narrative. One main means of exploring this question is to 
take the trope of the author-reader relationship as face-to-face interaction 
to an extreme: the narrator not only envisages himself, like Fielding in Tom 
Jones, as an inn-keeper who provides for his guests (CS I, p. 4) and as the 
arbitrator of social relationships who brings his readers ‘into the Company’ 
(CS I, p. 12) of the characters. He also offers a whole scenario in which the 
READING IS TRAVELLING and the READING IS SOCIAL INTERACTION 
metaphors are combined and extended:
13 Citations are to the Corbett edition from 1750 (available on ECCO). 
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Before I introduce my Readers to the Company of Miss Charlotte Summers, 
I must make them acquainted with some of her Friends […], for which 
Purpose, I must beg their Company as far as Carmarthenshire, in Wales. 
[…] [W]e Authors are always provided with an easy flying Carriage, which 
can waft our Readers in an Instant […]: We are Masters of a Kind of Magic, 
that we have only to speak the Word, and presto, you are transported […] 
to the Place where we would have you attend us. Don’t you f ind already 
the magical Effect? The Journey is over, and we are just alighted at the 
Gate of a stately old Building […]. You may enter freely, I’ll conduct you 
to the Parlour, where you may have the Honour to salute the hospitable 
Owner of this venerable Mansion (CS I, p. 13).
‘Author’ and ‘reader’ are both imagined as acting participants in the f ic-
tional world rather than as the producer and recipient of a book. Of course, 
by explicitly evoking the process of readerly immersion into the f ictional 
world, the narrator disrupts rather than enhances it. Similarly, by insisting 
on the supernatural powers of the author, the narrator draws attention to 
the differences between actual travel and the reader’s mental travel, the 
magical use of words to affect time and space, and the writer’s use of words 
to describe time and space. The outlandish image of the author’s superior 
power raises the question of his or her actual influence: what kind of impact 
do narratives actually have on their readers?
In fact, the specif ic image of the magician is itself already ambivalent 
with regard to the question of power. He could either be a wizard perform-
ing real magic, or an illusionist with a bag of tricks – the word ‘presto’, in 
particular, suggests a commercial performance rather than a supernatural 
action. Like the innkeeper who needs to advertise his services and keep 
his customers happy in order to make a living, the magician could then 
also be read as a f igure representing the dependence of the author on the 
reader. The reader is somebody to be manipulated, but also to be enticed 
and convinced (in the rhetorical manoeuvre performed in the passage) – 
and also somebody who may prove to be beyond the author’s control, and 
even in turn exerting control on the author. Rather than just asserting a 
sense of authorial power (however playfully), this passage – like many 
of the other metadiscursive comments – raises the question of its extent 
and limits.
This ambivalence with regard to author-reader relations is also evident 
in a particularly noticeable feature of the novel: its projection of possible 
reader reactions as concrete situations or interjections (a technique that 
was subsequently also used, among others, by Laurence Sterne in Tristram 
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Shandy and, a century later, by William Makepeace Thackeray in Vanity 
Fair):14
I fancy by this Time, my Readers are pretty well acquainted with the Lady 
Bountiful, and ready to thank me for the Pains I have taken, to introduce 
them into such valuable company, but I can hear Beau Thoughtless and 
pretty Miss Pert, whispering to one another, ‘Hang the old Woman, I wish 
we were done with her, we have seen enough of her, I wish to see the young 
Wench, there has been so much talk about, whereabout can she be? Sure 
she’s locked up in the old Lady’s Closet. The Devil take our Conductor, 
after leading us such a Dance, from London to Carmarthenshire, to keep 
us so long from what we want to see;’ but I must inform the pretty Triflers, 
that I am determined my Readers shall learn something in every Chapter, 
and in this, amongst other Things, they much learn and practice Patience 
[…]. But that you may not be altogether discourag’d, I must tell you, that 
I am now going to speak of her [Lady Bountiful’s] Faults; a Subject I am 
sure you cannot be so soon weary of, as it borders so much on your dearly 
beloved scandal (CS I, pp. 24-25).
Further reader f igures whose reactions are described in detail include Miss 
Censorious, who is shocked (though also fascinated) by any hints of sexual 
misconduct, Arabella Dimple, who reads Charlotte Summers in bed and 
has taken the already-cited commentary about the nap seriously, so that 
she has to turn back a few pages to understand what is going on in the 
narrative, and the Widow Lackit, who insists that the novel’s ending include 
the protagonist’s marriage.
Wayne Booth points out the ridiculous character of ‘this multifarious 
“reader”, who is always, underneath his various disguises, the same stupid 
person introduced for the real and unspecif ied reader to laugh at’ (Booth, 
1952, p. 181). Clearly, these reader f igures represent expectations towards 
the novel that are not altogether admirable (though not, I would argue, 
identical): Thoughtless and Pert want racy entertainment, Miss Censorious 
wants an aff irmation of her hypocritical sense of moral superiority, and the 
Widow Lackit wants vicarious gratif ication. The actual reader is certainly 
not invited to identify with these satirically drawn f igures, and by evoking 
concrete circumstances and even dialogue, the novel makes them appear 
as a special type of f ictional character rather than a stand-in for myself as 
14 Booth, in fact, sees Charlotte Summers as a missing link between Tom Jones and the more 
radically self-ref lexive Tristram Shandy (see Booth, 1952, p. 181).
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I am perusing the text. However, it should be noted that the novel, while 
making fun of these readers’ attitudes and demands, at the same time caters 
to them. The way Thoughtless, Pert and Censorious talk about Charlotte, 
for example, highlights the sexual interest that can be taken in the descrip-
tions of the ‘young wench’, who is, like Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa, 
continually exposed to unwanted sexual attention in the novel (and, for 
example, nearly raped by a man who adopts the same trick as Mr. B. in 
Pamela when he switches places with the heroine’s maid and bedfellow 
one night). Similarly, the Widow Lackit’s demand for a conventional happy 
marriage at the ending is complied with in the f inal chapter of the novel.
The passages evoking the reader f igures thus, more vividly than the 
more conventional reader address in Betsy Thoughtless, foreground how 
expectations on the part of the audience force authors to some kind of 
response, be it to deny or to cater to such expectations. Moreover, they 
reflect on the problem of the novel’s purpose in a more general sense: they 
raise the question of how to keep the reader interested (for example in 
the many ironic references to the narrator’s dullness), of how to address 
questions of sexual morals without being salacious, of what a reader could 
or should hope to ‘learn’ from a novel besides ‘Patience’. In alluding to the 
commercial, material, social and ideological implications of novel-writing 
and reading as a social practice, they dramatize not just the variety of 
possible roles to be taken by the reader, but also the possible social functions 
that can be fulf illed by the author of the novel, as well as the issue of his or 
her still precarious cultural standing.
Conclusion
The two case studies have shown how in the 1750s, the technique of authorial 
narration that had been popularized by Henry Fielding in Joseph Andrews 
and Tom Jones was taken into different directions: some authors opted 
for a restrained use of authorial commentary, others for its conspicuous 
extension. Further examples of the f irst option include Sarah Fielding’s 
The History of the Countess of Dellwyn (1759), John Kidgell’s The Card (1755) 
and Charlotte Lennox’ The Female Quixote (1752);15 William Goodall’s The 
Adventures of Captain Greenland (1752) is one of the (much rarer) examples 
15 Kidgell’s novel contains a number of original highly self-ref lexive elements, which play 
with aspects such as typography and graphic design (see Barchas, 2003, especially pp. 112-17), 
but its use of authorial commentary is not very extensive.
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of the second. I have argued that in both variants, narratorial commentary 
is used to complicate and reflect on the issue of authority and the relations 
between author and reader rather than just to reinforce authorial control. A 
closer look at the mid-eighteenth century as an early stage in the evolution 
of novelistic technique, then, serves to complicate simplifying views on 
the functions of authorial narration in literary history. Concerns about 
the practice of novel reading and writing in our age of mounting digital 
competition are only the most recent phase in a long tradition of novelistic 
self-reflection, for which authorial narration is a fundamental tool.
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 Problems of Tellability in German 
Eighteenth-Century Criticism and 
Novel-Writing1
Karin Kukkonen
‘My God, said the Duchess. I am pregnant. Who done it?’ Marie-Laure Ryan 
cites this mock-formula of French bestsellers in her entry on ‘tellability’ in 
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Narrative (Ryan, 2005, p. 590). What makes a 
narrative worth telling, it suggests tongue-in-cheek, are religion, aristocracy, 
sex and mystery. The formula illustrates how tellability depends on the 
subject matter of the narrative. Ryan points out that such salience can be, 
on the one hand, grounded in universally relevant topics (such as sex and 
death) and, on the other hand, be related to cultural contexts (for example 
the interest in the exploits of aristocrats seems to be tied more particularly 
to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Western literature). Narratology 
presents ‘tellability’ as a concept for what allows us to judge the story: 
Can it ward off the question ‘so what?’ However, the strategies with which 
the narrative prevents readers from asking this particular question move 
beyond pregnant duchesses. It can also depend on the rhetorical skill of 
the narrator in capturing the attention of the reader, the unexpectedness 
of events and their logical complexity (in the plot), as well as the general 
fascination with particular topics or particular settings and characters 
(see Baroni, 2014).
The roots of ‘tellability’ in narratology lie in research on oral storytelling, 
where the storyteller is constantly subject to the feedback of the listeners, as 
formalized in the ‘so what?’ question (f irst discussed by Labov, Storytelling 
in the Inner City). Indeed, most of the def ining features of ‘tellability’ have 
been developed on oral storytelling rather than literary narratives (see 
Labov, 1972; Ochs and Capps, 2001; Norrick, 2005), as well as professional 
storytelling in legal and journalistic contexts (see Baroni, 2009) and short 
1 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Raphaël Baroni for his comments on a previous 
version of this article, Liisa Steinby for sharing her expertise in eighteenth-century German 
literature and Aino Mäkikalli for her editorial work. My research was funded by an Academy 
of Finland Postdoctoral Grant.
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story structures (see Ryan, 1991).2 Monika Fludernik’s influential discussion 
of the tellability that arises from narrative’s capacity to capture experi-
ence also depends on her engagement with the ‘natural narratives’ of oral 
storytelling (Fludernik, 1996). As Ryan reminds us, ‘high literature often 
makes art out of the non-tellable, thereby following in the footsteps of 
Flaubert, who claimed that Madame Bovary was a “novel about nothing”’ 
(Ryan, 2005, p. 590).
Writing a novel about ‘nothing’ in the eighteenth century would be a 
decidedly trivial enterprise, and certainly not a feature that an author would 
brandish about as Flaubert does. Literature was meant to contribute to a 
learning process about the social world, its hidden workings and underlying 
order, that provides both emotional and intellectual pleasures to readers. 
In the terms of the Horatian formula, literature was meant to delight and 
instruct (‘aut prodesse aut delectare’). In order to fulf il these functions, as 
the critics in the eighteenth century knew very well, the narrative has to 
capture readers’ attention. For Johann Jakob Breitinger (and a few other 
critics of the German-speaking countries in the eighteenth century), the 
‘marvelous’ contributes to a narrative’s tellability, because it captures read-
ers’ attention and ensures their enjoyment of narrative. Breitinger states in 
Kritische Dichtkunst (1966 [1740]) that ‘der Poet durch das Wunderbare in 
seinen Erzehlungen die Aufmercksamkeit und die Verwunderung des Lesers 
beständig unterhalten muß’ (Breitinger, 1966, p. 342).3 For Breitinger (and 
other critics of the German-speaking countries in the eighteenth century), 
the ‘marvelous’ leads to a narrative’s tellability, because it captures readers’ 
attention and ensures their enjoyment of the narrative. At the same time, 
however, it also needs to be embedded in the general probability of the 
text. Where the boundaries between the marvelous and the probable run 
was the subject of f ierce debates in the German-speaking countries in the 
eighteenth century, which we shall revisit in the following section.
Approaching the concept of ‘tellability’ through these debates on the 
marvelous and the probable allow us to connect ‘tellability’ with a tradition 
in literary criticism that reaches back to Aristotle.4 At the same time, it also 
2 A salient exception to this trend is Mary Louise Pratt, who connects conversational analysis 
and literary theory (rather than narratology) in Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse 
(1977).
3 ‘The poet has to keep up the attention and the puzzlement of readers through the marve-
lous in his narratives’. Unless noted otherwise, this and the following translations are mine. 
Throughout, the German texts are kept intact with their original eighteenth-century spellings.
4 Throughout the article, I translate ‘wunderbar’ with ‘marvelous’ and ‘Wahrscheinli-
chkeit’ with ‘probability’. These are the corresponding terms found in seventeenth- and 
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helps us develop tellability further as a concept, in particular with respect 
to three issues: First, tellability is usually discussed in terms of a minimum 
threshold (how much excitement do you need to make a narrative tellable?). 
The tension between the marvelous and the probable, on the other hand, 
reminds us to take into account both the lower and the upper limits of tella-
bility. Second, narratology limits tellability to the diegesis of the narrative 
(what is being told, see Baroni, 2014). As the historical shift of what makes a 
story tellable in the period we consider here (1730-1774) shows, however, not 
only the events in the story but also the psychological development of the 
characters (existants in the diegesis) contribute to tellability. Third, Jerome 
Bruner’s notion of ‘canonicity and breech’ is introduced both by Ryan and 
Baroni as a specif ication of tellability. According to Bruner, a narrative has 
to draw on established scripts of action, but at the same time, it needs to 
break these scripts for the narrative to gain its ‘point’, to become tellable 
(Bruner, 1991). Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of ‘improbable probability’ 
(and its treatment in the eighteenth century), we discover the metafictional 
dimension of tellability’s treatment of scripts and conventions.
But before we move into the worlds of the marvelous and the probable, 
I need to correct my claim from earlier that no eighteenth-century author 
would advertise that they are writing a novel about ‘nothing’. The Austrian 
writer Maria Anna Sagar (1727-1805) entitles her second novel Karolinens 
Tagebuch; ohne ausserordentliche Handlungen, oder gerade so viel als gar 
keine (2013 [1774]).5 As the preface informs us in an impish tone, this might 
reflect the honesty of the author that, as a woman writer from the provincial 
backwaters of Bohemia (‘böhmisches Frauenzimmer’), she really has noth-
ing of interest to say. Or, she continues, perhaps it is a ploy on her part to 
make readers curious about how she is going to f ill the three hundred pages 
of her book with ‘nothing’. What Sagar chooses to do with her three hundred 
pages is roughly the following: Young Karoline writes a set of letters to her 
sister Nanette and to her writing master Herr Cyrili. As the bride of Karl, she 
traces her own emotional states with the wedding approaching, while at the 
same time, she sets out to recount the more adventurous tale of her friend 
Eleonora Lusani. Eleonora is abducted and put in the care of the mysterious 
Duchess of *** in order to protect her from the rakish duke, and she hears the 
duchess’s story of her unhappy marriage, separation from her son and how 
eighteenth-century English criticism for these concepts. For an accessible demonstration of these 
terms and debates, see ‘The Wonderfully Long Chapter on the Marvelous’ in Henry Fielding’s 
Tom Jones.
5 Karoline’s Diary, without extraordinary events, or just about none at all. 
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she finally managed to reunite with him. Throughout the novel, Nanette and 
Herr Cyrili critique the probability of these letters and question in how far 
they help Karoline in her attempts to put her thoughts into order. Luckily, 
Karoline is no Emma Bovary, and the project of literary education succeeds 
in the end. Karolinens Tagebuch is steeped in the contemporary critical 
debates that I have outlined above, and Sagar plays with the conventions 
of tellability as they were in the process of getting established for the novel. 
In what follows, instances from Karolinens Tagebuch shall accompany the 
more theoretical discussions of eighteenth-century takes on tellability.
Tellability, Marvelous and Probable
According to Aristotle, mimesis makes a f ictional narrative pleasurable 
for its audience because we take delight in imitations (Aristotle, 1996, p. 
6). How exactly this imitation of nature should work for a successful nar-
rative was the subject of seemingly never-ending debates in neoclassical 
criticism. A properly European project, neoclassical criticism begins with 
the extensive elaborations on Aristotle’s Poetics which Castelvetro, Vida and 
Scaliger provided in the sixteenth century, became the dominant critical 
discourse in seventeenth-century France and Britain, and was renegotiated 
within the tension between Enlightenment rationality and sentiment that 
arose in eighteenth-century France, Britain, and eventually Germany (see 
Kukkonen, 2015 for an overview). By that time, around 1730, the notion of 
‘probability’ (Wahrscheinlichkeit) had been established as the key concept 
for mimesis in neoclassical criticism (see Bray, and Kremer for France and 
Patey for Britain). Probability is not the same as reality. Instead, it shapes 
reality in such a way that it becomes interesting, pleasing and instructive 
for readers, while yet remaining credible. A narratologist might rephrase 
this as ‘probability makes narratives tellable’ today. There is a lot more to 
probability than just tellability, but we shall focus on the overlap between 
the two concepts here and follow our present purpose to let the eighteenth 
century speak back to the twenty-f irst.
In the 1740s, the German-Swiss relations in the world of letters were 
shaken, when the Swiss critics Johann Jakob Bodmer and Johann Jakob 
Breitinger took up their quills and responded to the German critic Johann 
Christoph Gottsched. While the strict Gottsched seemed to tie literature 
down to a dull correspondence to the real world, the Swiss stressed the 
freedom of the imagination and liberated literature to explore possible 
worlds. This is the potted narrative which is often told of the controversy 
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conducted between Gottsched’s Versuch einer kritischen Dichtkunst (2003 
[1730]), Bodmer’s Kritische Abhandlung von dem Wunderbaren in der Po-
esie und dessen Verbindung mit dem Wahrscheinlichen (1740), Breitinger’s 
Kritische Dichtkunst (1740) and Gottsched’s second edition of Versuch 
einer kritischen Dichtkunst (1751). Lubomìr Doležel, for example, highlights 
Breitinger’s Kritische Dichtkunst, certainly the most rewarding of the three 
treatises, as the point at which European poetics moves from the notion 
that literature imitates in correspondence with nature to the idea that the 
poet transforms possible worlds into worlds that have ‘the appearance and 
the name of reality’ (Doležel, 1990, p. 42; English version by Doležel). For 
our purposes, however, it is useful to take a broader view of the debate.
Gottsched’s Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst is part of the larger pro-
gramme for promoting literary culture in the German-speaking countries, 
which he pursued together with his wife Luise Gottsched (see Goodman, 
2005 and Brown, 2012), and which included the publication of a literary 
journal (Die Vernünftigen Tadlerinnen, 1725-1726), a repository of German 
translations of established pieces for the theatre (Die Deutsche Schaubühne, 
1741-1745) and a new standard grammar for German (Deutsche Sprachkunst, 
1748). Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst, in turn, is meant to lay the founda-
tions of German literary criticism. In particular, Gottsched sets out to define 
what literature is and what functions it should fulf il. He writes, ‘Die Fabel 
ist nichts als eine Nachahmung der Natur. Denn wenn eine Fabel nicht 
wahrscheinlich ist, so taugt sie nichts’ (Gottsched, 2003, p. 34).6 Gottsched’s 
use of the term ‘Fabel’ evokes the literary genre of the fable (which according 
to him is the essential genre of literature that carries a moral message), as 
well as the notion of what we would call ‘plot’ today. Does the fable have to 
be ‘probable’ with respect to its reference of reality? As Sarah Ruth Lorenz 
(2014) points out, Gottsched’s Critische Dichtkunst runs into trouble at this 
point, because even though Gottsched pursues the notion that literature 
should imitate nature, at the same time, he also privileges the fable where 
animals can talk and other improbable things happen. According to Lorenz, 
Gottsched’s forms are constantly shifting between probability as something 
which can happen in the real world and the potentially fantastic probability 
of the narrative that aims to instruct. This reflects Gottsched’s struggle to 
devise a literary theory based on probability which supports Enlightenment 
ideals of instruction.
At the same time, I think, Gottsched indicates − in slightly garbled 
form − a connectedness between the plot (understood as the arrangement 
6  ‘Plot is an imitation of nature, since if a plot is not probable, it is no good’. 
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of events in the narrative) and the referentiality to reality. Gottsched, as 
well as Bodmer and Breitinger, tends to describe the mimesis of literature 
in terms of painting in the ‘ut pictura poesis’-tradition, which had a long 
history at this point (see Hagstrum, 1968; see Kowalik, 1992, pp. 62-86 for 
Breitinger’s indebtedness to Dubos in particular). Like a good painter, the 
poet represents reality as faithfully as possible. However, poets also make 
changes to heighten the interest of readers in reality. In fact, as Breitinger 
points out, it is the artistic nature of the representation which leads readers 
to pay attention to things copied that they would ignore in reality (‘Die 
Copie ziehet uns stärcker an sich, als das Original’, p. 72). However, the 
things copied are not only representations of items and characters from 
reality, but also − true to Aristotle’s definition − the actions of the characters. 
As Gottsched puts it, ‘Ein Poet ahmet hauptsächlich die Handlungen der 
Menschen nach’ (Gottsched, 2003, p. 48),7 and the imitation of these actions 
unfolds through the plot of the narrative. Hence, the fable can be probable, 
even with its speaking animals, because it imitates the (typical) actions of 
men (see also Waldschmidt in this volume for eighteenth-century debates 
around the fable).
Probability, as the designed imitation of neoclassical criticism, unfolds 
both on the level of the f ictional world (and its degree of correspondence to 
reality) and on the level of the plot (and its arrangement of events). Drawing 
on the neoclassical debates (and contemporary cognitive approaches), I have 
suggested elsewhere that we can think of a narrative’s ‘probability design’ in 
terms of a feedback loop between the plot and the vraisemblance of the f ic-
tional world (that is, what we think its likely state of affairs; see Kukkonen, 
2014). As the narrative progresses, readers’ probability judgements for the 
fictional world develop according to the events and the information that the 
plot reveals. None of the neoclassical critics would have put the relationship 
in these terms, but when Gottsched writes that ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit’ ensures 
‘die Übereinstimmung der Fabel mit der Natur’ (Gottsched, 2003, p. 129),8 we 
can read ‘fable’ both in terms of the plot and in terms of the f ictional world.
Contrary to common prejudice, Gottsched admitted that a probable 
narrative can feature marvelous elements (‘lauter neue, seltsame und 
fürtreffliche Sachen’, p. 104), but these need to be carefully integrated into 
the overall narrative (Gottsched, 2003, pp. 115, 122). As Gottsched puts it, 
‘Ein heutiger Poet hat also grosse Ursache, in dergleichen Wunderdingen 
7 ‘The poet imitates mainly the actions of men’.
8 ‘The fabel matches nature’.
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sparsam zu sein’ (Gottsched, 2003, p. 115).9 He does not ask for the exclu-
sion of the marvelous, but for its judicious application to the purposes of 
narrative. One of the poets who, according to Gottsched, went overboard 
with the marvelous is John Milton in his Paradise Lost. Bodmer writes his 
Kritische Abhandlung explicitly to come to the rescue of Milton and to 
highlight the value of Paradise Lost, following and extending Joseph Ad-
dison’s series of essays on Milton in The Spectator. Bodmer defends Milton’s 
use of marvelous elements in the epic poem, explaining for example, why 
Milton was justif ied to present the immaterial angels as having bodies (and 
moreover bodies that can bleed), why Milton did not fail probability when 
he presents Pandemonium as too small for the entire host of Satan, and why 
Milton had every poetic right to introduce pagan gods and personalizations 
like Sin for allegorical purposes. In the second edition of his Versuch einer 
Kritischen Dichtkunst, Gottsched responds to Bodmer and adds comments 
that explicitly argue against Milton, stressing that the English poet fails to 
achieve probability in his epic (see for example the notes referencing the 
1751 edition in Gottsched, 2003, pp. 50, 78, 114).
While Gottsched and Bodmer disagree profoundly on the value of Mil-
ton’s Paradise Lost, they also perform a critical debate through the shared 
vocabulary of ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit’ (probability), ‘das Wunderbare’ (the 
marvelous) and ‘Natur’ (nature). Indeed Gottsched acknowledges a key 
point of Bodmer and Breitinger: ‘Dem Dichter stehen nun alle mögliche 
Welten zu Diensten’ (Gottsched, 2003, p. 89 FN).10 But while the poet can 
employ any possible world she likes, Gottsched stresses, she also needs to 
make sure that it still remains probable (‘wahrscheinlich’). In turn, Bodmer 
agrees that ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit’ is crucial for the successful poem. However, 
neither Gottsched nor Bodmer provide a convincing and clear definition of 
the relation between the marvelous and probability. Instead, if we read their 
arguments for or against Milton, the controversy soon seems to approach 
the level of farce.11
9 ‘Poets today have good reason to use the marvelous but sparingly’.
10 ‘The poet can draw on all possible worlds’. (This remark was added in the 1751 edition).
11 Let us take as our example their responses to Voltaire’s observation that Paradise Lost lacks 
in probability, because Pandemonium is not big enough for all of Satan’s host ( in Voltaire’s 
Essai sur la poésie épique, especially pp. 339-43). Gottsched repeats Voltaire’s charge, asking 
whether the demons need to turn into dwarfs in order to enter it. Bodmer, on the other hand, 
stresses that only Satan’s war council would need to f ind space in it. Breitinger indicates that 
he has little patience with such debates, and arguments around questions such as whether all 
the damned angels can f it Pandemonium or whether angels can bleed (also discussed in both 
Gottsched and Bodmer) that are so far removed from today’s concerns of literary theory that 
they are easily mocked. Note, however, that these examples serve to indicate roughly where 
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Breitinger’s Kritische Dichtkunst provides a more systematic engagement 
with ‘das Wunderbare’, ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit’ and ‘Natur’, and he spells 
out some of the assumptions which were more implicit in Gottsched and 
Bodmer (for general introductions to Breitinger, see Bender, 1973 and Zelle, 
2009). Breitinger def ines the work of the poet as follows: ‘Sein gantzes 
Vermögen bestehet in der geschickten Verbindung des Wunderbaren 
mit dem Wahrscheinlichen; Dieses erwirbt seiner Erzehlung Glauben, 
und jenes verleihet ihr eine Kraft, die Aufmerksamkeit des Lesers zu 
erhalten, und eine angenehme Verwunderung zu gebähren’ (Breitinger, 
1966, pp. 298-99).12 The marvelous is necessary for the attention of the 
reader and for the pleasure of reading, but (and Breitinger mentions 
this f irst), it also needs to remain credible. According to Breitinger, the 
marvelous does not just arise out of unusual personages like Milton’s 
angels. Instead, he stresses that ‘Das Ergezen ist also zweyfach, das erste 
entstehet eigentlich von der Materie der Nachahmung, das andere von der 
Kunst der Nachahmung’13 (Breitinger, 1966, p. 71; see also pp. 292-93). In 
other words, the tellability of the marvelous does not just arise from the 
subject matter, but also from the construction of the narrative. Breitinger 
def ines the marvelous in terms not dissimilar from today’s narratologists 
def ine tellability: ‘Je neuer demnach, je unbekannter, je unerwarteter eine 
Vorstellung ist, desto grösser muß auch das Ergetzen seyn’ (Breitinger, 
1966, p. 112).14 Such tellability can be due to the inherent strangeness of 
the idea, or, indeed, due to the fact that the mind of the reader has not had 
the opportunity to engage with the marvelous object before (Breitinger, 
1966, p. 124). Breitinger gives the notion that tellability can be due to 
contextual features an Enlightenment spin, when he approaches it with 
the assumption that texts engage readers’ minds and lead them to greater 
insight into the principles of the world.
the boundaries between the marvelous and the probale run for the two critics. Gottsched has 
a more limited notion of the marvelous. Hence Milton’s angels are too much, and he saddles 
them with another marvelous transformation in order to stress the absurdity. Bodmer, with 
his more capatious notion of the marvelous, thinks that Milton’s angels are still probable and 
hence he f inds the more probable explanation of the smaller group. Even though they draw the 
boundaries differently, both critics work on the same overall (Aristotelian) model. 
12 ‘All the poet’s capability lies in the skillful connection of the marvelous and the probable; 
the former gives credibility to the narrative, the latter gives it the force to maintain the attention 
of readers and to give birth to pleasant wonder’.
13 ‘Hence the pleasure is two-fold, the f irst emerges from the subject matter of imitation, the 
second from its art’.
14 ‘Accordingly, the newer, the less familiar, the less expected the thought, the more delightful 
must it be’.
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According to Breitinger, the poet can employ all possible worlds in her 
work, because she needs to explore both those parts of creation that are vis-
ible and those that are invisible. The marvelous that arises out of presenting 
the merely possible not only retains readers’ attention and creates delight, 
but also opens the literary work to elements of the world that might not be 
perceptible to the naked eye. It elicits a profitable struggle with our reason:
Sobald ein Ding, das das Zeugniß der Wahrheit oder Möglichkeit hat, 
mit unsren gewöhnlichen Begriffen zu streiten scheinet, so kann es uns 
nicht bloß als neu und ungewohnt vorkommen, sondern es wird das 
Gemüthe in eine angenehme und verwundernsvolle Verwirrung hinreis-
sen, welche daher entspringet, weil wir mit unserm Verstand durch den 
reizenden Schein der Falschheit durchgedrungen, und in dem vermeinten 
Widerspruch ein geschicktes Bild der Wahrheit und eine ergezende 
Übereinstimmung gefunden haben (Breitinger, 1966, pp. 129-30).15
Breitinger never cuts the marvelous loose from ‘Wahrscheinlichkeit’. 
Indeed, he writes ‘Das Wunderbare ist demnach nichts anders, als ein 
vermummetes Wahrscheinliches’ (Breitinger, 1966, p. 132).16 As the poet 
strives to distance her work from the actual world to a certain degree, the 
marvelous that emerges needs to be designed in such a fashion that our 
imagination can train itself in its judgements about probability (Breitinger, 
1966, pp. 138, 308-10).
While most other critics writing on the debate between Gottsched, 
Bodmer and Breitinger stress the (profound) disagreements between the 
Swiss and the German, it has been my interest here to work out the common 
ground from which they started the debate. In each of their takes, the mar-
velous and the probable are closely connected, and, with shifting emphasis, 
they acknowledge that both have a role to play in literature. If we phrase a 
definition of tellability in eighteenth-century terms, drawing on Gottsched, 
Bodmer and Breitinger, it can run as follows: A narrative becomes tellable by 
introducing aspects of the marvelous (through unnatural f ictional worlds, 
but also through actions and events in the plot), because it provides a new 
and unexpected take on this world. At the same time, the marvelous needs 
15 ‘As soon as something that has been conf irmed as true or possible seems to conflict with 
our general concepts, it might seem not just new and unfamiliar, but will pull the mind into a 
pleasant and marvellous confusion, which emerges because we have penetrated the teasing illu-
sion of falseness with our reason, and have found in the seeming contradiction a well-designed 
image of truth and a pleasurable correspondence’.
16 ‘The marvelous is accordingly nothing but masked probability’.
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to be embedded in the probability of the f ictional world so that it can lead 
readers back to an instructive realization about the real world drawn from 
the marvelous, and hence remain worth telling.
Upper and Lower Limits of Tellability
Let us turn to Karolinens Tagebuch to see how such eighteenth-century 
tellability plays out in the eighteenth-century novel. Karoline’s f irst literary 
endeavour in her letters to her sister Nanette clearly fails to achieve tellabil-
ity. ‘Wie? Ich wäre nicht klug, sagtest Du gestern zu mir: “mein Geschmiere 
wär’ nicht wert, daß man darauf achtete”’ (Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 33).17 
In the previous letter, Karoline recounts a dinner party in a satirical tone, 
concluding that none of the behaviours on display could be a model of her 
own. Nanette, however, does not care for her sister’s professed discern-
ment: It is ‘nichts als ein eitler Kunstgrif um mir dadurch einiges Lob zu 
erschleichen’ (Karolinens Tagebuch, pp. 33-34).18 The dinner party (which 
Nanette also attended) is profoundly uninteresting, as Karoline herself 
remarks, and also her satirical comments do not make it worthwhile. By the 
end of her letter of response to Nanette, however, Karoline has developed a 
different strategy: ‘Doch warte, ich habe schon einen andern Vorrath da: die 
Fräulein Eleonora Lusani hat mir in einen Aufsatz, ihre eigene Geschichte 
überschicket. Hievon will ich dir von Zeit zu Zeit einen Theil in Abschrift 
überschicken, und vielleicht kann ich dich damit angenehmer unterhalten’ 
(Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 40).19 In the narrative of Eleonora, which Karoline 
purports to copy, tellability is much increased. Indeed, we f ind almost 
all the features that Ryan introduces in her formula for French f iction: 
Eleonora encounters a duchess (aristocracy), she narrowly escapes a sexual 
predator (sex), she is locked away from the rest of world (social death) and 
she is repeatedly asked to rely on providence (religion). Eleonora describes 
herself as a ‘heroine’ (‘Romanenheldin’, p. 44) and the narrative might put 
contemporary readers in mind of Christian Fürchtegott Gellert’s Geschichte 
der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1746) or Sophie von LaRoche’s Geschichte 
des Fräuleins von Sternheim (1771), where young women are taken out of their 
17 ‘What? I’m not prudent you said to me yesterday: “my scribbling is not worth of being taken 
note”’.
18 ‘Nothing but a sleight of hand to garner praise’.
19 ‘But wait, I already have another store: Miss Eleonora Lusani has sent me an essay, her own 
history. From this narrative I shall send you parts from time to time, in hope to provide more 
pleasant entertainment’.
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safe domestic environments and submitted to the whims of fortune. By 
introducing elements of the contemporary novel, Karoline has dramatically 
increased the tellability of her narrative, and Nanette will not interrupt 
her again.
When Eleonora’s narrative draws to a close, Karoline already has new 
plans: she proposes to compose a novel ‘wo etwas mehr von Handlungen 
zu lesen seyn wird’ (Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 256).20 She writes:
Ein Paar Helden habe ich schon im Vorrath, die ihre Prinzessinnen 
von ihren Verfolgern erretten, sie hinter sich auf das Pferd werfen, und 
mit ihnen ganz tugendhaft in den Wäldern herrumirren, sie hernach 
verlieren, dreyssig, vierzig Jahre in der Welt herumsuchen, endlich 
auskundtschaften; aber um selbige blutige Kriege führen müssen, und 
als Ueberwinder, ihre Heldinnen noch in der blühendesten Schönheit 
f inden, sie heyraten und ganze Jahre mit Banquetiren und Turniren bey 
der Hochzeit verbringen (Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 256).21
If we identify tellability as the new and noteworthy aspects of narrative, 
then Karoline’s forecast of the next planned narrative brings even more 
tellable elements into play. We have even higher degrees of nobility (‘Prinz-
essinnen’), repeated separation and rescue, a larger scale of conflict (‘blutige 
Kriege’), surprising temporal inconsistencies and excessive splendour at 
the wedding. And yet we do not have to adopt the stern mind-set of Herr 
Cyrili to f ind the narrative that Karoline proposes ridiculous. Because this 
version of the baroque romance is such a condensed panoply of marvels, it 
ceases to have any signif icant degree of tellability.
Narratology usually does not ask whether one can stack a tall tale too 
high. Rather, following Labov’s ‘so what?’, the focus is on pushing the narra-
tive over the threshold of relevance by making it more tellable. An exception 
is Neal R. Norrick who, working on oral storytelling, suggests a ‘two-sided 
notion of tellability’ (2005) with both an upper and a lower limit. The lower 
limit corresponds to the familiar notion from Labov, whereas the upper limit 
is drawn by what Norrick calls the ‘propriety’ of the exchange. Whenever 
the narrative gets too personal, intimate and revealing, participants in 
20 ‘[I]n which one can read more actions’.
21 ‘I already have a couple of heroes in store. They will save their princesses from pursuers, 
throw them on their horse, and wander about virtuously in the woods, then lose them, search 
the world for thirty, forty years, f inally spot them, but have to lead bloody wars for them, and 
as victors, f ind their heroines in the most radiant beauty, marry them and spend entire years 
with the banquets and tournaments of the wedding’.
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conversational storytelling might judge it as untellable because the breach 
of canonicity is too violent. Arguably, such a notion of the upper limit of 
tellability translates into literary narration and, for example, could be 
fruitfully applied to the study of trauma narratives. To stay within the 
period, Samuel Richardson has his heroine Clarissa refer of her rape in 
fractured prose and in a text set confusingly on the page. The events are 
so disturbing that they do not bear narration or, indeed, create a narrative 
of ‘transgressive, unwelcome and frightening nature’ (Smith and Sparkes, 
2008, p. 230, see also Baroni, 2014).
Yet Karoline’s proposed novel does not interfere with Norrick’s conver-
sationally def ined notion of ‘propriety’. The heroes and their princesses 
behave ‘ganz tugendhaft’, and there is no indication of trauma after the 
‘blutige Kriege’. The upper limit of tellability is instead set by the structura-
tion of the narrative itself and the possible relationship to readers’ reality; 
in other words, its probability. Karoline does not paint a ‘geschicktes Bild 
der Wahrheit’ in Breitinger’s sense. Instead, we get multiple heroes and 
princesses and repeated rescues without any indication of how these events 
differ from and relate to each other meaningfully, expanded time schemes 
without any corresponding indication of the weight of the subject matter 
and comeuppance which seems ridiculously disproportionate to the events 
that precede it. Each element of the narrative has hyperbolic tellability, but 
Karoline does not provide us with the structuration that would make the 
narrative overall tellable.
Karoline sets out in her writings with the expressed purpose to learn how 
to think in an orderly fashion, and she recruits Nanette and Herr Cyrili to 
help her (Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 15). After each of the passages which she 
copies from Eleonora’s narrative, Karoline comments on her responses to it 
(p. 54), she reflects on her own emotions in relation to Eleonora’s experience 
and, at times, continues with the narrative to distract herself from her own 
emotional involvement (pp. 103-04). Also Eleonora and the duchess under-
stand their own lives in terms of the narrative which they read (in the case 
of Eleonora, p. 107) or write (in the case of the duchess, p. 137). Sagar writes 
her novel at a time when not only critics but also practioners of literature 
strove to provide means for educating readers to think about themselves 
and their place in society (see Baldwin, 2002, pp. 13-37; von Mücke, 1991; 
McCarthy, 1984); a development that gave rise to the Bildungsroman (see 
Saariluoma, 2004). The tellability of Eleonora’s narrative depends on how 
much it contributes to the process of Karoline’s mental education, which we 
read about in her comments on the narrative. In the whimsical follow-up 
narrative, which Karoline suggests, the marvelous does not seem to be 
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embedded in a probability structure that would allow readers to relate 
events to their own life. Her narrative, even though it capitalizes on the 
popular narratives of the seventeenth-century novel, does not give any 
indication of how it could be relatable through the experience of the char-
acters themselves and the constellations of events which happen. While 
the concern with the educational function of literature is fading after the 
eighteenth century, the trade-off that emerges from it, between marvelous 
features that make the narrative tellable and the overall probability of the 
narrative that ensures that it remains tellable (and relatable), is also today 
relevant for thinking about tellability.
Event-Based and Character-Based Tellability
In his entry on the topic in the Living Handbook of Narratology, Raphaël 
Baroni distinguishes between three aspects of tellability. He emphasizes 
that tellability can arise from the story level of narrative, the discourse level 
(and the interactions between the two levels), as well as from contextual 
parameters. The story level, the bare-bones events of the narrative, can 
hold interest for readers if its arrangement in the plot moves away from 
standard scripts of action (see Baroni, 2014 and Bruner, 1991) or if there is a 
particularly rich forest of alternative paths which the plot could have taken 
(see Ryan, 1991). The evaluation devices of the speaker (or narrator) on the 
discourse level also contribute to tellability. The third aspect which Baroni 
highlights are the ‘contextual parameters’ of tellability, which include on the 
one hand the situational feedback between storyteller and listener, and on 
the other hand, contemporary cultural expectations and genre conventions.
In Karolinens Tagebuch, we f ind all three aspects renegotiated. Her nar-
rative develops out of Nanette’s evaluation in the feedback situation of the 
epistolary novel, where Karoline and Nanette need to agree on what kind 
of narrative is worth their joint attention. Eleonora’s story then presents us 
with a very tellable narrative in the eighteenth-century mode, including 
abductions, hidden family relations and revelatory portraits. Its plot moves 
away from the standard, real-world scripts of action, according to which 
young women in the company of her mother are not subject to the preying 
desires of rakish dukes, but go home to marry a predetermined suitor. In 
particular critics writing on Sagar’s novel in a feminist vein have pointed 
out that the ideal life of a woman in the eighteenth century should not be 
tellable at all (see Baldwin, 2002; Jirku, 1993). Karoline herself writes to 
Nanette on their actual lives, ‘O was wird das für eine matte Geschichte 
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von uns beyden werden? Siehe in zwey Zeilen kann man unsere ganze 
Begebenheiten bringen’ (Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 302).22 There is clearly 
a gendered dimension, not only in terms of the kinds of narratives that 
female narrators are allowed to tell (particularly relevant with respect to 
oral storytelling, I presume), but also in term of the kinds of adventures that 
female characters can experience. This gendered dimension prefigures the 
tellability of female lives, probably according to the prototypical female 
plots that Nancy Miller (1984) works out for eighteenth-century French and 
British novels, and gives it standard ways of deviating from the uneventful-
ness of feminine lives. Karoline’s letters, in the feminist take on the novel, 
are a way for her to write back against the expected ‘matte Geschichte’ of the 
normal female life on the one hand (see Baldwin), but also, I think, against 
the expected conventional modes of female adventures made tellable in 
the literature of the day.
Karoline’s brother Leopold challenges her writing repeatedly and threat-
ens to publish it, which she responds to, f irst, by recording everything that 
he says, with unnerving accuracy, into her letters (Karolinens Tagebuch, 
p. 38), and then by stating that she is not afraid of what improbabilities 
male critics might discover in her writings (ibid., pp. 197-98). ‘Aber Dir 
bleibt Immer der Stahr in den Augen, wenn du auch mit jenen glaubtest, 
daß es, um einen Roman zu schreiben, über die frauenzimmerliche Logik, 
noch etwas mehreres brauche als Romanen gelesen zu haben’ (Karolinens 
Tagebuch, p. 198).23 In the overall composition of Sagar’s novel, these two 
responses are connected: the very detailed recording of Leopold’s taunts, 
and Karoline’s own thoughts, as she reflects on Eleonora’s narrative and her 
own situation as bride, stand in opposition to the well-designed narratives 
of Eleonora and the duchess and the stylized comedic conclusion to the 
novel (which I shall address in more detail in the next section). Sagar seems 
to work towards a novel in which the everyday life-events of Karoline gain 
narrative interest.
In 1774, the same year as Sagar’s novel, Friedrich von Blanckenburg 
publishes his Versuch über den Roman (Essay on the Novel). Blanckenburg 
operates within the same terminological parameters as Gottsched, Bodmer 
and Breitinger had thirty years earlier, and he asserts the need for ‘probabil-
ity’, but he gives the term a different emphasis than the earlier generation of 
critics had. Responding to new developments in novel-writing, in particular 
22 ‘Oh what an insipid narrative will be told of us? Look, one can write it all up in two lines’.
23 ‘But you will always be blind to the truth if you believe that in order to write a novel on 
female logic you need any other qualif ications than having read many novels’.
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Wieland’s Geschichte des Agathon (The History of Agathon; 1766-1767) and 
Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749), Blanckenburg writes:
Eine andre Folge, die aus dieser Behandlung der Begebenheiten entsteht, 
ist diese, daß der einzelnen Vorfälle nicht mehr so viel werden seyn 
können, als bis jetzt in den gewöhnlichen Romanen zusammen gepfropft 
sind. Der kleinste Vorfall nämlich wird zu seinem Wirklichwerden eine 
Reihe von Ursachen nöthig haben, die zwar an und vor sich selbst auch 
andere Vorfälle wieder seyn können; diese aber werden sehr oft aus so 
unmerklich kleinen Zügen bestehen müssen, daß man sie nie unter die 
Begebenheiten eines Romans wird zählen wollen, wenn man die Begriffe 
hierzu aus den gewöhnlichen Werken dieser Art nimmt. Daher wird 
natürlich eine einzige Begebenheit, zu ihrem Wirklichwerden, mehr 
Raum erfordern, als jetzt zur Erzehlung von zehnen erfordert wird […] 
Von dieser Art der Behandlung einer Begebenheit gilt es übrigens im 
eigentlichen Verstande, dass der Dichter seine Leser zwingen könne, das 
zu glauben, was er wolle, dass sie glauben sollen […] Wir sehen, bey dieser 
Behandlung, die Personen anschauend mit all ihren Eigenthümlichkeiten 
vor uns. Sie treten gleichsam aus dem Gemälde hervor (Blanckenburg, 
1774, pp. 308-10).24
What constitutes for Blanckenburg the successful imitation of nature is 
to have characters so detailed that they ‘step out’ of the picture of poetic 
creation, and the tellabilility that he envisages is that of the small events 
of everyday experience in all its complexity.
Wieland’s Geschichte des Agathon, for example, enacts this move. The 
narrative starts with fast-paced action of the ship-wreck, the Bacchantes, 
and the slave-traders that capture the hero (all features of the novel of the 
seventeenth century), but then, as the hero develops his own thinking 
about the question of the good life and as the narrative perspective gets 
more complex, the narrative itself slows down. Karolinen’s Tagebuch brings 
24 ‘Another consequence emerging from this treatment of events is the following: the individual 
events can no longer be as many as so far have been stuffed together in the ordinary novel. For 
the smallest event will need a whole range of causes to become real; causes which in turn have to 
be events, and those will very frequently consist of such small features that you cannot number 
them as the events of a novel if you take the terms from the common works of this genre. Hence 
a single event will, naturally, take more space to come real as now is necessary to narrate ten of 
them […] This treatment of events means (in the actually sense) that the writer can force their 
readers to believe what he wants them to believe […] We see in this treatment the characters 
with all their features before us. It is almost as if they stepped out of the painting’.
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this historical shift from the event-based tellability of baroque novel to the 
character-based tellability of the eighteenth-century novel (which arguably 
also underlies today’s standard of the novel) more explicitly to the fore. Here, 
we have the detailed description of Karoline’s experience as a bride-to-be 
and her confusion about her own feelings for her f iancé Karl in contrast with 
the narrative of Eleonora, and more strikingly, with Karoline’s own proposal 
for a new narrative. The baroque novel’s tellability depends on plot events 
and their strikingness as culturally meaningful. In the German-speaking 
lands, novels like Andreas Heinrich Bucholz’ Hercules (1659) and Henrich 
Anshelm von Ziegler und Klipphausen’s Asiatische Banise (1689) were still 
read when Sagar’s novel was published, or they were reedited, such as Anton 
Ulrich zu Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel’s Aramena (1669-1673/1782-1786). As 
late as 1797 and 1799, journals publish keys to identify the historical persons 
behind the characters in Wolfenbüttel’s Octavia (1685-1707; see Cholevius, 
1866, pp. 293-94). Sagar’s readers would have been well-aware of the event-
based tellability of the baroque novel that is satirized in Karoline’s proposal 
for a new narrative. The eighteenth-century novel’s tellability, on the other 
hand, depends more on the responses of characters to these plot events and 
on their strikingness as an exceptional (but relatable) experience. Even 
though I cannot offer a detailed historical trajectory from the tellability 
of the baroque novel to the tellability of the eighteenth-century novel, 
the juxtaposition of different kinds of tellability in Karolinens Tagebuch 
illustrates the need for a diachronic investigation of narrative concepts in 
order to distinguish between different kinds of their instantiation in the 
long course of the development of narrative f iction.
The Metafictional Dimension of Tellability
In his essay ‘The Narrative Construction of Reality’ (1991), the psychologist 
Jerome Bruner lists nine principles that circumscribe how our minds get 
a grip on reality through narrative. Narrative, in other words, becomes 
an intelligent tool through which we make sense of and communicate 
our world; a take which cognitive narratology has often supported (see 
Herman, 2009). ‘Canonicity and breach’ is one of Bruner’s principles that 
has been related in particular to tellability (see Ryan, 2005 and Baroni, 2014). 
According to this principle, the scripts of social actions, such as the moves 
we go through when visiting a restaurant (a classical example from Schank 
and Abelson), are ‘pointless’ and they need to be broken for a narrative to 
emerge out of conventional, routine actions (Bruner, 1991, p. 11). However, 
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he also stresses that the breaches of canonicity are often conventionalized, 
and focuses on the case of everyday narrative (and its cognitive functions) 
rather than on literary texts.
If we turn to the eighteenth-century debates around probability, we 
quickly come across a concept that shares features with Bruner’s princi-
ple: ‘improbable probability’. Gottsched writes, ‘eine Sache, die an sich 
unglaublich und unmöglich aussieht, durch den Zusammenhang mit 
anderen Begebenheiten und unter gewissen Umständen nicht nur möglich, 
sondern auch wahrscheinlich und glaublich werden könne’ (Gottsched, 
2003, p. 132).25 An improbable event can be included in the larger context 
of the narrative in such a way that it becomes probable after all. Aristotle 
puts this notion centre-stage in his Poetics: the best, complex plots involve 
reversals (peripetia) that are unexpected and yet following an inner logic 
(‘as a result of what has happened before, out of necessity or in accordance 
with probability’, p. 18), and hence they create effects of ‘astonishment’ 
(Aristotle, 1996, p. 30). For clever people, like Sisyphus, to be deceived in 
the reversal, says Aristotle, citing the Greek playwright Agathon, ‘[there] 
is no violation of probability in this; […] it is probable for many improbable 
things to happen’ (Aristotle, 1996, p. 30). In his conclusion to the discus-
sion of plot, Aristotle plays through the constellations of the improbable 
and the probable once more and states that ‘it is probable that improbable 
things will happen’ (Aristotle, 1996, p. 45). Improbable things may well 
happen in a narrative (and make it tellable), but literature then uses these 
improbabilities to reaffirm the probability of the narrative in an unexpected 
way (and hence increases the overall tellability of the narrative). David 
Herman’s discussion of Bruner’s ‘canonicity and breach’ (Herman, 2009, p. 
19-21) suggests that as the narrative deals with the breach, and redresses 
the balance, it provides explanations and formulates reasons for readers. 
The improbable is reinscribed into the probable. However, this account 
seems to side-line the surprising nature of Aristotelian reversal, as well 
as the more metaf ictional solution to improbable probability which the 
eighteenth century has devised.
In Karolinens Tagebuch, Sagar offers various instances of ‘improbable 
probability’. The first revolves around the conclusion to Eleonora’s narrative, 
when Herr Cyrili interrupts Karoline and asks her how she wants to bring 
the narrative to an end, given all its confusing loose ends (‘Sie haben sich 
25  ‘[A] matter, which in and of itself might seem incredible and impossible, [can] in connection 
with other events and under particular circumstances not only become possible but probable 
and believable’.
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ziemlich verwickelt, wie werden sie sich heraus helfen, und wo haben sie 
alles das Zeug hergenommen?’, Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 259). More precisely, 
how is she going to pay for all the expenses, such as debts accrued and 
commissions in the army, that she has imposed on her characters (‘sie 
haben sie in erstaunliche Ausgaben versetzt’, ibid.)? Karoline proposes 
to kill off some of the older characters to bring about an inheritance and 
to have a treasure hidden in the library to be found in good time, but she 
also states that this very conventional ending has been enforced by Herr 
Cyrili’s lack of patience and that she could have provided a more f itting one 
on the principle of improbable probability (‘Ich hatte meiner Geschichte 
eine unerwartete Entwicklung zugedacht, sie bringen sich selbst um die 
Ueberraschung’. Karolinens Tagebuch, p. 263). Sagar here provides a conclu-
sion that would fall f lat if it were not for the metaf ictional framework of 
Karoline’s comments on the narrative that she tells. For Eleonora’s narrative, 
the ending with the found treasure and the double inheritance seems rather 
too improbable, even within the conventions of the novel. However, because 
this conclusion emerges from Karoline’s reaction to Cyrili’s impatience, 
it works within the probabilities of the frame narration. It is a surprising 
ending, but one that Karoline would probably devise, given the situation.
In many eighteenth-century novels, improbable probability is included, 
and tellability is ensured, though such a metaf ictional shift of probability 
across narratorial levels. Rüdiger Campe in his book The Game of Prob-
ability (2012) connects the critical debates around poetic probability in the 
eighteenth century to debates around probability calculus. In the chapter 
on ‘Improbable Probability’, he discusses Fielding’s Tom Jones and Wieland’s 
Geschichte des Agathon for the ways in which they splice probability through 
a double narrative frame. According to Campe, Fielding’s and Wieland’s 
reader is presented with a ‘world whose probability he can supply because 
he understands the improbability of its constitution’ (Campe, 2012, p. 292). 
This framing device, so Campe, becomes ‘necessary for [the novel’s] own 
functioning’ (Campe, 2012, p. 290) and turns improbable probability into 
the ‘hallmark of the theory of the novel’ (Campe, 2012, p. 284).
In the case of Eleonora’s narrative, however, we as readers do not exactly 
supply probability for this narrative once we understand its improbability. 
Rather, Sagar seems to use Eleonora’s narrative to guide readers’ attention 
to another instance in which improbable probability works as it should. 
This other instance is the frame narrative of Karoline’s and Karl’s courtship. 
Throughout the novel, Karoline struggles with understanding the feelings 
that she has for Karl (see Karolinens Tagebuch, pp. 79, 81, 102). She chooses to 
approach him through the f ictional templates of the dramatic performance, 
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obviously contrived but highly effective in Sagar’s novel. When Karl declares 
his feelings, Karoline cannot respond in any other way than by asking her 
brother to tell her which role in this ‘comedy’ she is supposed to play (p. 
98). Elsewhere, she similarly understands their relationship as a piece for 
the theatre for the benefit of her relatives (‘Schauspiel’, p. 144) and describes 
her suitor in terms of theatrical protagonists (pp. 274-75). When Karl is 
seriously ill, Karoline expects, like a sentimental heroine, that seeing her 
will contribute to his recovery − and indeed, it does. Sagar foregrounds the 
improbable probability further, when she writes the scene in which Karoline 
confesses that she loves Karl and agrees to marry him as a dialogue in a play.
The frame narrative of Karolinens Tagebuch gains tellability, not so 
much because the events of the courtship would be terribly interesting, 
but because Sagar makes their constructedness salient in the metafictional 
shift in improbable probability. By foregrounding the conventionality of its 
narrative, Sagar’s novel (and many other eighteenth-century narratives with 
a metafictional slant) turns Bruner’s principle upside-down. Sagar does not 
rely on breaking canonicity. Rather, as she foregrounds the canonical modes 
of telling a narrative like Karoline’s, Sagar makes the narrative tellable. To 
my knowledge, narratologists working on tellability have not considered 
how the concept plays out in metaf ictional texts. From the eighteenth-
century perspective, improbable probability suggests that tellability can 
emerge from surprising, yet f itting plot solutions and from foregrounding 
the very f ittedness of a convention metaf ictionally.
Conclusion
Bruner writes, ‘Labov’s great credit is to have recognized that narrative 
structures have two components: “what happened and why it is worth 
telling”’ (Bruner, 1991, p. 12; cited in Baroni, 2014). As Baroni points out, the 
second question is side-lined by the structuralist approaches to narratology 
that consider mostly how a narrative is constituted and not why one might 
want to share it or hear it. Structuralist abstraction is certainly a good 
explanation for why it was sociolinguistics, and its interest in situated sto-
rytelling, that introduced the concept of tellability into narratology. At the 
same time, it seems that the general notions of literary appreciation are not 
entirely favourable to notions of ‘tellability’ either. As indicated by Flaubert’s 
comments on Madame Bovary, tellability smacks of narratives with a need 
to be heard, narratives that follow a purpose, and narratives that strive to 
please readers rather than ascend to heights of artistic disinterestedness 
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that became more prominent in the nineteenth century. Hence, it is not 
surprising that tellability has not been developed with literary narratives 
in mind. Eighteenth-century literary criticism, however, provides us with 
a reservoir of critical voices and conceptual developments that takes us not 
only back in time before the current conventions of literary appreciation 
were institutionalized but that also allows us to step outside these conven-
tions when discussing narrative concepts.
Eighteenth-century quixotes generally awaits a better fate than Madame 
Bovary, because the Enlightenment believes more strongly in the educa-
tional capacities of literature. Literary templates allow Karoline to come 
to terms with her feelings for Karl. In Wieland’s Don Sylvio, a narrative ‘wo 
alles wunderbare natürlich zugeht’ (as the subtitle informs readers),26 the 
hero seems to enter a fairy realm only to f ind out that the adventures were 
designed to educate him out of his delusions. Literature does not just take 
readers’ minds away from reality, and achieves tellability because it is new 
and special, but also because it can help readers f ind a new relationship 
to the social and cultural worlds that they live in, and achieve tellability 
because it provides an important insight to be gained. Narratives like Sagar’s 
(and Wieland’s) were written in close conversation with contemporary 
criticism and work through such tensions in tellability. They shuttle be-
tween the lower and the upper limits of tellability, they trace a development 
between (historically) different kinds of tellability and they renegotiate 
canonicity and breach by drawing attention to the metaf ictional aspects 
of tellability. Even if we do not want to go back to eighteenth-century ideas 
about literature that instructs and delights, we can still use their different 
perspective on narrative to develop our own, present-day perspective.
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 Immediacy
The Function of Embedded Narratives in Wieland’s Don 
Sylvio
Claudia Nitschke
Systematic narratological classif ication helps identify ‘trans-historical’ 
phenomena which share defining characteristics, but can still change over 
time in terms of form or function. In the eighteenth century, seminal, long-
term social and political shifts (even before the French Revolution) became 
widely tangible. With society undergoing massive structural changes, 
literature formed no exception: writers began taking stock and started 
rigorously to probe and investigate the semantic potential of emergent 
genres such as the novel, but also the narrative medium itself.
As a means of observing and analysing this historical self-exploration 
embedded narratives − here more specifically the metadiegetic level − seem 
particularly well-suited: they often directly thematize functions and quali-
ties which are perceived as specifically literary, i.e. pertinent to an emerging 
f ield of literature. The metadiegetic level in Christoph Martin Wieland’s 
novel Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerey, oder die Abentheuer des 
Don Sylvio von Rosalva, Eine Geschichte, worinn alles Wunderbare natürlich 
zugeht (1764) (Reason Triumphant over Fancy; exemplified in the Singular 
Adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva, 1773)1 will serve as starting point to 
delve into this form of eighteenth-century literary self-description. Toward 
the end of the century, the texts increasingly began to place an emphasis on 
the aesthetic quality of literature. In order to capture different stages of this 
development the article also includes a brief analysis of a play that makes 
extensive and quite explicit use of the metadiegetic level, namely Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing’s Nathan der Weise (1779) (Nathan the Wise), and f inally, in 
an even more succinct manner, of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s narrative 
1 The rendition of the title is obviously not accurate, since it replaces the German ‘Natur’ 
(which translates as nature) with reason. This translation is indeed not felicitous and omits 
central passages, therefore I had to draw on two different versions, only one of which actually 
included the so-called Nachbericht (supplement), which is actually a preface: for the preface 
I used Christoph Martin Wieland, Reason triumphant over fancy; exemplified in the singular 
adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva […] Translated from the German original of Mr. C.M. Wieland, 
I (1773), and for the rest of the novel I refer to Christoph Martin Wieland, The Adventures of Don 
Sylvio de Rosalva with an introduction by Ernest A. Baker (1904).
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cycle Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten (1795) (Conversations of 
German Refugees). While the meta-diegetic level provides us with a constant 
point of reference throughout, the close contextual analysis will help isolate 
the specif ic historicity of Wieland’s approach. Systematic and historical 
narratology thus interlock in this analysis.
Taking my cue from Gérard Genette, I presuppose that the metadiegetic 
level here refers to a narrative embedded within the intradiegetic level 
which in turn represents the primary narrative (cf. Genette, 1972, Chapter 
5). The fact that the narrative includes other, inserted narratives will be 
referred to as metadiegesis. There are further specif ications at our disposal 
which, for instance, focus on the simultaneity of events bracketed together 
(as accolement) (Bremond, 1973), however it will become clear that in the 
case of the three texts here that the primary narrative indeed represents a 
higher degree of immediacy than the narrative mediated by the narrator(s) 
who appear(s) as f ictionally real in the primary story. This notion of im-
mediacy generated by the different tiers of the text will be an important 
aspect of the argument in the following; it does not relate to the discussions 
on mediacy in narratological theory which address the famous dichotomy 
of discours/histoire,2 but def ines a historical concept which will prove 
more apposite to describe the emergence of a new self-ascribed quality in 
literature.
In addition to immediacy so def ined, another, intersubjective dimen-
sion of intradiegetic narration will be crucial: as Lynn Hunt has suggested, 
eighteenth-century literature comes into play as a major facilitator of 
concepts such as recognition and empathy. Empathy here does not only 
refer to the actualization of empathy between text and reader,3 but, more 
importantly, to the historical, textual conceptualization of empathy (cf. 
Hunt, 2007; Wispé, 1987). The empathetic function of the embedded narra-
tive allows for the pluralistic exchange of perspectives and the development 
of a mutual bond, a proper rapport which culminates in the formation of 
a collective,4 which takes a specif ic shape (and fulf ils a certain function) 
in the eighteenth century.
2 This has recently been done with a view to analysing the role of focalization and perspective. 
Cf. Fludernik, 2010.
3 Especially in cognitive sciences and neurosciences, the concept of empathy has risen to 
importance, for instance in Miall, 1989. Empathy is also crucial aspect in narratological concepts 
of narrative empathy, see Fludernik, 1996; Nussbaum, 1994.
4 This aspect also contributes to the role it assumes in the politically stimulated phase of 
war and revolution and German Romanticism, when the mentally dispersed Germans had to 
regroup and re-identify who they were, not only as individuals, but also as a collective. Emphasis 
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Process and Problem of Reading Fiction in the Eighteenth 
Century: Wieland’s Don Sylvio
As is often emphasized, Wieland’s Don Sylvio incorporates many genres 
and techniques pertinent to contemporary narratives. The novel – a very 
loose adaptation of Cervantes’ Don Quixote – unfolds the story of the young 
protagonist’s idiosyncratic, even ‘pathological’ reading habits. Don Sylvio 
immerses himself in fairytale fantasies (contes de fées), taking their generic, 
yet elaborate storyworlds for reality. In the vein of Don Quixote, he embarks 
on an adventure after f inding an amulet with the picture of a beautiful 
woman (an image which resembles the young widow Felicia) whom he 
falsely identif ies as a fairytale princess in distress. Full of enthusiasm, he 
readies himself to rescue her. The novel ends on a happy note with the cure 
of the naïve, but good-hearted Don Sylvio, and his marriage with Felicia; one 
can justif iably claim that the fairytale ending (rounded off by an unlikely 
family reunification) chimes with the fairytale patterns the novel explicitly 
ironizes in regard to the contes de fées Don Sylvio loves so much. In this 
sense as well as in those others I will address in the following, Don Sylvio 
as a text becomes self-reflexive.
Often identif ied as the f irst modern novel in Germany, Don Sylvio despite 
Don Quijote has a distinctly original approach to the function of literature, 
also by dint of its specif ic use of the metadiegetic level.5 With its intricate 
frame structure of narration, the novel features a multitude of voices con-
sisting of the ‘publisher’, the ‘translator’ of the Spanish author who penned 
the original, and f inally the latter as narrator who comments extensively on 
the course of action and the characters involved. Not only does the preface 
which explains this complicated transmission frame the entire novel, but 
the primary narrative is also intercollated with various stories (such as 
the fairytale Biribinker to which I will return) and recounted dreams. The 
proper interpretation of these (micro-)narratives thus becomes topical in 
the text. In particular, literary practice and reception are the recurrent 
objects of ironic scrutiny. Literary self-consciousness is particularly tangible 
in the plethora of interferences of author, publisher, and narrator, all of 
whom comment on the events or, in the case of the publisher, on each 
will not be placed on this function, I mention it here, however, as it touches on the question of 
how the texts devise f ictionality and what functions they attribute to this specif ic quality of 
literature. Cf. for instance Meißner, 2007, pp. 107-124; Schneider, 2010.
5 Cf. on the ‘Romanerneuerung’, especially in the context of ‘Bildung’ and narratological 
spef icities: Saariluoma, 2004, pp. 56-74.
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other – for instance, when he highlights the anachronistic reference to 
the eighteenth-century philosopher Hume in the allegedly older records:
Der geneigte Leser wird hier einen ziemlichen Anachronismus bemerken, 
der, zum Unglück, nicht der einzige in diesem Werke ist, und vielleicht 
einigen Zweifel gegen die Glaubwürdigkeit dieser ganzen Geschichte 
erwecken könnte, dessen Hinwegräumung wir den Criticis überlassen. 
Anmerk. des Herausg (‘Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerey, oder 
die Abentheuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva / Comische Erzählungen. 
März 1764-April 1765’, p. 308).6
Incidentally, the preface instructs the reader to regard the ensuing story as 
a f ictional narrative anyway and indeed reaccentuates this notion within 
the embedded narrative, when Don Sylvio marries Felicia, who turns out 
to be the daughter of Gil Blas (i.e. the offspring of the f ictive character from 
Alain-René Lesage’s famous eponymous novel). This reference to Lesage’s 
picaresque protagonist gently disrupts the reader’s absorption and introduces 
the notion of f iction into the text. Daniel Wilson therefore understands the 
title of the novel (Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei) as ironic:
Two of the main characters in Don Sylvio (Eugenio and Felicia) turn out 
to be quite literally descendants of other f ictive characters in another 
eighteenth century novel, Le Sage’s Histoire de Gil Blas de Santillane (1715-
1735). Eugenio explicitly raises the question of ‘Erfahrung’ as the last test 
of Sylvio’s folly, and then transforms this empirical reality into the world 
of f iction (Wilson, 1981, p. 69).
Following Wilson’s analysis for now (I will return to it later), this f inding 
adds to the proverbial grain of salt with which the readers are supposed 
to ingest f iction as such, just as the entire educational project in the text 
rests on learning how to differentiate between reality and f iction. Here 
Wieland’s novel essentially ties in with the ongoing debates about f iction, 
6 Christoph Martin Wieland, ‘Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerey, oder die Abentheuer 
des Don Sylvio von Rosalva / Comische Erzählungen. März 1764-April 1765’, in Wielands Werke. 
Historische-kritische Ausgabe, VII.1 (2009) ed. by Nikolaus Immer, Berlin, New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, p. 308. In the following quotes as Wielands Werke, VII.1. ‘The reader will observe a 
pretty sizeable anachronism in this place; which, unfortunately, is not the only one in the course 
of the work, and which possibly might excite doubts respecting the authenticity of this whole 
history. We therefore leave it with the critics either to remove the stumbling-block, or to trim 
and idealise it just as they please’. The Adventures of Don Sylvio, p. 409.
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verisimilitude, pertinent functions of literature, and conventional modes 
of presentation and reception (cf. Wilson, 1981, pp. 81-90). Coming from 
the initial verdict on novels as downright lies, the theoretical concept of 
fictionality began to evolve and branched into various positions on literature 
and its pertinent properties. As a disciple of Christian Wolff, it was Johann 
Christoph Gottsched, who established a concept of ‘Dichtkunst’ based 
on probability and mimesis of nature, which allowed him to juxtapose it 
with rhetoric and extend it beyond poetry proper.7 Adapting Wolff’s ideas, 
Gottsched proposes the invention of the fable as the highest form of literature 
(surpassing the description of nature and the mimetic portrait of characters) 
as a ‘Erzählung einer unter gewissen Umständen möglichen, aber nicht 
wirklich vorgefallenen Begebenheit, darunter eine nützliche moralische 
Wahrheit verborgen liegt’.8 The suff icient raison d’être of literature goes 
hand in hand with the ‘useful moral truth’ the text is supposed to convey.
Gottsched’s position was challenged by other concepts of fiction, famously 
by the Swiss critics Johann Jakob Bodmer and Johann Jakob Breitinger. As 
opposed to Gottsched’s stipulation that poetry is dependent on the mimesis 
of nature (as the latter is ruled by God) in order to avoid the pitfalls of imagi-
nation (and its perceived proximity to vice), Bodmer suggests that the poetic 
act presented a combination of internal and external experiences, while 
Breitinger’s approach ‘was a radical enhancement of sensuousness since it 
placed poetry in a realm of truth outside the reason-based notion of truth’ 
(Bendix, 1997, p. 31). Wieland’s Don Sylvio resonates with these debates: in 
this sense, the discussion of the embedded narratives in the primary story, 
for instance, focuses on the aspects of probability and mimesis of nature 
that in fact comply with many of Gottsched’s premises.
The publisher f iction and the ‘f iction of truth’ constitute additional 
techniques cited in Don Sylvio, drawing attention to the complex f ield of 
f ictionality from the start (Weber, 1974, pp. 40-73). In the same vein, the 
validity and the educational value of f iction is reiterated in the publisher’s 
preface which parodies conventional reception and aff irmation modes 
(Wilson, 1981, pp. 81-90), but also identif ies the core theme of the book as a 
current discourse topic in the eighteenth century: f ictional genres required 
the reader’s ability9 to differentiate between f iction and reality, but also 
7 Cf. for more details Grimm, 2007.
8 ‘[N]arration of an incident which is possible under certain circumstances, but did not 
actually happen beneath which one can discover a useful moral truth’.
9 Cf. on the f ictionality and reader experience (derived from reviews of literary texts): 
Berthold, 1993. Berthold describes the evolution of certain mechanisms of reception that allow 
the reader to perceive the text as an autonomous world (‘eigene Welt’).
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to distinguish them from ‘lies’.10 In the eighteenth century, in the midst 
of debates about the legitimacy of novels, it became staple to refer to the 
authenticity of ‘novel’. In the paratext, usually the preface, the ‘publisher’ 
claims to have come across the completed text and explains the reasons for 
publishing it. Wieland’s own use of this specif ic type of text is, in keeping 
with the actual novel, highly ironic. By paradoxically labelling the actual 
preface as supplement, he mocks the common practice of prefaces, namely 
conveying preconceived ideas with which the readers are primed in the 
name of authenticity and honesty. The publisher admits that he never 
saw the original manuscript. However, since his friend, the translator, has 
relayed the longwinded and intricate history of its origin and transmission, 
he has never really doubted his word. In this vein, the translator also admits 
to omissions from the original manuscript owed to nothing else than his 
own lack of time. While seemingly adhering to the genre of prefaces which 
are intent on authenticating the materials, the ‘Nachbericht’ in fact ironi-
cally undermines their genuineness and integrity. As mentioned above, the 
preface ultimately even suggests reading Don Sylvio as a work of f iction.
Moreover the ‘Nachbericht’ – and in this sense the paradoxical label 
‘supplement’ is accurate in another respect, even though technically it is 
the preface – allows for the publisher to take stock of various encounters 
with the actual novel, as he reads it out to his wife, his clerk and so forth; the 
publisher not only relates the hilarity the story provokes in the listeners, but 
also juxtaposes this immediate response, the ‘sardonic laughter’, and the 
learned reactions of both a jansenist and a well-reputed deacon who join the 
discussion later. By employing clerical modes of exegesis, the jansenist who 
happens on the manuscript and insists on burning it after the quick perusal 
of its content, is unable to determine the intentio operis. In fact he seems to 
emulate Don Sylvio’s fallacy: the latter transfers patterns of fiction to reality; in 
the same manner, the cleric projects exegetical categories onto a secular text:
Er wollte sichs nicht ausreden lassen, daß die Abentheuer des Don Sylvio 
eine Allegorie oder Parabola sey, wie er es hieß, deren geheimer Sinn 
und Endzweck auf nichts geringers als auf den Umsturz des Glaubens, 
des Evangelii des Pater Quesnell und der Wunder des Herrn von Paris 
abgesehen sey (Wielands Werke, VII.1, p. 6).11
10 As Gotthard Heidegger famously referred to novels in Mythoscopia Romantica: oder Discours 
von den so benanten Romans.
11 ‘Positively he would not be dissuaded from thinking, that the Adventures of Don Sylvio were 
so many Allegories or Parables, the later end and aim of which, tended to nothing less than the 
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By contrast the subsequently consulted deacon valorizes Don Sylvio’s 
story by tying it to the Horation aut delectare aut prodesse principle of 
Enlightenment:
und wenn in einem Buch, das mehr zur Belustigung als zum Unterricht 
geschrieben sey, und worinn guter Humor und scherzende Satyre herr-
sche, der scherzhafte Ton selbst über ernsthaftere Gegenstände ausge-
dehnt werde, so sey auch dieses so lange die Schranken der Anständigkeit 
nicht überschritten werden, ganz wohl zu dulden, indem die Wahrheit 
ein jedes Licht vertragen könne, und das Lächerliche niemals an der 
Wahrheit selbst hafte, sondern vielmehr bloß dazu diene, die falschen 
Zusätze, womit sie in den Köpfen der Menschen vermengt werde, von ihr 
abzuschneiden (Wielands Werke, VII.1, p. 6).12
In this manner, the novel and its various layers present a multitude of 
eighteenth-century reading habits and reception modes, ranging from 
readers who study the text for its educational value, often still following 
patterns of devotional literature, to the specif ic reader the novel f igures 
as the eponymous protagonist Don Sylvio, who takes the f ictional world 
for reality. The way the primary story is devised with its many embedded 
(micro-)narratives thus constantly circles around concepts of f ictionality, 
which coincides with the main focus of the plot, as Don Sylvio has to liberate 
himself from a cluster of misconceptions that he has previously gleaned 
from the contes de fées. In so doing, the legitimacy of f iction, and thus, 
self-referentially, the novel itself becomes the subject of negotiation.13
overthrow of the faith, the destruction of Father Quesnel’s Gospel, and of the miracles of the 
Abbé Paris’ (Reason triumphant over fancy, p. VII).
12 ‘That he apprehended the Author had no other design, which in itself, and if kept within 
proper bounds, is by no means censurable; that it was not only allowable, but even useful to 
laugh at the follies of mankind, their prejudices, and mistaken conceits; the extravagancies of 
their imagination, and the wildness of their passions, and that this surely might well be allowed 
in a Book, written rather to amuse than to instruct, in which good-humour, and pleasing satire 
prevailed, and where the jocose stile was, and might be extended to the most serious subjects, 
provided it did not transgress the bounds of decency; since truth might be placed in any light, 
and would stand the test even of ridicule itself, which served to seperate and distinguish it from 
those false and absurd notions with which it was too often blended by weak minds’ (Reason 
triumphant over fancy, I, pp. VIII-IX).
13 ‘Bücher, die mit desto besserm Erfolg unterrichten und bessern, da sie bloß zu belustigen 
scheinen, und die auch alsdann, wenn sie zu nichts gut wären, als beschäftigten Leuten in 
Erhohlungs-Stunden den Kopf auszustäuben, müßige Leute unschädlich zu beschäftigen, und 
überhaupt den guten Humor eines Volks zu unterhalten, immer noch tausendmal nützlicher 
wären als dieses längst ausgedroschne moralische Stroh, dieser methodische Mischmasch von 
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Don Sylvio’s Cure: Literature, Intersubjective Objectivity, Love
Even though Wieland emphasizes a certain overconsumption of contes 
de fées on Don Sylvio’s part, the latter’s delusion proves to be of a differ-
ent quality than the madness that befalls his famous predecessor Don 
Quixote. The young adolescent is in principal amenable to the distinction 
between reality and f iction, as the course of the novel shows, but turns 
out to be simply blind to it. In Don Sylvio the therapeutic function of the 
embedded narrative seems indeed connected to this Enlightenment idea 
of education (although it is on the whole more redolent of rococo style than 
Enlightenment moral didactics). It has been suggested that Don Sylvio has 
to be regarded as a forerunner of the ‘Entwicklungsroman’ (Scheffel, 1997) 
and, while his adventures are to a large extent imagined ones, he is indeed 
forced to re-adjust his belief system fundamentally and thus to undergo 
the essential transformation characteristic of the ‘Entwicklungsroman’. 
Nonetheless the accomplished young man sets about to gain proper life 
experience only after the narrative ends (the narrator briefly reports his 
two-year grand tour). Thus in fact the novel itself only focuses on the produc-
tive rectif ication of wrong assumptions.
Well-meaning friends expedite Don Sylvio’s cure by telling him another, 
highly exaggerated fairytale and subsequently examining it together with 
him. In the novel, their mission to illuminate Don Sylvio by means of a 
narrative is intrinsically related to the metadiegetic scenario in which 
characters are granted room to discuss the f iction within the text. This nar-
ratological device becomes essential to the story and its outcome, since the 
novel thus introduces a notion of intersubjectivity and places an emphasis 
on personal interaction.
It is useful to draw on Edmund Husserl’s Meditations cartésiennes 
(1931) (Cartesian Meditations, 1960) here to capture the complexity of the 
mißgestalteten und buntscheckigten Ideen, diese frostigen oder begeisterten Capucinaden, 
welche hier gemeynt sind, und die (mit Erlaubniß der guten Absichten, wovon ihre Verfasser 
so viel Wesens machen) weit mehr am Kopf der Leser verderben, als sie an ihrem Herzen bes-
sern können, und bloß deßwegen so wenig Schaden thun, weil sie ordentlicher Weise nur zum 
Einpacken anderer Bücher gebraucht werden’ (Wielands Werke, VII.1, p. 172). ‘Such books, I insist 
upon it, would be of inf initely more use to the public, than that insipid species of morality, that 
systematical jumble of misshapen whimsical ideas; those phlegmatic and fanatical monkeries, 
now under contemplation; and which (no affront to their authors’ good intentions, of which they 
make such parade) puzzle more brains than they correct hearts; and the possible pernicious 
effects of which nothing could prevent from being formidable, but the common practice of 
cutting them to pieces to pack up other books’ (The Adventures of Don Sylvio de Rosalva with an 
introduction by Ernest A. Baker, p. 222).
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process. In this treatise Husserl supplies the terminology to describe an 
important category in Don Sylvio, i.e. ‘objective intersubjectivity’, which 
is the key principle underpinning the healing of Don Sylvio. Community 
and an ‘objective’ intersubjectivity come about by analogy:14 for the young 
protagonist Don Sylvio the community seems to be a necessary corrective 
for his specif ic reading habits. Wieland indirectly anticipates what Husserl 
would call the psyche and the ‘animate organism’ at which one arrives, 
when one ‘reduces’ oneself:
if I reduce myself as a man, I get ‘my animate organism’ and ‘my psyche’, 
or myself as a psycho-physical unity — in the latter, my personal Ego, who 
operates in this animate organism and, ‘by means of’ it, in the ‘external 
world’, who is affected by this world, and who thus in all respects, by 
virtue of the continual experience of such unique modes of Ego- and 
life-relatedness, is constituted as psychophysically (Husserl, 1982, p. 128).
Husserl’s phenomenological analysis specif ies Wieland’s reflection, as it 
conceptualizes intersubjectivity as a connection between animate organ-
ism and psyche on the one hand, but also, and that is important here, as a 
connection between one person and another person on the basis of both 
their bodies and psyches. As opposed to the playfulness with which other 
aspects are promoted in the text, it is exactly this feature that provides 
a foundation for a potential detachment from the idiosyncrasies of the 
f ictional characters. It forms a quasi-transcendental premise for the events 
and for the dénouement at the end. The young protagonist Don Sylvio is 
14 ‘It is more important to clarify the community, developing at various levels, which is 
produced forthwith by virtue of experiencing someone else; the community between me, 
the primordial psychophysical Ego governing in and by means of my primordial organism, 
and the appresentatively experienced Other; then, considered more concretely and radically, 
between my monadic ego and his. The f irst thing constituted in the form of community, and 
the foundation for all other intersubjectively common things, is the commonness of Nature, 
along with that of the Other’s organism and his psychophysical Ego, as paired with my own 
psychophysical Ego’. ‘Higher psychic occurrences, diverse as they are and familiar as they have 
become, have furthermore their style of synthetic interconnexions and take their course in 
forms of their own, which I can understand associatively on the basis of my empirical familiarity 
with the style of my own life, as exemplifying roughly differentiated typical forms. In this 
sphere, moreover, every successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of 
opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and conversely, since every 
pairing association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its 
similarity and difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful for 
new associations’ (Husserl, 1982, p. 120).
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therefore required to develop a stance on reality and f iction which is com-
mensurate with an intersubjectively agreed probability.
As mentioned earlier, his new-found friends expose him therapeutically 
to an overdose of implausible and disconnected ideas in form of the fairytale 
Biribinker. Irrespective of its hyperbole, this fairy tale is still very much 
in keeping with the genre conventions of contes de fées. In the discussion 
surrounding this embedded narrative, not only the genre itself becomes 
relevant, but – and this is the designated lesson Don Sylvio is supposed to 
learn – literature is introduced as an autonomous realm, distinctly differ-
ent from reality yet legitimate. From the information that Biribinker is a 
made-up story, he eventually derives the intellectual means to dissect his 
former set of premises, purely by applying the logic of transfer:
Die Geschichte des Herrn Biribinkers kam ihm jetzt selbst so abge-
schmackt vor, daß er nicht begreiffen konnte, wie es zugegangen, daß 
er den Betrug nicht augenblicklich gemerkt habe. Er fand endlich, daß 
die wahre Ursache davon schwerlich eine andere seyn könne, als die 
Ähnlichkeit dieses Mährchens mit den übrigen, und das Vorurtheil, 
so er einmal für die Wahrheit der letztern gefaßt hatte. Er konnte sich 
selbst nicht länger verbergen, daß, wenn auch die Ungereimtheiten im 
Biribinker um etwas weiter getrieben wären als in andern Mährchen, 
dennoch die Analogie zwischen dem ersten und den letztern groß genug 
sey, um ihm, zumal in Betrachtung alles dessen, was Don Gabriel und 
Don Eugenio dagegen eingewandt hatten, alle Mährchen ohne Ausnahm 
verdächtig zu machen (Wielands Werke, VII.1, p. 317).15
Don Sylvio wonders why he first accepted Don Eugenio’s f iction so willingly: 
to him, he f inally concludes, the story seemed plausible, because it followed 
the genre specif ics of the contes de fées he has been devouring.
It is exactly this quintessential formula which in the end renders the 
entire genre of contes de fées dubious. An analytical mode comes into play 
15 ‘The history of Biribinquer really seemed to him so silly and so vapid, that he could not 
conceive how it was possible for him not to have instantly discerned the cheat. At last he found 
there could be no other reason for it than the resemblance between this and other tales of the 
sort, joined to the favourable prepossession which he had always indulged of the truth of such 
narrations: nor could he conceal it from himself, that if inconsistency and folly were carried 
further in the tale of Biribinquer, than in other fairy tales, yet the analogy between this and 
the rest was still suff iciently great, in his opinion, to render all other tales of the fairies without 
exception doubtful; especially too, when he reflected upon all that Don Gabriel and Don Eugenio 
had urged against them’ (The Adventures of Don Sylvio, p. 418).
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here, since it is not the immediate effect of the narrative (which Don Sylvio 
quite happily takes in, admittedly with an expressed moral concern at the 
equally absurd and frivolous storyline) but rather the following discussion 
and the logical reasoning about diverse functions of literature which initiate 
the healing process.
In accordance with Husserl’s assumptions, the actual cure, however, 
is predominantly linked to the physical presence of Donna Felicia (the 
coveted widow), as Don Sylvio discloses, when he reflects on the intellectual 
stimulation of his new friends:
Was ich empf inde, seit dem ich sie sehe, ist unendlich weit von den 
Würkungen einer erhitzten Phantasie unterschieden; Ihr erster Anblick 
hat das ganze Feuer meiner Einbildungs-Kraft ausgelöscht, ich erinnere 
mich meines vorhergehenden Lebens nur wie eines eiteln Traums; von 
dem glücklichen Augenblick, da ich sie zum erstenmal sah, fängt sich mein 
wahres Daseyn an, und o! möchte es – Hier hielt der allzuschüchterne 
Jüngling inne, und ließ einen Blick, der bis in die Seele der schönen Felicia 
drang, vollenden, was er nicht kühn genug gewesen war auszusprechen 
(Wielands Werke, VII. 1, pp. 322-23).16
Only the combination of three aspects: the narrative, the subsequent discus-
sion, and, last but not least, the sensual attraction which helps to set off the 
analytical process, ensures that Don Sylvio gains a proper and pertinent 
understanding of f iction as dissimilar from reality:
Don Eugenio und Don Gabriel bewunderten die sichtbare Verwandlung 
nicht wenig, die mit unserm Helden vorgegangen war; der erste hatte sich 
schon mit einer ganzen Rüstung von Gründen gewaffnet, um die Feen aus 
ihren letzten Verschanzungen in seinem Gehirn heraus zu treiben; allein 
er fand zu nicht geringer Beschämung seiner Philosophie gar bald, daß 
alle Arbeit schon verrichtet war, und mußte sich selbst gestehen, daß ein 
paar schöne Augen in etlichen Minuten stärker überzeugen und schneller 
bekehren, als die Academie, das Lyceum und die Stoa mit vereinigten 
16 ‘“What I have felt since I saw you, differs inf initely from the effects of a heated imagination. 
Your f irst look extinguished all that f ire. I remember my past life but as a vain airy dream; ‘twas 
from that fortunate moment alone in which I f irst beheld you, that I can reckon myself to have 
truly existed. And oh, how — how” Here our young, too-timid hero stopped short, explaining 
the residue of what he had not courage to pronounce, by a look that pierced the beautiful Felicia 
to the inmost soul’ (The Adventures of Don Sylvio, pp. 426-27).
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Kräften kaum in eben so viel Jahren zu thun vermöchten (Wielands 
Werke, VII.1., p. 326).17
Felicia’s corporeal presence paves the way for Don Sylvio’s cure, i.e. the 
proper understanding and handling of f iction in agreement with the others.
In addition to this, the text puts forward a relatively modern understand-
ing of f ictionality which differentiates between a pragmatic and an ontologi-
cal approach toward f iction (Schmid, 2008, p. 26): Don Sylvio as we saw falls 
in love with Felicia after f inding a pendant with her portrait in it. Around 
this image he spins his very own conte des fées in which the woman in the 
picture becomes nothing less than a princess. However, as soon as he meets 
her, the actual person (who is, rather mundanely, a widow) takes precedence 
over the idol. It is an ironic twist that the picture actually portrays Felicia’s 
grandmother of whom the young widow is a spitting image. Moreover, the 
locket does not even contain an original portrait of the grandmother, but 
a miniature of the original painting. Hence the pendant holds an image in 
the second degree. The connections here are confusing, but what transpires 
is that the representational value of the portrait works per se differently 
from f iction: the intricate history of the portrait can be reconstructed and 
explained; the portrait claims to have a factual (representational) value18 as 
opposed to the contes de fées which propose f ictive characters and actions. 
It becomes clearer in this context why the novel conjures up a curious 
genealogy referring back to Gil Blas: not chiefly in order to devaluate f iction, 
but rather to emphasize that it belongs to a different pragmatic category (in 
the sense of Schmid, 2008, p. 26) (and thus needs to be read and understood 
as f iction). Although certain f ictional worlds seem to be under attack (and 
more so their ontological [Schmid, 2008, p. 26] reception by the readers 
portrayed in the novel who take them for factual worlds), f ictionality – in the 
above mentioned pragmatic respect – also refers to the case that Wieland’s 
own novel Don Sylvio is ‘eine eigene Welt’, an autonomous category which 
simply presupposes a certain pragmatic knowledge on the part of the reader 
17 ‘Eugenio and Don Gabriel were greatly astonished at the visible metamorphosis which had 
taken place in our hero. The latter had got himself ready armed with a variety of arguments, in 
order to force the fairies to their last entrenchments in Don Sylvio’s brain. But he soon perceived 
the whole business done without him, and found himself obliged to allow that two f ine eyes 
know better how to persuade, and can work a more sudden conversion in a few minutes, than 
the Academy, the Lyceimi, or the Stoa might, with all their united forces, have been able to do 
in the course of as many years’ (The Adventures of Don Sylvio, pp. 431-32).
18 The wrong assumption that the image actually shows Felicia can be rectif ied and explained 
in reference to reality. It this sense it can be understood as a referent.
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who should understand f iction as f iction and must approach it with this 
functional prior understanding. While Don Sylvio’s specif ic consumption 
of literature is seen as problematic in a pragmatic respect, Wieland still 
sustains the inherent dignity and value of literature as a possible world, if 
understood and negotiated as such.
It is indeed an innovative perspective the novel provides here: if f iction is 
to be read in a different pragmatic mode (discarding the naive ontological 
stance which takes f iction for facts), the famous criterion of factual truth 
is a priori inapplicable. At the same time, this categorical shift (from to 
ontological to pragmatic reading) draws attention to the aesthetic quality 
of the text. This does not preclude an axiological approach from re-entering 
the novel and from implying an intra-f ictional, hierarchical distinction be-
tween various forms of literature which can run the gamut from potentially 
harmful to educational. The emergence of art as a pragmatically different 
category remains the underlying core theme nonetheless.19
Immediacy and Immersion
Apart from this notion of fictionality emerging as an independent, self-aware 
system, Wieland also introduces another crucial aspect that strengthens 
this autonomy with a focus on the reception: the self-reflective set-up of the 
various primary narratives leads surprisingly to a heightened sense of ‘im-
mediacy’ conveyed through f iction. Obviously, as John P. Heins has pointed 
out, the epistolary novel in the eighteenth century provided a specif ic sense 
of immediacy as an invited identif icatory immersion in the text. The ‘loss to 
the text’ (of a potentially problematic quality) Heins describes is a concept 
Wieland partly travesties in his novel. By means of another prolonged 
embedded narrative in the primary story, Wieland problematizes a specif ic 
19 To the same effect: ‘Denn mit der jederzeit als ein Werk der “dichterischen Imagination” 
zu durchschauenden Geschichte von der glücklichen Integration seines Helden in die schöne 
Gemeinschaft von Lirias realisiert und ref lektiert Wieland den für den Beginn der Neuzeit 
charakteristischen Prozeß der “Kunstwerdung der Künste” am Beispiel des Romans und vol-
lendet insofern ebenso dessen Befreiung vom Wahrheitskriterium historischer Faktizität wie 
seine Ablösung vom Gebot der Nachahmung einer metaphysisch-providentiell geordneten 
Wirklichkeit’ (Scheffel, 1997, p. 119). ‘Based on the story of the successful integration of the 
protagonist into the community of Lirias (which is a product of the poetic imagination and 
throughout as such discernible) Wieland realises and reflects the process of ‘becoming art’ at 
the beginning of the early modern period, adducing his novel as an example, and thus completes 
its liberation from the truth criterion of historical facticity and its detachment from the demand 
for imitatio of a metaphysically-providentially structured reality’. Translation mine.
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notion of immersion popular at his time: the love-story of Don Sylvio’s 
lost sister Hyacinthe and Don Eugenio (the brother of Don Sylvio’s future 
wife Donna Felicia) emulates structural patterns of Samuel Richardson’s 
novels by introducing a young woman who is determined to protect her 
virtue and yet exposed to many compromising dangers. This embedded 
narrative seemingly follows the rules of the genre right to its end, where 
the sentimental story (and consequently the reader’s immersion in it) is 
intentionally and quite ironically disrupted:
So interessant vermuthlich die Liebesgeschichte des Don Eugenio und der 
schönen Hyacinthe ihnen selbst und vielleicht auch ihren unmittelbaren 
Zuhörern gewesen seyn mag, so wenig können wir unsern Lesern übel 
nehmen, wenn sie das Ende davon zu sehen wünschen. Es ist in der That 
für ehrliche Leute, die bey kaltem Blut sind, kein langweiligeres Geschöpf 
in der Welt als ein Liebhaber, der die Geschichte seines Herzens erzählt 
(Wielands Werke, VII.1, p. 233).20
In this context, Heins highlights that Don Sylvio ‘refers not only to the prob-
lem of verisimilitude in general, but to the sentimental novel in particular’. 
Generally, Richardson’s novels drew on a convention of verisimilitude and 
immersion which helped ‘trigger the identificatory reading presumed neces-
sary for the appropriate moral effect’. The attempt to debunk Richardson’s 
verisimilitude effect, the authenticity of his texts, and their suggested 
morale went often hand in hand with recourse to Quixotic patterns which 
were supposed to undermine the notion of directness (Heins, 2003, p. 545). 
Johann Karl August Musäus (himself the author of Grandison, another 
Quixotic novel) for instance considered the psychological repercussions 
of the sentimental reception mode as psychologically dangerous, since he 
was concerned that the emotionally affected readers who found themselves 
fully immersed in the text might lose their potential for agency:
for Musäus the Quixotic mode of reading is not only a danger for read-
ers of ‘romances’ (Romane), that is, f ictional texts that might include 
the improbable or the fantastic (and hence bound to mislead the 
20 ‘Interesting as the above history of the amours of Don Eugenio and the beautiful Jacintha 
might have been to themselves and possibly to their immediate hearers; we are not at all disposed 
to blame our Readers, if they secretly wish to see an end of them. To a certain good sort of people 
indeed, calm and cool in sentiment and who have either forgotten the heigh-day of the blood, or 
never felt its impulse. To such there certainly cannot be a more tiresome creature in the world 
than a Lover, relating the history of his own heart’ (The Adventures of Don Sylvio, p. 307).
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emotional reader), but also for readers of sentimental epistolary novels 
(also Romane), precisely those texts that imagine themselves avoiding 
the dangers of unrealistic literature by presenting a verisimilar world. In 
fact, for him (and increasingly throughout the century for others) there is 
an intimate relationship between sentimentalism and quixotic reading, 
precisely because of the intended emotional engagement of the reader 
and the priority on identif ication and emulations (Heins, 2003, p. 428).
This particular mode of reception, namely immersion21 as a loss to the 
literary text, is central in the story of Hyacinthe and Eugenio. Here the focus 
lies on a certain form of sentimental absorption which is unexpectedly 
interrupted. Different from the other extensive, embedded narrative (the 
fairy tale Biribinker), this story is a factual account of the Hyacinthe’s and 
Don Eugenio’s lives and as such it also serves another purpose in the text: 
by including the factual past in the quasi-presence of the current plot, it 
establishes a second degree of a past reality against whose backdrop Don 
Sylvio’s story gains another form of immediacy within the novel, courtesy 
of the narrator who ungently (and with ostensible humility) disrupts the 
engaging emotional account of lovers, usurps the shared present and com-
mits the account to the past.
The novel actually draws on embedded narratives in order to reintroduce 
both immediacy and another degree of reality by establishing the above-
mentioned dichotomy of past (the embedded love-story) and presence (in 
the primary narrative), but also of f iction and reality, as expounded above. 
In Don Sylvio’s awakening at the end both f ictional reality (as opposed to 
f ictional f ictionality) and immediacy overlap, thereby imbuing the primary 
narrative with another, by comparison heightened quality of present reality.
The embedded narratives thus foreground two aspects: f irst, as often 
pointed out, it is implied that only a proper perspective on literature, an 
understanding of the different functions of different formats, is congruent 
with the standards of a natural life-style. Don Sylvio consumes the contes 
de fées following sentimental techniques cultivated in eighteenth-century 
reading circles in Germany, but he misjudges the inherent f ictional quality 
and thus becomes unfit for life/reality.
Second, on a completely different level, the novel performatively reinforc-
es its specific pragmatic concept of f ictionality with regard to immediacy. In 
contrast to the two embedded, generic narratives, it is the primary narrative 
21 I will use the word immersion here instead of immediacy to highlight the difference of 
these two modes in Wieland’s text.
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which generates the standpoint from which to evaluate the responses and 
to observe the impact of literature on the protagonists. Despite the frivolous 
tone of the comical novel, the new implication of a certain perfectibilité (a 
concept that is not-existent in Don Sylvio’s precursor Don Quixote) stresses 
the educational function of literature, but also the intersubjective dimen-
sion of anagnorisis. By including the results of the pedagogical process, 
the real-life encounters and emotions, the text performatively indicates 
literature’s capacity for grasping ideas which deviate from standardized, 
ready-made formulas. The reception of literature in the main narrative 
(i.e. the novel) ranges from the pathological, wrong use, through the 
pedagogically-administered correct use, to the appropriate reception of 
literature which provides enjoyment and stimulates the imagination. In 
so doing the text offers a complex analysis of f iction. However, it shies 
away from the conceptualization of a directly imparted or communicated 
aesthetic experience. Performatively, the self-referential novel itself offers 
this experience on another level, but the reactions triggered by the embed-
ded narratives within the novel rather comply intradiegetically with notions 
of prodesse as a major engine of education. The contes de fées by contrast 
afford pleasure (as one half of Horace’s dictum aut delectare aut prodesse 
requires), but potentially distort the perception of reality, which is why the 
entire genre appears to be devalorized. On this level, the novel seems to 
be strategically in keeping with accepted norms of Enlightenment. With 
its intellectual-holistic, intersubjective perspective and the performative 
actualization of the insights related to this angle, Wieland’s Don Sylvio 
anticipates similarly self-referential texts in Romanticism – admittedly 
without placing an emphasis on the explicitly aesthetic experience in the 
primary narrative.
Dealing with Fiction: From Empathy (Lessing) to Aesthetics 
(Goethe)
Obviously, the metadiegetic level in a play works differently, but it is use-
ful to include Nathan der Weise (Nathan the Wise) here, written in 1779, 
since it features a wide range of situations in which the protagonists are 
confronted with stories, parables, and hypothetical questions. The play 
engages extensively with the function and reception of f iction and diversi-
f ies Wieland’s approach in a characteristic manner. It incorporates ideas 
about the productive imagination that are closely connected to concepts 
of empathy more expressly relating to sensualism. Lessing’s play draws 
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on these concepts of empathetic discussion facilitated by f iction in order 
to introduce cooperative and altruistic concepts of togetherness which in 
certain instances nevertheless bear striking resemblance with events in 
Don Sylvio. In Wieland’s novel severed family bonds are reinstated and new 
ties are established after the protagonists have truly paid attention to each 
other’s stories. This resonates with the tableau at the end of Nathan der 
Weise in which secret family bonds are revealed and the hostile parties are 
brought together as relatives after they have carefully listened to what the 
other person had to say. While Wieland’s novel focuses on the potentially 
detrimental absorption in specif ic genres, however, Lessing puts forward 
a more explicitly proactive function of literature: Nathan’s educational 
principles stress that only a clear concept of both the difference and inter-
relatedness of f iction and reality leads to a productive understanding of 
the real world. In Lessing’s play the responses to the f ictional experiments 
and the surrounding explanations and discussions trigger the imagination 
productively, however, by departing from the complex intellectual (as well 
as intersubjective) realization Don Sylvio faces and by steering towards 
modes of empathy and identif ication. According to Martha Nussbaum 
literature hones these abilities which, in her eyes, represent prerequisites 
to a moral community (cf. the chapter on rational emotions in: Nussbaum, 
1994, pp. 53-78). In a properly functioning collective the person who can 
relate to others best, in other words the most compassionate person is 
– as Lessing famously pointed out – the best person. Reshaping Martha 
Nussbaum’s general assumptions historically, Lynn Hunt has suggested that 
these qualities become increasingly desirable properties in the eighteenth 
century.22 Lessing’s Nathan demonstrates how literature helps to detach 
oneself from self ish wants and to engage with the needs of others. Lessing’s 
f ictional world is a realm of imagination and emotional connecting, but 
with a clear view to creating companionship and cooperation. Although 
he still draws on Enlightenment techniques, such as cautionary tales, they 
distinctly appeal to emotional, rather than intellectual faculties.
In the ‘dramatic poem’ Nathan, a Jewish merchant returning to Jerusalem 
from a business journey, learns that his adopted daughter, Recha, has been 
rescued from a f ire at home by a young German Templar, for his part a 
22 Lynn Hunt describes this as a premise to the emergence of human rights, since ‘to have 
human rights, people had to be perceived as separate individuals who were capable of exercising 
independent moral judgement; as Blackstone put it, the rights of man went along with the 
individual‚ considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil’ 
(Hunt, 2007, p. 27). Cf. also Koschorke, 2003.
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captive whom Sultan Saladin spared because he resembles Saladin’s long 
lost brother. Towards the end hidden family ties come to light, as mentioned 
above, very much in keeping with the discovery of unknown family bonds 
in Wieland’s novel. Nathan discloses that the Templar and Recha are both 
children to Saladin’s brother, a revelation which aff irms the quintessential 
themes of aff iliation and kinship that are also prominently discussed in the 
so-called ‘ring parable’, the centrepiece of the play. In this narrative Nathan 
recounts this famous story in answer to Saladin’s question which religion 
is true. It unfolds around a priceless ring traditionally bequeathed to the 
most beloved son who then also inherits the entire fortune. The ring had 
the hidden virtue to render its wearer beloved of God and man, if he wears it 
with this conviction, as the text states. When the ring is inherited by a father 
who is unable to choose between his three sons and therefore forges another 
two rings, chaos ensues after his death. A judge is called to determine which 
ring is the original. He points out that none of the sons seems to display the 
grace the ring promises to bestow upon the wearer, and he concludes that 
the original ring must have gone missing. According to him, all three rings 
nevertheless embody an intrinsic value: unlimited and equally distributed 
paternal love. In keeping with that, he admonishes the three brothers to 
strive actively for the excellence they took for granted as designated heirs of 
the ring. He refuses to act as an arbiter here otherwise, referring to a wiser 
judge yet to come. The context of the ring parable is inextricably connected 
with the core values of Enlightenment and the concept of peaceful coexist-
ence of the three world religions indirectly advocated here. The message 
is conspicuously mediated through a narrative as the listener is supposed 
to adapt and apply it to their personal circumstances. It is not only the 
allegorical transfer, but also the paramount importance of the paternal 
emotions involved here that contribute to the understanding of the parable.
With this story Nathan paves the way for the individual reconciliation 
between Muslims, Christians, and Jews for which the play is famous. The 
scenario Nathan proposes with the ring parable invites empathy with the 
paternal dilemma and reaccentuates the essential aspects of worship and 
love, a message fully received by Sultan Saladin. The engagement with lit-
erature elicits ‘rational emotions’,23 incarnating an otherwise undercomplex 
understanding of reality.
Not only the ring parable springs to mind in this context, but also various 
instances in which characters are gently instructed by a specif ic maieutic 
23 In this context understood as a holistic judgement which includes a plethora of rational 
and emotional information.
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technique, always presented in a ludic as if-manner. It was Johan Huizinga, 
who has stressed that any type of play forms an indispensable (but not 
suff icient) premise for the evolution and generation of culture.24
The play elaborates on this notion and ties it to something that can be 
understood in the broadest sense as ‘f iction’, for instance, when Recha is 
determined to see the stranger who rescued her from a fire as an angel. What 
Nathan confronts her with in answer to this hubristic assumption might not 
be a coherent narrative; the series of maieutic questions and suggestions 
however do propose a different scenario, another ‘possible world’ (and since 
Nathan himself is aware that his speculation is f ictive from the start, this 
dovetails with the pertinent questions revolving around f iction). Nathan 
demonstrates that Recha’s belief in angels, which he ultimately understands 
as conceit (‘Stolz’), allows her to disregard the (potential) human needs of the 
rescuer. This proposition is in return received with a great deal of empathy. 
Rather than rationally evaluating the suggestion, Recha responds with heart-
felt dread, almost collapsing under the burden of what she learns to perceive 
as egocentric negligence.25 The invented, alternative story about her rescuer 
(according to which he has fallen sick after his feat) helps her to re-focus on 
the essential insight here, i.e. the empathy for the next person which she could 
neither feel nor perform as long as she believed the Templar to be an angel.
For Lessing, the bonding process based on mutual understanding and 
empathy is also a product of appropriately consumed ‘f iction’. The apposite 
reception of the micro-narratives is the instinctive, emotional response to 
the narratives themselves (in the sense of Martha Nussbaum’s concept of 
rational emotions or emotion-thoughts as a valuable contribution to moral life 
[Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 53-78]), which productively offers guidance and helps to 
adjust the self to social challenges. Imagination becomes a useful tool precisely 
in its (previously disowned) complexity. This implies that f iction allows for 
an immediate intuitive comprehension of an elaborate set of premises. In a 
much more direct manner than in Wieland’s Don Sylvio, the play suggests 
that the reception of f iction is coupled with the notion of immediacy as an 
instantaneous, enhanced grasp of reality through the dimension of fictional-
ity. Rather than to intellectual properties, the ‘stories’ told within the play 
appeal to the interlocutor’s compassion, his empathy, his ‘rational emotions’.
24 Cf. more specif ically: Huizinga, 1955, p. 119: ‘Poiesis, in fact, is a play-function. It proceeds 
within the play-ground of the mind, in a world of its own which the mind creates for it. There 
things have a different physiognomy from the one they wear in “ordinary life”, and are bound 
by ties other than those of logic and causality’.
25 Cf. Lessing, ‘Nathan der Weise’ in: Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden, pp. 483-627, 495-96.
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To bring these observations to a conclusion, it is, f inally, useful briefly 
to look at Goethe’s Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten (Conversa-
tions of German Refugees), as this text both combines and transcends the 
mechanisms I have described with regard to Wieland and Lessing and 
thus allows us to observe a development emblematic of the entire literary 
f ield in the eighteenth century. Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten 
introduces a heterogeneous group of refugees who seek respite from the 
f irst War of Coalition attendant on the French Revolution. The discussion 
among the group soon becomes agitated as it touches on political issues, 
so they f inally decide to share stories free of any political content.26 The 
novella cycle merges dramatic aspects in a Boccaccio-like frame narra-
tive with the insertion of various narratives that seem to comply with the 
increasingly ref ined content-related and also aesthetic demands of the 
refugees.27 While they begin with telling each other ghost stories, they 
gradually evolve as persons, and so does their literary taste and their hunger 
for a specif ic experience facilitated by literature which becomes more 
aesthetic in character.
The cycle of narratives culminates in the famous, elusive fairytale (Niggl, 
1988, pp. 91-108) which, interestingly, remains uncommented upon by the 
listeners since the Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten simply end 
with it. Here the aesthetic experience is no longer mediated by f ictional 
recipients, but rather delegated to the readers themselves. Goethe includes 
both above-mentioned aspects: the formation and education of a group and 
the elaboration of a new concept of literature. In Wieland’s Don Sylvio the 
narrated reaction to literature still is dominated by an intersubjective and 
analytical mode. Thus it remains inextricably connected with reality. By 
highlighting the principal dichotomy of f ictionality and facticity, the novel 
stakes out new territory. In Lessing’s Nathan the idea of f ictionality is a 
given and distinctly related to the power of imagination; at the same time 
the play explicitly endorses emotions and empathy as important facilitators 
of understanding in literature. Towards the end of the century, in Goethe’s 
novella cycle, the inherently aesthetic quality of literature comes to the fore 
in a tangible fashion. The Unterhaltungen deuscher Ausgewanderten literally 
cut out the (specif ically highlighted) middleman (in other words the group 
26 This is obviously crucial for the text and its distinct position on contemporary history, but 
I cannot focus on this particular aspect, since I want to highlight a different, complementary 
one. Cf. for a more thorough interpretation of these phenomena in Unterhaltungen deutscher 
Ausgewanderten: Nitschke, 2004, pp. 84-101; Tang, 2012, pp. 67-92.
27 These ideas of course tie in with a prominent and central idea of Bildung, cf. Niekerk, 1995.
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of refugees who have long-windedly discussed the previous narratives). 
With its end, it reinstates the reader as an immediate addressee, thereby 
performatively creating a form of aesthetic experience which is based on 
presence. In this specif ic respect the fairytale def ies the exegesis of the 
group, shifting the focus to its aesthetic quality.28
It is the immediacy29 def ining the autonomy of the aesthetic experience 
that is topical here; along these lines, Andreas Arndt elaborates on the new 
concept of immediacy as it came into being in the eighteenth century. He 
relates its emergence to the history of consciousness produced by a new 
form of individuality which in turn was formed and reshaped by both the 
enthusiasm in the view of nature and also by sentimentalism (‘Empfindsam-
keit’) in literature (Arndt, 2013, p. 19). Especially in the aftermath of Kant’s 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781) the terms referring to immediacy proved 
to be prevalent in the discourse of the time.30
In this sense, in Goethe’s Unterhaltungen the aesthetic realm stops 
existing for an audience and enters into the mode of a direct, immediate 
self-relation. In the wake of the metaphysical transformation the concept 
of immediacy undergoes at that time31 it becomes an immediacy in and of 
itself:
28 Chiming in with Karl-Friedrich Bohrer’s concept of suddenness, Goethe’s novella cycle 
already refers to an aesthetic, disruptive ‘epiphany’, enhancing previous elements and ideas 
(Bohrer, 1981, pp. 43-68).
29 The concept of ‘immediacy’ which is proposed here does not necessarily run counter to 
relatively recent theories on presence (Nancy, 1993; Ruina, 2006). However, it does not refer 
to any potential ‘metaphysics of presence’ in the sense of Jacques Derrida (Derrida, 1982) or 
the rebellion against meaning and hermeneutics as suggested by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 
in Production of the Presence (2004). The latter lays out the necessity of overcoming both the 
posthermeneutic and the metaphysical tradition by abandoning the epistemological premise 
of the subject and object paradigm as well as the semiotic idea of representation through signs. 
In their stead Gumbrecht reaccentuates the materiality of a spatial presence as a positive and 
plentiful experience. According to him, the chasm between the thinking and feeling self and 
its environment prevents any direct, immediate perception of the world. He does not follow 
Husserl’s phenomenology and his pre-linguistic meaning, but suggests a non-temporal, spatial 
concept of presence. Gumbrecht, following Heidegger here, conceptualizes an ‘Ent-fernung’ 
in this sense, introducing an aesthetico-historical realignment with a focus on an immediate 
existential core and an immediate experiential context (Gumbrecht, 2004).
30 Arndt brief ly sketches the relevant trajectory of the term from Jakobi, Reinhold, Fichte, 
Schleichermacher to Hegel.
31 ‘Sie f indet seit 1800 auch Niederschlag im literarischen Bewusstsein außerhalb der Phi-
losophie. […] In solcher metaphysischen Auslegung ist “Unmittelbarkeit” nicht mehr nur der 
Terminus für unmittelbare Relationen vielfältiger Art; sie ist vielmehr eine verdinglichende 
Kategorie, die etwas über die interne Verfasstheit von Seiendem oder des Seins überhaupt 
behauptet’ (Arndt, 2013, pp. 11-12). ‘This is also reflected in the literary consciousness outside 
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Von besonderer Bedeutung ist dabei die Unmittelbarkeit als direkter 
Selbstbezug. Über diese Variante verschränkt sich die Rede von der Un-
mittelbarkeit mit dem neuzeitlichen Subjektparadigma. Unmittelbarkeit 
ist dann nicht mehr nur eine Unmittelbarkeit für uns, wie im ästhetischen 
Schein oder dort, wo uns etwas unmittelbar gegenübertritt, sodass wir 
mit seiner Präsenz konfrontiert werden. Sondern indem das, was uns 
gegenübertritt (und sei es unser Selbst in der Selbstobjektivierung unseres 
Denkens), als Subjektivität im Modus unmittelbarer, direkter Selbst-
beziehung vorgestellt wird, verwandelt sich die Unmittelbarkeit von der 
Relation von uns auf etwas in ein Selbstverhältnis des Gegenstandes: Sie 
wird zu einer Unmittelbarkeit an und für sich (Arndt, 2013, pp. 10-11).32
These reflections resonate with the metadiegetic level of the three texts 
under discussion here which illustrate how literature becomes increasingly 
ref lective of its autonomous laws and begins to formulate a concept of 
aesthetic specif icity in accordance with the growing differentiation and 
functionalization of modern society (e.g.: Luhmann, 1997; Werber, 1992). 
Along these lines, immediacy as self-relation can be seen in the light of the 
emerging autonomous functionally structured sub-systems and their cor-
responding autopoeisis, meaning that literature, as a separate sub-system, 
starts to def ine, maintain, and reproduce itself as an autonomous system, 
following its own self-referential selection criteria, as famously described 
by Niklas Luhmann.
The specif ic analysis of the metadiegetic level in the eighteenth century 
– together with the historicization of the notion of immediacy – helps cast 
light onto this process which becomes discernable in narratives or plays 
that explicitly explore, conflate, and re-accentuate different functions of 
literature. It throws a trajectory of literary self-perception into sharp relief 
at whose end the immediate and, more importantly, incommensurable 
philosophy since 1800. […] In such metaphysical interpretation immediacy is no longer only 
the term for direct relations of various kinds; it is also an objectifying category which claims 
something about the internal constitution of Seiendem and Sein’. Translation mine.
32 ‘Immediacy is of particular importance here as direct self-reference. This specif ic variation 
combines the discourse of immediacy with the early modern paradigm of the subject. Immediacy 
in this case is no longer an immediacy for us, as in the the aesthetic realm or in the case of being 
confronted with something which faces us directly with its presence. By conceiving that which 
encounters us (even our self in the self-objectif ication of our thinking) as subjectivity in the 
mode of immediate, direct self-relation, the immediacy of the relation of ourselves is transformed 
into a self-reference of the object. It becomes an immediacy in and of itself ’. Translation mine.
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aesthetic experiences became an intrinsic aspect of literature as an au-
tonomous f ield.
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 The Tension between Idea and 
Narrative Form
The Example as a Narrative Structure in Enlightenment 
Literature1
Christine Waldschmidt
Enlightenment Interest in Exemplary Storytelling – Historical 
and Narratological Aspects
For the literature of the eighteenth century, particularly for those works 
that are seen as part of the Enlightenment, critics have foregrounded the 
moral, didactic interest of these texts. In the Enlightenment view, literature 
is supposed to serve a purpose (cf. Pizer, 2005, p. 91), and literary texts 
are always understood in terms of their function as serving moral goals. 
This penchant for the usefulness of literature is not very surprising: The 
Enlightenment def ines itself as a movement towards greater intellectual 
independence and moral instruction – leading mankind out of its ‘self-
inf licted immaturity’.2 Hence the Enlightenment tends to explain the 
(ever-noticeable) short-comings of reason in the world not as the world’s 
inherent lack but as our lack of understanding of the reasonable order of 
the world. Such an attitude allows for an improvement for the better; in 
particular, the possibility of improvement that is due to the subject (instead 
of the state of the world) and it leads to a global call for projects of education 
(which in German would be connected with the concept of Bildung).3 These 
projects are allied with a more specif ic purpose of literature: if we live in a 
world for which a reasonable (or at least comprehensible) order is assumed, 
then the reason why ‘truth’ does not seem to prevail in the general state 
of affairs must be that it is not put across very well. In order for truth to 
hold sway, it needs to be popularised. Thus the Enlightenment movement 
discovers literature as ‘a means of effecting rational, moral instruction 
1 My sincere thanks to Karin Kukkonen for her skill in translating my article and for the 
patience she showed in our lengthy discussions.
2 ‘Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit’. 
See Immanuel Kant, ‘Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?ʼ; Kant, 1964, p. 53.
3 For the notion of ‘Bildung‘ and its roots in the German Enlightenment, see Hammermeister, 
2005, p. 39.
226 ChriStiNE WaLdSChMidt 
under the aspect of entertainment’ (Mazur, 1986, p. 53) and the instrument 
for generalising ‘valid truths’ about the world – be it a moral rule or a theo-
retical insight – so that these gain wide acceptance. As the Enlightenment 
stresses the functionality of literature, it draws on the familiar concept of 
didactic literature but, at the same time, it also discovers a possibility for 
legitimising the aesthetic sphere.4
This assessment is true for the literature of the Enlightenment in general, 
and it comes to the fore especially when such an aesthetic programme sur-
faces in certain individual narratives. We see this in particular in the short 
prose genres that traditionally presented moral insights in the form of narra-
tive, namely the fable5 or the parable. They explicitly turn to the relationship 
between narration and theoretical or moral insights (that is, they mention 
their message or make it possible to derive such a message straightforwardly 
from the narrative), and they give to the story itself the function of illustrat-
ing the intended theoretical point. In that sense, these short prose texts 
present us with the basic features of the constellation of narration and moral 
purpose that I have outlined above. Basically, they work through exemplary 
storytelling,6 which represents general truth through a specif ic, concrete 
case. Of course, moral exemplif ication through narratives was a common 
literary strategy in antiquity already,7 but it gained new currency in the age 
of Enlightenment. We can see this in the increased theoretical interest in 
didactic narratives, as documented in the critical treatises of the time, as 
well as in the growing number of texts engaging in exemplary storytelling 
in the eighteenth century (Barner et al., 1998, pp. 224-25).
The historical perspective reveals that this complex of problems that 
comes with the attempt to use (literary) narration in order to convey 
4 Fick, 2010, p. 219, refers to the argument for moral usefulness as a means of legitimising 
literature.
5 The fable in particular has often been considered as the paradigmatic genre of Enlight-
enment. Cf. Schrader, 1991, p. 9: ‘In der Vielzahl der Fabeltheorien seit Chr. Wolff und in der 
Fabelproduktion des 18. Jahrhunderts erscheint die Fabel als diejenige Gattung, in der sich 
die Bildungsphilosophie der Aufklärung konkretisiert’. (‘Most of the fable theories since Chr. 
Wolff and most of the fables of the eighteenth century treat the fable as the genre which makes 
concrete the educational philosophy of Enlightenment’).
6 My notion of ‘exemplariness’ is wider than the ‘exemplum’ of the sermon. Such spiritual 
‘exempla’ are an important tradition of exemplary storytelling but, like the fable and the parable, 
just one instance of the larger phenomenon. 
7 See Pizer, 2005, p. 89: ‘Since the age of Aesop, the fable had been regarded as among the 
most effective genres for guiding the individual in developing rational and moral discernment’. 
Accordingly, the ‘fableʼs revival’ in French and later in German Enlightenment would not be 
surprising.
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particular (moral) ideas is paradigmatic for narrations of the age of En-
lightenment. Narratology, however, has rarely concerned itself with these 
issues, and the relation between narrative representation and its message 
does not feature prominently in the narratological f ield of inquiry. There 
are several reasons for this: the f irst is that structuralist narratology (see 
Genette, 1998) considers literary texts, even if it develops its terminology in 
dialogue with them, mainly from the formalist and systematic perspectives 
that this brand of narratology requires. Its goal is to identify and discrimi-
nate between basic elements of narrative (such as time, space, narrative 
perspective, events, etc.) and their possible variants, in order to draw a map 
of the formal features of narration. In this process, narratology abstracts 
from the content of the actual narrative, which is from the point of view of 
narratological theory-building no shortcoming but rather necessary for its 
claim to be scientific. However, concentrating on the abstract possibilities of 
narrative means that the individual shape of the story no longer features as 
a contribution to its message but gets relegated to the status of a realization 
of the possibilities of narrative that have been def ined beforehand. The 
intention to convey a message, and the choice of adequate narrative means 
to accomplish this intention, are no longer a subject of interest.8
The second reason why narratology has little to say about the content 
and the ideas of a story has to do with historical changes in how we see 
narrative. Narratology claims that its terminology and tools are universally 
applicable. However, because it considers every particular act of narration 
as the realization of assumed necessities of narration, narratology shows 
certain aff inities to the emphatic view of literature as it has been shaped by 
post-romantic notions of the disinterestedness of art. Hence, it is not exactly 
surprising that literature which explicitly claims to serve a purpose, like the 
literature of Enlightenment, is not at the centre of narratological discussion. 
Considering eighteenth-century narratives can thus provide corrections 
(or extensions) of the narratological purview (and its limitations) both in 
terms of historical and systematical perspectives.
8 In Rhetorical Narratology (1999) Michael Kearns shares this critical perspective on the 
formal bias of narratological analysis. Yet his study and its central interest are different from 
mine: Kearns is not concerned with the question of how a particular insight or idea is conveyed in 
narrative, but with how texts present themselves as narrative. At the same time, this perspective 
leads him away from engaging with particular texts. Rather than discuss the specif ic features 
and functions of the text, he concentrates on the abstract effect on readers (‘that a narrative 
text exists to move the audience in some way’). The epithet ‘rhetorical’ then is simply another 
term for the eff icacy of texts, which, moreover is not assumed to depend on these texts but on 
their situatedness in contexts. Cf. Kearns, 1999, in particular p. 3.
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Of course, the relation between narrative and the ideas expressed through 
it has not been completely ignored. It still resonates through some of the 
theoretical distinctions made by narratology, and it seems particularly 
prominent in cultural approaches to narrative. Yet these approaches treat 
the problem in very different ways from the rhetorical perspective that 
this article proposes. Narratology comes closest to touching on the relation 
between narratives and their ideas when it discusses the notions of ‘plot’ 
(that is, the structurations that turn the development of events and actions 
into a narrative) (cf. Kukkonen, 2014). The sheer diversity of notions of plot 
demonstrates, as has been frequently observed (cf. Dannenberg, 2008, pp. 
435-38), a rather uneven object of inquiry. ‘Plot’ covers connections between 
histoire and discours as causally motivated (Forster) or non-chronologically 
arranged (Genette), but also recurring story patterns (Propp). By and large, 
these approaches agree on placing ‘plot’ at the ‘Schnittpunkt der erzähltheo-
retischen Grundunterscheidung zwi schen dem “Was” […] und dem “Wie” 
[…] eines Erzähltextes’9 (Martinez, 2003, p. 92) and they usually describe the 
work of this ‘how’-dimension in an abstract manner as the implementation 
of ‘a sense-making operation’ (Dannenberg, 2008, p. 435). If we assert that 
whenever we narrate we engage in ‘sense-making’, we have actually not said 
very much, because we have not specif ied what this ‘sense’ is supposed to 
be or what it is that is supposed to make ‘sense’.
Hayden White10 and Paul Ricœur11 put these assumptions about the work 
of narrative representation and the importance of sense-making through 
narrative even more clearly centre-stage. Both these critics tend to see 
narration as a method for producing meaningful connections and, on 
the same stroke, assign it a cultural function. For White, narration is the 
method of historiography, as soon as historiography wants to ensure the 
comprehension of the events it presents. In turn, the epistemological claim 
of historiography itself depends to a great degree on the narrative mode. 
White understands the creation of coherence through narrative as the 
guarantor of a (seemingly) inevitable process of sense-making – without any 
regard to the contents that make up this narrative coherence. Rather, White 
likes to ‘confuse’ narration as a method that ensures sense-making (but does 
not say what it makes sense of) with the articulation of a world-view or an 
9 ‘[P]oint of intersection of the basic narratological distinction between the “what” […] and 
the “how” […] of narrative text’.
10  White, 1990, ‘Die Bedeutung der Narrativität in der Darstellung der Wirklichkeit’.
11 Ricœur, Zeit und Erzählung (1988-1991), see in particular the chapters on ‘dreifache Mimesis’, 
vol. 1, p. 87ff.
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ideological assertion (White, 1990, in particular p. 26).12 We can observe 
something similar with Ricœur, when he posits the narrative structuration 
of experience as the condition for identity-construction; a move which 
makes narrative inevitable on the one hand and accommodates the desire 
of the individual for a meaningful place in the world on the other (Ricœur, 
1988-1991, vol. 3, pp. 392-400). White and Ricœur do not distinguish the 
narrative from the function which it is supposed to fulfil but equate the two. 
If one makes narrative synonymous with its function, however, the func-
tion of narrative becomes its realisation (that is, the success of generating 
meaning through narrative). Moreover, this approach does not imply any 
distinction between the narrative mode and the production of an emphatic 
understanding of meaning, or indeed, between the notion of order and its 
confirmation. The impulse to equate narrative and its function thus does 
not seem to allow for a reflection of the relation between narrative process 
and the thoughts expressed by it, which need not always be aff irmative. 
Conversely, it is not necessarily the case that the ideas which a narrative 
expresses are equivalent with the assumption of a meaningful place in the 
world for the individual.
Recent approaches in ‘thematics’ (an extension of narratology, but dif-
ferent from the traditional research into the history of topics and motifs) 
suggest a move away from the formal analysis of narrative structures 
and towards considering the structuring work of the content conveyed 
by the narrative. Thematics represents a wide variety of methodical and 
disciplinary interests (cf. Pettersson, 2002). Generally, it conceives of a 
circular movement in the text: all elements of the narrative can be seen as 
referring to a larger theme (which will only be established in their particular 
constellation) and, in turn, the theme allows critics to grasp the principle 
which unites the narrative and all of its aspects (this comes to the fore in 
particular in Sollors, 2002). The goal seems to lie in unfolding an idea of 
order about the narration that is confirmed by that narration, rather than 
to develop a specif ic thought (that could also be expressed independently) 
in the course of narration.
We can conclude: the established approaches to narrative discussed 
here depend on a very abstract, but always binding notion of ‘content’ 
and assume that narrative meaning-making is necessarily successful. 
12 In addition, in Metahistory White posits four basic types for patterns of meaning-making 
in historical narration (tragedy, comedy, romance and farce), which he treats as if they were 
independent from content, or rather as the structure of sense which needs to be imposed on 
the concrete facts.
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The literature of the eighteenth century, which is not yet beholden to 
the notion that literature is disinterested, brings to the fore ref lections 
and modes of narration which reckon consciously with the rhetorical 
potential of narrative, i.e. with the relation between the narrative and the 
thought that it conveys, but do not equate the two. This is especially true 
for texts which do not just aim to repeat commonly accepted ideas but to 
establish new insights by means of narration. Enlightenment texts remind 
us not to assume that narration is always successfully at the service of 
ideas but, instead, to think of it as the result of the proper composition 
of the narrative. The texts of the eighteenth century (with the interest 
they display in narrative for the communication of ideas) invite us to 
investigate both the relationship between thoughts and their narrative 
representation, and the potential which the aesthetic generalization of 
an idea holds. The possibilities of narrative ref lected in these cases imply 
a number of relations between narrative and thought, which have not 
been sorted out so far. Leaving aside any turns to the mere appreciation 
of narration and notions of commitment, it seems important, in these 
instances, to draw critical attention to those features which are always 
taken for granted if one understands narrative as a means for success-
ful rhetorical persuasion; in other words, the conditions, methods, and 
aesthetics of functionalization.
Narration as a Means of Persuasion – Fable Theory in the 
Eighteenth Century and the Rhetorical Function of Narrative
If we look into the eighteenth-century efforts to theorise exemplary 
narratives, we encounter the idea of communicating a general thought 
through narration in the shape of an explicitly rhetorical concern and 
conceptualised as a task for creativity. However, also these efforts do not 
clarify the issue, but rather describe it from a point of view that makes us 
aware of the partiality for the matter to be communicated and that therefore 
very quickly tends to consider the form of narrative as the guarantee for the 
persuasion of what it communicates. This comes to the fore in particular 
in the numerous comments on the genre of the fable. ‘[T]he German En-
lightenment obsession with fable theory and practice’, as John Pizer puts 
it (Pizer, 2005, p. 90), has often been noticed, yet without specifying what 
this ‘obsession’ is all about. Indeed, the programmatic statements of the 
fable theorists demonstrate the ideal of the fable’s impact on the reader 
(or more specif ically, a quite unreserved reliance on the didactic effects of 
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narrative representation).13 Here, the relationship between narrative and 
moral message does not feature as a complication in reaching its intended 
purpose but rather as a contribution to the notion of its general eff icacy. 
A plain English version of this ideally imagined impact runs as follows: a 
narrative, in this case a fable, is considered to be more convincing than 
the moral maxim. Even if readers are in opposition to the message or if 
they experience diff iculties in comprehending the theoretical elements, 
the narrative will help them overcome these impediments and, while they 
follow (or enjoy) the story, they will not only understand but accept the 
moral message. The fable criticism of the eighteenth century (I refer to 
Wolff, Gottsched, Breitinger and Lessing in particular) paints time and 
again, in different shades and colours, the same picture of the ideal of the 
fableʼs didactic effects. Breitinger, for example, remarks with respect to 
Aesopʼs fables:
Diese [die Fabel] ist erfunden worden, moralische Lehren und Erinnerun-
gen auf eine verdeckte und angenehmergetzende Weise in die Gemüther 
der Menschen einzuspielen, und diesen sonst trockenen und bittern 
Wahrheiten, durch die künstliche Verkleidung in eine reizende Maßke, 
einen so gewissen Eingang in das menschliche Hertz zu verschaffen, 
daß es sich nicht erwehren kan, ihren heilsamen Nachdruck zu fühlen 
(Breitinger, 1966, p. 166).14
Breitinger assumes that an opposition to the moral message exists. He 
conceives of it, however, not as an opposition with regard to content but as 
a psychological issue. (As he (ibid.) suggests, we take exception to the ‘bitter’ 
and ‘dry’ truths, as well as to moral edif ication more generally). Now, the 
fable is presented as a means to get readers over the emotional version of 
this opposition, and it does this not by engaging with the issue or solving 
it, but by papering over the cracks. As readers f ind aesthetic pleasure in the 
‘artif icial cloaking’ of the narrative, it is assumed that they simply do not 
feel the opposition any longer. Aesthetic appreciation and accepting the 
message become one and the same, and the effect of the fable is associated 
13 This is the reason why, by and large, both the fable theory of the Enlightenment and numer-
ous contributions to todayʼs discussions of the fable attempt to f lesh out the ideal of persuasion. 
See Schrader, 1991, p. 13.
14 ‘It [the fable] has been invented in order to infuse the human mind with moral lessons and 
memories in a covert and pleasant way, and in order to allow these truths, which are dry and 
bitter otherwise, to f ind undeniable entry into the human heart through the artif icial cloaking 
in a charming mask, so that the human heart cannot help but feel their wholesome effects’.
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with automatic approval. If readers are in the grip of the narrative, they 
cannot but accept its moral message.
Whereas Breitinger conceives of the relation between narrative and 
thought as a ‘masking’ the truth, Lessingʼs def inition of the fable, on the 
other hand, understands this relationship as a means for bringing the truth 
to the fore. Herein he emphasizes the ideal effects of the fable even more: 
‘Wenn wir einen allgemeinen moralischen Satz auf einen besondern Fall 
zurückführen, diesem besondern Falle die Wirklichkeit erteilen, und eine 
Geschichte daraus dichten, in welcher man den allgemeinen Satz anschau-
end erkennt: so heißt diese Erdichtung eine Fabel’ (Lessing, 1997, p. 376).15 
Lessing simply equates the illustration with the complete comprehension of 
the general principle, that is, with the persuasion of exemplary storytelling.16 
With this def inition, Lessing enforces the identity of fable and moral mes-
sage, which does not allow for a separation between illustration and the 
meaning that can be read from it.17 On the one hand, he identif ies narrative 
form not simply with its function but with its effect.18 On the other hand, 
he takes his def inition beyond a statement on aesthetic procedure: Lessing 
connects the aesthetic potential of the text − or rather, the metaphorical or 
allegorical meaning-making − with a rather basic process of intelligence, 
namely, Anschauung, the perception of things for their ideal content.
If the critical treatises confirm the ideal effects of exemplary storytell-
ing, they also foreground that the narration has to overcome the problem 
that narrative and moral message are not the same. Herein we f ind a 
reference to a narratological problem which the theoretical exertions of 
the Enlightenment bring to the fore but cannot solve. In what follows, 
we shall attempt to discuss it with an eye on the rhetorical function of 
narrative. Every story which is constructed in order to communicate a 
15 ‘When we relate a general moral principle to a particular case, endow this specif ic instance 
with reality and from it create a story in which upon contemplation one perceives the general 
principle, then this creation is called a fable’. Trans. by Mazur, 1986, p. 54.
16 Helmut Koopmann describes how Lessingʼs conception of the fable strives for the perfect 
identity between narrated case and general truth, in Koopmannʼs words, ‘die unmittelbare 
Visualisierung einer Wahrheit’ (Koopmann, 1994, pp. 58-60). This understanding of the effects 
of the fable implies that a ‘decodingʼ or explanation of the narrated events is not necessary. See 
also Markschies, 1983, pp. 144-45.
17 Hence Lessing wants to elide any interpretative moves between a narrative and its meaning. 
Cf. Barner et. al., 1998, p. 229. 
18 Remarks on the fable or on the theory of fables are often content with tracing or reproducing 
such articles of faith in the immediate effects of narrative illustration by presenting what they 
ask of the fable in terms of the effect which they ascribe to the story. Instead of merely aff irming 
ideal effects, one would need to specify the narrative potential of the fable.
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thought creates a relation between thought and narrative, which can be 
described as establishing and sustaining a contradiction. This contradic-
tion can be described thus: a functional concern with regard to narrative 
prevails in these constellations, which is not rooted in the story that is told 
but in the thought it conveys. These kinds of narrative are supposed to be 
managed as fully as possible through the thoughts (or, rather depend on 
them) and hence they are subjected to a rhetorical purpose. However, if one 
subordinates the narrative to its rhetorical purpose, this also implies an 
additional effect of the narrative with regard to what it aims to argue, since 
narrative is preferred to the theoretical exposition or argumentation. This 
means that the thought to be conveyed depends on something different 
from itself – something constituted by a difference in form. Because the 
narrative gets to have its own effect, or provides its own contribution to the 
function to be fulf illed, it has to be something different from the thought 
and it has to assert this independence (or seeming independence) from the 
thought. In other words, the narrative run for communicating a thought 
is supposed to be dominated by this thought, but if the story is meant to 
confirm the theoretical assertion, then it needs to work as a narrated ‘slice 
of life’ and have features independent of the theoretical assertion. The 
analyses that follow will understand this contradiction inherent in turn-
ing narration towards its rhetorical function in terms of a dynamics that 
has unfolded its own productivity and which creates different degrees of 
dependence between narrative and thought. For such an approach, we have 
to distinguish between the ideal effects (that is, the desire for a narrative 
f it for purpose) and the actual effects of a narrative. We cannot ignore the 
difference between the act of ascribing potential to narrative and the act of 
realizing this function in practice. Readers might be able to guess that – in 
this analysis – we shall move beyond Enlightenment’s equation of literary 
form and its desired effects.
Moral Tales as Entertainment or Psychological Investigation – 
Lessing’s Fables and Schiller’s Short Prose Fiction
The f irst text to be discussed is a fable by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Draw-
ing on Aesop and, to some extent, on La Fontaine (who mainly features as 
a target of criticism in his fable theory),19 Lessing develops his very own 
19 Critics have observed that Lessing develops his programme for the fable by referring back 
to the Aesopian tradition (see Mazur, 1986, p. 53; Pizer, 2005, p. 93-94), while he criticizes La 
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kind of fable. Lessing aims for a sparse, pointed narration and a terse 
plot structure,20 and he refuses to place an explicit moral maxim (called 
‘epimythion’) at the end of his narratives. Both these strategies of narration 
bear testimony to a literary programme that stresses that everything that 
happens in the fable contributes to the message, which cannot be divorced 
from the narrative events.
Der Wolf auf dem Totenbette. (1759)
Der Wolf lag in den letzten Zügen und schickte einen prüfenden Blick auf 
sein vergangenes Leben zurück. Ich bin freilich ein Sünder, sagte er; aber 
doch, hoffe ich, keiner von den größten. Ich habe Böses getan; aber auch 
viel Gutes. Einsmals, erinnere ich mich, kam mir ein blöckendes Lamm, 
welches sich von der Herde verirret hatte, so nahe, daß ich es gar leicht 
hätte würgen können; und ich tat ihm nichts. Zu eben dieser Zeit hörte 
ich die Spöttereien und Schmähungen eines Schafes mit der bewunderns-
würdigsten Gleichgültigkeit an, ob ich schon keine schützenden Hunde 
zu fürchten hatte.
Und das alles kann ich dir bezeugen; f iel ihm Freund Fuchs, der ihn zum 
Tode bereiten half, ins Wort. Denn ich erinnere mich noch gar wohl aller 
Umstände dabei. Es war zu eben der Zeit, als du dich an dem Beine so 
jämmerlich würgtest, das dir der gutherzige Kranich hernach aus dem 
Schlunde zog (Lessing, 1997, pp. 316-17).21
Fontaine for concentrating on the entertaining aspects of the fable, its formal polish in rhyme 
and metre and the embellishment of the narrative. 
20 Lessing rejects everything that only serves purposes of ornament, because in his view it 
diminishes the persuasive effect of the narrative. We can see this in his fable theory when he 
criticizes La Fontaine, but it is also noticable in the well-known fable Der Besitzer des Bogens 
(The Owner of the Bow), which reflects on its own poetic principles (cf. Fick, 2010, p. 230).
21  The dying Wolf.
A Wolf at the point of death, cast a retrospect on his past life, and examinʼd his actions with the 
air of a penitent. I have been a great offender no doubt, said he; yet, I hope, I can say it without 
f lattering myself, there are many much more criminal than I am. I have done ill ʼtis true; but 
I have likewise done good. One day, I remember, a Lamb strayʼd from the f lock, and came 
bleating to the place where I stood; I might have killʼd it with the greatest ease; yet I meddled 
not with it. Much about the same time, I had the patience to hear the ill-language and abuse of 
a Sheep, with an indifference so much the more extraordinary, as I had nothing to fear, there 
being no Dog at hand to defend her. I can bear witness to the truth of these things, said a Fox, 
who attended him in his last moments: all the circumstances are fresh in my memory. ‘Twas at 
the time when thou wast almost choakʼd by the bone which stuck in thy throat, and which the 
Crane was afterwards kind enough to extract from thence (Fables, pp. 65-67).
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A wolf professes on his deathbed that some of his actions were due to his 
moral nature, but he is soon presented to be a liar when the fable reveals 
that his ‘good deeds’ are occasioned by practical obstacles rather than his 
moral convictions. The general thought which the fable means to convey is 
obvious. Its narrative does not present a maxim, but diagnoses the general 
practice of moral pretension, which is adopted especially by those who do 
not act from moral motivations. In other words, when one moves away from 
good actions, one likes to hide behind a show of moral excellence. Lessing 
thereby conveys a generally known and generally accepted thought – hy-
pocrisy in moral matters comes as no surprise to anyone and its acceptance 
therefore does not depend on persuasion.22 The message of the fable rather 
establishes a piece of worldly wisdom: That we can assume hypocrisy for 
every moral action (cf. Fick, 2010, p. 232), constitutes a universal judgement 
of the state of world, and it presupposes neither the moral constitution of 
the world nor the need to be shocked by this state of affairs. Here Lessing 
does not differ from the tradition founded by Aesop, which is also concerned 
less with the promotion of a moral message than with the demonstration 
of theoretical knowledge about the world or practical applications of this 
knowledge, and which does not assume a moral order to be at work.
If making a thought acceptable to readers is not at stake in Lessingʼs 
fable, then we need to ask what purpose the narration serves instead 
and what kind of relationship with the theoretical message it enters. 
The fable presents its thought as a riddle; a riddle, to which the solu-
tion is immediately supplied. It unfolds this riddle as a sequence of two 
interpretations of the wolf ’s actions (one by the wolf; one by the fox). 
The f irst interpretation establishes an ambiguity through the repeated 
contrast between the expected and the actual actions of the wolf – with 
the repetition underlining it. The fox then solves the riddle by conf irming 
the predicted order of things, that is, by offering an explanation that 
matches the expected, characteristic behaviour of the wolf. The story 
unfolds the thought step by step. This gradual development implements 
22  Neither can we f ind an instruction on how to act in the fable. After all, it is not clear what 
such an instruction could look like: do not cheat and do not lie? Or rather, do not let yourself 
be cheated? This has also been observed by Dithmar, 1988, p. 103: ‘Lessings Fabeln enthalten 
Erfahrungssätze, die nicht immer unmittelbar auf Handeln zielen’ (‘Lessingʼs fables contain 
maxims which do not always directly aim for action’), and Fick, 2010, p. 232: ‘Die “Moral” liegt 
meistens darin, dass er [der Leser] die Bestrebungen und Gesinnungen der Fabeltiere erkennt 
und richtig bewertet’ (‘We f ind the moral in readersʼ attempts to recognize the intentions and 
motivations of the animal characters and in their skill to judge them correctly’). However, both 
Dithmar and Fick maintain that the intention of the fable is to lead to a change in behaviour.
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the following rhetorical strategy: If one follows the sequence of the nar-
rative, one has already followed the logic of the thought. The sequence of 
riddle and solution suggests to readers that they themselves have created 
the thought (and hence have already accepted it). At the same time, this 
strategy presents the thought conveyed by the narrative as a confirmation 
of what we already know. As readers share the move to the solution, the 
narrative ‘enacts’ a commonly shared prejudice about the world as a matter 
of interest and approval, because it presents it as the result of readers’ 
own thinking and insight. Here the fable differs from the established 
theoretical statements about the fable: To follow and to enjoy the story 
does not constitute an invitation to overlook a more or less fundamental 
disapproval of its message but rather an invitation to appreciate what one 
already knows because it is presented as the result of the entertainment 
of one’s own intellectual activities.
In terms of its contents, the narrative produces a mere duplication of the 
thought: whatever we know of behaviour that is not moral, but claims to be, 
is confirmed by the narration of a particular case, where an action deviates 
from the moral ideal, and the judgement of the world is only enhanced 
by the indication that such behaviour indeed exists. By these means the 
narrative creates the abstract contradiction innate in any observation 
of non-moral behaviour (namely, the contradiction between non-moral 
behaviour in practice and the concept of morality which implies universal 
approval), without offering hope for change. Still, the acknowledgement 
that the ideal moral order does not match the actual state of affairs is 
not used as an argument against the notion that such an order exists.23 
(In fact, this is the enlightened quality of the fable that makes it different 
from the Aesopian tradition.) On the contrary, the narrative presents this 
mismatch as a confirmation of our moral judgement on the state of affairs. 
Both form (riddle and solution) and its content of moral insight consist 
of a return to the expected, or rather, a return to the presupposed moral 
order (which enables the contradiction produced by the narrative in the 
f irst place). Because the deviation from moral behaviour is presented as 
the aff irmation of the order of things, in the sense that, as a deviation, it 
asserts the basic validity of the ideal, it already forms part of the larger 
moral worldview. Lessing’s fable can thus reconcile the knowledge of the 
ideal moral order with the awareness that this moral order does not entail 
the moral behaviour of all its actors.
23 Certainly, Lessing does not mean to imply that all moral action is mere hypocrisy.
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The result is that exemplary storytelling brings to the fore the notion 
of placing a single instance into a given order of the world. What the nar-
rative makes ‘concrete’ here is not the subject matter or the content of 
the theoretical insight or judgement. Instead, this insight unfolds as a 
process of recognizing the ideal order. With this move of conf irmation, 
the narrative takes the long way round, but the confirmation also depends 
on this detour so that it can match the thought that the narrative conveys. 
Thus, the fable fulf ils its function of persuasion under the condition that it 
enacts the confirmation of prejudice (or pre-judgement) that has already 
been accepted. The story as the ‘material’ for such a conf irmation does 
not get in the way of the thought; rather, the narration provides a playful 
way of taking a distance from the well-known judgement. It relegates the 
narrative itself to a means of depiction on which the theoretical insight no 
longer depends. This allows the narrative to create particular divergences 
from the thought, which have the sole purpose of showing that they match 
the general moral judgement after all. Even though the narrative (used as a 
means of confirmation) needs a particular, self-suff icient action, this does 
not turn into a contradiction of the fact that this action is subordinate to 
the thought to be conveyed. On the one hand, the particular action rather 
constitutes the minimum requirement for action as action and the details 
are introduced to provide its motivation, as well as minimal causal or 
practical coherence. In the case of Lessingʼs wolf, the events take place as 
the animal lies on its death bed, and this motivates the presence of the fox. 
On the other hand, Lessingʼs fable takes its place in the well-established pat-
terns of its genre. Hence it can draw on already known moral characteristics 
for the animals. It is also a continuation to Aesopʼs The Wolf and the Crane, 
which tells the story of how the wolf swallows a bone and gets rescued from 
suffocation.24 The fable hence does not work towards establishing its own 
reality, but rather towards its inclusion in the genre’s world of agreed-upon 
moral meanings.
We f ind a very different – to a certain extent contrary – mode of ex-
emplary storytelling in a narrative that is originally embedded in Denis 
Diderotʼs Jacques le fataliste. In this novel, the narrative in question is part 
of an exchange of stories that unfolds between Jacques and his master on 
24 Many of Lessingʼs fables draw on ancient precursors (in particular on Aesop) or on the 
fables of La Fontaine, but they usually revise their moral message or give their story a different 
turn. Cf. Markschies, 1983, p. 157; Fick, 2010, p. 229. See also Barner et. al., 1998, p. 232: ‘Wenn 
[Lessing] auf seine Quellen verweist, dann nicht nur, um auf die Ähnlichkeit, sondern auch um 
auf die Unterschiede hinzuweisen’ (‘Whenever Lessing refers to his sources, then he does not 
just highlight similarities but also differences’).
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their journey.25 In what follows, we shall discuss this narrative, called the 
story of Madame de la Pommeraye, independently from the larger context 
of Diderotʼs novel. Indeed, a contemporary of Diderot, Friedrich Schiller, 
saw f it to take this story out of its larger context, when he translated it 
into German as a stand-alone narrative.26 Schiller gives the story the title 
Merkwürdiges Beispiel einer weiblichen Rache (A Remarkable Example of 
Female Revenge; 1785), which carries the multiple meanings of German 
‘merkwürdig’ as both ‘strange’ and ‘remarkable’. The following analysis is 
based on Schillerʼs text, which does not simply provide a translation but 
rather a shortened and modif ied version of Diderotʼs narrative. Schiller 
leaves out the interruptions of the narrative (so typical of Diderot’s narrative 
style), as well as the comments of the characters. He also condenses the 
plot and revises the style to include more emphatic and elevated features.27
The narrative tells the story of a woman who, betrayed and abandoned 
by her lover, carefully lays a plot of revenge that leads to his utter moral 
and social ruin. In the beginning, Madame von P*** succumbs, with some 
hesitations, to the seductive charms of the Marquis A***, and after several 
vows of inviolable f idelity on his part, she agrees to become his mistress. 
Yet over time, the ardour of the Marquis cools off. When he admits as much 
to Madame von P***, she takes his abandoning her as cause for turning her 
emotional shock into a violation of her honour:
‘Also ist es wahr,’ schrie sie laut aus, ‘es ist mehr als zu wahr, er liebt mich 
nicht mehr!’ – Nachdem ihre ersten Aufwallungen vorüber waren und 
sie in stiller Wut über dem erlittenen Schimpfe gebrütet hatte, beschloß 
sie eine Rache, die ohne Beispiel war, eine Rache zum Schrecken aller 
25 For his embedded narratives, Diderot adopts the narrative pattern of the contes morales 
(moral tales). In these tales, a particular case is subsumed in a general thought about the moral 
constitution of the world. The conte morale is another case of exemplary story-telling: a narrative 
from which we can draw general conclusions on moral principles and the determining factors for 
human actions. Diderot draws on this narrative pattern in order to execute it in an innovative 
way that departs from the generic convention.
26  Schillerʼs version of the story from Jacques le fataliste appeared for the f irst time in Schillerʼs 
journal Die Rheinische Thalia, and is quite likely based on a manuscript version of Diderotʼs 
novel, which the director of the national theatre at Mannheim, Heribert von Dahlberg, who 
subscribed to the Correspondence littéraire, sent to him. Not only Schillerʼs version (1785), but 
also a re-translation of it into French (1793) appeared before Diderotʼs novel was published in 
1796. See Meise, 2005, p. 302. See also Buck, 1990, p. 247.
27 When Schiller takes the story out of the context of the novel and concentrates on the plot 
alone, this leads to the removal of the comments of the protagonists, the landlady and the 
extradiegetic narrator which shape the passage in Diderot, as well as the numerous digressions 
which interrupt the narrative of Madame de la Pommeraye. See Johnston, 2008, p. 202-03.
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Männer, die sich gelüsten lassen, eine Frau von Ehre zu betrügen, und 
diese Rache führte sie aus (Schiller, 1954, p. 192).28
What we have here is not the expression of disappointed, one-sided love. 
Indeed, in the course of her revenge, Madame von P*** will no longer act 
as a lover. Instead, her emotional pain is immediately connected with the 
‘insult she had suffered’ (‘dem erlittenen Schimpfe’), and still the story gives 
no indication of loss of honor or social disgrace.29 Rather, Schiller presents 
us with Madame von P***ʼs move to a moral standpoint that derives from 
the emotional relationship a claim, a right that has been violated, and in 
turn, a violation that needs now to be redressed.
The narrative then details the progress of revenge, its planning and 
execution. Two women, mother and daughter, who work as prostitutes, 
are instructed to pretend to be impoverished and pious ladies and to lead a 
life of retreat from the world (the details of which are specif ied by Madame 
von P***). Madame von P*** makes sure that the ladies are introduced to 
the Marquis, who, as planned, falls in love with the daughter. Madame von 
P*** fans his f ires and denies him satisfaction. Through both strategies 
she aims to increase the sufferings of the Marquis so that the marriage 
with the daughter comes to seem the only solution fulf illing his desires. 
Madame von P***ʼs revenge appears to be complete in the moment when 
she can expose her former lover to public disgrace for marrying a harlot the 
day after the wedding. Nevertheless, her plan fails insofar as the Marquis 
remains true to his love and, while he has to leave the city, goes on to lead 
a happy married life.
The narrative follows the sequence of events and traces each step of the 
revenge. It offers everything necessary for such an intrigue: the explanation 
of an intended purpose, the consideration of the means, as well as how they 
are used, and the development of the state of affairs, as well as, f inally, the 
realization of the particular purposes.
Einen ganzen Monat lang wußte sie den Marquis in der Erwartung der 
versprochnen Zusammenkunft hinzuhalten – während dieser Zeit hatte 
28 ‘So it is true’, she exclaimed, ‘it is more than true. He no longer loves me!’ – When the f irst 
waves of emotion had subsided and she had brooded in quiet rage over the insult she had suffered, 
she decided on a revenge without example, a revenge that would serve as an awful warning to 
all men who might take it into their heads to seduce and deceive a woman of honor. And she 
proceeded to carry out this revenge. (Trans. by Robert Ellis Dye in Schiller, 2008, p. 16).
29 This interpretation is only mentioned at the end of the narrative in a comment on the 
behaviour of Madame von P*** as a justif ication of her excessive revenge.
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er volle Muße, sich abzuhärmen, zu berauschen und seine Leidenschaft 
in Unterredungen mit ihr noch mehr anzufeuern. Er erkundigte sich nach 
dem Vaterland, dem Herkommen, der Erziehung und den Schicksalen 
dieser Frauenzimmer, und erfuhr immer noch zu wenig, und frug immer 
wieder, und ließ sich immer von neuem unterrichten und dahinreißen. 
Die Marquisin war schelmisch genug, ihn jeden Fortschritt seiner 
Leidenschaft bemerken zu lassen, und unter dem Vorwand, ihn zurück-
zuschröcken, gewöhnte sie ihn unvermerkt an den verzweifelten Ausgang 
dieses Romans, den sie ihm bereitet hatte (Schiller, 1954, p. 208).30
The logic of consequence that is suggested here comes even more clearly 
to the fore in the correspondence between the events as they are expected 
and the events as they happen. We can see this in the passage where the 
Marquis f inds the confessor of the daughter and turns him into an ally: 
‘Sie erwarteten nun nichts Gewissers, als daß der Mann Gottes über kurz 
oder lang sich brauchen lassen würde, seiner geistlichen Tochter einen 
Liebesbrief zuzustellen, und diese Vermutung traf glücklich ein’ (Schiller, 
1954, p. 211).
At the same time, there are a number of things that we do not f ind in 
the narration of the planning and execution of revenge. We have a moral 
point of view as the source of the action, but it leads to actions that are 
anything but moral (let alone confirm a moral order of reality). On the other 
hand, however, it is never suggested that Madame von P*** can be seen as 
a thoroughly evil character (not only the f inal comment makes this clear), 
while her erstwhile lover would be turned from the villain to the victim of 
the intrigue. We also do not f ind any didactic gesture that would state that 
it would have been advisable to refrain from revenge. All in all, the narrative 
does not display a judgemental point of view; it does not present a moral 
evaluation and does not turn its action into the subject of a moral verdict.31 
Neither the action of the narrative, the use of the means of revenge nor any 
30  ‘She was able to put off the Marquisʼ expectation of the promised meeting for a [whole] 
month. During this interval he [had ample opportunity to] languish, [intoxicate himself with 
love and intensify his feelings even further in] conversations with Madame von P***. He asked 
about the women’s origins, from which providence they came, about their education [and the 
fortunes which had befallen them], and could not learn enough, [and continued to enquire over 
and over. The Marquise was rascal] enough to call attention to every increase in his fervor, and, 
under the pretext of cautioning him, prepared him for the desperate outcome of the adventure 
[which she had prepared for him]’. The translation is based on that of Robert Ellis Dye, Schiller, 
2008, p. 27; the modif ications in brackets are added by Jessica Quinlan.
31 It seems beyond comprehension why the emphasis on the sequence of events should entail 
a clear moral perspective, as Otto W. Johnston, suggests, when he describes the narrator as 
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of the ensuing narrative developments permit readers to draw a conclusion 
as to who is in the right. In the end, the narrative neither accuses Madame 
von P*** of the vanity of her efforts or of her moral depravity, nor does it 
teach the Marquis a lesson regarding false honour. The story of Madame 
von P*** does not attempt to evoke a fascination with the invidious plan 
of revenge and its meticulous execution.
Instead, Schillerʼs narrative only gives us the events, the moves of the 
plot, the sequence of actions and reactions, their expediency and results. 
This way of narrating foregrounds two aspects of the narrative in particular: 
First, the plan for revenge comprises all of Madame von P***ʼs actions. 
What is remarkable is the absolute consistency with which everything is 
subordinated to the execution of revenge. One can call this revenge exces-
sive because it bears no relation to its cause,32 the Marquis’ breaking up 
the relationship, but also because of the radical execution that aims for the 
utter destruction of the lady’s former lover and that considers everybody 
else (their feelings, their happiness in life, etc.) as means to achieve this end. 
In this way, the narrative overshoots what would be – from a moral and 
rational point of view – sufficient and appropriate for revenge. Second, these 
excesses of revenge are presented by the narrative as part of the consequence 
of the events, as a sequence with its own logic, in which one event follows 
from another as if guided by a certain necessity.33 The narrative stresses 
this logic of consequence as it shows how the strategies of Madame von 
P*** match the reactions of the Marquis, as it anticipates events which will 
happen later on and, in particular, as it names the simple sequence of events. 
The narrative presents the events in such a way that the excess of revenge, 
the moral ruin of the protagonists (even with the unexpected outcome for 
the Marquis), does not result in a contradiction with the concern or the 
condemning Madame von P***ʼs actions and when he puts forward Schillerʼs narrative as a 
treatment of ‘the depths of immorality’ (Johnston, 2008, pp. 202-03, 207, 209).
32 In that sense Schillerʼs version is rather similar to Diderotʼs: the character of Madame de 
Pommeraye appears ‘inexplicable’. Rainer Warning writes, ‘Unerklärbar insofern, als die Intrige 
in ihrer diabolischen Perfektion ein derartiges Eigengewicht erlangt, daß die Treulosigkeit des 
Marquis schließlich nur noch als auslösendes Moment, nicht aber als hinreichende Motivation 
erscheint’. (‘It cannot be explained in the sense that the diabolic perfection of this intrigue takes 
such importance that the inf idelity of the Marquis only appears to be the trigger rather than an 
adequate motivation’). Quite obviously, it is exactly the aim of the narrative to deprive readers 
of motivation. See Warning, 1965, p. 104.
33 Meise already stresses that Schiller was obviously interested in such a logic of consequence, 
because – as we have already seen – he drops all digressions and inserted discussions that occur 
in Diderotʼs novel. See: Meise, 2005, p. 302. Thus Schiller ‘give[s] the tale a coherence Diderot 
didn’t intend’ (Johnston, 2008, p. 203).
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execution of revenge, but instead in such a way that it puts into effect the 
consistent progress of revenge.
By these means Schillerʼs strategies of narration support the impression 
that the sequence of events is the result of a principle that, though it cannot 
be made plausible by rational motivation, is still effectively at work and 
determines everything through its law-like mechanics. (Moreover, the end-
ing of the narrative, the only instance where the actual events differ from 
what the Marquise had planned, and which prevents the triumph of revenge 
successfully carried out, provides us with further proof of the existence of 
forces that move beyond rational control and that demonstrate in this case 
its powers in moving against the plan.) The sequence of events thus hints at a 
general law that seems to determine the events, but this general law cannot 
be grasped. The narrative suggests that there are powers at work behind the 
events, determining and driving these events and making them describable 
as the concrete actualization of these very powers. Thus Schiller continues 
the exemplary mode of storytelling that is guided by a general thought 
and that develops an example for the effects of the determining factors of 
human behaviour. Yet, at the same time, apart from the story’s denial of 
moral motivations as the guiding principles, there is no explanation of what 
these powers, or the general principle behind the events, should be.34 On the 
contrary, the narrative stresses the difference between the events narrated 
and any of usual hypotheses employed to explain human behaviour. Schiller 
turns this into his message: he repeats the paradox which is shaped by the 
sequence of events, when he states that there are powers at work which we 
do not know and of which the only thing we can say with certainty is that 
they do exist. This dynamics of psychic energies is identif ied as something 
to be clarif ied, something to be discussed. Rather than an explanation, the 
narrative intends the discovery of a f ield of further study.
The narrative strategy that we have observed in Schillerʼs narrative 
links to a general interest of the eighteenth century in the parameters 
that determine human behaviour. We f ind it elsewhere in the journals 
of the time, especially the moral weeklies, but also in early descriptions 
of mental drives and energies. Schiller offers a contribution to the latter 
genre with his translation of Diderot which presents an approach that 
is not dissimilar to Karl Philipp Moritzʼs collection of short stories and 
descriptions in ‘Erfahrungsseelenkunde’ (literally, the experiential study of 
34 Warning shows for the embedded narrative in Diderot that the behaviour of the characters 
cannot be reduced to a general principle. There is no moral evaluation of the events; instead, 
the moral message itself turns into the element to be judged (Warning, 1965, p. 105).
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the soul) (see also High, 2008, pp. 176-77). These texts consider themselves 
basically as pioneering work in psychological investigation. They set out to 
collect materials empirically,35 so that it can be analysed later for insights 
into the general laws of human behaviour.36 In making these efforts, it is 
assumed that such general principles are indeed accessible to our minds 
(and thus the psychological interpretation does not result in the diagnosis 
of irrationalities). With regard to this psychological interests, it is perfectly 
reasonable to put Schillerʼs adaptation of Diderotʼs narrative into the context 
of his original literary prose works, in particular with the text Der Verbrecher 
aus verlorener Ehre (The Criminal of Lost Honour, 1786/92).
This analysis has also shown which possibilities of exemplary storytelling 
Schiller develops here. As the narrative presents a reference to general prin-
ciples – without making it particular through the content – it contributes 
to give substance not to the specif ic content of the thought but relevance to 
the question which it treats. The theoretical message that there are powers 
that guide human actions and thought is, taken by itself, almost void as a 
statement. Only through the narration do we get a sense of what is at stake. 
Only the narrative provides us with the flesh and bones (and the practical 
relevance) of the general principle for human behaviour. Schiller pursues 
a different strategy from Lessing here: we do not have a repetition of the 
thought in order to initiate a process of subsuming the individual case 
under the general judgement. Instead, the thought depends on the narrative; 
more particularly, on the capability of the narrative to create events that 
are incommensurable with the known principles of the human psyche. 
These are the strategies of the narrative which not only demonstrate the 
notion that there are principles shaping human behaviour, but also supply 
35 In his preface to Rheinische Thalia Schiller states that he wants to present ‘Gemälde merk-
würdiger Menschen und Handlungen’ (‘pictures of remarkable people and action’), as well as 
‘[n]eugefundene Räder in dem unbegreif lichen Uhrwerk der Seele’ (‘newly found cogs in the 
ineffable machine of the soul’). See Schiller, 1958, p. 95.
36 ‘Es soll ein Beitrag zu einer Systematisierung und Klassif ikation der menschlichen Seelen-
kräfte geleistet werden, […] zu einer analytischen Psychologie’ (‘The aim is to contribute to the 
systematication and classif ication of the powers that move the human soul, […] to an analytic 
psychology’) (Kaiser, 1978, p. 51). Nicolas Martin mentions Meißner and Moritz and refers to 
the influence of the ‘anthropological and psychological perspective of the late Enlightenment 
that will govern Schiller’s experiments in short prose f iction’ (Martin, 2008, p. 190). Taking 
into account other prose by Schiller, High writes about the ‘predilection for the combination 
of “inner truth” [of the story] and extreme or aberrant characters’ and the aim to represent ‘the 
deepest behavioural and moral truths about humanity’. The ‘inner truth’ of the narrative which 
High def ines in terms of ‘the correspondence of character, situation, and reaction’, is meant to 
guarantee the exemplariness, the insights into the general principles of human behaviour and 
psychology (High, 2008, p. 174).
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narrative substance and relevance for a presumed inner order of the subject 
that does not correspond to the expected analogy between subject and 
world (or rather, between a material and a moral order).37
Conclusion
All the narratological approaches discussed in the opening section of this 
article have presumed that any narrative carries the content for which it 
has been created (or told) in the f irst place. However, these approaches 
do not consider the relationship between the thought conveyed by the 
narrative itself and the form of narration as a matter to be investigated 
theoretically. This is the case, partly, because they discuss primarily ele-
ments of narrative that have to be put into effect before actualising any 
particular subject matter of the narration; partly, because they already see 
the abstract structure of narrative as the key feature of narrative meaning. 
As most narratological approaches presume that the relationship between 
narrative form and specific content is not a complicated one (or, indeed, that 
the content is fully at the disposal of narrative form), they actually make 
a far-reaching statement about this relationship: From this perspective, 
there would always be a mutual aff irmation between form and content 
of the message in a narration. This aff irmation would take the form of a 
dependence that works automatically and that runs so flawlessly that it does 
not have to be considered more particularly in a general theory of narrative. 
My investigations here are meant to gently rock the all-too-steady boat of 
this narratological certainty, as they show that, at least in the eighteenth 
century, before the advent of a literature of disinterestedness, most nar-
ratives would present awareness of a tension between narrative form and 
the thought that they convey. Eighteenth-century writers are ambiguous 
about this tension: sometimes, it represents the possibility to heighten the 
plausibility and the binding effect of the thought; sometimes, it is felt to be 
a problem that cannot be easily explained away.
Both cases of exemplary storytelling considered here also demonstrate 
the importance of maintaining the tension between the subordination 
to an implied moral message on the one hand, and the appearance of 
37 This is even more salient in Schillerʼs f inal sentences, added after the translation from 
Diderot: ‘Aber die kühne Neuheit dieser Intrige, die unverkennbare Wahrheit der Schilderung, 
die schmucklose Eleganz der Beschreibung haben mich in Versuchung geführt, eine Übersetzung 
davon zu wagen […]’ (Schiller, 1954, p. 224).
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independence of the narration on the other. The narrative presents a slice 
of life in such a way that the thought appears as the order behind the events 
narrated. It is not surprising that narration is put into the service of such 
meaning-making, because it is a general feature of storytelling to present a 
thought about the world in terms of a connection between circumstances 
and events. It is true that the exemplary narrative – as a concrete case 
– always falls short of reaching the universal claim of the thought, and 
hence can never present the general idea in its entirety, but the concrete 
cases of exemplary storytelling offer something else: namely, proof that 
the theoretical maxim can be demonstrated as a principle of reality. The 
achievement of narrative in exemplary storytelling lies in presenting a slice 
of life in such a way that readers see how it is governed by the general truth 
and in thus showing such truth both to be generally valid and practically 
relevant.
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 ‘Speaking Well of the Dead’
Characterization in the Early Modern Funeral Sermon
Penny Pritchard
Introduction
In depicting the character and personality of their deceased subject, 
English Protestant ministers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
employ features of writing strikingly comparable to contemporary works 
of f ictional narrative. Such features include not only the selective inclusion 
of biographical details from the subject’s life and death, but a spectrum of 
seemingly ‘literary’ devices such as the portrayal of multiple points of view 
through eyewitness ‘testimonials’, direct quotation of correspondence, 
poetry, diary entries, and vividly-realized deathbed scenes (some of which 
include dialogue).
These correlations illustrate the extent to which, as J. Paul Hunter has 
observed, such writing ‘may be used to shape a “life” that has become 
independent of its funeral occasion and taken on an ethical and literary 
form of its own’ (Hunter, 1990, p. 319). Hunter’s invaluable investigation, 
Before Novels: The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-Century English Fiction 
(1990), invites us to re-examine the shared origins of early modern f ictional 
narrative and a host of contemporary popular genres including funeral 
sermons, spiritual biographies and the hagiographical ‘lives’ of saints and 
martyrs. The breadth of popular print culture from which the English novel 
emerges in the early modern period provides a remarkably rich cultural 
legacy, informing every feature of the genre, and ranging from scientif ic 
and political treatises to newssheets and ballads, spiritual biographies 
and conversion narratives, conduct works, sermonic and other popular 
religious literature. As these collected chapters demonstrate, many of the 
novel’s component features – including though not limited to plot, character, 
mode, narration, perspective, temporality, and paratextual elements – 
are paradoxically unique even while their analysis usefully informs our 
consideration of parallel features in other forms of contemporary print, 
both literary and otherwise.1
1 In addition to Hunter’s Before Novels, op. cit., important critical investigations of the novel’s 
development in relation to other, both literary and ‘non-literary’ contemporary print, include 
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Broadly speaking, characterization presents certain challenges for narra-
tological theory since narratology is formalistic and people do not easily lend 
themselves to systematic, formal, categorization. In the case of eighteenth-
century novels, these challenges are exacerbated since narratological theory 
was developed in relation to modernist literature and does not comfortably 
accommodate historical texts (for which literary genre cannot be so rigidly 
defined). Notwithstanding the essentially ahistorical derivation of narrato-
logical theory, I shall suggest that consideration of modes of characterization 
employed in early modern funeral sermons will inform how narratological 
analysis of character might be applied to specif ic historical models, includ-
ing both early modern prose f iction and non-fictional ‘specialist’ forms of 
narrative such as the published funeral sermon.
The most pressing issue to be dealt with here is the matter of applying 
theories of literary analysis – designed for the consideration of f ictional 
characters – to ‘real’ people (specif ically, the deceased individuals being 
commemorated in funeral sermons). I feel this approach is justif iable for 
several, distinctly different, reasons. The f irst reason is ahistoric, based on 
principles of human cognitive function; the second is historically and geo-
graphically specif ic to the early modern print culture in which both novels 
and published funeral sermons f irst gained significant popular recognition.
On the level of cognitive function, readers do not make formal or even 
particularly discernible distinctions between f ictive and actual people 
when actively engaged in reading (or viewing, or hearing) about them. Paul 
Hernadi suggests that
information transfer among humans goes beyond simple semiotic encod-
ing and decoding: it involves hermeneutic inferences as to the feelings, 
intentions, and beliefs of those sharing information. As we study the 
transfer of information among humans, impersonal notions of ‘upload-
ing’ and ‘downloading’ must be replaced by personalistic concepts of 
expression, communication, and representation (Hernadi, 2010, p. 57).
Hernadi goes on to assert that ‘there is no clear division between literary 
and non-literary signif ication’ (Hernadi, 2010, pp. 60, 62).2 Such an assertion 
Nancy Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel; Lennard J. Davis, 
Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel; Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English 
Novel: 1600-1740. 
2 For discussions of the role of human cognitive function in the reading of f iction and non-
f iction, see Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel; Hogan, Cognitive 
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reinforces Alan Palmer’s f indings in Fictional Minds when he concludes 
that
Just as in real life the individual constructs the minds of others from 
their behaviour, so the reader infers the workings of f ictional minds and 
sees these minds in action from observation of characters’ behaviour 
and actions […] in various ways f ictional minds are seen not as private, 
passive flows of consciousness, but as engaged, social processes of mental 
action (Palmer, 2004, p. 246).
Further support may be drawn from a concept central to cognitive psychol-
ogy, that of ‘Theory of Mind’, the highly-evolved social capacity by which 
human beings feel they can understand the mental state of others on the 
basis of observable actions.3 Although the Theory of Mind function initially 
evolved in humans many thousands of years ago, to ‘decode’ authentic 
human behaviour, it is also precisely this function (cognitive psychologists 
argue) which later enabled the development of literature itself. As Lisa 
Zunshine has observed,
The very process of making sense of what we read appears to be grounded 
in our ability to invest the flimsy verbal constructions that we generously 
call ‘characters’ with a potential for a variety of thoughts, feelings, and 
desire and then look for the ‘cues’ that would allow us to guess at their 
feelings and thus predict their actions. Literature pervasively capitalizes 
on and stimulates Theory of Mind mechanisms that had evolved to deal 
with real people, even as on some level readers do remain aware that 
f ictive characters are not real people at all (Zunshine, 2012, p. 10).
If human cognitive function responds to real or f ictive characterization 
in the same manner (regardless of readers’ awareness of the real or f ictive 
nature of the person characterized), then there is no reason not to consider 
modes of characterization in relation to ‘real’ individuals.
The critical application of narratological models to historical, non-
f ictional, texts is comparatively rare, but it is not unprecedented (see, in 
Science, Literature and the Arts: A Guide for Humanists, ‘Literary Universals’, Poetics Today, pp. 
223-49.
3 See Zunshine’s discussion in Part I: ‘Attributing Minds’, Sections Two and Three, especially 
concerning the work of Simon Baron-Cohen in Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory 
of Mind (1995).
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particular, Fludernik, 2004, pp. 129-54 and 2007, pp. 241-66). As works of 
nonf iction, even the simplest early modern funeral sermon presents a 
historical narrative, one which alludes to multiple points along a chrono-
logical timeline of ‘the past’. This frequently includes, at the very least, the 
days immediately before death, as well as episodes in the earlier life of the 
deceased, and very often Scriptural references which evoke more ancient 
periods of history. These multiple ‘pasts’ are distinguished in relation to 
a more collectively-experienced ‘present’ in which the deceased has died 
and congregational mourners are gathered together. The sheer complexity 
of the historical narrative(s) within a published funeral sermon merits 
further narratological analysis beyond the scope of this, introductory, 
investigation. Monika Fludernik, in particular, has provided an increasingly 
nuanced categorization of historical narratives in relation to the positing 
of experientiality (the representation of experience), and while her earlier 
investigations of nonfictional narrative found relatively little narrativity 
(compared with works of f iction), more recently she has concluded that 
‘experientiality (and hence narrativity) occurs on a scale, and […] the 
more academic a historical text is, the less experientiality there will be’ 
(Fludernik, 2010, p. 50).
I have two points to draw from Fludernik’s more recent estimation of 
the scope for narratological analysis of historical narrative. The f irst point 
supports the estimation of human cognitive function drawn above by Zun-
shine, Palmer and Hernadi insofar as it merely reiterates that a simple binary 
distinction between f iction and non-fiction is insuff icient to scrutinize the 
representation of human experience. The second point is more problematic 
and poses potential obstacles in relation to the narratological analysis of 
funeral sermons; although I have suggested the published funeral sermon 
presents a complex form of historical narrative, it is one in which ‘experi-
entiality’ plays a considerably lesser role than its more prominent functions 
as a sermon and as a portrait of an exemplary life. This second point is the 
subject for a much more nuanced analysis of funeral sermons than will be 
possible here, and does not exclude the viability of the project at hand so 
much as it seeks further clarif ication of the precise role of ‘experientiality’ in 
the narratological analysis of historical narratives in general, and published 
funeral sermons in particular.
My f inal justif ication for the narratological analysis of character in 
relation to the deceased individuals commemorated in published funeral 
sermons is more pertinent to the cultural and historical context of this 
particular book. All of the eighteenth-century English novels under consid-
eration here were f irst published in a period when funeral sermons jostled 
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alongside works of literary f iction, biography, satirical ballads and poems, 
plays, newssheets, and other works, in which clear distinctions between 
terms such as ‘fact’, ‘f iction’, ‘romance’, and ‘history’ were often purposely 
blurred by authors who typically worked in more than one of these genres 
(on this subject, see McKeon, 1987, pp. 25-64). The cross-fertilization of 
early modern popular print – in literary genres and otherwise – offers far 
more analytical scope and insight into this cultural period than the later 
imposition of formalized critical boundaries between them.
Notwithstanding these several justif ications, what follows is also posited 
with clear acknowledgement of the signif icant caveats needed in applying 
techniques and terminologies associated with narratological analysis of 
characterization to the early modern published funeral sermon. It will also 
be necessary, at the outset, to place this relatively neglected genre of popular 
sermonic literature into a more precise cultural context, particularly in its 
printed form.
Exemplary Lives and the Origins of the Protestant Funeral 
Sermon
It is precisely the representation of the deceased’s lived experience, as nar-
rated by the minister through his published funeral sermon, which concerns 
us here. This textual component is integral to the overwhelming majority of 
Protestant funeral sermons in the early modern period.4 One of the osten-
sible purposes of the Protestant funeral sermon, that is, the exhortation of 
the living via narratives of exemplary spiritual conduct in those now dead, is 
fulf illed by the minister’s portrayal of the deceased as an individual whose 
character and conduct merits the particular attention of the congregation, 
or reader, in relation to their own life.5 Indeed, the inclusion of exemplary 
biographical narrative may be cited as a feature of many contemporary 
forms of popular writing in the early modern period, in which accounts 
of human experience serve as positive (or alternatively, in the example 
of Newgate confessionals and other exceptions, admonitory) examples 
4 There are some notable exceptions; see, for example, Samuel Acton’s 1699 funeral sermon 
for an anonymous infant, Benjamin Mills’ 1750 funeral sermon ‘on the occasion of the death of 
a Pious Young Person’, and Samuel Walker’s 1753 (second edition) funeral sermon for ‘a young 
man, who was drowned as he was bathing’. 
5 For an investigation of the early modern Protestant funeral sermon, see Pritchard, ‘The 
Protestant Funeral Sermon in England, 1688-1800’ in The Oxford Handbook of the British Sermon 
1689-1901.
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for readers to follow (or avoid) in their own lives. The importance of the 
‘exemplary life’ is such that some extant biographical narratives, specifically 
enhanced for publication, are published alongside funeral sermons – and 
this is often stated openly in the sermon’s preface, as in Richard Gilpin’s 
1700 commemoration of Timothy Manlove (Gilpin). Such enhancements 
also indicate a reading public whose taste for didactic literature included 
a range of genres including, quite probably, both prose f iction and funeral 
sermons, thus reinforcing the potential for striking correlations between 
the modes of characterization found in these parallel forms.
It is relatively straightforward to identify when the English Protestant 
funeral sermon ‘began’ after the Protestant Reformation, yet its origins were 
not without controversy. According to the most stringent interpretations 
of early Calvinism, the Protestant funeral sermon shouldn’t exist at all; 
scriptural prohibition of clerical attendance at funerals in the f irst verse 
of the twenty-f irst chapter of Leviticus technically def ined the act of burial 
as a civil, rather than ecclesiastical, off ice. Throughout the early modern 
period, Protestant ministers have been periodically subject to accusations 
of mercenary behaviour, or hypocrisy, for exchanging public endorsements 
of spiritual integrity for fame, favour, or prof it – charges dangerously remi-
niscent of the Roman Catholic procedures which had been outlawed by the 
Protestant ecclesiastical courts (Tromly, 1983, p. 137).
The secularity of funeral sermons was further emphasized by their an-
cient, pagan, origins in the Classical cultural tradition, as a public function 
undertaken by a professional body of orators in Athenian society. Singled 
out for particular criticism was the encomiastic rhetoric of such oratory, 
since ‘praise for the dead’ could be purchased (Tromly, 1983, p. 295). Despite 
the form’s pagan and Roman Catholic origins, these aspects came to be 
comfortably acknowledged in light of what the genre had to offer the reader, 
as Edmund Calamy makes apparent in his 1694 funeral sermon for fellow 
minister Samuel Stephens:
Though funeral orations had their rise from heathenish vanity, yet may 
they (provided all unjust commendation of the dead, and servile f lattery 
of the living, be avoided) be exceeding useful, even among Christians, in 
helping to make the survivers [sic] better; there being nothing that more 
promotes the amendment of our lives, than the serious consideration and 
improvement of the departure of others (Calamy, p. 1).
This cultural transition was achieved through the form’s near-universal 
adoption of an asymmetrical bipartite structure in which the earlier (usually 
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larger) section was wholly dedicated to Scriptural exposition with little or 
no reference to the deceased subject whatsoever. Only the funeral sermon’s 
second, biographical, section served to commemorate notable aspects of 
the deceased’s life, death, and spiritual legacy. Although some exceptions 
to this structural template remain extant, these are strikingly rare during 
the long eighteenth century as a whole.
It is, arguably, this confinement of the biographical component to the 
sermon’s second section which allowed the form to achieve so much more 
popular recognition than merely a re-acceptance into the Protestant canon 
of religious literature. Frederic B. Tromly observes that less than twenty 
funeral sermons were published during Queen Elizabeth I’s reign, but 
from the latter seventeenth century onwards, multiple editions – and also 
multiple versions – of printed funeral sermons for notable individuals (as 
well as those by particularly distinguished ministers) indicates the form’s 
burgeoning popularity within early modern print culture (Tromly, 1983, 
pp. 306, 311). Edward Pearse’s 1674 work The Great Concern: or, A serious 
warning to a timely and thorough preparation for death … recommended as 
proper to be given at funerals serves as an example of the form’s popularity; 
the work reached its twenty-f ifth edition by 1715 and was never out of print 
during the f irst half of the eighteenth century. Funeral sermons present one 
of the most recognized forms of popular religious literature in the early 
modern period, and in their published form, dominate a genre which Tony 
Claydon has observed was ‘among the commonest publications of the era […] 
many sermons would have made it towards the top of seventeenth-century 
best-seller lists’ (Claydon, 2000, pp. 213-14). Because of their popular recogni-
tion, exactly contemporary with the genesis of the early modern novel, 
this chapter seeks to examine the potential for narratological analysis of 
published funeral sermons, and in particular, the modes of characterization 
employed both in novels and this form.
If Monika Fludernik has convincingly argued that narratological analysis 
may be applied to many forms of expression, both literary and otherwise, 
what is under investigation here concerns only the printed versions of 
funeral sermons – and thus not only the narrative discourse of Genette’s 
narration and récit but also the range of linguistic utterance possible via 
mediated (textual representations of) language, avoiding altogether the 
question of verbal and rhetorical ‘performance’ of sermons (a f ield of 
enquiry demanding a very different set of analytical instruments).6
6 See, in particular, Fludernik, An Introduction to Narratology (2009); Genette, Paratexts: 
Thresholds of Interpretation (1997). On the analysis of oral performance and transmission in 
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The intrinsic value, in spiritual terms, of biographical narrative in both 
novels and published funeral sermons also supports Bruce Hindmarsh’s 
description of the period’s taste for popular religious literature as one which 
‘witnessed a signif icant anthropocentric turn as theology increasingly 
concerned itself with the sequencing of salvation and mapped this under-
standing onto experience as an order of conversion’ (Hindmarsh, 2005, p. 
15). A contemporary account of the spiritual biography’s value may also be 
found in the preface to Theodosia Alleine’s Life of Joseph Alleine, in 1672, 
in which Richard Baxter observes that ‘the Lives of Holy Men’ provide the 
reader with ‘God’s Image […] not only in Precept, but in Reality and Practice; 
not Pictured, but in the Substance […] the real Impress and Holiness in 
the Soul, is that living Image of God’ (Baxter, 1672, pp. 13-14). One aspect of 
the value of religious works containing biographical narrative is precisely 
this provision of a life with substance, specif ically, the actual printed text 
of the funeral sermon itself. Indeed, in some quarters, the printed form of 
the sermon came to be valued in terms superior to its verbal counterpart. 
Plenty of extant evidence suggests the texts of published funeral sermons 
were given as gifts at funerals, a more appropriate gift – as argued by John 
Dunton in his 1692 commemorative anthology of notable deaths from his-
tory entitled The Mourning Ring – than the ‘bisquets, Gloves, Rings, &c’ 
traditionally given to well-to-do mourners attending the burial (Dunton, 
1692). As Isobel Rivers has described, works such as Baxter’s own Christian 
Directory of 1673 and Theodosia Alleine’s 1672 biography of her husband 
extol the ‘personal, domestic, social, economic, and political advantages 
of reading over hearing, with particular emphasis on the freedom of the 
individual reader to choose books most suitable to his or her condition’ 
(Rivers, 1991, p. 116).
In turn, the importance of the individual reader’s role in deriving didactic 
benef its from the published funeral sermon is one shared with contem-
porary prose f iction (with Defoe and Richardson providing only the most 
obvious examples). This perspective lends itself to a view of contemporary 
readership in which, as Henry Godman observed in the preface to his 1688 
funeral sermon for Elizabeth Kilbury, the reader must ‘act the part of a 
Pastor and Teacher unto thy self, and thy own Soul [… since t]he Minister’s 
Application without thine own, will be little or no purpose’ (Goldman). As 
both novels and funeral sermons develop, quite consciously, as products 
of a culture increasingly saturated by print, both make implicit demands 
on authors who seek the means to convey to readers a viable sense of their 
early modern sermons, see Fox, Oral and Literature Culture in England: 1500-1700 (2000).
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moral authority. Characterization, employed both in early modern funeral 
sermons and early novels, provides one of those means.
In seeking to convey their moral authority via the medium of popular 
didactic literature, both minister-authors of funeral sermons and early novel-
ists were subject to vociferous criticism of their hypocrisy and mercenary 
objectives.7 Critics of published funeral sermons included John Dunton in his 
1707 poem The Pulpit-Fool as well as Daniel Defoe himself, who in his satirical 
Hymn to the Funeral Sermon remarks how ‘Pulpit-Praises may be had/Ac-
cording as the Man of God is paid’ (Defoe, 1703, p. 2). In 1745, an anonymous 
author in A Brief Dissertation on Funeral Solemnities, observes that
[t]hough some regard should be paid to the old maxim, De mortuis nil 
nisi bonum, and we should not unnecessarily say anything contemptible 
of the dead, yet if ministers are enjoined to say something in a publick 
manner concerning a notorious, graceless villain, they ought […] so to 
express themselves as not to poison the living (A Brief Dissertation on 
Funeral Solemnities, p. 26).
Such sentiments are far from uncommon, but the most vicious castigation of 
funeral sermons may be found in contemporary ministers’ own writing. In 
1701 Philip Stubs defends the brevity of his own funeral sermon for Thomas 
Wright as a strategy to avoid the ‘tedious Heap of foolish, fulsome, false 
daubings (the too common Entertainment in many such Discourses as 
this) which whilst they are made for every body, do indeed f it no body’ 
(Stubs, 1701, p. 29). Hypocrisy in funeral sermons, Stubs continues, ‘damns all 
Religion as Craft and Cheat, and Priests of all Perswasions for a Mercenary 
Tribe’, while the corruption of the form has come to dissuade the ‘honest 
well-meaning Parishioner’ from even requesting a funeral sermon for his 
own burial since, ‘[h]aving seen the Sacred Place so often prostituted to 
the basest Flattery for f ilthy Lucre, [he] dares not run the risque of undue 
Mixtures in his Panegyrick’ (Stubs, 1701, p. 30).
Presented within a funeral sermon itself, however, Stubs’ arguments 
detract signif icantly from his own ability to praise the deceased subject, 
on whom he is forced to conclude, rather weakly, that
7 The earliest critic of Robinson Crusoe, Charles Gildon, specif ically attacks Defoe’s mixture 
of religious didacticism and f iction: ‘The Christian Religion and the Doctrines of Providence 
are too Sacred to be deliver’d in Fictions and Lies, nor was this Method ever propos’d or follow’d 
by any true Sons of the Gospel … substituted in the Place of the Holy Scriptures themselves’ The 
Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Mr. D- De F--, of London…
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[i]f any of this congregation knew of any remarkable failings in him 
(which God knows the best of us are subject to) those ye should industri-
ously avoid: If any vertues which I have omitted, as unacquainted with 
them, those ye must endeavour to imitate […] and that will be the best 
application of this part of my discourse (Stubs, 1701, p. 32).
The validity of the ministerial position, then, becomes increasingly 
paradoxical as the published funeral sermon simultaneously attempts 
to encompass both self-effacement and self-promotion (through publica-
tion). This moral conundrum, not dissimilar to that which taxed writers of 
early modern f iction such as Defoe and Richardson, continued to plague 
authors of published funeral sermons throughout the eighteenth century. 
The authority and durability so often associated with the written word 
are frequently invoked in funeral sermons, yet ministers’ seeming reluc-
tance to publish – their insistence that publication was only undertaken 
under duress from mourning relations or congregations – is expressed so 
frequently in prefatory sections that accompany funeral sermons that such 
disavowals constitute a commonplace of the genre. Notwithstanding these 
ministerial apologetics, the vilif ication of ‘Hackney funeral sermons’ was 
at its most acute during the long eighteenth century and also has direct 
implications for the spectrum of characterization strategies employed by 
ministers in funeral sermons.8
Typology and Characterization in Funeral Sermons
This lengthy preamble concerning the origins and cultural status of the 
published funeral sermon in this period is provided in order to contextualize 
the more detailed discussion of characterization strategies which follows. 
Regarding the deceased persons whose biographical narratives constitute 
the vast majority of published funeral sermons, most are private individuals 
now largely unremembered by posterity, depicted through funeral sermons 
tailored to aspects of their public and professional identities. It is frequently 
possible to make correlations between certain professions and a typological 
series of virtues – such as the charitable merchant, the philanthropic physi-
cian, and so on. A significant majority of funeral sermons, however – almost 
half of the published funeral sermons still extant from the long eighteenth 
8 The phrase ‘Hackney funeral sermon’ is employed by John Dunton in The Hazard of a 
Death-Bed-Repentance, Fairly Argued… (1708).
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century – do not relate to the noble classes but instead commemorate peacea-
ble and pious ministers, both those within the established church and various 
non-conformist denominations. Additionally, ‘virtuous Christian wife’ could 
be posited as a significant sub-category of funeral sermons, with a distinct 
typological and gender-based complement of prevailing characteristics.
For every typological classif ication of funeral sermons attempted (for 
example, by profession), there are inevitable and interesting exceptions. 
This is, obviously, because the recognition of an individual’s character 
in relation to their worldly profession represents a minute proportion of 
the myriad ways in which we might come to understand that individual. 
Notwithstanding this fact, to dismiss characterization in funeral sermons 
as a simple typological schema of human characteristics or professions, 
derived largely from the form’s classical antecedents, would be reductive 
and inaccurate. In funeral sermons, the scope for diversity of characteriza-
tion within broad typologies is large (and far beyond the parameters of 
this investigation) but not all-encompassing. The admixture of traits and 
observable actions which contribute to the funeral sermon’s portrait of the 
deceased generally extends beyond one order of characterization. As in 
literary portraits, the sum of character is always greater than its typologi-
cal parts, as was collaboratively observed nearly f ifty years ago by Robert 
Scholes, James Phelan and Robert Kellogg:
There is more of myth and of f iction in Don Quixote than in Isabel Archer. 
There is more of mimesis in her. She may be quixotic, but he is Quixote. 
She may be typical, but he is archetypical. Yet, in their different ways, 
they both live. To suggest that one order of characterization is better than 
another is folly. To recognize that differences exist is the beginning of 
wisdom (Scholes, Phelan, and Kellog, 2006, p. 161).
More readily discernible across the whole genre of funeral sermons, how-
ever, is the near-universal inclusion of praise for the deceased. Praise almost 
always unites the qualities of the virtuous Christian with more singular 
features of the individual’s public identity. In 1798 Dr Joseph Harrison of 
Hatton Garden, for example, is conventionally depicted as ‘studious, diligent 
and indefatigable in his honourable profession as a physician […] ever will-
ing to deliver his healing balm to the poor and distressed without fee or 
reward’ (Proud, 1789, p. 18). Equally, patriotic, martial, and Christian values 
are seamlessly united in the commemoration of Sir Cloudesley Shovell in 
1707, effusively praised for his efforts to ‘rescue the Honour of God and 
Religion, and vindicate the Laws and Glory of our Nation’ while exercising 
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those talents which ‘render’d him a Sanctuary to Friends, and a Terror to 
the Enemies of his Cause’ (Butler, pp. 6-7).
Shovell, now, is most often remembered as the unfortunate agent of 
the disastrous and arguably ignominious shipwreck which took his and 
many other lives in the Scilly Isles Disaster, and so the dubious praise 
expressed here – though common enough in published funeral sermons 
commemorating military f igures – once again raises the possibility that the 
funeral sermon’s tendency to praise the deceased’s character compromises 
the overall sincerity of the genre. The ‘sincerity’ or authenticity of funeral 
sermons, however, is not within our remit here; what is signif icant for 
our consideration is that the interrogation of an individual’s profession in 
relation to their behaviour may well be deployed as a means of depicting 
character in other forms of literature, including novels. In other words, we 
should not concern ourselves with the question of authenticity or ‘truth’ in 
the representation of Shovell’s character so much as the means by which 
character is represented in published funeral sermons through an amalgam 
of attributes including, though not exclusive to, the profession or employ-
ment undertaken by the deceased.
Although exalted or noble social status is generally acknowledged with 
some deference in early modern funeral sermons, it is also common that 
members of the nobility are primarily praised for their private conduct as 
Christians, while aspects of their public, noble, or professional conduct 
are only subsequently acknowledged. In due deference to Christ’s synoptic 
gospels in Chapter 19 of Matthew, Verses 23-24 (‘it is easier for a camel to 
go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter the 
kingdom of God’), this tendency of characterization is readily apparent 
in Daniel Burgess’ remark, concerning Elizabeth, Countess of Ranelagh, 
that ‘[o]f the Honour of her Parentage […] I say not anything […] Though, 
in the World these do make great Figures, the Church takes them for no 
more than Cyphers’ (Burgess, p. 72). His categorical dismissal of her worldly 
attributes is immediately followed by a f ive-page description of the lady’s 
Christian qualities, including ‘Spiritual Understanding’, ‘Holy Affections’, 
and ‘Universal Godliness’. It remains impossible to know, now, whether this 
characterization reflects any authentic sense of the deceased’s character, 
but it does represent one means by which funeral sermons mitigate catego-
rization of ‘character’ by public or social status (noble, wealthy, privileged) 
with praise for Christian virtues.9 Here, some correlation with f ictional 
9 Other examples include Birch, A funeral sermon on…Grace Lady Gethin; Skynner, A sermon 
preached at the funeral of Baptist Earl of Gainsborough…
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works can be found in the early depiction of Squire Allworthy, in which 
Henry Fielding combines the natural virtues of ‘an agreeable person, a sound 
constitution, a solid understanding, and a benevolent heart’ with secondary 
acknowledgement of Allworthy’s possession of ‘one of the largest estates in 
the country’ (Fielding, 1968, p. 53).10
Non-Typological Modes of Characterization in the Early Modern 
Funeral Sermon
The remainder of this chapter will focus on two quite exceptional, though 
markedly different, detailed examples of characterization in published fu-
neral sermons. These examples challenge, further still, any received notion 
that funeral sermons’ modes of characterization are ‘merely’ typological or 
encomiastic in nature. The f irst is derived from Bishop of Salisbury Gilbert 
Burnet’s 1692 funeral sermon for eminent Fellow of the Royal Society Sir 
Robert Boyle. During the course of a lengthy description of the deceased’s 
well-known piety, Burnet observes that
the very name of God was never mentioned by [Boyle] without a pause 
and a visible stop in his discourse, in which one who knew him most 
particularly above twenty years, has told me that he was so exact, that 
he does not remember to have observed him once to fail in it’ (Burnet, 
1692, p. 24).
What is immediately striking about this seemingly minor detail (that is, a 
notable tendency to pause after naming God, as well as confirmation of this 
habit via a lifelong friend) – which is included within a much more elaborate 
portrait of Boyle’s religious character – is its idiosyncratic nature and, related 
to this, how ostensibly ‘useless’ this detail of characterization would be as 
moral or spiritual exemplar. Burnet’s detailing of Boyle’s idiosyncratic verbal 
‘tic’ does, however, offer a vivid sense of the deceased’s Christian fervour, 
and so still fulf ils the ostensible didactic purpose of the funeral sermon in 
depicting the (spiritual) character of the deceased for the benefit of readers. 
Nevertheless, there is no discernible spiritual benef it to be gained from 
pausing after naming God, or in emulating the behaviour of one who does.
10 A further consideration of exemplary character in novels and related concepts of ‘type’ and 
‘case’ may be found in Clemens Lugowski’s Form, Individuality and the Novel, in particular his 
discussion of ‘The style of Wickram’s cautionary novels’, pp. 116-38.
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Yet the opposite point – that literary f iction sometimes adopts the 
more conventional (exemplary) modes of characterization generally seen 
in funeral sermons – is certainly apparent and demonstrates the rarity of 
Burnet’s particular mode of characterization considered here. Idiosyncra-
cies in the depiction of f ictional characters are common enough; often, 
however, these serve to reinforce rather than undermine prevailing features 
of the character under scrutiny. Squire Allworthy’s refusal to remarry, or 
Uncle Toby’s reluctance to kill a f ly, present just such exemplary qualities 
in the form of idiosyncracies; in the case of Allworthy,
he would often talk a little whimsically on this head: for he sometimes 
said, he looked on himself as still married, and considered his wife as 
only gone a little before him, a journey which he should most certainly, 
sooner or later, take after her; and that he had not the least doubt of 
meeting her again, in a place where he should never part with her more 
(Fielding, 1968, p. 54).
Here, Fielding elaborates further the moral and religious integrity of his 
subject in terms of his steadfast f idelity and Christian resolve, and does 
so in a manner which might be emulated by others (in not remarrying 
after the death of a f irst spouse). Similarly, Uncle Toby’s benign behaviour 
towards flies might be emulated by others in a manner which Boyle’s verbal 
pausing would not.
Elsewhere in the funeral sermon Burnet offers a more conventional 
encomiastic portrait of Boyle’s spiritual integrity, described at length in 
the pages preceding and following the detail of the verbal idiosyncracy. 
Taken together, the exemplary traits and the idiosyncratic one are closely 
aligned to Burnet’s repeated observation that the deceased was a singular 
and remarkable individual, ‘one man among a thousand have I found’ 
(Ecclesiastes Chapter 7, verse 28), intellectually brilliant and innovative in 
the application of his mental faculties, and thus not so much an example 
for ordinary men to copy but one simply to admire (Burnet, 1692, p. 6). As 
Burnet expresses it,
The different degrees and ranks of men, with relation to their inward 
powers and excellencies, is a surprising but melancholy observation; 
many seem to have only a mechanical life, as if there were a moving and 
speaking spring within them, equally void both of reason and good-
ness. The whole race of men is for so many years of life, little better than 
encreasing puppits […] (Burnet, 1692, p. 6).
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Fitting praise indeed for one of the greatest minds of the new sciences, 
but hardly intended to inspire readers to imitate Boyle’s example. Burnet 
continues, however, in a vein which allows for a more encouraging perspec-
tive on mankind’s potential for greatness:
But as there is a dark side of humane nature, so there is likewise a bright 
one, the flights and compass of awakened souls is no less amazing. The 
vast croud of f igures that lie in a very narrow corner of the brain […] The 
strange reaches of the mind in abstracted speculations, and the amazing 
progress that is made from some simple truths to theories, that are the 
admiration as well as the entertainment of the thinking part of mankind 
(Burnet, 1692, p. 7).
Ultimately, Burnet’s depiction of Boyle’s ‘exceptional’ character, if not 
exemplary, offers readers the opportunity to be more indirectly inspired, 
and much greater scope to reflect productively upon the chiaroscuro of 
‘Humane Nature’ and the capacity for ‘amazing progress’ in some men’s 
minds.
My second example offers an entirely different method of characterising 
the deceased subject, one heavily influenced by aspects of the published 
funeral sermon which remain formally separate from the main body of the 
sermonic text (specif ically, the title page and preface). In f ictional texts, 
such narrative components can be described in Genette’s terms as part of 
the ‘paratext’.11 In Thomas Easton’s 1692 funeral sermon for John Melford, 
a young man who died after a fall from a horse at the age of eighteen years, 
the minister’s preface makes clear that the whole purpose of publication 
is to quash the false and heinous rumours which spread subsequent to the 
sermon’s original reading at Melford’s internment. In his published text, 
Easton states that the document in the reader’s hands is in ‘exactly the same 
Method and Language that ‘twas f irst written, without so much as altering 
a sentence, scarce a single word’ (Easton). It seems that, following Melford’s 
funeral, local gossip had suggested that the deceased’s accidental death 
occurred through inebriation and, in direct response to these rumours, 
Easton states in the preface to his published funeral sermon that he ‘was 
personally with [the deceased] within one hour [after the fall], and neither 
his relations, nor myself, nor other friends could in the least suspect [the 
deceased’s being drunk]’ (Easton).
11 For a discussion of the def inition of Genette’s paratext, see Genette and Maclean, 1991.
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We are not in a position to know if Easton is truthful in asserting that the 
text of this funeral sermon is identical to that which he originally preached, 
nor have I been able to f ind any other information concerning John Melford 
in order to interrogate Easton’s depiction of him. This is not really the point; 
what concerns us here is that the strategies of characterization deployed in 
the printed version of this funeral sermon, portraying the character of the 
deceased John Melford, are mitigated by Easton’s prefatory remarks as well 
as the sermon’s title page (both of which would be encountered by readers 
prior to their reading of the main sermonic text). Specif ically, Easton’s 
title page makes reference to Chapter 13 of Luke, Verses 2-5, in which the 
disciple considers the fate of the eighteen innocent Galileans crushed to 
death when the Tower of Siloam collapsed. This allusion to the innocence 
of those who sometimes die a premature, if accidental, death might seem 
to relate simply to Melford’s actual cause of death (a violent fall) but the 
contents of Easton’s title page and preface were added for publication, and 
differ entirely from the key Biblical text for the original funeral sermon.12 
In seeking to quash the ugly rumours that Melford’s violent death was a 
divine judgement on the sin of drunkenness, Easton’s title page is further 
annotated with the solemn observation that ‘Strange Judgements don’t 
always infallibly denote the sufferers to be extraordinarily guilty’, thus 
tacitly warning readers not to misconstrue the meaning of the narrative 
which will follow.
Moreover, in his preface, Easton draws attention to his own cir-
cumstances, rather than those of the deceased, when he alludes to St 
Paul’s frustration in Galatians 4, Verse 16, commenting that ‘Mine is a 
Worse Case’, since it is his duty to correct others’ misinterpretation of 
sin (Easton, 1692). In short, Easton provides a spirited defence of the 
deceased’s character, not through his narrative discourse (since this 
ostensibly comprises merely the reiterated content of the oral version of 
his sermon), but instead, in his prefatory remarks and title page. Such a 
strategy is further notable in terms of funeral sermon characterization 
because the sermonic content is specif ically deployed in printed form 
as a means of more accurately depicting the character of the deceased. 
In a comparative manner, in eighteenth-century popular f iction, Defoe, 
Richardson and Fielding all offer paratextual or prefatory discourses in 
12 Easton’s original Scriptural text (which proceeds directly after his preface) offers a consider-
ably more anodyne reflection on Melford’s death from Psalm 103, Verses 15-16: ‘The life of mortals 
is like grass, they f lourish like a f lower of the f ield; the wind blows over it and it is gone, and its 
place remembers it no more’.
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order to clarify or direct readers’ understanding of the narrative which 
follows.
Taken together, the character portraits of Sir Robert Boyle and John 
Melford demonstrate the sheer diversity of characterization techniques 
apparent in a hitherto largely neglected form of print culture, in particular, 
one which enjoyed such a notable level of contemporary popular recognition 
in parallel with early modern works of literary f iction. It remains to be 
seen how best to address the vexed question of ‘genre’, whether ‘literary’ 
or otherwise, in considering the scope for narratological analysis of early 
modern texts.
Conclusion
In the introduction to this chapter I offered a series of reasons justifying the 
application of narratological modes of character analysis to a nonfictional 
historical genre. Some of these reasons were ahistoric and related to hu-
man cognitive function (broadly: humans do not distinguish, much, when 
reading about fictional versus nonfictional characters). Moreover, perceived 
as a complex form of historical narrative, funeral sermons might also be 
conducive to narratological analysis although it remains to be seen what 
precise role is played by ‘experientiality’ in this particular (sermonic) genre 
of nonfiction.
As relevant to both its Classical origins and its radical reformation 
through the Christian and subsequently Protestant didactic traditions, 
the funeral sermon bears witness to the character of the deceased almost 
wholly in terms of exemplary, and spiritual, conduct (whether positive or 
negative), and for didactic purposes. This is not to say that extraordinary 
individuals – such as Robert Boyle – are not recognized for their singularity 
of character, nor that unusual modes of characterization (such as those 
used by Thomas Easton to depict John Melford) are not extant. Funeral 
sermons are, however, principally concerned with the spiritual dimension 
of the deceased’s character. Yet near-identical modes of characterization 
are readily apparent in myriad contemporary forms, including Newgate 
confessions, spiritual biographies, and early novels. In terms of the true 
scope for narratological analysis of characterization, it is this wider context 
of historical and biographical narratives in early modern print culture, in 
which both funeral sermons and the novel found popular recognition, which 
invites our further scrutiny.
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 The Use of Paratext in Popular 
Eighteenth-Century Biography
The Case of Edmund Curll
Pat Rogers
Why Curll, of all people? A natural reaction to the title of this essay might be 
to wonder what the rascally publisher Edmund Curll has to do with narratol-
ogy, the theme of this volume. It might be thought that Curll (1683-1747) was 
an interesting fellow, no doubt, but scarcely a pioneer of writerly innovation. 
The case I shall try to make here is that Curll’s most characteristic produc-
tions, above all the instant biographies he brought out in the late 1720s and 
early 1730s, do tell us something about paratext – specif ically on the way it 
constitutes a type of narrative statement – and may even exemplify changes 
in the shape of biography. In the limited space available, I can only point 
to a few salient features of his method, such as it was, and provide some 
empirical instances.
Western life-writing in classical and Renaissance times had been 
dominated by the Plutarchian model. This usually meant something 
brief, even elliptical, emphasizing character, and incorporating only a 
selection of signif icant incidents. Comparatively little use is made of 
letters until the time of James Boswell – though William Mason had 
anticipated the Life of Johnson under this aspect in his work The Poems 
of Mr. Gray. To Which are Prefixed Memoirs of his Life and Writings (1775). 
In English examples scant use is made of commonplace diurnal details; 
the biographer stands outside the narrative (again a fashion not followed 
by Boswell); we regularly detect a certain pudeur about using gossip 
in serious contexts; and the exemplary quality of the story outweighs 
picturesque ‘human’ touches. Few of these conventions, or shibboleths, 
held much appeal for Curll.
Output
Between 1706 and 1747 Curll was involved in the publication of some 
1100 titles, of which more than 40 can be regarded as self-standing or full 
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biographies.1 A number went into several editions, real or factitiously 
described as such. Some of these are short; some are very long, padded 
out by various devices to occupy hundreds of pages. In the majority of 
cases, the volume in question constituted the f irst such treatment of a 
particular individual, though it has seldom remained the best. Curll himself 
was probably responsible for writing as many of twenty of these, though he 
almost always makes no claim on the title-page or in advertisements. In 
other instances he assuredly edited the work of others.
These books ranged across several categories. Authors were the subject 
of the largest number of items: they included John Gay, Joseph Addison, 
Richard Steele, Matthew Prior, Delarivier Manley, William Congreve, Wil-
liam Wycherley, and John Philips. The printer John Barber, who performed 
the presswork for many works by Jonathan Swift, stands in a group of his 
own. Among churchmen and theologians we f ind Gilbert Burnet, Thomas 
Sprat, Francis Atterbury, and John Tillotson. Add to these scholars and 
antiquarians such as Thomas Hearne, Jean Le Clerc, and William Dug-
dale; thinkers such as John Locke; free thinkers such as Walter Moyle and 
Matthew Tindal (perhaps also John Toland, though this may be wrongly 
ascribed to Curll’s list). A further category of politicians includes Robert 
Walpole, the Duke of Shrewsbury, the Earl of Halifax (also a writer of sorts), 
Arthur Maynwaring, and the Earl of Wharton. Physicians on the list are Dr. 
John Radcliffe, immortalized by the Camera, Observatory, and Inf irmary 
in Oxford, and Dr. John Freind. From the acting profession come Thomas 
Betterton, Robert Wilks, and Anne Oldfield, a performer admired by Vol-
taire, and commemorated in her biography among other accomplishments 
for her liaison with Maynwaring. Soldiers, misers, Jacobite conspirators, 
and historians help to make up the tally. A miscellaneous group includes 
the astrologer John Partridge (victim of Swift’s Bickerstaff hoax); the deaf 
soothsayer Duncan Campbell (a life formerly – but no longer – believed to 
have been written by Daniel Defoe); and historic f igures such as Jane Shore, 
Lady Jane Gray, and the legendary f irst king of Britain, Lucius – this was put 
out to trade off a play by Manley currently on the London stage. Perhaps the 
most distinguished individual within all these categories is Cicero. A few 
were presented as autobiographies, including those on Manley again and 
on the adventurer John Ker, whose indiscreet revelations landed himself 
in gaol and Curll in the pillory. We should also note that the bookseller 
reprinted a number of the shorter productions, as well as fresh items, in 
collections of composite lives.
1 The count of 1100 includes new editions of previously published items.
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Not included in this reckoning are more than thirty ‘memoirs’ appended 
to the works of writers published by Curll. On the surface the count is 
impressive, since among those involved are some considerable f igures. We 
might name at random Vincent Voiture, Nicholas Rowe, Thomas Burnet 
(author of The Sacred Theory of the Earth, and an inexhaustible source of 
material for Curll), Jean de La Bruyère, George Farquhar, St. Évremond, 
Boileau, John Aubrey, John Pomfret, Sir Philip Sidney, Andrew Marvell (in 
the f irst collected edition of his works), the Earl of Rochester, the Duke of 
Buckingham, Sir Thomas Browne, Lord Roscommon, the mercurial Duke 
of Wharton, the neo-Latin author Bonefonius (Jean Bonnefons), and oth-
ers – this is not to mention Julius Caesar and Theocritus. An outrider is 
the translation of three portions of De viris illustribus by Cornelius Nepos. 
Finally there are the copies of last wills commonly included with the pub-
lished life, but also sold separately. At least twenty-f ive of these survive, 
and they too were spliced together into collections – bundling is not an 
invention of modern f inanciers.
Components
A characteristic Curll biography, as def ined here, will contain a number 
of features, some of which serve to def ine by negatives the main goals 
of biography up to this point in time, especially those in the Plutarchian 
tradition. These include:
– A narrative of incident, without any subjugation of detail to the overall 
view of the subject.
– A willingness to include material of any kind Curll had been able to 
obtain, either by writing to friends and relatives, raking the dustbins, 
or merely by sending someone down to Doctors’ Commons (the ec-
clesiastical court where probate registers were kept), to get a will for a 
small fee.
– The habit of throwing in these things into the ongoing narrative as they 
come to hand. By what seems pure literary incompetence, he managed 
to create an often arresting cento which was before its time – before 
Sterne, Blake, Jean-Paul, and Carlyle he brought some of the effects 
associated with Robert Burton or Rabelais into non-satiric discourse. 
He even constructed a written collage long before the term was applied 
to literature.
– Regular interventions at arbitrary moments to boast about his discover-
ies and to deplore the failure of his rivals to lay hands on such privileged 
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material. At times the result approaches the effects of metanarrative. In 
some respects his productions can even resemble A.J.A. Symons’s The 
Quest for Corvo (1934) or Ian Hamilton’s In Search of J.D. Salinger (1998), 
where we may learn less about the putative subject than the process of 
attempting to come to terms with him or her.
– Elaborate documentation for the sake of it. No one snapped up more 
unconsidered trifles than Curll, and few trifles were more justly uncon-
sidered than the scraps of correspondence he was able on occasions to 
ferret out. The interest of this material lies in tis associative quality, not 
its content. It is no paradox that the great master of publicity made his 
name by exposing what had up till now been considered intensely pri-
vate. As it happens, this is much the way that some celebrity biography 
has gone in our own day.
– Embedding off icial-looking documents that appear to confer a serious 
quality to the narrative. The most astounding example occurs in the 
third volume of The Memoirs and Secret Negotiations of John Ker, of 
Kersland, Esq; (1727). Curll had got into very serious trouble over the 
f irst two volumes of the memoirs, in which the former spy released 
some embarrassing details about diplomatic activities during the reign 
of Queen Anne. Indeed it was this work – not as often supposed his 
obscene publications − that landed him in the pillory very soon after 
the third volume came out. So keen was Curll to boost the appeal of 
his production that he bookended this text with two curious items. 
The f irst is an aff idavit at the outset, signed S. Gray, and purporting to 
guarantee the authenticity of the memoirs. Its author was Susanna Gray, 
a mysterious woman who may have lived with Curll around this period. 
The second was an appendix which actually gives the full indictment 
by the King’s Bench court of the publisher in both Latin and English, 
setting out in complete form the accusations against Curll, named as 
‘a Malitious and Seditious Man’ (with much more along those lines).
 Admittedly the imprint carries no name, and technically there was 
no obvious proof that the bookseller had been responsible for the new 
volume: but then Curll had kept his identity out of the two earlier 
volumes which had prompted the case against him.
In general Plutarch’s approach has been effaced by that of John Aubrey, 
whose Brief Lives remained undisturbed in the Ashmolean Museum, but 
whose antiquarian volumes on local history such as The Natural History and 
Antiquities of the County of Surrey (published by Curll in 1723) had begun to 
appear in print. Most of these were published under the auspices of Richard 
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Rawlinson, the nonjuring bishop and Jacobite who furnished Curll with 
much of his most saleable material. It was probably Rawlinson who supplied 
many of the purloined manuscripts that the bookseller brought before the 
public gaze (see Tashjian, Tashjian, and Enright, 1990; Baines and Rogers, 
2007, pp. 132-38). But the snippets of information from which Curll typically 
assembled his text do not provide a succinct and relatively coherent picture 
of the subject, as with Aubrey’s method of terse summary. They contribute 
rather to a loose-knit fabric in which anecdote, vital data and embedded 
citations mesh with one another.
Modes of Paratext
The foundational document here is of course Gérard Genette (1987). Seuils 
was translated into several languages, including an English version in 1997. 
We should begin with some semantic issues. The word seuil in French, which 
is cognate with la soglia in Italian, looks forwards and backwards. Where in 
the English language we use words such as threshold or doorstep, we typically 
think of progress into a space: the good thing about seuil is that we exit as 
well as enter that way. Genette and his followers have shown how le péritexte 
regularly invades the text proper. In his book Genette explores ‘l’entour du 
texte’, its surroundings. The Greek preposition peri, as is well known, means 
‘about’, but also ‘beside, on the edge of’, shown in terms we have derived such 
as periphrasis or perimeter. The work deals with a threshold that obviously 
has to be crossed. Even simply to name and conceptualize this peritext is 
to open up an expectation of border crossings and transgression. While the 
school of Genette seldom allude to biography or historiography, prime forms 
of narrative discourse, I am suggesting that the notion is as applicable here 
as in f iction, where these matters are usually detected.
Famously Jacques Derrida told us, ‘Il n’y a pas de hors texte’ (see Der-
rida, 1997, 158). Certainly in Curll’s volumes what should be external, or 
preliminary, or supplementary, regularly inf iltrates the main body of the 
book, and becomes constitutive rather than ancillary. We might think here 
of parallel French idioms: hors d’oeuvre of course, but also hors série,  out 
of sequence, unclassif iable, and extending to the sense of incomparable or 
unrivalled. Then there is hors sujet, irrelevant, an idea highly relevant to 
what ends up in Curll’s books. It may be recalled that Derrida made much 
of supplementarité. As far as I understand it, he claims that the supplemen-
tary insinuates itself into the centre, in other words not just accreting but 
substituting or replacing as well as augmenting: as it inscribes, it erases. 
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Curll loved supplements, which took many forms, such as new editions with 
slightly expanded contents. Since his productions are regularly constructed 
on the principle of the assembly toy Lego, as discrete gatherings which can 
be, and are, bound together in almost any order, they readily accommodate 
themselves to such a process. More obviously than any other publisher in 
early modern times, he takes advantage of the fact that buyers commonly 
acquired their books in sheets, and selected the binding style for themselves. 
This can lead to an aleatory quality in his works since we may encounter 
surviving copies on a variety of different assemblages, recalling the volumes 
of William Burroughs and B.S. Johnson in the 1960s. Of course he did not 
consciously attempt to create such an effect; but the productions of chance 
would seem to produce much the same results as a more purposeful use of 
the technique. Burroughs and Johnson may just mimic the processes which 
followed naturally from the way Curll did things.
Some of the elements of paratext have generally been def ined as fol-
lows: Title-page (with half-title); Contents; Dedication; Preface; Aff idavit/
testimonial; Commendatory letters; Verse; Elegies; Footnotes; Postscript; 
Appendices; Supplement; Key; Index; Advertisements; Appendages, e.g. 
wills. One addition might be lists, for which Curll had a great fondness: 
as in Faithful Memoirs of the Life, Amours and Performances, of that Justly 
Celebrated, and most Eminent Actress of her Time, Mrs. Anne Oldfield (1731), 
where eight pages near the end set out well over 100 roles in which the 
subject performed. The array of features just supplied excludes graphic and 
visual items, such as frontispieces and plates, which Curll did employ, as well 
as typographic devices like borders and ornaments – one reason for omitting 
the latter here is that Curll employed a very wide range of printers over his 
career and never developed a unique house-style in matters such as layout.
However, he was master of almost all the elements just set out. Some 
examples will be given shortly, but a rapid summary will be help at this 
point. His title-pages are famous for their deceptions − for example, by an-
nouncing a new edition on a cancel title-page (that is, a new page that would 
be bound or pasted in to replace the original) while using old unsold sheets. 
Another common trick was to attribute a given book to a pseudonymous 
writer who bore a name suspiciously close to a real one. This happened in the 
case of several productions by ‘Mr. Joseph Gay’, not far from the successful 
John Gay, famous for The Beggar’s Opera and other works. These items were 
mainly written by his hack author John Durant Breval.2
2 Typography can also help here: thus Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Right Honorable 
Joseph Addison, Esq; with his Character, by Sir Richard Steele (1719: 1724), by Giles Jacob, makes 
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His half-titles at the start of the volume often supply a name for the book 
quite different from that on the full title-page, which follows immediately 
afterwards in the printed sequence. On repeated occasions his imprint is 
unreliable, very frequently concealing his own responsibility, while the date 
of publication is put forward or back without compunction. He likes to sup-
ply affidavits guaranteeing the legitimacy of what follows, and more rarely a 
warrant from the Lord Chamberlain or other high authority (see for example 
its point by printing Steele’s name in the same large font size as that of Addison, even though 
Steele’s contribution is simply a few paragraphs lifted, doubtless without permission, from the 
dedication to The Drummer.
Illustration 1
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the late biography by ‘William Ayre’ of Pope (1745) – Curll may not have 
written this, as is often claimed, but he was almost certainly responsible 
for ‘a patent under his Majesty’s royal signet’ claiming privilege at the start).
Contents lists do not invariably match up with all the material included. 
Footnotes are another speciality, utilized most often to advertise items 
from the publisher’s catalogue. Supplements, already mentioned, include 
last-minute updates as new material reaches the bookseller. Keys, which 
Illustration 2
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were used to decode the identity of persons mentioned within the text in 
a disguised form, f ind a place appended to scandalous works such as the 
so-called autobiography of Manley, published as The Adventures of Rivella, 
2nd edition (1715); but they move from paratext to text in works such as Curll’s 
Complete Key to the Tale of a Tub (1710) and Compleat Key to the Dunciad 
(1728), along with a few other such items. Indexes are generally found in 
the longer biographies among those considered here, but they seldom are 
very detailed or well compiled.
This leaves advertisements, a branch of the trade in which Curll had few 
superiors. They may appear at any point in the book, but most commonly on 
the verso of the half-title, before or after the prelims, or at the end. If placed 
at the end, they may be integral parts of the make-up of the volume, printed 
on the concluding leaves of the last gathering. Alternatively they may form 
a separate gathering, which bears a signature which aligns them with the 
entire collation of the volume. Just as often they are bibliographically sepa-
rate entities, which might or might not form part of the whole in any given 
copy. The simplest to classify here are cases where Curll included his full 
catalogue, running to 16 or 24 pages, at the end of the text. Their presence 
in surviving copies is a little hit and miss, but the evidence would mainly 
indicate that they were routinely included in some publications – thus any 
titles with relevance to Pope are likely to have the catalogue present at 
the end, since items of Popiana f igure so heavily in these lists. It should be 
stated again that much incidental advertising goes on within the main text.
Uses of Paratext
The paratextual modes employed by Curll do not exactly correspond with 
those found in the typology set out by Genette, who stresses the need to 
def ine categories in advance of any examination of their historical evo-
lution: ‘Their establishment is a precondition of any attempt to provide 
historical perspective’ (Genette, 1997, pp. 13-14). This arises from his declared 
ambition to offer ‘a synchronic and not a diachronic study’. If we look at 
Curll’s procedures in a historical context, we shall require some adjustment 
of the categories.
In practice, we f ind an array of devices whose principal goals might be 
summarized as follows:
– Authority and authenticity. Curll generally aims more openly for the 
latter, but elements such as aff idavits and warrants, already mentioned, 
clearly seek to achieve the former.
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– Novelty or at least recency. This most often shows up in dates appended 
to letters he received shortly before publication, provided sometimes in 
the body of the text but usually in prefatory material or in some kind of 
postscript. By way of example, in the f ive volumes of Mr. Pope’s Literary 
Correspondence (1735-1737) these dates may be as recent as a few days 
before publication.3
– Competitive advantage. Supplementary materials such as a preface 
denounce rival versions as spurious or incomplete (a claim often implicit 
in title-pages or advertisements).
– Supplementation. Curll engaged in this across almost every kind of 
book he published, but a good instance from his output of biographies 
occurs in [William Pittis], Some Memoirs of the Life of John Radcliffe, 
M.D. Interspersed with Several Original Letters: His Two Speeches in 
Parliament, and a True Copy of his Last Will and Testament. The item 
appeared in April 1715; during May a Supplement to the First Edition was 
issued both as an independent work and as a component of a second 
edition.4
– Reuse and rebranding of old materials. The Radcliffe life supplies some 
illustration of this, as the title was altered for the third edition and the 
title-page heavily reworked so that a buyer might even assume there 
were substantial new materials (not so). On scores of occasions – per-
haps little short of a hundred times − Curll brought out a work with a 
cancel title-page, trumpeting a new edition, where the reality was that 
the rest of the volume consisted of unsold sheets from an earlier. The 
interval between these ‘editions’ might be as much as twenty years or 
more, or as little as a few days – a striking example occurs in the case of 
[‘William Musgrave’], The Life of the Right Honourable Sir Robert Walpole, 
where the f irst edition was advertised on 27 September 1731, the second 
on 1 October, and the third on 11 October. A substantially new version 
with a fresh section on the family history of the Walpoles (and a new 
title) appeared in 1732. The family history portion came out again in 1738, 
with another fresh title, and once more this consists of the old sheets.
– Vindication. Curll actually uses this word from time to time. He may 
have been involved in the f irst edition of [John Oldmixon], Memoirs of 
3 This effect was facilitated by Curll’s publishing strategies. He produced a second and 
sometimes a third edition of volumes in this series shortly after their original appearance, 
typically in a different format (e.g. duodecimo following an octavo version). 
4 The new material was also grafted into the text of the third edition (1716) and the fourth 
edition (1736). 
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the Life of John Lord Somers… With a Large Introduction, in Vindication 
of the Modern Biography (1716), although he did not advertise his claim 
prior to a supposed new edition said to be in the press in 1734. But more 
regularly he uses extra-textual means to justify the need for a given 
book and the means he has used to access the materials.
– Promotion of his stock, through advertisements, catalogues, booklists, 
footnotes, addenda and other methods. The brand is enhanced by 
extensive self-advertisement, with the insertion of his own doings, 
correspondence and publications. Thus the main flow of the volumes of 
Pope’s letters (insofar as they have one) is interrupted by items such as a 
sneering dedication to Pope, doggerel verses celebrating the bookseller’s 
triumph over his adversary in a case that came before the House of 
Lords, or notices of a print of Pope’s house and garden entitled The 
Honour of Parnassus – a deliberately invasive gesture that carries the 
quarrel of the two men away from the pages of the current volume to 
a larger extra-textual space.
We could add to these objectives a greater opportunity for cheating, since 
much of the fraudulent side of Curll’s output relates to claims he makes in 
a paratextual rather than a textual location. It is here that we f ind misdat-
ing, confusing or duplicated titles, misleading descriptions of previous 
bibliographical history, and other devices meant to throw buyers of the 
scent, or to circumvent the restrictions of the Copyright Act of 1709. Much 
of the appeal of his books lies in claims surrounding the text, rather than 
in the narrative itself.
Representative Cases
It would require a space equivalent to the length of this book to document 
in full the characteristics of a Curll biography, as outlined above. All that 
can be done here is to provide a brief sampling of particular cases as they 
illustrate features already noted, and the use made of the components listed. 
They make up a fairly arbitrary set, but not in any respect a misleading one.
Thus, The Life of the Late Honourable Robert Price, Esq; One of the Justices of 
his Majesty’s Court of Common-Pleas (1734) is alleged on its title-page to have 
been ‘printed by the authority of the family’. Such authority seems to derive 
from the countenance given to it by the judge’s estranged wife, Lucy Price, a 
remarkable woman who acted − illegally of course, since she could not enter 
the inns of court – as an attorney for individuals in civil and criminal cases. 
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She supplied an aff idavit testifying to the authenticity of Curll’s Memoirs 
of Matthew Tindal (1733), which was itself a text centrally concerned with a 
question of authenticity – that is, the legitimacy of claims made by the writer 
Eustace Budgell to the estate of the freethinker Tindal. Lucy had probably 
drafted the will that was in dispute, and could not be regarded by any stretch 
of the imagination as an impeachable witness. There followed a long struggle 
between Budgell and the deceased man’s expected heir, Nicholas Tindal, a 
clergyman and translator of Rapin de Thoyras’s History of England. Curll 
became heavily involved in the episode, reprinting a copy of the will, contact-
ing the Prime Minister Robert Walpole about it, and publishing pamphlets on 
the topic. The dedication to Lucy Price in the Memoirs is signed by Curll, and 
her testimonial is dated f ive days later. Budgell’s fragile mind was unhinged 
by the affair and he ultimately threw himself into the Thames.
Curll’s self-justifying prefaces are a thing of wonder in themselves. Take 
for example Mrs. Manley’s History of her Own Life and Times. Published from 
her original manuscript. The Fourth Edition. With a Preface Concerning the 
Present Publication (1724). In reality, this is no more than a reissue of The 
Adventures of Rivella (1714), with a substitute title-page together with the 
addition of three leaves ‘To the reader’ before the preface, and a key at the 
end. The reissue came about because Delarivier Manley had recently died. 
The note at the start begins, ‘It must be confessed, That these Memoirs have 
been written above Ten Years; and, likewise, That they have been published 
as long, though under a different Title. The Reason of which, as well as to 
prove them Genuine, I shall lay before the Reader with as much Brevity, as 
the Fact will admit of’ (sig, A2r). Curll, who signs the note at its conclusion, 
describes his original dealings with the author in 1714, and cites three of her 
letters, expressing friendship and gratitude to him as well as her readiness 
to carry out more work for him. The document openly admits that Charles 
Gildon (a frequent presence among Curll’s stable of hacks) had originally 
planned to write a hostile account of Manley, and explains that she felt the 
need to provide her own more authentic narrative. It further seeks to justify 
the subterfuge of presenting the narrative on its first appearance as a transla-
tion of a foreign work. We cannot know how much of this is true, although 
the letters may well have been genuine. The professions of ‘honesty’ serve 
an obvious rhetorical purpose and they had enough plausibility to mislead 
some of those engaged in the study of Manley for a long time to come.5
5 For a full recent discussion, see Carnell, 2008, pp. 15-16, 130-32. See also the edition of Rivella 
by Zelinsky, Manley (1999).
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Whenever possible, Curll enlisted his main antagonist as an unwitting 
collaborator, appropriating whatever he could. Thus, while he was in gaol in 
1727, he had his son Henry issue Some Memoirs of the Life of Lewis Maximilian 
Mahomet, Gent. Late Servant to his Majesty. Curll also made oblique use of 
the other Scriblerian satirists, notably Swift and Gay. The Life of Mr. John Gay, 
Author of The Beggar’s Opera, &c. (1733) contains a tasteless set of ‘Verses 
on the Death of Mr. Gay’. The title of this item suggests that the compiler 
had somehow got wind of Swift’s verses on his own death, which had been 
f irst drafted around 1731 but remained unpublished for some years. This 
volume carries a dedication to Gay’s sisters and legatees, Catherine Baller 
and Joanna Fortescue, otherwise little known to history. It opens, ‘Ladies, 
The Authority of the Gentleman from whom I have borrowed the Motto, 
prefixed to these Papers, is a suff icient Vindication of their Design’ (sig. π3r). 
The convenient quotation on the title-page, printed just above a vignette of 
Gay, comes from William Congreve. Midway through the text, the author 
suspends his discussion of The What D’ye Call It, a farce co-written by Gay 
with Scriblerian colleagues, as he has received a letter dated 28 December 
1732, less than a month after the writer died, and f ive weeks before the 
biography appeared. This praises the parodies of tragedy found in the play. 
The interruption ends with a puff for a racy poem called The Hornbook, 
which came out about this time and in which Curll apparently had some 
interest. After this the narration resumes with no sense of embarrassment 
on the part of the compiler, recognisably Curll himself. Self-evidently, 
chronology must suffer in cases like this.
The typical form of these biographies was of course fully apparent to 
critics of Curll, and they were many. His main scourge was the Grub-street 
Journal, the weekly organ that served as a kind of streaming Dunciad. 
Another work devoted to the acting profession, The Life of that Eminent 
Comedian Robert Wilks, Esq; had come out in 1732 (dated ‘1733’). This is what 
the paper made of it on 8 March 1733: ‘We could not refuse to publish gratis 
the following Content […] written by a much greater comedian’.
False title-page and dedication. Pag. 8
Preface, with a catalogue of Lives printed for, and (most of them) 
supposed to be written by Mr. E. Curl. 6
Introduction taken from Two Tatlers, and one of Mr. Farquhar’s 
Prefaces. 2
A digression about Mr. Farquhar, with a Prologue and Epilogue. 6
A second digression about Mr. Farquhar, with a Prologue and 
Epilogue. 8
282 Pat rogErS 
A third digression concerning Mr. Hen. Norris, called Jubilee 
Dickey, and his wife Mrs. Eliz. Knapton. 2
A fourth digression, containing an· honest confession of Mr. Cibber 
in a Dedication. 1
A f ifth digression, giving an account of the preference of Mrs. Old-
field to Mrs. Rogers. 2
An Essay on the action of the Stage, containing characters of four 
Plays, in which Mr. Wilks had the most eminent parts; taken word 
for word from the History of the Stage, published in Mrs. Oldfield’s 
Life by Mr. Curl, and taken originally from the Tatlers. 4
Characters of some other Plays, taken from the Tatlers. 4
Post-script, taken from the lord Lansdowne’s Works, containing his 
Defence of Mr. Dryden, against bishop Burnet. 4
Advertisement, containing an inventory of goods to be sold, taken 
from the Tatler of July 16, 1709. 5
A catalogue of books printed for E. Curl. 3
Some circumstances relating to Mr. Wilks’s Life. 8
Some account of his two wives. 2
A copy of his last will and testament. 4
A catalogue of the principal parts he performed. 5
Stanzas on his death taken from a Daily Journal. 4
The Journal could not resist adding, ‘The reader, by casting his eye upon 
this table, will be surprised to see the Life of so great an actor, drawn within 
the narrow compass of 8 pages; for which he cannot surely grudge to pay 1s. 
6d.·having 4 pages of his last will and testament, and 66 of useful digressions 
into the bargain’. While this volume offers a slightly more muddled collection 
of disparate elements than some, it could not be claimed that the ‘table’ is 
inaccurate or that the overall description is misleading. Significantly the order 
of these items differs from one copy to another – the last two in the Journal’s 
table sometimes appear among the prelims, before the preface. One of those 
providing a ‘testimonial’ is the actor’s widow, Mary Wilks, also the dedicatee.
The need here was to guard against a rival life put out by a bookseller who 
was bidding fair to inherit Curll’s mantle as the least scrupulous member of 
the trade, William Rayner, who had got his version into print more speed-
ily. The preface begins, ‘That the Public may be farther convinced of the 
Genuineness of these Memoirs, I shall lay before them, the several Steps I 
have taken in compiling them’ (sig. a1r). Among documents cited are letters 
to the publisher/compiler from the daughter-in-law of Wilks. As usual, 
their recency is crucial to the effect: the idea is to lend these biographies 
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the appearance of what used to be called bang up-to-date. We should also 
note that the list of Curll lives is integral to the text, occupying the last 
page of the gathering. Likewise the catalogue seems to be present in all 
copies: it takes the form of ‘new books’ printed for Curll, and features as ‘just 
published’ a collection of the lives and families of more than thirty people. 
Actually these had been compiled by John Le Neve and strung together by 
Curll among other booksellers in 1713 and 1714.
Illustration 3
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Almost exactly the same thing happened in the case of the life of Matthew 
Tindal, already mentioned. This time the Grub-street Journal of 18 October 
1733 analysed the contents of the volume, beginning with the dedication 
to Lucy Price, and then identifying seven sections that serve to pad out 
the book to 59 pages. These include four letters by William Whiston, ‘in 
which there is not word relating to Dr. Tindall; which Mr. C. calls curious 
Anecdotes relating to our author, &c’. A further f ive pages are described as 
follows: ‘A short account of the Doctor; one page of which is taken from Mr. 
Wood’s Athenæ Oxonienses: one page a half from Minutes communicated by 
Mrs. Price or Mr. Small; the remaining page and a half f ill’d with necessary 
connections of the curious materials above-mentioned, by Mr. E.C.’. We are 
told that fresh information on Tindal occupies less than four pages. Once 
again, it could scarcely be claimed that the Journal has misrepresented 
what the book contains.
In many respects the most egregious example of Curll’s methods is 
to be found in a work dated 1730, but actually published in August 1729. 
This is Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Amours of William Congreve Esq; 
Interspersed with Miscellaneous Essays, Letters, and Characters, Written 
by him. Also some very Curious Memoirs of Mr. Dryden and his Family, with 
a Character of him and his Writings, by Mr. Congreve. Compiled from their 
Respective Originals, by Charles Wilson Esq.
The complex bibliographical history of this item has been set out else-
where and its heterogeneous contents described, so it is enough here to 
isolate a very few features (see Rogers and Baines, 2008). One concerns the 
preface, in which ‘Charles Wilson’ (possibly Giles Jacob, but perhaps the 
bookseller himself) remarks, ‘I employ’d Mr. Curll to print these Memoirs, 
and think my own Authority suff icient for whatever I am inclin’d to publish’ 
(p. xii), despite threats of reprisal from the physician and Scriblerian satirist 
Dr John Arbuthnot. The italics here hark back to expressions used in a 
paper war over the forthcoming book that had been going on in the pages 
of the daily press. Wilson goes on to attempt to convince his opponents 
that ‘there was a very friendly Correspondence between Mr. Congreve 
and Mr. Curll’, by citing a letter from the dramatist to the bookseller, 
conveying strong approval of one of Curll’s earlier projects, The Historical 
Account of the English Poets (1719-1720). Thus the writer kills at least three 
birds with one stone, as he is able to announce his publication, establish 
his title to authorship of the work, and make good his claim to authority 
by emphasizing the good relations between Curll and the subject of the 
biography. Actually there are no signs of anything remotely approaching 
intimacy between the two men.
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Among all the eccentricities of this broken-backed compilation the 
strangest comes perhaps in a passage referring to Congreve’s ill health. 
This led to advice that he should drink snail-water as a remedy:
‘but since he had ‘a strong Aversion to this Insect ’, he rather chose Ass’s 
Milk; till last Summer he became a Convert to the Snail, by reading at 
Illustration 4
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Bath, in the Posthumous Works of that ingenious Poet and Physician 
Dr. Sewell of Hampstead, a small but very curious Dissertation of the 
Usefulness of S N A I L S in MEDICINE, written by him, but the Year before 
his own Death, which for its Excellence and publick Benefit I shall here 
insert…’ (pp. 128-29).
The next three pages reprint Sewell’s deathless words which survey the 
advantages of snail-water. It hardly needs pointing out that Sewell had 
been one of the bookseller’s most prolif ic authors; that a footnote directs 
readers to the Posthumous Works; or that the entire passage has no possible 
bearing on the main narrative.
Conclusion
Plainly, Curll in his eccentric fashion was one of those who contributed to 
the evolution of paratext. So much so, that he may be said to have taken 
its use almost to the point where our habitual category comes close to 
dissolution. When the ‘core’ of a life amounts to only eight pages, while the 
additional elements take up 58, these scarcely serve any longer as a mere 
‘threshold’.6 They serve a different function from the purely ancillary or 
supplementary role described by Genette. Seuils assumes that the make-
up of books is overwhelmingly the responsibility of the author, who uses 
paratexts as a means of guiding the audience towards the meaning of the 
whole. By contrast Curll’s publications are put together by the bookseller, 
and ‘paratexts’ become a constitutive element that serve his commercial 
interests. This distinction applies even in the many cases mentioned where 
we must regard Curll as the ‘author’ of the volume in question.
As the foregoing examples may suggest, the opportunistic and slapdash 
methods employed by Curll ensured that his biographies were as much 
process as product. The ostensible centre is under constant threat as 
subsidiary parts swell; yet these add-in elements flaunt their externality 
by their title or by the insertion of dates meant to stress the topicality of 
their contents. Postscripts, in particular, advertise their separation from 
the main narrative. With these biographies, Curll blundered and cheated 
himself into literary and publishing innovation. Some of the devices he 
employed to capture attention still have a place in our own day. It might 
6 I owe some of the points here to Liisa Steinby, who offered incisive comments on the whole 
of this essay.
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seem that his methods belong more to the history of publicity than to the 
development of the literary text per se. But they certainly helped to mould 
the way that readers understood the narratives of human life. If it is accepted 
that title-pages, prefaces, supplements and indexes can be involved in the 
creation of meaning for a story, then the old reprobate can legitimately 
claim a place in this volume.
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The study of the so-called transnational novel has demonstrated the variety 
of practices of rewriting inside and across linguistic borders in the eighteenth 
century Europe (see e.g. Montandon, 1999; Stewart, 2009). Original works 
from the period are hard to distinguish from translations, translations of 
translations, pseudo-translations, authorial revisions, free adaptations, 
impostures, crudely abridged editions and other versions (Stewart, 2009, pp. 
164-65). According to Coulet (1992), French authors were particularly busy 
revising their own works. Signif icant changes in narration and plot were 
common. Well-known is marquis de Sade’s transposition from f irst-person 
narration in Justine (1791) to third person in La Nouvelle Justine (1799). In 
the edition of 1763 the protagonist in Gaspard Guillard de Beaurieu’s L’élève 
de la nature is confined to live in a cage as a punishment inflicted at his 
parents; eight years later the confinement is, on the contrary, a part of an 
educational experiment approved by them.
Instead of these glaring cases of authorial revision, my focus in the follow-
ing will be in cases in which significant changes – authorial or not – concern 
the texts framing narratives rather than narratives framed. More precisely, 
I shall pay special attention to interactions between the main narrative, its 
framing texts and the acts of revision in eighteenth-century French works. 
My hypothesis is that these interactions present theoretical and analytic 
challenges far from being exhausted in the study of narrative.
Theoretically, my starting point is not completely new: to really meet the 
challenge, a rapprochement between the theoretical and historical study 
of narrative is needed. Such an approach has, of course, repeatedly been 
called for in ‘postclassical’ narratology (see e.g. Nünning, 2000; Fludernik, 
2003; de Jong, 2014) as well as in the historical study of eighteenth century 
f iction (see e.g. Richetti, 2011–12). In principle I agree with Richetti, who 
argues that ‘the eighteenth-century novel… is very much a proper object of 
cultural as well as more strictly literary studies, since novels were part of 
an emerging consumer culture, a response to audience needs as they were 
perceived’ (Richetti, 2011-12, p. 158). After all these proposals it is, however, 
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still relevant to ask: under what conditions would the study of narrative ef-
fectively undermine the separatedness of the theoretical and the historical, 
the cultural and the literary approaches to eighteenth-century French texts?
In the following, Gérard Genette’s (1987) theory of the paratext will be 
transformed into a meeting-place for literary historical and narratological 
approaches to eighteenth century revisionist practices. The theory has 
potential for several reasons: although synchronic in emphasis (see Genette, 
1987, p. 18), it is designed precisely to highlight the interplay between textual 
and contextual features in reading a literary work. Further, it is better 
attuned to the connection between an individual text, the history of the 
book and the development of print technology than the major theories 
of narrative, including Genette’s own structuralist narratology. Lastly, as 
paratexts were the privileged place for foregrounding of the problematic 
of revision described above, focusing on them we can temporarily bracket 
the main text, usually in the centre of the analysis of narrative and, by so 
doing, get a sharper view of the consequences of revision to the layers of 
eighteenth century works.
After a mapping of what I will call ‘peritextual dispositions’ in eighteenth 
century French prose, two analyses will follow which show how the rap-
prochement of history and theory, text and context works in practice. I will 
conclude by discussing the consequences of my analyses vis-à-vis certain 
tendencies in narratology.
Peritextual Dispositions and Narrative in the French Eighteenth 
Century
By ‘paratext’, Genette refers to the various ways a text is presented as a book 
to its audience; its subconcept, ‘peritext’, gathers together ways to delimit 
a text inside a book (Genette, 1987, pp. 7, 10), such as titles, generic labels, 
prefaces and appendices. Although Genette developed his theory in the 
1980s, paratexts have only recently become objects of extended study in 
literary history as well as in media studies (see Calle-Gruber and Zawisza 
eds., 2000; Berger and Massai eds., 2014; Desrochers and Apollon eds., 2014). 
The shift of focus to the boundaries of texts has been particularly called 
for in the context of eighteenth-century novel. The importance of prefaces 
and other prefatory materials has long been noted in the study of the period 
(see May, 1963). Over the past f ifteen years, an excellently rich basis for 
a comparative study of French uses of peritext has been created, among 
others, by Jenny Mander (1999), Jan Herman (1999), Christian Angelet (2003) 
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and Elisabeth Zawisza (2013). Zawisza even dubs the eighteenth century 
as the ‘golden age’ of peritext in French literature; Angelet (2003, p. 9) calls 
it, less jubilantly, the age of its inflation. The studies mentioned also offer 
ample material for theoretical reflection. Following Angelet and Zawisza, 
I will transform the Genettean problematic by discussing peritextuality as 
effects instead of paratexts as objects.
My approach to peritextuality stems from problems in Genette’s theory. 
Genette distinguishes between f ive dimensions in any paratext: spatial, 
temporal, substantial, pragmatic, and functional (Genette 1987, pp. 10-16). 
Spatially, the question is to what extent the ability of a textual unit to 
mark the boundary of a work is dependent on its location. Temporally, 
the peritextual set-up can change from the f irst authorial versions to later 
editions. The question concerning substance is how peritexts are mediated, 
by linguistic or other means; pragmatically, the question is who communi-
cates them to whom and what is communicated. Aside from the principal 
function of peritexts to present the main text, they may serve various other 
purposes. Genette (1987, p. 17) posits the subsidiary functions primarily 
as objects of an empirical and inductive research, but, in my view, the 
functions – the principal function included – are not simply there to be 
observed and categorized. To identify a textual unit or feature as peritextual 
requires interpretation which takes into account factors inside and outside 
the work and, at the same time, requires reflection on how the boundary 
between them is constructed.
Drawing on an ambiguity of a term used in law and rhetorics in the eight-
eenth century France, I propose that in all of its dimensions, peritextuality 
is to be conceived as dispositional. The term combines the semantic f ields 
of the terms ‘(the act of) ordering’, ‘arrangement (of objects or parts)’ and 
‘predisposition or susceptibility (to act or change in one way or another)’: 
what I am after is the interplay of authorial and other determinations, 
textual arrangements and readerly stances in a literary text always taking 
its place in a process of production, mediation and reception.1 In this view, 
in peritextuality it is not a question of empirically describable features 
of certain textual methods but of effects across the boundary of text and 
off-text, determined partly by individual textual features and partly by 
1 See Encyclopédie, ‘disposition’. The ambiguity of the term is in conscious use, for example, 
in Diderot’s novel La Religieuse: by describing herself as disposed of her liberty before she is 
allowed to dispose of any sum of money (Diderot, 2004, p. 285), Suzanne wants to dispose the 
audience of her narrative to empathic response (ibid., p. 296). My approach to the term is closer 
to Foucault’s (1994, pp. 299-300) dispositif as dynamics of power relations than Palmer’s (2004, 
pp. 108-12) disposition as cognitive potential forming the background of behavior.
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contextual factors and always requiring interplay with the reader. On the 
one hand, the effect of separation between text and off-text can be created 
by verbal and other methods at one’s disposal that highlight what is crucial 
in the text, what is marginal in it and what can be disposed of without 
changing the identity of the text. The author and others responsible for 
producing and reproducing the text may use peritexts to dispose the reader 
to a certain frame of mind. However, the same textual methods can have 
the contrary effect of disposing the producers of the text to lose control of it.
If we understand peritextuality as dispositional effects, we are more 
ready to face connections, transformations and hybrid forms inside different 
dimensions of peritexts and across Genettean distinctions. This requires 
us not to lean in advance on the logic of either-or implied in separation. 
Genette does emphasize that paratext as a threshold is a place of transi-
tion and interaction between text and context and between writer and 
reader, and not simply a place where these pairs are separated. However, he 
maps the dimensions of paratexts – except the functional – with exclusive 
alternatives: according to him, a preface, for example, is either by the author, 
or by an editor or by someone else; it is located either inside or outside a 
given work (see 1987, p. 17). In the context of eighteenth-century literature, 
this is too categorical; the studies of collective and collaborative writing 
have suff iciently shown, for example, that the question of authorship is 
more complex even empirically (see, e.g., Paku, 2007).
Next I will clarify what I mean by peritextual dispositions with examples 
from eighteenth-century French novels. Following Zawisza, the discussion 
is divided roughly in three parts: the extension of the main text, the status 
of the author, and the distribution of narrative features.
Peritexts can help to separate the main text from its surroundings, but, on 
the other hand, they allow the text to exceed its limits and thus destabilize 
its closure (Zawisza, 2013, p. 4). Here the boundary between f ictional, the 
‘pseudofactual’ (Paige, 2011) and factual is often at stake, as on the title page 
of de Cahousac’s Grigri (1749), where it remains to be interpreted whether 
the place and time of publication (Nangazaki, Klnporzenkru, year 59749) 
is motivated by the contours of the f ictional world, by the pressures of 
censorship in the real world of the author, by both, or by something else 
altogether. The reader of eighteenth-century French literature is wise to be 
alert to the world-constructing effects of censorship, which go beyond the 
traditional masking of the world and the author with a f ictional veil. On 
the other hand, since the pseudofactual posture of the text as an authentic 
document had already enjoyed a long history at the beginning of the cen-
tury, the possibility of parody should not be forgotten. This applies, among 
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other things, to the more than common use of histoire (‘true story’) in the 
subtitles, as in Voltaire’s L’ingénu: Histoire véritable (1767). Again, Grigri is 
not only presented as a translation of a translation but as ‘the last edition 
less correct than the previous’ (de Cahousac, 1749, title page).
The degree of integration of peritexts with the main text varies greatly, 
even to the point that their principal function of foregrounding is threat-
ened. Prefaces and postfaces can be relatively detached from the text they 
seem to introduce or comment, and titles can be in contradiction with 
the text that follows, as the satirical entries in Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s 
Encyclopédie show. The preface can usurp the main role in the book and 
postpone the beginning of the main text excessively. It may also be diff icult 
to determine where the text ends and a postface begins: the ending of 
Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste is much commented in this respect. In all these 
cases, the spatial def inition of peritext proves to be insuff icient; it is a task 
of reading to determine whether or not the texts framing the main text are 
actually used to mark the difference between the outside and the inside of 
the work, and if not, what we are to do with them.
‘I writ this book, and this book improves me [me fait] every day’, writes 
Abbé Bordelon (1706, p. v), introducing his study of language: paradoxi-
cally, the author is not an author before she has written the text, and the 
text does not come into existence without a subject of production. For the 
writer, peritexts such as the preface promise ways, as Flint (2002, p. 635) 
succinctly puts it, ‘to appropriate a degree of authority often attributed 
to the supposedly impersonal process of the printing trade’. However, 
peritexts may associate the authorial voice with a series of more or less 
f ictional discursive agents – in Angelet’s terms, allographic and actorial 
instead of autographic2 – and, by so doing, distance the author from the 
main text.3 On the other hand, the realities of book trade disposed the 
eighteenth century author to new kinds of error (see Angelet, 2003, p. 11). 
In the process of publishing the f irst edition of Julie, ou la nouvelle Héloïse 
(1761), Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously insisted that the title of the work 
2 Angelet (2003, p. 10; comp. Genette, 1987, p. 182) divides prefaces in three categories: auto-
graphic and authorial, i.e. read as serious statements of the author; allographic and f ictional, 
with the subject a f ictional author, editor or publisher who has chosen the following texts, 
translated or otherwise transformed them; and actorial or f igural, written by characters in the 
story as in autobiographical f ictions.
3 These associations also create possibilities of identity confusion and metalepsis, strange 
loops between narrative levels as when a real-world writer meets a f ictional character she has 
invented. On the uses of metalepsis in French literature from Bordelon’s Gomgan (1711) to Aude’s 
Diderot à Versailles (1804), see Kahan 2004. 
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should be divided onto two title pages to emphasize the f irst name in the 
title. In later editions and translations, however, the insistence was ignored, 
and ‘Julie’ was dropped altogether; even in off icial editions, the work has 
often gone by the name La nouvelle Héloïse, which presents the work and 
its heroine f irst and foremost as a rewrite of a symbol of passionate love 
(Stewart, 1997, pp. xiv-xvi).
One of the challenges eighteenth-century texts present to narrative 
theory is in the ways the distinctions between narrative sources and identi-
ties become blurred. Flint (2002) shows how Irish and British authors such 
as Jonathan Swift and Laurence Sterne used the framing methods offered 
by printing technology (asterisks, dashes, notes, empty spaces, etc.) to create 
ambiguity in the medium of expression (speech, manuscript, print) and 
in the source of utterance (character, narrator, editor etc.). In France, the 
avoidance of autographic framing produced comparable results. In a lucid 
early criticism of Genette, Keskinen (1993, p. 171) argued that there is no 
reason why the ‘implied author’ – the rhetorical subject of the work silently 
communicating over the narrator’s discourse – could not be held responsible 
for quotations such as epigraphs. On the other hand, also according to 
Keskinen there are ‘more often than not’ reasons to attribute peritexts 
to an agent he proposed should be called ‘the editor-narrator’, hierarchi-
cally located between the implied author and the principal narrator, and 
responsible for ‘present[ing] a given text to readers as a f inished product, 
complete with the peritextual thresholds’ (ibid.). The odds are diff icult to 
tell in the context of eighteenth-century literature and in general, as well. 
However, the most tenable result of Keskinen’s analysis is that a peritext 
cannot be anchored to a certain context of utterance before reading, and 
therefore it is wise to keep the question of agency – and its relevance, in 
the f irst place – open for interpretation.
In de Mouhy’s Lamékis (1735-38), it is hard to tell to what extent the 
complexities of narrative agency follow an overall authorial design: in the 
text, the reason is that the f igure of the author and the writing of the text is 
connected with the fantastical turns in the story. In ‘The author’s preface’ 
we are told that the f irst three parts of the book are based on what he heard 
from an Armenian. At the end of the fourth part – not the third, as one 
would expect – the author-narrator tells us that he is unable to continue 
the story of the philosopher Déhahal because of a lacuna in the manuscript 
(de Mouhy, 1788, pp. 339-40). After a series of surprises by which the author 
has, among other things, to answer for his narrative choices to protesting 
characters from the story of Lamékis, he receives a manuscript including 
the continuation of the story of Déhahal. The manuscript is, however, 
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written in an unknown language, and thus the narrator is unable to retell 
its story (1788, p. 381). The problem is solved when the manuscript itself 
begins dictating the translation, and the author’s pen automatically writes 
it down (de Mouhy, 1788, pp. 383-84). After a month and a day of dictation, 
the rest of the work is f inished starting from Part 5 – the one in which we 
have been reading all this. In Lamékis, the continuation between narrative 
levels is constructed in a way that ridicules the pseudofactual posture in the 
preface: the author who has pretended to recount only what he has heard is 
f irst condemned for his inventions by the characters and then deprived of 
the ability to tell the story, to transform it, or to translate it altogether. Here 
we have an extreme case of mimetic narration in the Aristotelian sense, in 
which the lack of authorial intervention in the mediation of the text hardly 
makes the narrative more convincing.
Eighteenth-century uses of peritexts invite a study of the interaction 
of narrative, argumentative and other discourses without raising any one 
of them to the master position in advance. For example, there are various 
reasons why we should be alert to the problems in the use of the attribute 
‘narrative’ in a totalizing way to cover the entire text. A classical prescrip-
tion was to read a novel as exemplifying an argument, and sentimental 
variant in Samuel Richardson’s works presented sensible details, identifiable 
characters and visually concrete scenes as media for edifying empathy. In 
either case, the explication of the poetics of the novel and other genres in 
the peritexts was often apologetic and ironic – the anonymous author of 
Justine arguing for his edifying purposes is a case in point – and thus the 
degree of integration of the narrative text and peritexts vary greatly. On 
the other hand, peritexts seemingly preferring argumentation often use the 
same narrative techniques as the main text, such as dialogues, dramatic 
scenes and independent narratives (Angelet, 2003, p. 9). We may have, then, 
two more or less narrative texts commenting on each other rather than a 
clear distinction between, say, a narrative text proper and its genre-critical 
metatext.
In the following I set out to analyze the peritextual dispositions in two 
pairs of eighteenth century texts, in versions of Les deux amis de Bourbonne 
(‘Two Friends from Bourbonne’, 1770) by Denis Diderot and Les liaisons 
dangereuses (Dangerous liaisons, 1782) by Pierre Choderlos de Laclos. Both 
works foreground the problematic of textual revision in their peritexts 
in a variety of ways, and both were revised in subsequent editions. With 
Diderot, I will focus on the extension of the main text and the distribution of 
narrative features; de Laclos’s novel will deepen the view on the problematic 
status of the author.
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Narrative as an Attachment: Diderot’s Les deux Amis de 
Bourbonne
Denis Diderot, who began his writing career as a translator, used a plethora 
of methods to highlight the adaptable and appropriable character of texts 
throughout his work as he constantly revised his own texts and inserted 
various framing structures into them. The originality of his texts and their 
authorial status are often complicated peritextually. Works are presented, 
for instance, as supplements to existing works, e.g. Supplément au Voyage 
de Bougainville, or as parts of an open-ended series, e.g. Ceci n’est pas un 
conte (see Diderot, 2004, p. 1079, n. 4). Jacques le fataliste ends with editorial 
comments on documents on which the story was based and passes the 
task of supplementing the text to the reader (Diderot, 2004, pp. 881-82); 
the sovereignty of authorial narration hitherto celebrated in the text thus 
fades away.
In Diderot’s Les deux amis de Bourbonne, adaptability is an issue in the 
history of the revision of the text, in the peritexts of its different versions, 
and in the stories they frame. The f irst (private) version tells the story of the 
consequences of friendship between Félix and Olivier in two letters, one by 
an anonymous ‘Madame’ and the other by Papin, the vicar of Bourbonne. In 
the story, third wheels seem to bring in all the misfortunes: the harmonic 
alliance between the two men is broken by a shared love for a girl; Olivier 
dies after he has saved Félix from being hanged by a cruel judge; Félix is 
forced to leave his homeland after becoming involved in a dispute over 
the location of a boundary stone between two neighbours; and the bond of 
empathy between Madame and the widow of Olivier is broken by the vicar, 
who sees the story differently than all the others.
In his introductory presentation to the second (semi-public) version 
in Correspondance littéraire, the editor of the magazine Melchior Grimm 
claims that, originally, the text was composed as a part of collective past-
time storytelling in which he and Diderot had joined two lady friends of 
theirs in a game of ‘mystif ication’ by letter, of narrative make-believe. The 
story was sent as an attachment in a letter to a mutual friend of theirs with 
a tendency to believe touching stories (Diderot, 2004, p. 463). Grimm’s 
introduction guides the reader to see through the pseudofactual posture to 
the comic ambiguity of the textual methods employed: in addition to the 
ideal couple in the story, ‘two friends’ in the title can be read as referring 
to the real-life collective process of writing the text (see Diderot, 2004, pp. 
463, 1048–49). Furthermore, it can be read in relation to the moral tales of 
ideal friendship published around 1770 in France, including Les Deux amis 
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(1770) by Saint-Lambert, and also to the epistolary exchange in the text, as 
there are two letter-writers from Bourbonne involved in the fates of the 
characters. Grimm’s presentation playfully complicates the choice of the 
primary frame of reference for the various dual relationships in and around 
the alleged kernel of the story.
If the reader does not compare the two versions, she may miss the em-
phasis of the peritextual set-up in the latter. In the f irst version, Madame 
tells the short story of the ideal friendship after responding to things in 
a previous letter by her addressee, nicknamed ‘little brother’, and before 
she moves on to other subjects. The story is thus delivered as a by-product, 
among other things. The continuation to Félix’s story is told in the letter 
by the vicar Papin in response to another letter by Madame omitted from 
the text. Although Papin expresses his indignation towards the impious 
and criminal nature of the main characters, it is he who reconstructs the 
touching scenes of terror and pity in the f irst version.
By cutting the letter date away, the second version allows the reader to 
identify with the narrator’s audience before it is revealed that the narrator 
is a certain she addressing a certain he, the ‘little brother’ (Diderot, 2004, p. 
439). The reader is f irst invited into the storyworld with a straightforwardly 
conversational way of recounting; then this frame is interrupted and the 
reader may note how the events are mediated by writing in the storyworld. 
At the same time, the illusionist use of the pseudofactual is downshifted. 
Diderot’s later decision to leave out Grimm’s introduction altogether from 
his (public) authorial version downplays the comic ambiguity and gives 
more weight to the poetic and critical supplements in his own postface. 
The f irst part of the postface sets out to develop a classif ication of types of 
conte – ‘tales’, i.e. shorter pieces of narrative f iction – a theory which would 
then locate the means and purposes of the story just read. However, it does 
something else. Paige (2011, p. 154) has good reasons to argue that Diderot 
is, in fact, applying the classic distinction of epic, comic and tragic to the 
art of narrative in general, and not only to shorter f iction. In particular, 
he is criticizing his fellow ‘historical storytellers’ for failing to transpose 
tragedy into prose, as they preferred exotic sentimentality and senten-
tious wisdom over visually concrete and believable scenes (see Diderot, 
2004, p. 450). In the quest for a more convincing sentimentality, Diderot 
pushes the classic criticism of mimesis to a paradox: even the most natural 
way of telling a story is an art of rhetoric which persuades the reader by 
certain means, and therefore the hierarchy between the narrative genres 
cannot be constructed on oppositional distinctions between truthful 
discourse, histoire and immediacy on the one hand and lies, mystif ication 
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and mediacy on the other. Instead, immediacy could even be seen as an 
effect of mediacy.
The dismantling of the classic oppositions has bearings on the narrative 
form of Diderot’s story as well, even though he does not continue in that 
direction in Les deux amis de Bourbonne. The formulation of the way out of 
the paradox is curious in this context: according to the postface, the most 
persuasive storyteller focuses not on ‘the thing itself’ but, metonymically, 
to what is attached to it, ‘il parsèmera son récit de petits circonstances si 
liées à la chose […] que vous serez forcé de vous dire en vous-même: Ma foi, 
cela est vrai, on n’invente pas ces choses-là’.4 There is no denying that this 
reads easily as a poetics of reality effect via detail; however, can it not be 
read as concerning narrative form and mediation, as well? In both versions, 
Madame has heard the story of Olivier from his wife; in the second, Madame 
receives the continuation to the story of Félix – which, in fact, constitutes 
the majority of the text – from a certain monsieur Aubert, whose version is 
preferred to the one expected from the vicar (Diderot, 2004, p. 441). Aubert, 
in his turn, has heard the story from the widow of a coal merchant, and he 
ends his story by attaching a letter from the vicar in which the latter suggests 
f inding less impious objects of Madame’s charity than the widows of Félix 
and Olivier. The story can only be constructed from a montage of rewritings 
of hearsay material by narrators who have not witnessed the events they 
recount. Instead of ‘the thing’, then, we have its effects in the narratives by 
people attached in one way or another to the chain of events. This is what 
stays unchanged in the two versions of the text. To dispose the audience 
to certain reactions, it seems not best to tell the story of the thing itself – 
whatever it might be, ideal duality in friendship, perhaps – but, instead, to 
present it in its absence, displaced to the marginal, in its narrative effects.
In Deux amis de Bourbonne, as well as in Diderot’s other shorter prose 
from the 1770’s, a reading of the moral of the story is complicated by the 
narrative form. In Diderot’s text, the narrative seems valuable in its ability 
to dispose its audience to morally good emotions: it raises Madame’s pity 
towards the widows and poor families without fathers. On the other hand, 
it can also fail in the task, as Papin’s pitiless answer to Madame shows: 
she even thanks the vicar for clearing her mind to see how the story was 
‘well done for seducing a honest and sensible soul’ (Diderot, 2004, p. 448). 
However, it can be argued that it is precisely this failure Madame uses to 
4 ‘the little circumstances so connected to the thing […] that you have to say to yourself: by 
Jove, this is true, these things cannot be invented’ (Diderot, 2004, p. 449). The translations are 
mine.
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dispose her addressee, the little brother, to a certain response, to indignation 
towards the vicar, for example. This rhetorical strategy is comparable with 
the epistolary double-play in Diderot’s La Religieuse (1760): Suzanne, the 
sentimental heroine, is not simply a naïve victim in the mercy of more 
cunning plotters, but also a writer who constructs images of herself as a 
naïve victim to dispose her correspondent to certain feelings and actions. 
And what would be more convincing than a narrative of a double failure, a 
naïve representation of naïveté? However, in difference to La Religieuse, in 
Deux amis de Bourbonne we do not get to know about the rhetorical success 
of the organization of the narrative, as no response from the little brother is 
quoted in the text, and thus the text does not end by celebrating the sym-
metry of responses in a dual relation – or the seductive power of narrative.
The changes made by Diderot to the versions of Deux amis de Bourbonne 
show his awareness of the importance of peritextual effects in a narrative 
text. Ending the text with a postface where a third party interrupts the 
epistolar exchange foregrounds a structure of attachments which enables 
narrative persuasion but, at the same time, delimits narrative authority. In 
Deux amis de Bourbonne, narrative emerges in a chain of attachments, ever 
disposed to being relocated among other things.
Authors in Response: De Laclos’s Liaisons dangereuses
The f irst published work by Choderlos de Laclos was a dramatization of 
Marie-Jeanne Riccoboni’s novella L’Histoire d’Ernestine (1762). Riccoboni 
was one of the most-read authors in the late eighteenth-century France, 
popular for her epistolary novels, but also for her sequel (1761) to Marivaux’s 
La vie de Marianne. Both facts are echoed in de Laclos’s epistolary classic Les 
liaisons dangereuses (1782): the adaptability of texts is an object of constant 
reflection on all the levels of the work, and when de Laclos took responsibil-
ity for the work as a novel, he did it, signif icantly, in a correspondence with 
Riccoboni attached to the 1787 ‘Nantes edition’ of the novel.
In the story, rewriting is what the libertines Valmont and mme de Mer-
teuil do: they appropriate other people’s messages and transform them 
into instruments of seduction and revenge. Their skill in carrying out their 
wicked plotting consists of an ability to detach from expressing their true 
views on the events and to foresee how the others – their victims and help-
ers – react and respond to them. The libertines present themselves to each 
other as masters of narrative détournement, capable of turning the message 
around against the original writer’s intentions.
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The connection of the peritextuality with the libertine art is created by 
an analogue between a written work and a human subject in the much-
commented letter 81 by de Merteuil. There she describes her skill in combin-
ing ‘à l’esprit d’un Auteur, le talent d’un Comédien’ (de Laclos, 1951, p. 179).5 
Before one can be a successful author, reading is indispensable. Novels 
and works by moralists have given her material with which she has learnt 
to build her outward appearance convincingly and to detach it from her 
true designs hiding behind it.6 De Merteuil wants Valmont to celebrate her 
systematicity in carrying out her poetic prescriptions: ‘[Q]uand m’avez-
vous vue m’écarter des règles que je me suis prescrites, et manquer à mes 
principes? […] ils sont le fruit de mes profondes réflexions ; je les ai créés, 
et je puis dire que je suis mon ouvrage’.7 However, the very letter aimed at 
demonstrating that she, as a piece of work, really follows her self-prescribed 
poetics turns against her as Valmont passes the text on to Danceny, who 
then allows it to circulate around Paris.
In the texts framing the correspondence, a similar logic of appropriation 
and loss of control can be seen at play. The f ictional editor (rédacteur) tells 
that in principle he has obeyed a request from above to preserve the au-
thentic letters as they are, but then he admits in fact having left some letters 
out and organized the rest into a meaningful whole by putting them in to a 
sequence and commenting on them (de Laclos, 1951, p. 6). Like de Merteuil, 
the editor emphasizes his control of the work by demonstrating how he has 
manipulated the text to produce a certain effect for the ‘instruction of some 
others’, as the subtitle to the work says. Again, it is questionable in what 
sense the work follows his prescription. Does it do so by quoting de Merteuil 
on how to read f iction to know how to deceive others? Or does it do so by 
showing how the written text is disposed to be re-framed, appropriated 
and turned against the intentions of its original – or previous – author? The 
last footnote to the correspondence further undermines the editor’s initial 
claim of the completeness of the correspondence: there (de Laclos, 1951, 
p. 399) the publisher (éditeur) presents the end of the ouvrage contingent 
5 ‘[T]he spirit of an Author, and the talent of a Comedian’.
6 See the post scriptum in Mme de Merteuil’s letter to Cécile Volanges, the girl who is ignorant 
of her role in de Merteuil’s revenge to her former lover, where the former guides the latter to 
conceal her real thoughts from everybody else except her trustee (de Laclos, 1951, p. 249). What 
Cécile does not know is, of course, that the post scriptum itself is written in accordance with 
the principle it is prescribing.
7 ‘When have you seen me stepping back from the rules I have prescribed to myself and 
neglecting my principles? […] they are the fruit of my profound reflections; I have created them 
and I can say that I am my work’ (de Laclos, 1951, p. 176).
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and the possible future completion of it dependent on the response by the 
reading public. By this intervention, the publisher questions the alleged 
authenticity of the correspondence and recommends reading it as a novel. 
Even if the work were based on real letters, he writes in his preface, they are 
most likely from another time and place, adapted to ‘our clothes and our 
customs’ but foreign to the enlightened French people (de Laclos, 1951, p. 5).
De Laclos’s initial choice to stay tacit behind the prefatory texts and 
allographic writer f igures calls into question any linear development of 
novelistic authorship in the eighteenth-century French novel. The prefaces 
in Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749), one of the key developments in the ‘emergence 
of the author’ in the eighteenth century, show, by their proliferation, the 
authority in constant need of further support and dependent on the educa-
tion of an audience that would recognize the author as the master of his 
domain. In the French novel, the authority of the author had comparable 
delimitations. Montesquieu had originally presented Lettres persanes (1721) 
as an authentic collection of letters and posed as its editor; however, in the 
1754 edition, he admitted being the author of what he then characterized 
as a well-designed novel with a beginning and an end (Zawisza, 2013, p. 
70). As the pseudofactual preface of the former edition was retained in 
the latter, no decisive leap in authorship had taken place from allographic 
editing to autographic creation of a f ictional novel. De Laclos can be read 
as rewriting the tension in Lettres persanes of 1754 allographically, using 
the f igures of the publisher and the editor. He wrote even less in his own 
name than Rousseau had done in Julie: the title page of the f irst edition of 
the novel bore only his initials (‘Par M.C….. de L…’), and the epigraph quoted 
Rousseau’s claim of being only the publisher of the letters.
The question of truthfulness and usefulness of the text, discussed in the 
prefaces by the publisher and the editor, reappears in a complex way in the 
revised edition of 1787.8 In this edition, enter the f igure of the ‘bookseller’ 
(libraire) who repeats the editor’s gesture as he claims to be publishing 
letters not originally intended for public use; this time the reference is to the 
correspondence between Riccoboni and de Laclos (de Laclos, 2011, p. 6). On 
the other hand, his irony points at the whole enterprise of revising editions 
with new prefaces and other peritexts: the new edition is designed especially 
for those readers who are not interested in the novel but want to f ind, in a 
condensed form, what can be said for and against it. The correspondence 
8 The Nantes edition adds a bookseller’s preface, the correspondence between Riccoboni and 
de Laclos, and a collection of de Laclos’s poetry to the text of 1782, and changes the initial order 
of the publisher’s and editor’s prefaces.
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is presented as an answer to this call and thus as a device with which to 
avoid reading the narrative altogether (de Laclos, 2011, p. 5).
In the correspondence, Riccoboni writes (de Laclos, 2011, p. 466) that 
she is having trouble, as a Frenchwoman and a woman, accepting Mme de 
Merteuil’s reality as the pseudofactual posturing of the work has invited 
her to; she is more inclined to take her as a f ictional character, and harmful 
as such. Riccoboni’s criticism seems to provoke de Laclos to acknowledge 
responsibility for the work and, at the same time, to convince Riccoboni 
that it is following the author’s prescription well:
[J]’ai pu, comme lui, ressembler dans un même personnage les traits épars 
du même caractère. […] J’ajouterai cependant que Mme de M. n’est pas 
plus une Française qu’une femme de tout autre pays. […] Si j’ai donné à 
celle-ci l’habit français, c’est que, persuadé qu’on ne peint avec vérité qu’en 
peignant après nature, j’ai préféré la draperie que je pouvais avoir sous 
mes yeux, mais l’œil exercé dépouille aisément le modèle, et reconnait 
le nu (de Laclos, 2011, pp. 469-70).9
Reading de Laclos’s response as a sincere description of his poetics is problem-
atic for several reasons. De Laclos seems to discard the pseudofactual posture 
by reverting to the classical notion of poetic truth as probability. He presents 
himself as a reproducer and synthesizer of features from different sources 
and as adaptor of an already existing – natural – model to contemporary 
circumstances. According to De Laclos’s classical analogue, writing is divided 
in two, supplementary (cultural) clothing and the naked (natural) truth, 
a local and particular expression and universal meaning. The ethos of the 
poetics is made suspicious by the close resemblance between de Laclos’s 
description of the practice of creating a character by synthesizing scattered 
traits and de Merteuil’s way of constructing a deceiving facade to herself as her 
work. On the other hand, de Laclos’s analogue can be read as a rewrite of the 
publisher’s view of the novel as adaptation to local setting – a view made less 
convincing by the reference to the French people’s incapability to the wicked-
ness displayed by the libertines.10 One may also wonder about the rhetorical 
9 ‘I have been able, like [Molière in Tartuffe] to gather together into one person scattered traits 
of one and same character. […] I add, however, that Mme de M. is no more a Frenchwoman than 
a woman from any other country. […] If I have given her a French habit, it is because, convinced 
that one paints truthfully only by painting after nature, I have preferred the clothing I have 
under my eyes, but a trained eye easily undresses the model and recognizes the nude’.
10 See Vanpée’s (1996) f ine analysis of how the correspondence between Riccoboni and de 
Laclos is related to the two prefaces.
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motivation of the description: de Laclos implies that Riccoboni is not included 
in the community of trained readers who can move easily through the preface 
of clothing to the naked truth of the narrative body text. There are, however, 
profound reasons to doubt whether anyone is. Does not the structure of the 
work with all its framings and reframings precisely complicate the boundary 
between the inside and outside of the work, and by so doing prevent any 
direct view to the thing, to the real nature of the characters, to what happens 
between them, and to the overall purpose of the story?11
The supplement of 1787 connects de Laclos to the chain of producers 
and compilers of ouvrages in the original edition who enter by responding 
to texts not written by them. De Merteuil, the editor, the publisher, the 
bookseller and de Laclos are all responding to texts they have read: the 
publisher has read the edited collection of letters; the editor has (suppos-
edly) also read the letters he omitted, de Laclos answers Riccoboni’s initial 
comment, and the bookseller comments not only their correspondence but 
the public debate and the publishing practices around the work, as well. 
Instead of being sovereigns who dictate conditions for entrance to the 
storyworld, the authors comment on the text and its reception in a f igural 
continuum with other discursive agents. Their responses gain relative 
authority by subjecting themselves to the danger of losing that authority 
at the same time. The fact that the Riccoboni-de Laclos supplement was later 
detached from the work not only marks a retreat from the (mock-)classical 
to the pseudofactual but also further emphasizes the provisional nature 
of narrative authority as subject of and to peritextual dispositions. All this 
complicates the ultimate readerly position as subject to instruction given 
in the subtitle to the work. If there is a lesson in Les liaisons dangereuses it 
is that the text is not useful or harmful in itself but one or the other unless 
otherwise reframed.
Conclusion: Problems in Certain Tendencies in Narrative Theory
‘How can we talk in more or less formal terms about works of prose fiction that 
are opportunistic and improvisatory and do not seem to adhere to any particu-
lar formal pattern? What sort of critical terms might be employed to explain 
11 Among the cinematic and theatrical dramatizations of the novel, Heiner Müller’s Quartett 
(1980) stands out due to its sensitivity to the mediatedness of the events in the original. Instead 
of being faithful to the story, Müller’s aim was to create a dramaturgy for the epistolary structure 
(see Müller, 1992, p. 317).
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how such fiction possesses a sustaining structure that provides coherence 
and meaning?’ Above, this call by Richetti (2011-12, p. 158) is answered with a 
reading of peritextuality as dispositional in the context of eighteenth-century 
French prose. On the one hand, what Genette calls peritexts can surely be 
counted as stabilizing structures at writers’ disposal. They allow emphasizing 
that the contours of a narrative text follow the author’s prescription. However, 
even a brief look at eighteenth-century French novels suffices to show that 
they also created other effects than stabilizing the narrative genres: hybrid 
forms and fluidity between author, narrator, and other discursive agents; 
between narrative and other discourse types; and interactions on the bound-
ary between text and context. This does not mean, however, that peritexts 
only follow the ‘opportunistic and improvisatory tendencies of the century’, 
to quote Richetti’s words (2011-12, p. 158); in my reading, peritextual effects 
can emerge from a systematic thinking of the specificity of written text as a 
medium of narrative as well as by a sum of coincidental and contradictory 
factors, in between the intentional and the unintentional.
In my analysis of Diderot’s and de Laclos’s texts, I have tried to show how 
peritextual effects emerge as boundary-crossing movements from story to 
narration and framing texts, in the positing of authorship, in the interplay of 
narrative features and other discourses, and in the ambiguous references to 
textual features and contextual factors. These are but two examples of the 
ample material eighteenth-century French prose provides to question the 
tendency to posit textual boundaries f irst and foremost as separators of the 
artistic text from its historical surroundings. The tendency can be seen at play 
in the structuralist neglect of reflection of what makes textual identity and 
self-sameness possible or impossible, neglect which was again manifested 
in the more or less confused debate on the concept of implied author (see 
Kindt & Müller, 2006). One counter-force to this tendency in the structuralist 
tradition is Doležel’s (1988) theory of literary ‘transduction’ in which written 
texts are ‘always already’ rewritings pregnant with their future revisions.
Though based primarily on literary material, structuralist theory seldom 
really focused on the particular features of written communication or 
reflected on the non-verbal means of utterance offered by print industry 
and book technology. A narrative theory best responding to ambiguities 
in the source of utterance and to particular effects of narrative medium in 
the eighteenth century would be one ready to see potential to disruption 
of communicative framings in any type of written narration, f irst-person 
included. In this respect, among the most promising recent developments is 
Nielsen’s (2011) theory of inventiveness in narratives, especially if this theory 
is seasoned with a historical view on f ictionality such as the one provided 
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by Paige (2011). Furthermore, my analysis of peritextual dispositions could 
be continued in directions that narrative theories have not been willing 
or able to go, for example to the philosophical problematic concerning 
the roots of the ambiguities which haunt the narratological objective of 
anchoring textual features to a certain source.
The project of ‘natural’ narratology launched by Monika Fludernik in the 
1990s set out as a large-scale attempt to map the historical development of 
narrative forms in English literature. While carrying out this enormous task, 
Fludernik has presented views on the differences between oral and written 
media that also deserve attention in the study of peritextuality: one is her 
noting the tendency of written narratives to blur the boundaries between 
text types such as narration, description and evaluative commentary 
(Fludernik, 2005, pp. 80-81), boundaries allegedly naturally separative in 
the basic forms of conversational storytelling. However, even if ‘natural’ 
narratology is better attuned to the historicality and mediality of narrative 
than structuralist narratology is, the specifically written means of narration 
are at times too easily translated into conversational terms.12 For example, 
for Fludernik (2005, p. 168) the authentication devices of epistolar narratives 
are reducible to the f irst-person mode anchored ‘in the personal witness 
function of the narrator’. My analyses of Diderot and de Laclos give more 
support to Mäkelä’s (2011, p. 200) counter-argument, according to which the 
core legacy of epistolar narration is, rather, the ambivalence of immediacy 
and mediacy in written experience.
In my view, the differences between versions of the same text, ‘authorial 
revisions’, as they are somewhat problematically called, should not be left 
only to textual criticism. Considered as acts of repetition and transforma-
tion which do not simply take place outside the text or the work but connect 
in various ways to the reflection of writing in and around it, these revisions 
create narratologically challenging communications between the main 
narrative, its framings, and cultural contexts.
The peritextual problematic discussed above is neither exclusively an 
eighteenth-century phenomenon nor limited to the genre of novel, or 
12 On the diachronic orientation in cognitivist-oriented study of narrative, see also Zunshine 
(2011), who sketches parallels between the changes in cultural circumstances and narrative 
patterning. The project of unnatural narratology reacting to Fludernik’s diachronically oriented 
theory is still searching its stance towards the historicality of narrative forms: Alber, for instance, 
has been balancing between the ideas of a narrative situation unnatural per se and the history of 
the automatization of defamiliarizing narrative forms. Note, however, how he (Alber, 2016, ch. 
2.2) argues for a radical difference between unnaturality in the eighteenth century narratives 
and in the postmodernist questioning of representation.
306 tEEMu ikoNEN 
even to books. A comparative study of literatures of earlier periods and 
non-European cultures could be begun with the aid of recent research 
on the global history of the novel (e.g. Moore, 2010). Transformations of 
peritextual dispositions offer a rich f ield of study in contemporary cross-
generic adaptations of eighteenth-century novels as well. To end by quoting 
but one example: in a very eighteenth-century  manner, Martin Rowson’s 
The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman (1996) omits, in its 
peritexts, the obvious – that it is rewriting a novel discussing the benefits 
and dangers of rewriting.
Works Cited
Alber, Jan. 2016. Unnatural Narrative: Impossible Worlds in Fiction and Drama. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Angelet, Christian. 2003. ‘De la préface au roman: la doctrine classique mise à l’épreuve 
du récit’. Recueil de préfaces de romans du XVIIIe siècle, ed. by Christian Angelet 
and Jan Herman. Vol. II: 1751-1800. Saint-Étienne: Publications de l’Université de 
Saint-Étienne & Louvain: Presses Universitaires de Louvain: pp. 9-48.
Berger, Thomas L. and Sonia Massai (eds.). 2014. Paratexts in English Printed Drama 
to 1642. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bordelon, Laurent 1706. The Management of the Tongue. Done out of French. 
London: D. Rhodes.
Calle-Gruber, Mireille and Elisabeth Zawisza (eds.). 2000. Paratextes. Études aux 
bords du texte. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Coulet, Henri. 1992. ‘Remodelages romanesques. Retouches et revisions dans 
quelques romans français du dix-huitième siècle’. Studies on Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century 304: pp. 1293-96.
de Cahusac, Louis. 1749. Grigri, histoire veritable… Nangazaki, Klnporzenkru.
De Jong, Irene J.F. 2014. ‘“Diachronic Narratology”. (The Example of Ancient Greek 
Narrative)’. Handbook of Narratology, ed. by Hühn, Peter et al. Berlin: De Gruyter: 
pp. 115-22.
Desrochers, Nadine and Daniel Apollon (eds). 2014. Examining Paratextual Theory 
and its Applications in Digital Culture. IGI-Global. http://www.igi-global.com/
book/examining-paratextual-theory-its-applications/.
Diderot, Denis. 2004. Contes et romans. Ed. Michel Delon et al. Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade. NRF. Paris: Gallimard.
Doležel, Lubomír. 1988. ‘Literary Transduction. A Prague School Approach’. The 
Prague School and Its Legacy in Linguistics, Literature, Semiotics, Folklore, and the 
Arts, ed. by Yishai Tobin. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamin: pp. 165-76.
PEritEx tuaL diSPoSitioN iN FrENCh EightEENth- CENtury NarrativES 307
Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers. Par une 
societé de gens de lettres. Tome IV (1754). Cons-Diz. Neufchastel: Samuel Faulche.
Flint, Christopher. 2002. ‘In Other Words: Eighteenth-Century Authorship and the 
Ornaments of Print’. Eighteenth-Century Fiction 14.3-4: pp. 625-72.
Fludernik, Monika 2003. ‘The Diachronization of Narratology’. Narrative 11.3: pp. 
331-48.
Fludernik, Monika. 2005. Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (1996). London and New 
York: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel. 1994. Dits et écrits III. Paris: Gallimard.
Genette, Gérard 1987. Seuils. Paris: Seuil.
Herman, Jan. 1999. Recueil de préfaces de romans du XVIIIe siècle. Vol. I: 1700-1750. 
Saint-Étienne: Publications de l’Université de Saint-Étienne & Louvain: Presses 
Universitaires de Louvain.
Kahan, Michèle Bokozba. 2004. ‘Intrusions d’auteur et ingérences de personnages: 
la métalepse dans les romans de Bordelon et de Mouhy’. Eighteenth-Century 
Fiction 16.4: pp. 639-54.
Keskinen, Mikko. 1993. ‘Reading on the Threshold: Gérard Genette’s Peritexts as 
Interpretive Commentary’. Reading Reading: Essays on Theory and Practice 
of Reading, ed. by Andrew Bennett. Tampere English Studies 3. Tampere: 
University of Tampere: pp. 159-82.
Kindt, Tom & Hans-Harald Müller. 2006. The Implied Author. Concept and Contro-
versy. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Laclos, Choderlos de. 1782. Les liaisons dangereuses ou lettres recueillies dans une So-
ciéte, & publiées pour l’instruction de quelques autres. Amsterdam, Paris: Durand.
Laclos, Choderlos de 1951. Œuvres complètes. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: 
Gallimard.
Laclos, Choderlos de 2011. Les Liaisons dangereuses. Édited par Catriona Seth. 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard.
Mander, Jenny. 1999. Circles of Learning: Narratology and the Eighteenth-Century 
French Novel. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation.
May, Georges. 1963. Le Dilemme du Roman au dix-huitième siècle. Etude sur les rapports 
du roman et de la critique (1715-1761). New Haven: Yale University Press; Paris: PUF.
Montandon, Alain. 1999. Le roman au XVIIIe siècle en Europe. Paris: PUF.
Moore, Steven. 2010. The Novel. Alternative History. Beginnings to 1600. New York: 
Continuum.
Mouhy, Chevalier de. 1788. Lamékis, ou les Voyages extraordinaires d’un Egyptien 
dans la terre intérieure, avec la découverte de l’île des Sylphides, enrichis de notes 
curieuses. Vol. I. A Asterdam [sic], et se trouve à Paris, rue et hotel Serpente.
Müller, Heiner. 1992. Krieg ohne Schlacht. Leben in zwei Diktaturen. Köln: Kie-
penheuer & Witsch.
308 tEEMu ikoNEN 
Mäkelä, Maria. 2011. ‘Masters of Interiority: Figural Voices as Discursive Appropria-
tors and as Loopholes in Narrative Communication’. Strange Voices in Narrative 
Fiction, ed. by Per Krogh Hansen, Stefan Iversen, Henrik Skov Nielsen, and Rolf 
Reitan. Narratologia 30. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter: pp. 191-218.
Nielsen, Henrik Skov. 2011. ‘Unnatural Narratology, Impersonal Voices, Real Au-
thors, and Non-Communicative Narration’. Unnatural Narratives – Unnatural 
Narratology. Linguae & litterae 9, ed. by Jan Alber and Rüdiger Heinze. Berlin/
Boston: De Gruter: pp. 71-88.
Nünning, Ansgar. 2000. ‘Towards a Cultural and Historical Narratology: A Survey 
of Diachronic Approaches, Concepts, and Research Projects’. Anglistentag 
1999 Mainz. Proceedings, ed. by B. Reitz and S. Rieuwerts. Trier: WVT: pp. 345-73.
Paige, Nicholas D. 2011. Before Fiction. The Ancient Régime of the Novel. University 
of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia.
Paku, Gillian. 2007. Wanting a Name: Constructions of Anonymity in Milton, Defoe, 
Johnson, and Sterne. Unpublished PhD. Diss. Harvard University.
Palmer, Alan. 2004. Fictional Minds. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press.
Richetti, John. 2011-12. ‘Formalism and Eighteenth-Century English Fiction’. 
Eighteenth-Century Fiction 24.2: pp. 157-60.
Saint-Lambert and Marquis de Jean-François. 2002. ‘Les deux amis’. Les Deux Amis 
de Bourbonne et autres contes, by Denis Diderot. Ed. by Michel Delon. Collection 
Folio. Paris: Gallimard.
Stewart, Philip 1997. ‘Introduction’. Julie, or the New Heloise. Letters of Two Lovers 
Who Live in a Small Town at the Foot of the Alps, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. 
Trans. by Philip Stewart & Jean Vaché. The Collected Writings of Rousseau Vol. 
6. Hanover & London: University Press of New England: pp. ix-xxi.
Stewart, Philip. 2009. ‘Traductions et adaptations: le roman transnational’. Le 
Second Triomphe du roman du XVIIIe siècle. Études présentées par Philip Stewart 
et Michel Delon. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation: pp. 161-70.
Vanpée, Janie. 1996. ‘Dangerous Liaisons 2: The Riccoboni-Laclos Sequel’. 
Eighteenth-Century Fiction 9.1: pp. 51-70.
Zawisza, Elisabeth. 2013. L’Âge d’or du péritexte. Titres et préfaces dans les romans 
du XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Hermann.
Zunshine, Lisa. 2011. ‘1700-1775 Theory of Mind, Social Hierarchy, and the Emer-
gence of Narrative Subjectivity’. The Emergence of Mind. Representations of 
Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in English, ed. by David Herman. Lincoln 
and London: University of Nebraska Press: pp. 161-86.
 List of Abbreviations
BT The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless
CS I The History of Charlotte Summers, the Fortunate Parish Girl, vol. I
CS II The History of Charlotte Summers, the Fortunate Parish Girl, vol. II
FID Free indirect discourse
FRC The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe
MF Moll Flanders
O Oroonoko
OED Oxford English Dictionary
RC Robinson Crusoe
TJ Tom Jones




Addison, Joseph 59, 86, 183, 270, 274-275
Adimantus 42, 51
Aesop 226, 231, 233-237
Alber, Jan 16-17, 305
Alembert, Jean le Rond d’ 293
Alleine, Theodosia 256
Angelet, Christian 290-291, 293





Bacon, Francis 54-55, 57
Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 27, 54, 128-129, 139
Bal, Mieke 13, 18, 27-28, 41-42, 47, 51, 53, 60-63, 
71, 99-101
Balzac, Honoré 60, 65, 90
Barnes, Djuna 60
Baroni, Raphaël 177, 179, 189, 195
Barthes, Roland 10, 46
Battestin, Martin 82-83
Baxter, Richard 256
Beaurieu, Gaspard Guillard de 289
Behn, Aphra 30, 106, 121, 123, 127-130, 132
Blanckenburg, Friedrich von 190-191
Bodmer, Johann Jakob 31, 180-185, 190, 203
Bohrer, Karl-Heinz 219
Booth, Wayne 10, 162, 173
Bordelon, Laurent (abbé) 293
Boswell, James 269
Bourchier, John 101
Boyle, Robert 33, 261-263, 265
Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Anton Ulrich zu 192
Breitinger, Johann Jakob 31, 178, 180-185, 188, 
190, 203, 231-232
Brown, Laura 128
Bruner, Jerome 179, 192-193, 195
Bucholz, Andreas Heindrich 192
Burgess, Daniel 260
Burke, Edmund 59
Burnet, Gilbert 161-163, 270
Cahusac, Louis de 292
Calamy, Edmund 254
Campe, Rüdiger 194
Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de 53, 64-65, 201
Chomsky, Noam 12
Claydon, Tony 255
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor 59, 79
Collier, Jeremy 67




Curll, Edmund 33, 269-287
Dawson, Paul 161-163
Defoe, Daniel 24, 29-30, 55, 86, 102-103, 107-110, 
114, 116, 121, 123, 130-132, 135, 138-139, 143, 145, 
155, 256, 258, 264, 270
Derrida, Jacques 219, 273
Dickens, Charles 60, 90
Diderot, Denis 32, 34, 237-238, 241-244, 291, 293, 
295-299, 304-305
Doležel, Lubomír 181, 304
Dryden, John 59, 292, 294





Fielding, Henry 28, 53-57, 64-66, 79-96, 116, 126, 
138, 145-146, 151, 162, 167-168, 170-171, 174, 179, 
191, 194, 261-262, 264, 301
Fielding, Sarah 115, 162, 168, 170
Fiennes, Celia 107, 110, 116
Flaubert, Gustave 46, 65, 178, 195
Flint, Christopher 293-294
Fludernik, Monika 8, 10-17, 20, 29, 33, 70, 72, 121, 
123, 178, 252, 255, 305
Foucault, Michel 291
Frye, Northrop 39-40, 71
Gay, John 270, 274, 281
Genette, Gerard 8-11, 15, 23, 27-28, 33-34, 41-53, 
57-58, 60-63, 65-66, 121, 137-138, 151, 156, 163, 
200, 228, 255, 263, 273, 277, 286, 290-294, 304
Gildon, Charles 257, 280
Gilpin, Richard 254
Godman, Henry 256
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 30, 32, 135, 
144-155, 199, 214, 218-219
Goldsmith, Oliver 81
Goodall, William 174







Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich 219
312 NarrativE CoNCEPtS iN thE Study oF EightEENth- CENtury LitEraturE 
Hamon, Philippe 101
Haywood, Eliza 31, 161-162, 164-168, 170
Heins, John P. 211-213
Herder, Johann Gottfried 136
Herman, David 12-15, 18, 20, 70-71, 74, 193
Herman, Jan 290
Hernadi, Paul 250, 252
Hillis Miller, J. 122
Hindmarsh, D. Bruce 256
Homer 39, 42-44, 46-51, 85
Huizinga, Johan 217
Hunt, Lynn 200, 215
Hunter, J. Paul 24, 249
Husserl, Edmund 32, 206-207, 209, 219
Jahn, Manfred 103, 105
Johnson, Samuel 59, 269
Joyce, James 63, 103
Kellogg, Robert 40, 71, 259
Keskinen, Mikko 294
Kidgell, John 174
Koselleck, Reinhart 22, 136
Kukkonen, Karin 31, 79, 167-168
La Fontaine 233-234, 237
Labov, William 108, 111, 177, 187, 195
Laclos, Pierre Ambroise François Choderlos de 
32, 295, 299-305
Lanser, Susan 164, 166
Lennox, Charlotte 162, 168, 174
Lesage, Alain-René 202
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 32, 199, 214-218, 
232-237, 243
Lipking, Joanna 123
Locke, John 135, 270
Lorenz, Sarah Ruth 181
Luhmann, Niklas 220





Manley, Delarivier 270, 277, 280
Marivaux, Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de 299
Marx, Karl 69
Mason, William 269
McKeon, Michael 24-25, 27-28
Miller, Nancy 190
Milton, John 183-184
Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin) 302
Montesquieu (Charles Louis de Secondat) 301
Moritz, Karl Philipp 242-243
Mouhy, chevalier de (Charles de Fieux) 294-295
Müller, Heiner 303
Musäus, Johann Karl August 212
Nielsen, Henrik Skov 304
Norrick, Neal R. 187-188
Nünning, Ansgar 14, 17-20, 165
Nünning, Vera 18, 164
Nussbaum, Martha 215, 217
Ortega y Gasset, José 54
Paige, Nicholas 297, 305
Palmer, Alan 12, 151-152, 191
Pearse, Edward 255
Pedro, Diego de san 100
Pepys, Samuel 107-108, 116, 126
Phelan, James 11, 20, 137, 259
Plato 39, 42-46, 49-52
Pope, Alexander 85, 276-279
Propp, Vladimir 27, 228
Proust, Marcel 48, 66
Queen Anne 272
Queen Elizabeth I 255
Rabinowitz, Peter J. 20




Richardson, Samuel 28, 55-57, 64, 80, 107, 138, 
162, 174, 188, 212, 256, 258, 264, 295






Rosenthal, Laura J. 124, 128
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 293, 301
Rowson, Martin 306
Ryan, Marie-Laure 177-179, 186
Sade, Donatien Alphonse François (marquis) 
de 289
Sagar, Maria Anna 31, 179-180, 188-196
Saint-Lambert, Jean François de 297
Santayana, Giorgio 74
Saße, Günter 136
Saussure, Ferdinand de 40
Scaliger, Joseph 131-132
Schiller, Friedrich 32-33, 155, 233, 238-244
Scholes, Robert 39-40, 71, 259
Schulz, Armin 26-27
Scott, Sarah 111
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley 102
Sherman, Stuart 24, 143
Shklovsky, Viktor 47, 57





Stanzel, Franz K. 8, 29-30, 103-106, 111, 113, 116, 
147, 161, 163
Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle) 90
Sterne, Laurence 163, 172, 271, 294
Stubs, Philip 257-258
Swift, Jonathan 67-68, 270, 281, 294
Thackeray, Henry Makepeace 90, 173
Tindal, Matthew 270, 280, 284
Todorov, Tzvetan 9, 21
Trollope, Anthony 103-104, 106, 116
Tromly, Frederic B. 255
Vanpée, Janie 302
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet) 183, 270, 293
Wall, Cynthia 99, 106-107
Walpole, Robert 270, 278, 280
Watt, Ian 22-24, 28-30, 53-54, 57, 102-103, 130, 
135-136, 138, 140
White, Hayden 13, 228-229
Wieland, Christoph Martin 32, 146, 151, 191, 194, 
196, 199-218
Wilks, Mary 282
Wilks, Robert 270, 281-282
Wilson, Daniel 202
Wolff, Christian 203, 231




Ziegler, Heinrich Anshelm von und Klip-
phausen 192
Zunshine, Lisa 12, 20, 251-252, 305
Index of Subjects
adaptation 289, 302, 306
adventure-time 128
aperspectivism 103-106
author, status of 34, 292-306
authorial narration 30-31, 161-175, 296
authority, moral 161-162, 166, 168, 257
authority, narrative 31, 161, 164-165, 299, 303
biography 13, 33, 139, 143, 253, 256, 269-287
Blif il and Northerton in Tom Jones 28-29, 84-97
boundary 34, 291-292, 296, 303-304
chapter titles 168-170
character representation 28, 138-156
characterization 33, 67-68, 121, 127-128, 130, 132, 
146-149, 249-265
chronology 68, 121-122, 130-132, 152, 281
classical narratology 10, 12, 19, 69, 121, 135, 138, 163
classical origins of funerary oratory 253-258
cognitive narratology 12, 17, 192
comic plenitude 87




Culloden, Battle of 82
cultural narratology 18-20
description, types of 29, 100
diachronic narratological research 9, 14-17, 
20, 305
diachrony and synchrony 69
dialectics 46, 51, 65, 68-69, 72-73
didacticism 24, 32-33, 225-226, 230-231, 240, 
254, 256-257, 261, 265
diegesis 42-26, 55, 58, 60, 179
disposition 34, 289-292, 295, 303-306
editor, f ictional 292-293, 300-301
embedded narratives 32, 199, 203, 213-214, 238
encomium 254, 261-262
English 18th-Century Army 82-84, 86, 90
English institutions examined in Tom Jones 
28, 86
Enlightenment literature 225-245
epistolar narration 303, 305
exemplary narrative 70, 230, 245
experientiality 14, 121, 252, 265
fabel theory 181-182, 226, 231-232, 235
feminist narratology 164
f igural novel 103
focalization 7, 10, 45, 61, 64, 99-106, 111, 116, 138, 
163, 200
‘formal realism’ 22, 28, 135
free indirect discourse (erlebte Rede) 15, 28, 49, 
61-68, 71-73, 105, 111
generic instability 25, 80-82
genre theory 41, 67
histoire 26, 200, 228, 293, 297
historicism 30, 136
imitation 28, 39, 42-53, 59-60, 62, 69, 180-184, 191
immediacy 32, 55, 58, 199-200, 211-213, 217, 
219-220, 297-298, 305
314 NarrativE CoNCEPtS iN thE Study oF EightEENth- CENtury LitEraturE 
immersion 32, 172, 211-213
implied author 7, 10, 164, 170, 294, 304
improbable probability 179, 193-195
internal focalization 103, 106, 111, 116
‘intersubjective objectivity’ 32, 206
intersubjectivity 206-208, 214-218
Jacobite Rebellion 81, 83, 86
life-writing 269
marvelous 31, 178-180, 182-189
mercenary motives 254, 257
metadiegesis 199-201, 206, 214, 220
metaf iction 32, 179, 192-196
mimesis 28, 42-49, 52-55, 58-60, 69-70, 180, 182, 
203, 259, 297
minor characters 28, 82
mode and genre 70
narration and description 58
narration and imitation 44-51
narrative identity 147, 155-156
‘narrative turn’ 13
narratorial commentary 164, 166, 175
‘natural narratology’ 10, 12, 14-16, 123, 305
Newgate biographies, Newgate confessionals 
253, 265
non-f iction 33, 250, 252
Northerton as subversive double of Tom Jones 90
omniscient narrator 161-162
orality and literacy 72
paratext 33, 168, 204, 255, 263, 269, 273-287, 
290-292
paratextuality 168, 249, 264, 277, 279
peritext 33-34, 273, 290-306
peritextuality 34, 289-306
perspectivism 103, 105, 113, 116
plot 28-29, 32, 64, 73-82, 86-97, 126, 135, 137, 
151-155, 171, 177, 181-182, 185, 189-195, 205, 213, 
228, 234, 238, 241, 249, 289
plot as rhetorical artif ice 28, 80
postclassical narratology 8, 16-17, 20, 28, 70-72, 
74, 289
postfaces 293, 297-299
prefaces 171, 199, 201-204, 254, 263-264, 278, 
280-287, 290-295, 301-303
print culture 249-250, 255, 265
probability 51, 178-185, 188, 195, 203, 208, 302
pseudofactual 292, 295-297, 301-303
publisher, f ictional 293
reader address 167-169, 174
reader response, theory of 44
realism 24, 27-30, 42-49, 53-60, 64, 69-70, 73-74, 
123-129
revision 34, 289-290, 295-296, 304-306
rewriting 42, 49, 289, 298-301, 304, 306
rise of the novel 22-24, 29, 33, 54, 135, 163
scientif ic method 9, 40, 54-55, 57
self-fashioning (of the author) 162, 164
short prose f iction 226, 233, 243
story and discourse ( fabula and sjǔzet) 7, 55, 121
structuralism 12, 40, 46, 68-74
structuralist narratology 9-10, 12, 17-18, 40-41, 
48-49, 60, 62, 66, 69-71
supplementarity 273, 278, 286
tellability 31-32, 177-196
telling and showing 44-46
temporality 30, 63, 68-69, 121-132, 135-139, 
144-156, 249
‘Theory of Mind’ 20, 250-251
titles 275-279, 290, 293
transduction 304
transnational novel 289
typology in funeral sermons 258-265
unnatural narratology 70, 73, 305
vraisemblance 131, 182
